İSTANBUL TİCARET ÜNİVERSİTESİ

ISTANBUL COMMERCE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOLOF SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF AFRICAN STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

PRE- ELECTION VIOLENCE A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA

Master Thesis

Muse Abdulkadir OMAR

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DEDICATION

I dedıcate all the required information in this title ‘pre-election violence case study of Somalia’ has been written in accordance with the academic manners and ethical commitment. I will clarify that all the materials, sources, data and all extra inputs have been benefitted well throughout the written procedure of this thesis. All matters contained in this thesis are my personal opinion and do not reflect the official view of İstanbul Commerce University.

Muse Abdulkadir Omar

ABSTRACT

Somalia had experienced many crises as a result of power struggles and leadership elections amongst others that was one of the most challenging things that caused the Horn of Africa backwardness was due to election violence even though election violence was not a new thing because most of their African colleague's countries such as Uganda, Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria and so on had experienced same phenomena. however, Somalia's election violence was the main focus of this research that was being investigated the objective of this study was to examine the theoretical and practical aspects of the election and elaborate on the history of their election violence and their political system, and the causes of their pre-election violence and the possible way forward to prevent pre-election in post-conflict nations which was Somalia amongst others. The study used a historical approach, mainly focused on past events, and came to conclusions that predicate what would happen in the future. The study's objectives were in line with the data from various sources used books, journals, papers, studies, policy documents, and other sources were used to acquire the data. The study used a case study approach to evaluate pre-election violence in the post-conflict nation. researchers reported that pre-election violence and competitiveness are inseparable, especially in most African countries (Kanyinga, 2009). that study also adopted a historical approach design method that will look into past events and conclusions that preempted future events. Most of the findings of those studies included clans and subclans fighting for political power in Somalia clans fighting for political power in Somalia. Somalia's election crisis started in 1960 after its independence. Some of the causes of pre-election violence included disagreement between parties, corruption, bribery of electoral officials, and so on. That study concluded that pre-election violence had demoralized the democratic system of Somalia. Those who had perceived malpractice of the election violence were less likely to support it, which was in contrast to those who perceived the integrity of the elections. The study recommended that the government of Somalia conducted a free and fair election within a framework of laws that guaranteed that effective exercise of voting rights and the Somalia authorities ensured that independence was credible and impartial investigations were promptly conducted into all attacks and acts of physical intimidation amongst others. The study had been carried out to fill the lacuna in the aspect of election violence research being conducted by prolific researchers to widen the horizon of knowledge creation of humans and other creatures.

As a result, analysis done by the research on corruption and bribery of electoral officials, hiring of individuals to cause harm and unrest on election day, and others included among the findings found in this research. These findings were supported by other researchers like Norris (2014), the system is linked to perceived electoral integrity. On the other hand, election fraud is found to be the main cause of pre-election violence in Somalia. The study proposes that the causes and effects of the electoral crisis in Somalia be investigated to reduce it completely. Also, the electoral violence and its challenges to democracy and governance in Somalia should be investigated.

Key Terms: Election, Violence, Democracy, Constitution, Clans.

ÖZET

Somali, güç mücadeleleri ve aralarından bir lider seçilmesi sonucunda birçok kriz yaşamıştır. Afrika Boynuzu'nun geri kalmışlığına neden olan en zorlu şeylerden biri seçim şiddetidir, ancak seçim şiddeti yeni bir şey değildir çünkü Uganda, Gana, Etiyopya, Nijerya ve benzeri Afrikalı meslektaşlar bu fenomenleri deneyimlemiştir. Ancak bu araştırmanın asıl odak noktası olan Somali'nin seçim şiddeti, seçimleri nasıl yönettikleri araştırılıyor. Bu çalışmanın amacı, seçimin teorik ve pratik yönlerini incelemek, siyasi sistemin seçim şiddeti tarihini, seçim öncesi şiddetin nedenlerini ve seçim sonrası şiddeti önlemenin olası yollarını detaylandırmaktır. Çalışma, çatışma sonrası ülkelerde seçim öncesi şiddeti değerlendirmek için bir vaka çalışması yaklaşımı kullanıyor. Araştırmacılar, özellikle çoğu Afrika ülkesinde seçim öncesi şiddet ve rekabetin birbirinden ayrılamaz olduğunu bildirdiler (Kanyinga, 2009). Çalışma aynı zamanda geçmiş olaylara bakacak ve gelecekteki olayları önleyen sonuçlar çıkaracak tarihsel bir yaklaşım tasarım yöntemini benimsemiştir. Bu çalışmanın bulgularından bazıları, Somali'de siyasi güç için yarışan klanlar ve alt klanları içeriyor. Somali'nin seçim krizi, bağımsızlığını kazanmasının ardından 1960 yılında başladı. Seçim öncesi şiddetin nedenlerinden bazıları arasında partiler arasındaki anlaşmazlık, yolsuzluk, seçim görevlilerine rüşvet verilmesi vb. yer almaktadır.

Çalışma, seçim öncesi şiddetin Somali'nin demokratik sisteminin moralini bozduğu, seçim şiddetinin yanlış uygulandığını algılayanların, seçimlerin bütünlüğünü algılayanların aksine, onu destekleme olasılığının daha düşük olduğu sonucuna varılmaktadır. Çalışma, Somali hükümetine oy haklarının etkili bir şekilde kullanılmasını garanti eden yasalar çerçevesinde özgür ve adil seçimler düzenlemesi tavsiyesinde bulundu ve Somalili yetkililer, tüm fiziksel saldırı, korkutma ve eylemlerle ilgili bağımsız, güvenilir ve tarafsız soruşturmaların derhal yürütülmesini sağlamalıdır. Çalışma, insanın ve diğer canlıların yaratılışından bu yana dinamik ve hiç bitmeyen bilgi ufkunu genişletmek için üretken araştırmacılar tarafından yürütülen seçim şiddeti araştırmaları noktasındaki boşluğu doldurmak amacıyla yapılmaktadır.

Anahtar Terimler: Seçim, Şiddet, Demokrasi, Anayasa ve Klanlar.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

NIEC	National Independent Electoral Commission
NCC	National Constitutional Convention
SEITS	State Electorate Implementation Teams
SYL	Somali Youth League
SNC	Socialist National Congress
UNHCR	United Nations Commission for Refugees
ICU	Islamic Court Union
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
SRC	Somali Revolutionary Council
SRSP	Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
SNM	Somali National Movement
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNITAF	United Task Force
NDI	National Democratic Institute
USAID	United State Agency for International Development

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

Elections: Refers to choosing political representatives by the people
Violence: Refers to behavior involving force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something
Democracy: Refers to a system of Government in which laws, policies, leadership,and major undertakings are directly or indirectly decided by the people
Constitution: Embodies the fundamental principles of a government
Clan: Refers to a group of people, as a clique, set, society, or party,especially as united by some common trait, characteristic, or interest.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION III
ABSTRACT IV
ÖZET V
ACKNOWLEDGMENT VI
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS VII
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS VIII
TABLE OF CONTENTS IX
INTRODUCTION 1
Introduction 1
Study Objectives 4
CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 5
1.0 Theories on Electoral Violence 5
1.1 Causes of the Consequences of Electoral Violence 5
1.2 Reasons for Electoral Violence in Africa 5
1.2.1 Situation in Somalia 6
1.2.2 Struggle for Security 7
1.2.3 Activators of Violence in a Somali Election 8
1.3 Data on Electoral Violence 9
Using a binary logistic model, the table below illustrates the impact of electoral violence: 9
1.4 African Electoral Participation and Theories of Electoral Violence 10
1.5 Theories of Pre-Election Violence 11
1.5.1 Constitutional Referendum 12
1.6 Relevance of Capacity to Engage in Election Violence 12
1.7 Dimensions of Electoral Violence in African Countries 12
1.7.1 Electoral Violence and its Motives 13
1.7.2 Indirect Election Dispute Resolution for 2020/2021 Elections 14
1.7.3 Elections in Somalia (2020/2021) 14
Election Committees 15
1.7.4 Role of Civil Society in Election Dispute Resolution and Management 15
1.8 Upheavals and Crisis in Somalia in 2022 16
1.9 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia 16
1.10 2022 Somalia Election Report 16
The table below shows the results of the presidential election's final round: 17
1.11 Selecting a Clan Elder 17

CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 18
2.1 Introduction 18
2.2 Research Design 18
2.2.1 Historical Documentary Analysis 18
2.2.2 The Implementation of Electoral Systems in Somalia 19
2.2.3 Colonial Historical Records 20
2.2.4 Data Analysis and Presentation 20
2.3 Somalia Pre-Election Crises (1960-2009) 20
2.4 Somali Post-Election Crises (AMISOM INTERVENTION) 21
2.5 Successive Somalia's Constitutional Amendments 28
2.6 Somalia Multi-Party System 29
2.7 A Multidisciplinary Strategy for Election-Related Conflict 30
2.8 International Relations Theory and the Greater Horn of Africa 32
3.9 The Domain of Ideology in International Relations 35
CHAPTER THREE: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN SOMALIA 37
3.0 Introduction 37
3.1 Situations during the Transition (Democratic Change) 37
3.2 Clan Democracy 38
3.3 Democracy Rule in Somalia 39
3.3.1 Democracy Support 39
3.3.2 Politics Discourse 40
3.4 Party System in Somalia 41
3.5 Rule of Law in Somalia 41
3.6 Electoral Justice System in Somalia 42
3.7 Electoral Operations under the Electoral System in Somalia 42
3.7.1 Distinct Election Procedure 42
3.8 Cash: Limited and Uncertain 43
CHAPTER FOUR: SWOT ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM 44
4.0 Introduction 44
4.1 Strength of the Political and Electoral System 44
Table 1 below shows various seat allocations of some Somaliland regions: 45
4.2 Weakness of Somalia's Political and Electoral 45
4.2.1 Identifying the Root Causes of the Conflict 46
4.2.2 Develop a Culture of Constituency for Peace in Somalia 47
4.3 Opportunities in Somalia's Political and Electoral System 47
4.4 Threats to the Political and Electoral System of Somalia 48

4.5 Conflict Management: A Description of the Procedure and the Plan 48
4.6 Process Transparency 49
4.7 Political Agency and Ideology 49
4.8 Building Bridges between People, Religious Organizations, and the State 51
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 52
5.1 Conclusion 52
5.2 Recommendations 53
5.3 Area for Further Studies 53
Reference 54

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

This case study evaluates the pre-election violence in Somalia. An election is defined as a democratic system of governance in which the people are allowed or given an opportunity to pick or choose those to lead them via voting. In a democracy, elections play a vital part by permitting the citizens to participate in choosing whom to lead or rule them and by so doing hold their leaders accountable. However, in some countries in Africa (Somalia) with a history of political conflict and with institutions whereby competitiveness is extremely high with do or die mentality before or during the election leading to election violence.

Also, the election poses a lot of challenges in a country that just recovered from the civil war and is yet to recuperate. Violent killings, destruction of lives and properties, tension, criminality, and corruption are the orders of the day. Most times, the main purpose of the election can be defeated rather than boost the democratic process as a result of being manipulated via different means by the existing regime.

Election violence or electoral violence can be described as a move or activity of some individuals via the destruction of lives and properties, arm-twisting, and exploitation targeting at manipulating electoral process outcome in order to achieve a favorable result that is different from the wishes of the voters or electorates. established studies have shown that election violence endangers democratic stability and process, especially in transitional democracies. The majority of countries in the whole world participated in an election today but the integrity and quality of the elections are still in doubt, especially in African Continent (V-DEM, 2020).

About one-third of national elections in the whole world are followed by pre-election violence (Birch and Muchlinski, 2017). African continents including Somalia have experienced non-specified, dictatorial, and tyrannical destruction of lives and properties at some point as a nation before the election (Straus and Taylor, 2012).

The majority of electorates in Africa dread election violence and it is very rampant in developing countries, especially countries with political crisis example, Somalia (Burchard, 2020).
Reports had it that a competitive election in which the outcome is not known is at extreme risk of pre-election violence compare with a less competitive election. Illicit exploitation and tactics, and pre-election violence are inevitable in a highly competitive election (Fjelde and Hoglund, 2016). Researchers reported that pre-election violence and competitiveness are inseparable, especially in most African countries (Kanyinga, 2009). Pre-election violence has been reported to be capitalized on by the elites to narrow the political space against their opponents via antagonizing effective campaigns (Wahman, 2017).

Somalia as a country has suffered a lot of setbacks including insurgency, counterinsurgency, and armed violence that led to the civil war since 1998. Between 1991 and 2012, Somalia was without a functioning central government which many observers termed a failed state. It is reported that citizens of Somalia between the ages of 35 years alongside with about one–third of the total population were without any history of a functional government. Some observers have attributed the country's ordeals to warlords; ethnic cleansing and wanton killings disrupted by the failed peacekeeping operation organized by the United Nations between 1993 to 1995, Somalia tops the list of the post-conflict nation with no-go areas for election due to many issues including but not limited to the fact that southern Somalia was in direct control of the deadly terrorist which repeatedly attacks Mogadishu capital. So for the election to hold in the country the federal government of Somalia must come to a compromise with the federating member states by negotiating with the state actors involved.

Turbulence and disharmony crippled the government with no good services to the citizens, atrocity, and fraud were the order of the day while most of the security forces of the government were intentionally loyal to militia leaders in some of the clans. A breakaway state or self–recognized state (Somaliland) with a population of about three million citizens vowed never to have anything with the country's election or the government (Menkhaus, 2017).
In late 2016 and early 2017, an indirect election was held in Somalia due to pressure from the Western and the donor Nations, a new president alongside upper and lower federal houses of parliament was formed, though it was reported that in the lower house of parliament, more than

half of the elected members were newcomers because the majority of the post-transitional lower house of parliament lost their seats during the election.

Before the election, the process was messy with pre-election violence, atrocity, and fraud, massive repression was the order of the day including interferences from the external forces that have come to be in the political system of Somalia. The entire electoral process was left in the hand of non – nonconstitutional authority making the whole process marred with crises. The whole electoral process was termed unconstitutional by some of the presidential candidates but in the end, they were able to pull through with some level of success including the formation of a new government with no major armed conflict. According to Winston Churchill, the 2016 – 2017 indirect election in Somalia was the worst electoral process in democracy due to a lot of electoral impasses.

After the 2016 – 2017 indirect election in Somalia, a more difficult task was ahead in the 2020 general election. The signing of a new electoral law in 2020 which replaced indirect voting with the direct voting process as recommended by Western donors created yet another pre-election tension in the country between President Farmaajo and the opposition.

The hope of holding parliamentary elections in December 2020 was dashed because of the inability of the central and federating states to form the electoral commission coupled with the escalating disagreement between the Somali president and his neighboring country Kenya accusing them of inciting an uprising in one of Somalia's clan which led to the diplomatic breakdown between the two nations.

The Somali president was accused by the opposition of using the situation between the two nations to elongate his constitutional stipulated term of tenure, and they vowed never to recognize the incumbent at the expiration of his term. In late 2020 and early 2021, there was a pocket of pre-election demonstrations across the country even with restrictions in order to contain the spread of the deadly coronavirus, there was pre – an election crisis in the capital of Mogadishu between the government security forces and the supporters of the oppositions.

The long delay of the general election that was meant to be commend in 2021 generated a lot of controversies to the extent that even the international partners including the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union were worried over the long electoral impasse, they were afraid of the already tensed atmosphere escalating into full pre-electoral violence in Somalia.
Between 2020 and 2021, Somalia has been through a lot of pre-election violence experience that resulted in some level of instability in the country linked to the planned presidential and parliamentary elections.

This research aimed to evaluate pre-election violence, the economic implication of electoral instability, and the role of international partners in post-conflict Somalia. This research will also take a look at the Clans political system of Somalia and its implication.

Study Objectives

1. To examine the Theoretic and the Practical Aspects of Election and Challenges to Democracy in Somalia.
2. To elaborate on the History of Election Violence and the Political System in Somalia.
3. To assess the Election Violence Implication on Post-conflict Nations.
4. To evaluate the Pre-election Violence Impact on Somalia's Economic and Its Citizens.
5. To outline a possible way forward to Prevent Pre-election Violence in Post-conflict nations.

CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWOR

1.0 Theories on Electoral Violence

This chapter introduces Somalia's electoral violence and its connection to the reasons behind pre-election violence.

We must first examine the idea of electoral violence. Because the word "electoral violence" lacks a clear meaning, it is still not well understood. IFES presented the first thorough definition and attempts to investigate electoral violence. "Election conflict and violence can be characterized as any random organized act or threat to intimidate, physically injure, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in aiming to determine, postpone, or otherwise influence an electoral process," said Fischer in his working paper (Fischer, 2002).

Numerous authors focused their work on electoral violence in 2009. Electoral violence, according to Collier, encompasses civil war, riots, and political strikes (Straus and Taylor 2009, 19).

1.1 Causes of the Consequences of Electoral Violence

While actors wish to "influence voter choices and torment by intimidation and instilling fear of vengeance, or when trying to enhance their position in talks to get a seat at the bargaining table," according to Straus and Taylor, they resort to violence (Swain 2011, 32).

They contend that electoral violence primarily manifests in nations with a combination of an authoritarian system and mid-level fractionalizations when "both candidates' strategies and local actors who want to change resource distributions during this advantageous tome believe they will benefit from it (ethnic cleavages in which two or more ethnic groups can form a winning coalition).

1.2 Reasons for Electoral Violence in Africa

In Africa's new democracies that emerged during the third wave of democracy in the 1990s, conflicts, and tension have been frequent during elections. The way that these tensions are handled could determine whether or not an election is conducted peacefully or if it turns violent.

According to studies, between 19 and 25 percent of elections in Africa are impacted by election violence. Somalia and other African Nations including Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Kenya, etc. have all suffered losses in one form or another. Ethnic marginalization, economic marginalization, and the weakening of democratization are the driving forces behind this violence.

1.2.1 Situation in Somalia

Political unrest and internal conflict have plagued Somalia for almost 30 years. President Siad Barre was ousted and ejected from the country in 1991, after holding the position for 22 years. The ensuing brutal civil war was marked by bitter clan rivalries and the rise, fall, and resurgence of radical militant Islamic extremist groups. A humanitarian emergency, including widespread population displacement, starvation, and the collapse of the Somali economy, was the final outcome.

In Somalia, numerous initiatives for peace and reconciliation have been carried out. Between 1992 and 1995, peacekeeping forces commanded by the United Nations and the United States were stationed in Somalia to establish the security requirements for the distribution of humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, all UN peacekeeping forces were withdrawn in 1995 as a result of the increase in violence, which included assaults on foreign forces.

After the 2007 launch of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), it will be more than ten years before another international peacekeeping mission is launched. One of the repercussions of the continued bloodshed and instability has been the absence of a functioning administration for more than 20 years after president Siad Barre's toppling in 1991. While a Transitional Federal Government was established in 2004, Somalia lacked a Permanent Central Government. This government was reliant on external conflict and had little power or control over most of the nation. In actuality, the militant Islamist Organization Al-Shabaab had authority over the majority of Southern Somalia between 2009 and 2011, including the nation's capital, Mogadishu. As AMISOM and government forces with targeted assistance from the military began to reclaim territory from Al-Shabaab militants.

Since Somalia's descent into civil war in the 1990s, a Permanent Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was finally established in September 2012. A provisional constitution that called for a Federal Parliament was approved in the same year. With the creation of the FGS, a process of structural, legislative, and institutional reform was started, which included efforts to create district and regional control. In late 2016 and early 2017, Somalia held indirect legislative and presidential elections- the country's most extensive electoral process in decades.

Muhammed Abdullahi Muhammed, popularly known as Farmejo, who had previously led Somalia as Prime Minister from 2010 to 2011, won the presidential elections. A number of reforms have been implemented by the Somali Government since it came into power in 2007. The committee

was informed by Marc-Andre Fredette, Director General, Southern and Eastern Africa Bureau, Global Affairs Canada, that the government of Somalia places a high priority on fighting corruption, thwarting the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, providing essential services, and addressing clan dynamics. The committee was informed that President Farmajo has given constitutional and electoral reforms a top priority.

Despite the Significant improvements under place, Somalia nevertheless faces formidable political obstacles. This involves conflict over the distribution of authority and resources between the Federal Government and the Sub-National States. Then there comes corruption occurrence. Ken Menkhaus, Professor, of Political Science, at Davidson College, remarked despite "some wonderful Somali's wasting in the government". Vanda Felbab Brown, Senior Fellow at Brookings, expressed a similar sentiment in a written brief, stating that corruption and clientelism are pervasive and infect every branch and level of government, industry, and society. According to Transparency International's 2018 ranking of the 180 nations polled, Somalia is rated 180th overall. Corruption perception index, which rates nations and territories according to how corrupt they are seen to be in the public sector.

1.2.2 Struggle for Security

Witnesses gave varying assessments of Somalia's current situation. Minister Hassan offered a viewpoint, noting the substantial advancements made in the war against Al-Shabaab. Compared to a few years ago, with the aid of AMISOM and the assistance of contributing nations.

Jay Bahadur of the UN Security Council's Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea provided another viewpoint, stating that Al-Shabaab is still capable of carrying out routine asymmetric strikes and sporadic conventional attacks against AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA). He told the committee that while AMISOM or the SNA now control the majorly of metropolitan areas, Al-Shabaab still retains control over a large portion of the hinterland and the primary supply channels that it utilizes to make money. Mr. Bahadur claims that AL-Shabaab operates as a "shadow government" throughout the entire nation and has established a productive system for collecting "taxes" from the local populace. The twin luck bombs that AL-Shabaab carried out in October 2017 – which left 587 people dead and at least 300 more injured –illustrated both its continued capacity to attack security and government objectives and its readiness to cause massive civilian casualties. In all of Somalia's history, it was the bloodiest terrorist strike. Over the past year, Al-Shabaab has continued to carry out a wave of attacks. According to Georgette Gagnon,

Director of the Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCR), 1,010 civilians were murdered or injured in Somalia alone in September 2008. Al-Shabaab is responsible for 55% of the fatalities, according to MS Gagnon.

Continual clan and political conflict, in the words of Felbab-Brown, "gives al-Shabaab a lease of life." She stated that the systemic marginalization of some tribes and land seizures are two things that cause strife in Somalia. According to Professor Menkhaus, Somalia is "one of the most insecure regions in the world" due to the multifaceted challenges it faces. He claims that even though Somalia is not presently engaged in a protracted civil war, it is still racked by assassinations, terrorist attacks, clashes between neighbors, and other forms of violent crime. Overall, Professor Mekhaus informed the committee that there are dangerous fault lines that have increased the likelihood that Somalia may regress.

1.2.3 Activators of Violence in a Somali Election

In order to assess and monitor elections for the president, lower house, upper house, speakers and deputy speakers, and six conflict triggers, the Somalia civil society election Situation Room has been established. The UNDP's 2009 guide on elections and conflict prevention claims that there is a clear association between how an election process is managed and executed and acts of violence. In each of the Federal member states where ESR conflict monitors were stationed, the conflict was triggered during election planning and execution.

Key factors contributing to, or mitigating violence in elections include:

- The legal system's effectiveness in ensuring transparent, rule-based electoral competition is one of the main factors causing or mitigating election violence.
- The legitimacy of the organizations in charge of managing elections, as well as the stakeholders' level of professionalism, openness, and trust in that process
- Respect for the law, consistency with the law, and uniformity in its application.
- Civil society has access.
- Levels of diversity, particularly for women.
- Anyone seeking to challenge an administrative judgment should have a free and accessible right to appeal.

There was a presidential election as well as elections for the speakers and deputy speakers of both houses of parliament in Somalia. After the NIEC announced in June 2020 that the one-person, one-vote elections scheduled for the end of 2021 would be postponed until 2021 and not be held as scheduled, an indirect election model similar to the one used in the 2016 elections would be used once again.

1.3 Data on Electoral Violence

According to studies, political violence increased over the past 50 years, particularly in the form of escalating long-standing conflicts and rivalries, whereas large-scale armed conflict decreased. On election violence, there is, however, little comprehensive information. In close-knit societies or areas with shoddy infrastructure, it can be challenging to gather information, which contributes to this. Accurate data on fatalities and injuries may be difficult to find in remote or chaotic areas, and the data frequently only provides broad estimates. Furthermore, violence may not always be classified as being politically motivated or electoral in nature because it frequently results from conflicts in society that seem unrelated to one another.

Using a binary logistic model, the table below illustrates the impact of electoral violence:

Violence	Voting	Attending Campaign Rally	Working for Candidate/Party
1. The perception of violence during the election campaign.	0.05	0.10	-0.06
2. An impression of neighborhood violence.	0.06	-0.14	0.05
3. A rumored concern for violence at a political rally	0.15	0.37	0.09
4. An impression of public fear of violence.	0.01	-0.08	0.06

1.4 African Electoral Participation and Theories of Electoral Violence

Election-related violence influences voter turnout Studies conducted in-depth on the effects of voting or voting participation reveals a negative correlation between the two voters who have been threatened with election violence at the polls are more inclined to vote in Nigeria, according to a cross-sectional study (Bratton, 2013, p. 121).

Globally, a cross-national study discovered the same thing (Norris, 2014, p. 143). In this instance, it may be considered that the incumbent utilized electoral violence to discourage the supporters of the opposition from voting (Hafnex Burton *et al*, 2014). In this research, voting participation and electoral violence were solely measured using a single item. Threats of violence at the polls were used by Burchard (2015) and Bratton (2013) to measure electoral violence.

Norris (2014) performed the same thing, but she included her measurement of violence in the scope of an electoral malpractices index along with other factors related to voting participation (Bratton, 201 5; Burchard, 2015; Norris, 2014). The propensity to engage in politics generally can also be used to predict electoral participation. According to Bratton et al. (2005), the act of engaging in politics following elections through contact and communication encouraged Africans to vote on election day (Bratton et al, 2005, p.297). Reviewing the relationship between election quality and democratic consolidation is crucial, as it has an impact on both, in addition to voter involvement. According to Norris (2014), perceptions of electoral malpractice had a detrimental effect on democracy satisfaction while perceptions of election integrity were positively correlated with democracy satisfaction. based on research from Norris (2014) and other studies on the impact of electoral violence in Africa (Brat ton, 2013; Burchard, 2015). Election participation is impacted by the general quality of the elections.

Elections are frequently fundamentally broken, according to Norris (2014), which means that they lack integrity. The situation is a problem also in Africa. In the words of Bleck and Vande Walle (2019), "substantial intimidation of the opposition and suspension of the opposition newspaper took occurred, respectively, in the 2016 Gambian and Zambian elections" (p 2-3). Ahead of the 2008 elections, Zimbabwean districts were redrawn (Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018, p. 41), while candidates in Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, and Kenya bought votes (Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018, pp. 61-92). Voting behavior is influenced by how institutional actors like the ruling or opposing parties are performing as well as by how well they are performing as individuals. It is founded on the rational theory, which presupposes that voters behave rationally. Specifically, it

assumes that voters weigh the costs and benefits of various options before choosing a course of action (such as purchasing a specific product) and that they will choose the course of action that maximizes those benefits and minimizes those costs to them (Denver, 2007). As a result, voters cast their ballots and decide which political party to support based on their assessments of the performance of the parties and candidates after considering current political concerns, campaign activities, and the personalities of the candidates. According to Bachtel *et al*. (2018), the Vaud canton in Switzerland had compulsory voting from 1960 to 1 970, and the long-term spillover impacts of this policy increased Federal referendum turnout by 30%. Although scholars have categorized dominant parties by totaling the number of parties, this method is proved to be problematic and unreliable. (2014s Bogords). One such factor influencing election participation is media coverage based on research indicating that exposure to media influences voting behavior significantly. One may assert that voters who frequently use the media will be more engaged in electoral participation than other voters (Bratton et al., 2005, p.297; Norris 2 001; Venna & Sardesai 2014).

Due to the recent evolution of the news media, where we can distinguish conventional media from new media, various results could be predicted. The new news media tends to be less ethical than traditional ones because they are less controlled globally, including in Africa (Martens et al., 2018). While Norris (2014) used a battery of metrics, Green berg and Mattes (2013) only used free and fair elections to gauge the quality of elections. She cited fair vote counting, impartial election officials, true choice in the voting process, and impartial election coverage as examples of electoral integrity she cited a number of electoral frauds, including the fact that wealthy people buy elections, government-aligned television news, the exclusion of opposition candidates from running, and the use of violence against voters at the polls.

1.5 Theories of Pre-Election Violence

Despite a polarized electoral system, pre-election violence still occurs. Pre-election violence is rarely utilized to successfully sway swing voters or win over new supporters (Collier and Vicente, 2012; Robinson and Torvik, 2009), according to the majority of theories on the subject. Voters react badly to political parties that use violence, according to some who have questioned its efficiency as a campaign technique (Rosenzweig, 2017).

1.5.1 Constitutional Referendum

A draft constitution that was broadly endorsed by all members of the 45-member committee that was jointly constituted by the president and parliament was produced in 2000, and copies of it were made available throughout Somaliland. On May 31, 2001, a referendum was held. The establishment of the Puntland autonomous entity in 1998, which asserted territorial claims over parts of eastern Somaliland, and the 2000 Arta conference of the Transitional National Government, which asserted control over the entirety of Somalia, were the primary impetuses for holding the referendum. The TNG and Puntland only put Somaliland's claim to sovereignty in jeopardy.

1.6 Relevance of Capacity to Engage in Election Violence

While studies have traditionally emphasized electoral manipulation, pre-election violence is not only a straightforward result of demand. According to Rundlet and Svolik (2017), the capacity to use violence and other forms of manipulation varies between incumbent and opposition parties. These agents must be willing to commit crimes on behalf of a dependable patron.

The capacity for violence in a party is increased by local domination. Locally powerful parties can give agents reliable access to patronage networks and protect violent offenders from consequences. Parties that are financially challenged and organizationally weak locally have the motive to use violence to disrupt their rivals' hold over their territory. African parties frequently lack the resources to operate outside of their strongholds. According to empirical research (Birch and Muchilinski, 2017; Hafner- Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski, 2014; Straus and Taylor 2012), incumbent parties in Africa are largely to blame for pre-election violence on the continent. Take Zambia's 2016 elections, for instance, which provided enough resources for underemployed men in the city to work in political campaigns.

To safeguard their might and induce dread in the members of the opposition party, these guys frequently wore military-style clothing (Lehoucq 2003; 233). It represents a significant source of democratic instability. A further examination will show that the basis of election violence in Africa is this inversion of these fundamental democratic tenets.

1.7 Dimensions of Electoral Violence in African Countries

The nascent democracies in Africa have experienced numerous grave violations (Aremu and Omotola 2007). Physical, psychological, and structural aspects of electoral violence have recently

emerged, all with the primary goal of influencing the electoral process in the aggressors' favour. In Somalia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, there have been reports of physical manifestations of electoral violence, such as political assassinations, riots, assaults, arson, looting, bombings, and the kidnapping at gunpoint of election materials.

The psychological condition worsened as a result of Nigeria, where the president and his party declared the 2007 elections to be a do-or-die affair, being the most egregious example of this type of electoral violence (Omotola 2007). The violence took the structural shape of an ongoing state of disequilibrium based on unfairness. This is demonstrated in the case of Nigeria, one of the most populous countries in Africa, where during the 2017 elections, all political parties were not granted equal access to the state-owned media outlets Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) and Nigeria Television Authority (NTA).

In addition to the aforementioned, the incumbent party utilized one of its anti-corruption agencies, the EFCC (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission), as a political tool to harass, intimidate, and sabotage the other political parties, including one opposition party. Somalia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe are among the African countries that have seen this type of violence, along with economic repression, sabotage, eviction, and displacement, particularly during the 2016-2017 and 2020-21 pre-election in Somalia.

1.7.1 Electoral Violence and its Motives

The following primary motives, which have the potential to result in electoral violence, include:

a. Using threats, intimidation, and coercion against political rivals and their followers in an effort to obtain electoral benefits.
b. Election disruption is frequently a motivation for those who choose not to run for office. They can be left out of the voting process (disenfranchised groups).
c. Preventing election tampering is an incentive for people who believe that elections are rigged or influenced. Election procedures may be planned and carried out a way that favors one candidate over the other.
d. Violence against women is a powerful instrument that can be used to punish women for participating in activities that challenge the dominance of the male power system.

1.7.2 Indirect Election Dispute Resolution for 2020/2021 Elections

In the form of an indirect election dispute resolution team, the National Consultative Council developed an impartial mechanism to manage conflicts and disagreements linked to the 2020-2021 elections. The head and vice chair are chosen by the committee's 21 members, who also make up the Indirect Election Dispute Resolution Committee. The National Consultative Council will use a consensus-based process to deal with issues that call for political reconciliation. As a result, the BEDC has a legal obligation to: harmonize and resolve disputes; look into and handle complaints and rejections relating to the election or voters; and handle complaints and disputes. The committee will decide by a simple majority (507 votes), and its judgments may be challenged by Federal government officials. The National Consultative Council's judgments are irrevocable and cannot be changed.

1.7.3 Elections in Somalia (2020/2021)

The main organization in charge of organizing the 2020-2021 elections is the National Consultative Council. The Federal Member States and Banadir Regional Administration are members of this organization, which is led by the prime minister.

The Federal Electoral Implementation Team (FEIT) and State Electoral Implementation Team are two autonomous committees that were established for the 2021 elections as part of the electoral committees (SEIT). In addition to these committees, there is a Federal Committee for Election Conflict Resolution, which has 25 members, 12 of which were appointed by each state, with the remaining 15 members being appointed by the Federal Government (Puntland, Galmudug, Jubaland, Histrabelle, Southwest and Somaliland).

Election Committees

Committee Team	Level	Responsibility
Federal Election Implementation Team (FEIT)		The broad mandate for the implementation of the 2021 elections.
State Election Implementation Team (SEIT)		Organize parliamentary elections at the state level.
Election Dispute Resolution Team (EDRT)		Resolve problems and disagreements relating to elections. Creation a system for voters, candidate, etc. To file grievances.
Somaliland Election Implementation Team		A special committee has been established to carry out parliamentary elections.

1.7.4 Role of Civil Society in Election Dispute Resolution and Management

Conflict resolution and election-related tensions are significantly reduced by civil society organizations. They demonstrate effectiveness in the most recent election deadlock and support a smooth election process. The important contributions that civil society organizations could offer to the election resolution process include the following:

1. Encourage civic education and awareness initiatives to better inform the populace and reduce the like likelihood of public violence.
2. Encourage and promote dialogue and methods based on consensus.
3. Encourage minority and female representation in the legislature.
4. De-escalating tensions before they develop into a full-fledged conflict will aid in conflict prevention methods and early warning.
5. Encourage cooperation and coordination between all parties involved in the election, including FEIT, SEIT, IEDC, and others.
6. Consult with the leadership team for the 2020-2021 elections and make recommendations.
7. In the electoral district, form a community-based group to resolve election-related disputes.

1.8 Upheavals and Crisis in Somalia in 2022

Another significant distraction from the problem and support for action has been the ongoing political unrest in Somalia surrounding its lengthy election process. The potential to prioritize famine avoidance as more than just a fund-raising project on the ground arises with the election of a new president and administration. The selection of a special Envoy to address the drought is a significant and symbolic move, and it must be followed by the necessary efforts. What actual steps will be taken next is still unclear.

The political elite in all regions of Somalia under the country's new administration have demonstrated leadership and a dedication to ensuring the safety of their constituents. Despite this, the federal government in Mogadishu will continue to have a limited geographic scope and capacity. However, the lack of planning and advancement in reaching supposedly difficult-to-reach locations and people, including but not limited to those under Al-Shabaab's authority is the more important political issue.

1.9 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia

The Federal Republic of Somalia was established as a representative democracy, according to its provisional constitution from 2012. A number of additional civic and political rights, such as freedom of expression, are among the rights recognized in the constitution, along with the right to vote. However, the constitutional framework is still insufficient, provisional, a point of contention, and a possible cause of conflict.

In Somalia, one-person-one-vote elections are governed by a legal framework. In February 2020, legislation governing elections was adopted. However, the NCC agreement of September 17 replaced the framework that was first employed for these elections.

1.10 2022 Somalia Election Report

The NCC served as these elections' main decision-making body. It discussed important crisis points and situations that needed to be resolved while the elections were in danger of being delayed. Federal Electoral Implementation Team, a temporary election management organization, was established at the federal government level. At State-level, State Electoral Implementation Teams (SEITS) complimented this group.

There was a great deal of mistrust for these organizations and a lack of trust in both their ability to conduct fair elections on a professional level and, more crucial, in their independence and ability

to fend off political meddling. This mistrust and amount of conflict were exacerbated by the failure to behave in a transparent and open manner, which included failing to publish crucial election information on time, delivering goods late, and engaging in personal fights with other members. The election was held on May 15, 2022, as planned. Registration for candidates took place between May 9and May 11, 2022. Initial registration included 39 candidates, and the election took place in a setting that was calm and pleasant overall, with observers not reporting any disturbances.

The table below shows the results of the presidential election's final round:-

S/N	Candidate's Name	Number of Votes
1	Hassan Sheikh Muhammad	214
2	Muhammed Abdullahi Farmajo	110
	Invalid Votes	3
	Total Votes	327

The election was universally recognized, and the current president extends his congratulations to the new leader. Although there were numerous charges of vote-buying before the voting process, the procedure was transparent. Additionally, observers observed difficulties the joint committee was having in preventing the private media from entering the polling place which would have boosted openness.

1.11 Selecting a Clan Elder

In Somalia's election, the procedure for choosing the clan elders-who in turn select the election colleges for the lower house- is crucial. The elder list must be verified by the Federal and State electoral commissions in cooperation with the clans. Disputes have previously arisen when the appointment of elders became politicized with recent elections at the federal and state levels. Elder selection may once more cause a rift between the federal government and the member states because of how important this procedure is in determining the results of the lower house elections and, ultimately, the presidential election. In order to limit the likelihood of a politicized replacement process, the 2020-2021 process should rather rely on elders whom clans have decided to represent in prior elections.

CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explain why the research methods and analytical strategy chosen for the study were appropriate.

2.2 Research Design

The study used a historical approach and mainly focused on past events and came to conclusions that predicate what would happen in the future. The study's objectives were in line with the data from various sources used books, journals, papers, studies, policy documents, and other sources were used to acquire the data.

2.2.1 Historical Documentary Analysis

The reviews take into account not only what had been said or written about the subject but also what had been done in terms of the electoral process, human rights, and electoral-related difficulties in Somalia. Because it cannot function on the premise of manipulating cause and effect, historical research differs from other scientific studies. A systematic recovery of the nuanced details, characters, events, meanings and even ideas from the past from influences and influences from the past that has formed the present is the goal of historical research or historiography. (Berge and Lure, 2012 p. 305).

The main aspect or quality of this technique involves reconstructing the past through the accurate portrayal of the past and illustration of inferences from which there is informed insight into the events coherently that contributed to the present developments involving political politics and their execution difficulties with the approved electoral system in Somalia. In order to respond to the preliminary research inquiries provided, it was determined that documentary analysis was the best research approach to use.

Instability, intense conflict, and legitimate struggles have plagued Somalia for the past 25 years. These have included state collapse, the outbreak of Union Islamic Courts and civil war, and ultimately Al-Shabaab (Mahleasela, 2016). Numerous human casualties, countless internal displacements, significant economic losses, major infrastructure damage, and widespread mistrust among the populace have all been brought on by these protracted battles (Farah, 2011). Most significantly, this current youth has been raised lacking an established government that might offer public services like security, education, or healthcare. However, Somalia hasn't completely

descended into chaos. The northern region of Somaliland has experienced peace for more than 21 years., and institutional complexity has increased (Hansen & Bradbury 2007; Johnson & Smaker 2014). Despite being profit-driven, doctor coverage is currently better than it was before the conflict, but there hasn't been fighting there since 2003.

On May 18, 1991, Somaliland rose to prominence in the global political system after the rest of Somalia. Burao hosted the Northern people's ground conference. Somaliland has an 850-kilometer coastline and a land area of 137,600 square kilometers. In 1997, there were roughly three million residents there. About 55% of the population is made up of pastoralists, with the remaining percentage being split between urban and rural residents. Northwest, Awdal, Sahil, Togdheer, Sanaag, and Sool are the six geographical regions that makeup Somaliland.

Three prominent clans, the Isaaq, Dared/Harti (including the Warsengeli and Dhulba Hante), and Gadabursi, make up the majority of the population-representing 66 percent, 19 percent, and 15 percent, respectively.

2.2.2 The Implementation of Electoral Systems in Somalia

According to David Farrel, electoral systems "define how votes are converted into seats during the election of politicians to offices. This is essential for nations recovering from civil wars brought on by rivalry for control of resources and power since the system offers peaceful means of acquiring authority. According to the aforementioned definition of voting procedures, Horowitz Donal outlined six criteria for those designing such systems: Minorities are well represented and the executive branch is stable, the ability to control the behavior of elected officials, and the ability to support the success of the candidate with the most support.

According to Benjamin Reilly, the system's capacity to control political behavior and principles of proportionality and accountability are crucial. For those creating an election system for a specific nation, Bernard Groforian and Arend Lijphart offer a more helpful framework. The dispute the electoral system's formula (plurality, majoritarianism, proportional, or mixed), the ballot's design (electing parties or individual candidates), the legislature's size, the requirement that parties satisfy, and the district (how many seats are in a district). The success of a particular election system is also greatly influenced by the Lijphart fairness integrated into the representation mechanism.

2.2.3 Colonial Historical Records

The study was feasible since there was unpublished data and information at government research institutions, as well as important topics that had not been explored in comparable or earlier studies. They were crucial materials that were used in this study since they include a wealth of information and data that are extremely relevant to it. The majority of the public records and similar archives from their previous administrations up to the present that was used as archival sources showed historical colonial perspectives on the Somalian election system and democracy.

Additionally, previous literature about the pre-election specifics, election problems, and obstacles in Somalia during the period of those years was explored and analyzed using documentary analysis.

2.2.4 Data Analysis and Presentation

After a thorough evaluation of the study data throughout the selection process, the data were organized, verified, and validated, which was important to support those processes. The initial phase involved reading through the text of the document and scanning the index for relevant keywords, after which notes on the pertinent chapters and citations were prepared. After classifying the data sources as primary or secondary, the computer citation end note was utilized to help the organization of the data in a number of concurrent ways, including chronologically and in accordance with major themes identified by the research inquiries.

These inquiries also offer a consistent framework for data collection and analysis to encourage objectivity, and they were crucial in determining the validity of the study. The framework inquiries have also been used to identify, analyze, and cite sources of information to support claims and offer counterarguments during these theses. Additionally, evaluations of the research's objective, methodology, and epistemology were required in order to accurately assess its value and use when compared to different data.

2.3 Somalia Pre-Election Crises (1960-2009)

On July 1, 1960, Somalia formally reclaimed its sovereignty from UN trusteeship and Italian rule. The Legislative Assembly's President, Adan Abdullah Osman Dair, was chosen to serve as acting president. Abdi Rashid Ali Shirmarke was named prime minister on July 20, 1960, by President Adan Abdullah. On June 20, 1961, a new vote was taken. The Somali Youth League (SYL) won

69 of the 123 National Assembly seats in the legislative elections that took place on March 30, 1964.

22 seats in the National Assembly were gained by the Socialist National Congress (SNC). On October 15, 1969, a government police officer shot and killed Abdi Rashed Ali Shirmarke in the northern Somalian town of Las Anod. A military coup led by General Muhammed Siad Barre removed Prime Minister Maxamed Xaaji Ibrahim Cignal from office. The 21st of October 1969. On October 25, 1969, the governments of Egypt and Italy offered the military government diplomatic support. On November 3, 1969, General Barre assumed control of the government. Political parties were outlawed by General Barre, who also put them on hold the constitution. The military support for the Somali government came from the governments of Cuba and the Soviet Union. On April 21, 1970, he put an uprising on hold. 20 government troops died when the Somali government put down a military uprising led by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf on April 9, 1978. 17 military members were put to death on October 26, 1978, for their participation in the military uprising.

2.4 Somali Post-Election Crises (AMISOM INTERVENTION)

AMISOM Along with other responsibilities, AMISOM aids the forces of the Federal Government of Somalia in their conflict with Al-Shabaab terrorists. AMISOM was established on January 19, 2007, with a six-month initial mandate, by the African Union Peace and Security Council. The mission's mandate was authorized by the United Nations Security Council on February 21, 2007. AMISOM's subsequent six monthly mandate extensions by the African Union Peace and Security Council have also been approved by the United Nations Security Council (Wikipedia, 2017). Every time the mandate of AMISOM has been up for revision, most recently in October 2914 the tenure has been extended. As of November 30, 2015, the current term was over.

Up until then, 22,126 soldiers were its maximum permitted strength. Operation Indian Ocean was started in August 2014 by the Somali government with AMISOM's help to clear out the last enclaves of the countryside controlled by Al-Shabaab. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) was supplanted and absorbed by AMISOM, which took it place and authority after the African Union on September 14, 2006, approved the IGASOM as a proposed training and protection mission to Somalia. On December 6, 2006, the UN Security Council also gave its approval to IGASOM. In March 2005, IGASOM was initially suggested for quick implementation in order to supply peacekeeping personnel for

the most recent stage of the conflict in Somalia. The TFG, which had organized in Nairobi, Kenya in 2004 and was aiming to construct Baidoa, Bay area, Somalia as a provisional capital, held the majority of expectations for national unity at that time because the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had not yet seized power of Mogadishu. By May 2006, a conflict for control of Mogadishu had broken out between the ICU and the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, or ARPCT. They had taken over command of the city by June.

As the ICU gained footing, fighting started to spread to other regions of the country (Ibid). Plans for IGASOM went forward, but by July there were signs that the ICU might be against them since they viewed the project as a US-backed, Western strategy to slow the expansion of their Islamic movement. Up until December 2006, the UN Security Council had placed the organization under an arms embargo; however, on December 6, 2006, the embargo was partially lifted and IGASOM was given a six-month mission. ICU resistance began as early as March 25, 2005, when Union of Islamic Courts Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys issued a warning that any peacekeepers entering the nation would be welcomed. According to a comment from him provided to the BBC, any factor that intervenes that enters Somalia will have a tremendous uphill battle till it is destroyed. The ICU was not the political or military power it would later become, though, at the time. After the ICU won the Second Battle of Mogadishu in May and June 2006 and seized control of the capital, UN observers began to worry about the ICU's level of antagonism against the projected IGASOM expedition. The International Criminal Court (ICU) was openly and vehemently opposed to peacekeeping forces entering Somalia when UN Security Council Resolution 1725 was passed on December 6 and vowed to treat any peacekeepers as hostile forces, despite the fact that IGAD and the ICU had met and authored an amicable and structured joint statement on December 2 devoting the ICU to the IGAD plans. UIC opposition to including Ethiopian forces in the operation was a result of regional divides. For its part, Ethiopia was wary of allowing Eritrean soldiers to serve in the IGAD peacekeeping mission. Uganda, the only IGAD member to publicly propose to send forces (troops), retreated in response to ICU's malicious information to doubts about the current viability of the situation. Despite Uganda's defense, those were active skirmishes being carried out with sophisticated weaponry during the instability, which prevents the deployment of peacekeepers. After the ICU was defeated in many engagements in December 2006, Uganda once more reaffirmed its commitment to provide a battalion of troops on January 1. There was a guarantee of 8,000 peacekeepers among both Uganda and Nigeria (which is a Member State of the

African Union but not of IGAD). According to reports, Ghana, Rwanda, and Tanzania were thinking about sending troops. AMISOM Obtaining Support from Funders Following the Islamic Courts Union's collapse in December 2006 and January 2007, the global community started to assemble financial resources and military forces for the operation. African Union countries that are not a part of IGAD were contacted for assistance. The US publicly backed the sending of a security force to Somalia on January 17, 2007. By January 20, the EU had made a commitment. The AU officially established and authorized the mission on January 19, 2007, at the 69th conference of the Council for Peace and Security.

The AU officially established and authorized the mission on January 19, 2007, at the 69th conference of the Council for Peace and Security. On Jan 22, 2007. Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi, and Burundi had agreed to participate in the humanitarian mission, but the overall number of participants was only approximately half of the 8,000-person contingent that had been suggested (Ibid) Soon after devastating bomb assaults in the Ugandan capital, on July 22, 2010, AU ministers decided to change the mission's objective from one of peacekeeping to one of peace enforcement, engaging al-Shabaab more directly. A few days later, under pressure from the UN, the AU agreed to refrain from expanding the mandate but permitted pre-emptive operations against al-Shabaab and pledged more troops from other countries in exchange. Guinea and Djibouti promised military support to AMISOM on July 23, 2010. An AU representative reported in Nairobi on September 17, 2010, that a further company from Uganda had joined AMISOM, increasing its strength from 6,300 to 7,200 soldiers. Agreement 1964 of the UN Security Council, dated December 22, 2010, supported AMISOM in extending the mission's authorized size to 12,000, while at the same time, reports claimed that Burundi and Uganda had each pledged an additional 850 personnel. Burundi increased its force deployment to AMISOM by 1,000 in March 2011, increasing the total to 4,400. General Godefroid Niyombare, the head of the Burundian military, was quoted by AFP as saying that the troops had been deployed one week earlier. The United Nations Security Council increased the number of forces assigned in February 2012 from 12,000 to 17,731.

The approval follows a string of victories over al-Shabaab fighters who had previously played roles all across the country's central and southern regions. AMISOM Commander stated that al-Shabaab was "at [its] weakest" during the same month and predicted that the organization will "implode in the not too long future" as a result of a series of military setbacks and the migration of hundreds of its members to the Arabian Peninsula.

Ethiopia put a stop to its preparations to totally leave Somalia after the Al-Shabaab attack in Nairobi's Westgate shopping mall. Instead, it said it will keep assisting the Somali military and its AMISOM allies (Ibid). Ethiopia stated in November 2013 that it would join the AMISOM and include its troops stationed in Somalia. Somalia applauded the move and emphasized the significance of the alliance with Ethiopia. Ethiopia's announcement came in response to an unsuccessful missile strike ploy by al-Shabaab in Addis Ababa in October, as well as after it received a fresh growing threat from the insurgent group. The choice to join AMISOM was made to increase the security of the humanitarian mission. AMISOM's pull-out puts the world community to the test. There may be disastrous effects if AMISOM forces are withdrawn from the area. In the midst of rising tensions and threats from emerging Al-Shabaab militants, troops assigned to the African Union Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, have started to gradually remove their personnel from the area. There are already more than 500 American troops operating in the area, and the withdrawal of AMISOM forces may have catastrophic effects on both the area and the American mission there. According to a U.S. State Department official, the withdrawal of forces from the five nations that provide troops—Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti—has been planned for some time due to restrictions imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 2373. The UN Resolution gave the AMISOM mission permission to carry on. AMISOM has frequently said that its pull-out will be subject to certain criteria and that responsibility for sustaining security stability will be turned over to capable Somali security forces. However, given the nation's recent string of car bombings and deaths, it doesn't seem that AMISOM's departure from the area was motivated by any particular set of circumstances. ISIS has not previously been the target of American forces in the area, and this may be a sign that it is attempting to rebuild itself in the Horn of Africa after suffering significant territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Nevertheless, as shown by Robyn Mack, a U.S. AFRICOM spokesperson, there are currently more than 500 American soldiers deployed in Somalia. According to Marine Gen. Thomas Waldhauser's presentation of AFRICOM's 2017 posture statement to legislators earlier this year, AFRICOM has backed proposals to extend amisom's mission into 2019. According to Mack, speaking to Military Times recently, "from a security viewpoint, we regard the participation of AMISOM as vitally critical to sustaining peace in Somalia until circumstances permit for an orderly pull-out." "International help will remain a vital enabling component for the Somali

National Security Forces," Mack said, despite the fact that Somali forces have made gains. Overall, Somalia's defense issue appears dire. According to AFRICOM evaluations, the country is home to between 3,000 and 6,000 Al-Shabaab combatants and about 250 ISIS members. Despite AMISOM soldiers' success in forcing extremists out of main cities, Al-Shabaab still controls several territories. Around 20% of Somalia is under Al-Shabaabs, controlled mainly in the south. Despite having no actual area under its grip, ISIS Somalia nevertheless has some authority and a negligible representation in northern Puntland, Somalia. Less than 50% of Somalia's land is under the hands of the Federal Government, but a pullback of AMISOM troops without a larger American presence could cause Somali forces to lose further ground. This will depend on how AMISOM is disbanded, and it emphasizes how crucial it is for there to be a smooth transitional between AMISOM and the Somali National Security Forces that is condition-based.

However, American soldiers have already increased their use of force against insurgents. Early in September, three air raids against Al-Shabaab were conducted by American forces. Based on a recent AFRICAOM news release, American forces also carried out another strike on November 9 that resulted in the deaths of many Al-Shabaab fighters. State Department officials oppose any additional withdrawals below the UN-mandated caps. The United States backs a condition based on AMISOM pullback linked to the establishment of competent, experienced Somali security forces (Snow,9 Nov 2017). According to the official, the United States has given Somalia more than 1 Billion dollars in aid since 2007, including more than 400 million dollars to develop credible Somali troops to fight together and overtake AMISOM. A rush of hope that a new era of stability was on the way awaited the swearing-in of Somalia's new president Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo, who won by a landslide on a wave of nationalist favor. The ceremony was held at a well-guarded airport area under AMISOM control in a city that has frequently been targeted by Al-Shabaab, but this just serves to highlight the size of the challenge before him. According to the most recent report from the ICC, Farmajo benefited from being viewed as the best leader to create a strong Somali National Security Force (SNSF), hasten amisom's withdrawal, stabilize the security situation, prevent neighboring countries from interfering with Somalia 'internal affairs, and defend Somalia's honor and autonomy.

The prospect is hazardous because this is an aspirational wish list. The 22,000-strong AMISOM international army is essential to Somalia's stability. It has been engaged in Somalia for ten years attacking Al-Shabaab and assisting in the steady expansion of governmental power. By December

2020, AMIOM is anticipated to have completely left the country, giving over control to the SNSF, which is only projected to number 20,000 (Mogadishu's Heritage Institute for Policy Studies) AMISOM cannot fight Al-Shabaab on its own.

This will only be possible if AMISOM can work with a competent, honest and diverse group of Somali Security Forces. The Somali National Army, however, is a force plagued by issues, mainly corrupt practices, capacity, and recognition outside of Mogadishu. There are now concerns that it won't be able to repel a weak but nonetheless threatening insurrection (Anyadike, 2017) The dilemma is one that the AU special envoy to Somalia National Security Services, which it is doing to the best of its ability and with the resources at its disposal. Analysts fear that AMISOM's mandate is strengthening the capabilities of the Somali National Security Service, which it is doing to the best of its ability and with the resources at its disposal. Analyst fear that AMISOM's withdrawal will be too soon and with the inherently fragile and fractious structure of the Somali state. Considering the prevailing condition of the situation on the ground, it appears incredibly doubtful that the Somali army and government institutions will be ready in just three years. AMISOM's withdrawal would be premature; instead, it would be more practical for humanitarian organizations to fund a transition that would last five to ten years. The difficulty for AMISOM is that leaving Somalia with some honour depends on a number of uncontrollable events. Importantly, it is dependent on foreign money, and not enough of it has been provided to truly weaken rather than merely replace Al-Shabaab. The primary fighting units of AMISOM are based in Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Burundi. The EU provides compensation for the troops, and the UN offers logistical support, including food and medical supplies. It hasn't had access to the assault helicopters it so sorely needs. Additionally, there is currently unrest among the states that provide troops, which have attempted to leave ever since the EU reduced the monthly stipend provided to soldiers by 20% in January 2016, from $1,028 to $822. The EU responds that there are other stability efforts on the globe that deserve its help, including CAR, Mali, and the Lake Chad situation, while the AU maintains that its soldiers suffer while the West simply gives monetary assistance.

The EU cannot perceive the end of the road as AMISOM approaches its tenth anniversary. As the UN typically does, it is not prepared to support another perpetual peacekeeping deployment. AMISOM lacks the manpower and resources necessary to completely destroy Al-Shabaab, but unless it achieves greater battlefield success, it will not be able to win further funds. However,

destroying Al-Shabaab requires more than just military might. The Somali administration has struggled to maintain the territorial gains won by the AU soldiers, let alone offer the populace the much-needed services and security. This indicates that the group's ideological underpinning is still difficult to undermine among the local populace. Furthermore, Somalia is a Federal State with its regional government having tense relations with Mogadishu and occasionally with one another. Local support for these regional forces is higher than for the SNSF. Projects to establish a state in Somalia are still hampered by persistent conflicts between autonomous regions. How can the nation's various regions work together toward a common goal? The African Union's response is a soldier influx to degrade Al-Shabaab before the 2018 drawdown. On January 16, it requested permission form the UN Security Council to use another 4,500 soldiers for a quasi-six months' period. According to the AU delegates, strategies have been finalized to reclaim the final Al-Shabaab bastions in Somalia with coalition forces, just for this mission, after which the military deployments would return to pre-assignment levels. The necessity for a negotiated transition in Somalia that includes both the federal government and the regional government is a crucial component of the issue. A plan for merging along with a resolution on how to run Somalia and a shared understanding of the functions of the nation's security forces.

Long-term solutions to the unrest and uncertainty engulfing the nation can only be found in a well-equipped and properly trained security establishment in Somalia. If Somalis organize themselves and truly focus on improving their infirm province, and if the regional allies offer sincere support, much could be accomplished in three years. To advance on main fronts, especially in terms of reconciliation, combating corruption, and finalizing the constitution, Farmajo's mandate is essential. In the meantime, Farmajo will be fought as an apostate by Al-Shabaab. We know how to eat cheese, the commander boasted in a furious message published earlier this month, adulating to the president's moniker. However, rumors have emerged that the revolt is concerned about his notoriety. Nationalist Al-Shabaab's branch is led by a dissident leader who has apparently thought about giving up. Farmajo and the effort to restore Somalia would experience a true win if there were any meaningful indications of the insurgency fragmenting, of which there aren't any as yet.

2.5 Successive Somalia's Constitutional Amendments

The Garawe summits serve as a foundation for the Constitution, which clarifies several elements of the new democratic structures. It starts off with a list of practical guidelines for legislatures:
Article 3(5): All National Institutions, in notably all elected and appointed posts across the three levels of government and in the National Independence Commission, must effectively incorporate women.
A person who is a citizen of Somalia cannot lose that citizenship, even if they acquire citizenship in another nation, according to Article 8 (3).
Article 11 (1) states that all citizens have equal rights and obligations in front of the law, regardless of their sex, religion, social or economic level, political viewpoint, clan, disability, occupation, birth, or dialect.
Article 12 (2): The state must make sure that it does more than just make sure that its citizens' rights aren't being violated by others.
Every person has the right to associate with other people and groups, according to Article 16. This includes the freedom to create and join associations, such as political parties and trade unions.
Everyone has the right to partake in public affairs, according to Article 22 (1). Thus, rights comprise:

a. The ability to run for any office inside a political party.

Section 42(2)(g): Every individual has a responsibility to try to cast a ballot in elections. Article 46 (2): Everyone must be given the chance to participate in the public representation system, which must be open. These participation tenets must be followed by any legislation regulating elections and political parties. Only the legislature will be chosen by popular vote among the three organs of government, however, all residents have the right to vote and to run for office. The upper house cannot exceed 54 members and the lower house has 275 members. These bodies have the authority to select the president and approve cabinet nominees submitted by the president. The people of Somalia will elect both legislative chambers in a "direct, secret, and free ballot," albeit the precise electoral procedure has not yet been decided.
According to the constitution, the following criteria shall be used to elect representatives of the senate:

1. The 18 regions of Somalia that existed prior to 1991
2. How many Federal Members States there are in the Federal Republic of Somalia?

3. The requirement is that each federal member state has an equal number of representatives in the Federal parliament's upper house.

2.6 Somalia Multi-Party System

Tribes and sub-clans currently compete for political dominance in Somalia instead of political parties. Prior to October 1969, Somalia had a multiparty system of government, with both the opposition parties and members of the dominant party being able to voice their opinions in the legislature. The main party, the Somalia Youth League (SYL), began as the Somali Youth Club in 1943. The program involves non-alignment in international affairs, social, political, and economic development, as well as the unity of all Somalis (including those in Kenya, Ethiopia, and French Somaliland).

It represented nearly all the government employees, business owners, and semi-skilled laborers in the region's southern region, formerly known as Italian Somaliland. The SYL obtained to an absolute majority of 64 out of 123 parliamentary seats in the first national elections held following independence on March 30, 1964. Eleven parties split up the remaining seats. General elections were conducted in which 1969, and Muhammed Ibrahim Egal's SYL, which had been in power, won again.

The election featured 64 political parties in total. Elections would be held in due course, according to the supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), which outlawed all political parties in October 1969. The SRC was disbanded in 1976, and its responsibilities were given to the newly created Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), which was governed by the SRC's former members. Siad Barre served as the SRSP's general secretary, and the organization was the only one standing to sue him until his downfall in January 1991. The Somali National Movement (SNM), which was associated with clans and sub-clans and bargained to increase their dominance, then took over control of the north and created the autonomous state of "Somaliland."

2.7 A Multidisciplinary Strategy for Election-Related Conflict

The civic society, religious institutions, academic community, and legal community come together under a multidisciplinary strategy. Many organizations employ the electoral cycle method to emphasize that elections are not discrete events but rather ongoing processes that begin as soon as one election is done and cover the pre-election, election-day, and post-election stages.

- Electoral Cycle
- Electoral campaign
- Voter registration candidatures
- Training and Education
- Legal Framework
- Voting and Counting
- Results
- Post-Election reviews

Lisa Kammeru suggests using a comprehensive strategy to lessen and avoid violence at elections. In order to combat and avoid violence during election season, Kammeru contends that the electoral cycle strategy is insufficient and should be combined with a conflict cycle.

In order to undertake elections using the electoral cycle technique, Kammeru advises election relevant stakeholders to include their interventions in the conflict cycle, which is closely related to the election cycle. The formation of multi-stakeholder technical expertise that collaborates with the election administration body to aid the process of mitigation and resolution is another recommendation made by the integrated approach. Additionally, Kammeru suggests that viewing election violence through the prism of the conflict cycle can help you better understand it. It takes carefully considered measures to resolve, prevent, and mitigate election-related violence in order to manage effective elections without violence. The conflict cycle source is listed below Karen Kammaru:




Figure 1

The election cycle is shown in the graph above, where the time spent on election preparation comes before election day. Since the population is where the conflict's underlying causes are present, it does not manifest outside during the first sequence (Latency). This provides that violence is likely to occur. The existence of numerous election triggers is represented by this sequence. When heated debates and verbal threats escalate into physical acts of violence, the third phase (Breakout of Open Violence), it takes place. Conflict that was intended to be productive degenerates into violent conflict. People perceive the election season and showing support for a certain candidate or political party as a potential danger to their lives. When a third party or parties to the conflict decide to resolve the dispute and duration of serenity rules, that is the fourth phase (De-escalation).




Figure 2:

The cycle of responding to conflict is shown in Figure 2 above. According to an analytical hierarchy process (AHP of election-related violence, the election cycle, which begins in the run-up to the election, should be viewed through the prism of the dispute response cycle). The conflict reaction cycle is connected to every phase of the election cycle. Elections tend to exacerbate demography, ideology, and ethnic divisions that have existed in many nations that have undergone a conflict crisis. Insurgence poses a threat to some nations and interferes with free and fair elections. Many other nations are governed by a minority entity that exercises an authoritarian dictatorship to frighten, mistreat, and forbid political candidates from running in races.

2.8 International Relations Theory and the Greater Horn of Africa

As a response to interwar ideological cognition, realism or democratic realism hypothesis draws on a primitive tradition of philosophy. Its three main tenets are statism (a state-centric thought), survival (states must survive on their own because global governance is anarchy), and self-help (states must help themselves to survive) (Dunne, Tim, and Schmidt, 2004). Realists contend that no other state can be counted on to ensure the survival of a state (Mearsheimer, 2001). Survival: Realists contend that there is no centralized authority and that lawlessness governs the world system (Smith, 2007). International diplomacy is thus a fight for dominance between governments with a vested interest (Snyder, 2004:55, 145). According to classical realists, states are innately hostile. According to objectionable realists, states are overly concerned with their own security, which can lead to a conflict situation in which enhancing one's security can increase upheaval as the adversary increases its own military strength, turning security into a zero-sum game in which performance compared gains can be made. Neorealism, also known as structural realism, is an advancement of realism put forth by Keneth Waltz in 1979. It holds that in order to understand state behavior, one must consider the impact of structure. The two definitions of structure are the allocation of functionality among units and the anarchic establish the validity of the global community. But it simply represents one aspect of neorealism. Neo-realist and more conventional realists, as well as contemporary realism, have been merged by Joseph Grieco (Mearsheimer, 2006) Waltz also questions classic realism's focus on conventional power in terms of the state's collective powers (Gartzk, 1998).

Idealism or Utopianism was the forerunner of liberal theory about international relations. Idealism is a philosophical position in international politics that contends that a state's foreign policy should

be oriented towards its own internal political philosophy. Wilson's idealism served as a forerunner to the liberal philosophy of international affairs, which would emerge among those who built institutions following World War II. According to liberalism, state behavior is mostly determined by state preferences rather than state capabilities. Liberalism permits a variety of state acts, in contrast to realism, which views the state as a sovereign entity.

As a result, inclinations will differ from state to state contingent on elements like culture, economic system, and style of governance. Liberals also contend that interactions between states occur on a low-politics (economic and cultural) as well as high-politics (political and security) level, whether through businesses, organizations, or private citizens. As a result, there are many options for cooperation and more expansive definitions of power, including social heritage (movies, music sports), which supports the idea that peace may be attained via interaction and integration.

Neoliberalism is a development of liberal thought, often known as liberal institutionalism or renaissance institutionalism. It makes the case that international organizations can help countries work together effectively in the global system (Chandler, 2010:43-90) According to the principle of equality (Schmidt, 1998:219), which contends that liberal democracies have less problems among themselves and have never waged war on one another, Kant's ideas on permanent peace were an early addition to the field. This is viewed as undermining realism theories in particular, and this objective scientific assertion is currently one of the biggest debates in political science. Democratic peace has been explained in a variety of ways. Additionally, it has been suggested that democracies generally conduct diplomacy significantly differently from non-democracies, as in the book Never at War.

Liberals disagree with (neo) realists on the notion; they frequently point to structural causes for the peace rather than the state's leadership. Democratic peace theory is contested by those who cite the West's treatment of left-leaning democracies during the Cold War (Copeland, 1996:5-41). One defense of economic interconnectedness is that it lessens the likelihood of war between economic powers (Sutch, 2006:11). Realists contend, in contrast, that economic interconnectedness actually makes conflict more likely. In opposition to neorealism, Keohane and Nye (2011) created a rival theory they call complex interdependence, which at times is more accurate than realism. They discuss the three tenets of realist thought in order to explain this: first, that states are coherent entities and the dominating actors in foreign policy; second, that force is a useful and efficient tool of policy; third, that there is a structure in international politics. The core

of their thesis is that, in comparison to the traditional system of states in international politics, there are several pathways connecting societies today. They contend that there isn't actually a hierarchy of issues, therefore there are actually a variety of intentions that comes to the surface in addition to the fact that the military arm of international relations isn't the best means of advancing a state's objectives. According to one interpretation of the post-liberal theory, states are really compelled to work together in the contemporary, globalized world in order to protect their security and autonomous interests. The reconsideration of the notions of sovereignty, which swings from a right to duty and independence, is where the difference from classical liberal philosophy is most obviously felt. International organizations keep sovereign governments accountable in the global economy, creating a system where sovereignty is jointly produced by independent countries.

The premise is that governments collectively give up some rights in exchange for complete autonomy and sovereignty; it is no longer able to be acknowledged as an absolute right (Richmond, 2011). Understanding the nature of the state and the international system depends on social movements from below. Without their commitment to political order and its developmental potential, it is impossible to recognize or fully comprehend the limitations of the state, the flaws of liberal peace, and the problems with global governance. Additionally, some scientific analysis of the complex changes in international relations is provided by the influence of social forces on institutions of power in politics and commerce (Waltz, 1979). The central tenet of constructivist theory or social constructivism is the conviction that compelling arguments, shared values, cultural norms, and social identities influence international politics while cognitive structures, which are the material world meaning, socially construct international reality.

Constructivism, according to Adler (1997), encompasses a middle ground between rationalist and interpretative theories of international relations. This position emerged from discussions about the role of the scientific method of international relations theories in the creation of global power. It challenges the static premises of conventional theories and emphasizes the social creation of international relations, challenging the ontological foundation of rationalist theories.

It is primarily concerned with the role that ideas have in influencing states and non-state actors within the international system, including objectives, threats, fears, identities, and other components of reality that are perceived. These conceptual considerations frequently have far-reaching repercussions and are often more important than physical power considerations.

3.9 The Domain of Ideology in International Relations

Above the realm of political agency, the potential and challenges of transnational security transparency and peace in Somalia can be understood in terms of the associated field of ideology. One could consider ideological components and conceptions to be the basic foundation of procedure accessibility and finality. The concepts and principles of government, national and cultural values, customs of political speech and argumentation, and styles of representing particular interests, needs, and issues are all additional characteristics that frequently define and unite international relations. During political change, these elements - or complexes of elements- will frequently take on different shapes and engage in fluid relationships of rivalry, cooperation, and hegemony.

In general, the chance of a process being open and transparent increases the wider the spectrum of ideological factors involved, as well as how variable and unpredictable their relationships are. Ideological frameworks for international relations frequently have an uneasy and occasionally disquieting nature, much like the political activities and organizations to which they are more or less directly connected. They are more likely to be ambiguous than stable frameworks of ideas and values, especially in the early stages of transformation. As a result, the peace process is opened up and liberated from the simple dominance of any one player or group of players. However, a hierarchy of international and regional organizations and groupings is where ideological components and linkages take shape and are put into action. Through complexes of transitional concepts and values, a predetermined order of agencies, powers, interests, and activities fill out, specifies, anchors, and frequently shortens their formal substance or meaning. Additionally, this can place ideological and practical restrictions on how much and how foreign relations reform procedures can be opened up or expanded in the wider Horn. The potential of the principles and aims they espouse is so frequently not effectively realized in practice by external backers or promoters of transnational stability in Somalia and security challenges in the larger region.

The argument of how well the concepts in inquiry may be essentially limited at the crucial time of their emergence by the very organizations and meritocratic formations that describe their framework is brought up by the fact that the quantity of their initiatives is not working synergistically to their effect (Constantinos, 1996). While the implied notions of foreign relations that are currently in use in the greater Horn of Africa may be coherent with objectives of empowering indigenous states and communities and strengthening local organizations and human

potentials, the proposals seek to perform toward their objectives in limited financial and administrative terms. Initiative appears to connect strength and propose in their entirety.

By using specific techniques and methodologies, the current leaders in Somalia may deliberately dampen the flow of concepts to regulate security and stability. Thematic alternatives might not be realized or be accomplished in the best way possible if the ruling elite is focused on filling in the gaps in peace and security, debate, and actors that opposition or alternative parties would fill during their own participation.

CHAPTER THREE: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN SOMALIA

3.0 Introduction

In Somalia, attempts to move to democracy have been met with arduous protests, invalid or fraudulent elections, and acts of violence in several parts of the country. On various occasions, the states of Somalia and its political parties have contested the status quo of the political party system, leading to the adoption of a constitution that includes the formation of true democracy and the patriotic government of the Somali people. These include, among other things, political change, political involvement, political party structures, difficulties with implementing the chosen electoral system, and the way forward.

3.1 Situations during the Transition (Democratic Change)

Following almost two decades of state collapse marked by civil war, fractions, clannish behavior, religious extremism, and a succession of unsuccessful central governments Somalia occupies a special place in the world. The dictatorship of Siad Berre, a form of scientific socialism that tried to dismantle Somalia's most lasting social institution, the clan, while also causing a string of expensive wars with Ethiopia, is where their political and security problems have their roots. Sub-clans struggled for control in the ensuing political vacuum as Somalia descended into a bloody civil war, forcing the UN to launch two of its most ambitious peacekeeping operations, United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and II. As part of the stability operation, the US also provided military forces, starting with the United Task Force (UNITAF), which was UNISOM II. However, international intervention troops steadily reduced their engagement and completely withdraw by 1995 after 18 United States Army Rangers were killed in an incident that sparked outrage and called into doubt the efficacy of the peacekeeping mission.

Nearly 20 attempts at political reconciliation were made in the ensuing ten years. There were other conferences and summits held both demoniacally and overseas, each bringing together a similar group of clan representatives, local politicians, and militia leaders to work toward a new arrangement of the central government. Although some agreement was achieved, there was no national Somali leadership that was seen as genuine. The Transitional Federal Charter was approved by the interim Somali government in 2004, and Abdullahi Yusuf was chosen as the new Transitional Federal president in a vote held in Nairobi, Kenya. This power was ineffective, and their attempts to solidify political control were thwarted by the Islamic Court Union (ICU), a rising Islamic movement that established viral systems of government and judicial administration

throughout Mogadishu. In 2006, Ethiopian troops intervened to assist in re-establishing the TFG's authority by expelling the Islamists from Mogadishu out of concern for religious extremism and sensitivity to the claims of larger Somalia made by more radical elements within ICU. The insurgent movement, however, continues to pose a severe threat to the transitional process.

3.2 Clan Democracy

The clan serves as the basis for an individual's social, political, and economic organizations based on agnatic patrilineal systems. Clan affiliations existed both before and after colonization, but until 1969, when Major Siad Barre took power in a military coup, they were not a significant cause of bloodshed (Kaptenjis 2013, p.3). The president enforced communist values on society with the support of the Soviet Union. Self-declared communist President Barre curiously supported members of his own sub-clan while publicly opposing clan favoritism and nepotism (Seereo, 2003). During his rule, Barre supported the nation of comradeship and thought of clan groupings as ancient and archaic (Seereo, 2003).

The clan benefited greatly from the Siad Barre government, and this led to societal differentiation and rivalry among Somalis, which sparked the civil war in 1991. Said Barre also prevented the development of civil society, which contributed to Somalia's complete failure (Harvey, 2003), (Elmi, 2004), and (Farah, 2002). President Barre was forced into exile after the USC (United Small Congress), and SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement), overthrew his destructive and polarizing clan politics and took control of Mogadishu in December 1990 and January 1991. But USC officials developed a stance that equated all Somalis with Darood (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p.7). The clan structure, which president Barre saw as a barrier to growth, was excluded by the Somali state after it gained independence, leading it to view itself as a liberated democratic state. Since clan politics are incomplete with the modern state's liberal democratic norms, the state forbade their use among its citizens and those of other states. Nevertheless, when civil conflict broke out in 1991, Fuelles turned to their tribe, which provided natural security. The clan reappears as an institution of the rule of law, offering its Somali clan members services akin to those of the state (Elmi, 2014).

Ever since the state's dissolution in 1991, Somalia has been subject to global governance principles (Menchaus, 2014). The United Kingdom (UK) government called a meeting in May 2012 in London, UK, to ask the Somali transitional federal government (TGF) to conclude its term and be ready for elections after extensive failed peace negotiations and the establishment of a transitional administration. The next step was a civil society gathering in Istanbul, Turkey, when

representatives from various Somalia sectors gathered to debate the role of civil society in the country's reconstruction. Dealing with the concept of "many governments within in a government" presents the electoral team with a significant conundrum. This is due to the fact that each federal state runs on its own. Additionally, the element of the clan and sub-clan power politics is added by the nomadic model of hierarchical leadership, which places a clan elder in a position of leadership.

By incorporating the elders, it is hoped to encourage a sense of power-sharing between the rival clans. However, this procedure accentuates favoritism and clan loyalty. There are worries that traditional leaders or federal presidents could sway election results by abusing their position of influence. There is also worry that corruption is encouraged by the absence of accountability and openness in the nomination of traditional elders. In fact, reports of certain presidential candidates buying their way to office have already surfaced.

3.3 Democracy Rule in Somalia

According to Carothers, when promoting democracy abroad, proponents use tools, theories, and templates (Carothers, 1999). In Somalia, these interventions have succeeded in re-creating dependent entities that are answerable to the donors. Civil society and the phantom state, which are created as prerequisites to democracy, have a paradoxical relationship in which they are more answerable to their sponsors than to their constituents (Chandler, 2006). Moreover, it is believed that a democratic society must have citizen engagement, free and fair elections, and an open administration (Carothers, 1991).

3.3.1 Democracy Support

The most crucial tool for advancing democracy, according to political scientist Thomas Carothers (2000), is aid. The nations must embrace non-interventionist political strategies in order to repair their frail institutions through reliable mechanisms like non-governmental organizations (NGO) (Reno, 2000, p.287).

Bilateral financing is provided to NGOs like NDI by the US, the UK, and Norway. Their upbeat worry relates to financial availability. Without the contributor's consent, nothing can be implemented programmatically. Carothers (1999), p.104, states that the US. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which then funds organizations like NDI, is one of the government agencies through which aid is funneled.

As a result of the neo-liberal structural adjustment programs' failure, the bilateral donors changed their strategy, creating "the new assistance architecture" (Mosse and Lewis, 2005). The states abide by political conditions requiring them to support the multiparty strengthening of their state and civil society and changing election processes (Herbeson J, 2000).

2013 saw the establishment of a stability fund by the international community during a summit in London for Somalia. Major donors from western states attempted to plan Somalia's reconstruction on a global scale by creating the stability fund. In his remarks at the conference, the president of Somalia emphasized the benefits the young nation needed from the conflict. "However, as you will hear over the course of the next few hours, we have come to London to present to you our comprehensive strategies for overcoming these difficulties. Our military is currently being rebuilt. Our police force has undergone restructuring and development. Our justice system is undergoing an overhaul. Our methods for managing public finances are also undergoing transformation. We are causing Somalia to go from emerging to recovering, and then from recovering to developing. How can foreign policy become reputable? How do their programs enlist users who are free to collaborate, own anything, or participate? Lewis and Moses (2005). Is bureaucracy a source of guidance for organizations like NDI?

3.3.2 Politics Discourse

The language of democracy regards the state and civil society as important development instruments, models, and ideas, hence these identities were lacking. However, aid has adopted a new strategy known as "governmentality" due to the unpopularity of the structural adjustment initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s (Carothers, 1999). Ferguson (2002), Gould (2005), Green (2003), Herbason J (2000), Lewis and Mosse (2006), and (Menkhaus, 2014).

The principle of cooperation, participation, and ownership are used in Somalia's democratic system. Theories of development make up a discourse in which knowledge and power are concealed by traits that suggest advancements. The goal of development is to comprehend why so many nations lack basic amenities and how these deficiencies can be either eliminated (as in the case of poverty) or enhanced (as in the case of democracy) (Ferguson, 2002). (Fleam, 1997; Mosse & Lewis, 2005). Discourse, in the view of Foucault, produces means of defining truth and knowledge. In his opinion, discourse should be seen as a collection of discontinuous parts whose functions are neither steady nor uniform (Foucault, 1990 p-100).

According to him, the norms and practice of discourse establish a constrained environment in which a specific type of knowledge, like democracy, can be absorbed (Patey J, 2002).

According to the worldwide Britannica, democracy is "government by the people." The word is coined from the Greek word demos (people), which is divided into demos (people) and kracia (rule). However, the term "democracy" is used to define a form of representative government in which the government representatives were chosen through free and fair elections (Birch, 2007). The definition of democracy as a feature of a modern state that then acts to further democracy is called "democracy discourse."

3.4 Party System in Somalia

The clan is still regarded as the most important institution in Somalia. The division of the three most powerful Positions-President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament – among the Hawiye, Darood, and Rahuwen clans is the most recent formal and informal power-sharing arrangement. For years, there have been various formal and informal power-sharing arrangements to accommodate various clan families and interests.

Somalia's laws and political system must be adjusted in such a way that clan families and their traditional leaders can still influence political and political debates to prevent the emergence of clan parties that could lead to disaster. It paralyzes transitional democracy.

3.5 Rule of Law in Somalia

No clear division of powers exists in Somalia, regardless of whether a region is under FGS or FMS authority. There has been some progress in the creation of important governmental institutions, and in some instances, it appears that the role of the various ministries is more clearly defined. However, the independence of these powers is hindered by nepotism, corruption, and clan-based decision-making.

The judicial system is ineffective, and the parliament's legislative powers are still meager. In Somalia, while there is a considerably clearer separation of powers, the executive has a strong tendency to have significant influence over both the legislative and judicial branches of government. There is no generalized rule of law in the nation, and the circular legal systems are still developing, understaffed, and frequently accused of corruption. The official court system in Somalia operates concurrently with two other legal systems: customary law and Islamic sharia law, which are located in different areas and are applied by various courts.

Only 13% of respondents to a study conducted in Mogadishu in 2014 said that had used trust courts; the other 48% said they had used customary processes, and they had used religious ones. As a result, the capacity of the court's staff is typically poor, and most judges and prosecutors lack official qualifications.

3.6 Electoral Justice System in Somalia

The National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) is tasked by the constitution with resolving electoral disputes. The commission will establish an electoral justice team, headed by some designated legal experts, to accept complaints regarding elections and set up a procedure for hearing cases. Four more selected members will make up the. The entire commission will next hear the team's recommendation before making a decision on each case by majority vote.

3.7 Electoral Operations under the Electoral System in Somalia

Elections campaigns in Somalia are steps that must be taken to create a legal frame work. These are influenced by many key variables such as voter turnout, voter satisfaction, electoral integrity, violent electoral disputes, and legitimacy of results. It is therefore important that the government properly plans and conducts operations in its four main areas: (a)Voter education (b) voting (c) aggregation, (e) result reporting, and certification. Not only will this lead to successful free, fair elections at the end of the election, but it will also reduce and/or reduce pre-and post-election violence.

3.7.1 Distinct Election Procedure

Somalia's electoral system is distinctive and fascinating. A one-person, the one-vote election has not yet been made possible. Clan elders thus serve as the people's representatives when choosing the members of parliament who ultimately choose the president. According to the 2012 constitution, elections for officeholders must take place by the year 2020. A total of 14,025 voters will select the 275 members of parliament in 2016 using a secret ballot. These electoral delegates are chosen from each community by 135 traditional elders.

There were only 135 traditional elders who chose the members of the parliament in the 2012 elections, which is one of the key changes. More Somalis than ever before will take part in the process this year.

The election will be used to choose the members of the two chambers of parliament. 2012 saw the election of a parliament with just one house.

Four years ago, Mogadishu was the only site where the parliament met to vote. This year, there will be voting in at least six places around the country.

The federal Indirect Election Implementation Team is in charge of the supervision, overall planning, and uniformity of the electoral process across all states. Making sure the election is transparent and dealing with a clan and regional politics will be among of the biggest obstacles it faces.

3.8 Cash: Limited and Uncertain

The fact that Somalia lacks financial independence is another important concern. It receives its funding from donors or the global community. International parties have agreed to contribute roughly 60% of the necessary funds in the case of these elections, including the US and the EU. However, even with assistance, the Federal Reserve faces a considerable financial burden. Especially in light of the protection the nation will be required to offer for the electoral team during the entire procedure.

The primary threat to security comes from AL-Shabaab, a Somali militant organization, which has increased its bombing campaigns. Al-Shabaab attacks and assassinations are expected to rise throughout the election period. As a result, the traditional elders will be the target of their threats and attempts at manipulation. The government's primary attention will be on the election, which they will also exploit.

CHAPTER FOUR: SWOT ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

4.0 Introduction

The Somalia political election system's SWOT analysis includes its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. The fact that Somalia has persevered through these difficulties, which are essential to the African nation's success, must also be noted.

4.1 Strength of the Political and Electoral System

There have been several parliaments and governments in Somalia. Each of these required three seats of the 18 pre-1991 regions, an equal number for each state (including the five, six, or seven seats each for Somaliland and Banadir), and a maximum of 54 seats in the upper house. The first assembly, the territorial council, was created in 1951 and served as a trustee for the Somali region. The Italian governor randomly and legally selected the representatives, who eventually numbered 35 as needed. Continually using closed lists and proportional representation, the election system. In 1959, elections for the second generation were held. Women and males over the age of 18 were granted universal suffrage and better electoral regulations, and they cast secret ballots to choose their representatives. Additionally, chiefs were no longer permitted to cast ballots on behalf of clan members. Closed-list elections and proportional representation were required under the new electoral legislation. The law included specific provisions to ensure that voters in a rural areas could cast ballots because the majority of Somalis were nomads. According to Millman, "rural and urban constituencies were developed as envisioned."

A significant political turning point occurred in Somalia on August 20, 2012, with the establishment of a permanent federal administration replacing the interim Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The Somali Federal Government (SFG) created its Vision 2016 political roadmap, outlining a number of tasks to be accomplished in four years, most notably finishing and translating the federal constitution and establishing a multi-party political system with national elections (one man/one vote) by 2016. (Bryden & Thomas, 2015). Following discussions and meeting with regional states including Puntland, Jubaland, and Galmudug, it was decided that this vision would be achieved in 2020 and that the 4.5 system would be implemented in this election (FP, 2016).

The clan-based power-sharing system known as system 4.5 gives Somalia's four largest clans Darood, Hawiye, Digil/Mrifle, and Dir (4) equal opportunity in terms of political representation,

with the remaining minor clans receiving half representation. (0.5) 51 electors from each MP's clan must be chosen. Then select a federal president through the two legislatures (Onyulo, 2016). Thus, the 2016 election was a step toward democracy. The 275 seats were to be decided by an electoral college made up of 51 members of each elder's clan (New African, 2016).

Clan elder participation caused rational politics to interact with local political processes. Politicians and clan elders suggested potential members of parliament, and the people backed them based on their political, economic, and military influence. Since Farmajo had a solid reputation for enacting anti-corruption measures while serving as Prime Mister, many in the diaspora and urban Somalis interpreted the outcome as a nationalistic vote against Ethiopia's participation in Somalia and as an anti-corruption (Aglionby, 2017).

Table 1 below shows various seat allocations of some Somaliland regions:

Regions	**Seat Allocations**
1. Waqooyi Galbeed	20
2. Awdal	13
3. Sahil	10
4. Togdheer	15
5. Sanaag	12
6. Sool	12
TOTAL	82 SEATS

4.2 Weakness of Somalia's Political and Electoral

For the lower house, the electoral statute establishes 275 political districts on clans and another 54 based on the 18 administrative regions that the military government abandoned. Many towns disagree with how the districts and regions are organized, and there are disagreements in the Senate on the interpretation of the relevant constitutional clauses. Politically, the government of Somalia will face a Pandora's Box of problems with the introduction of 275 clan-based political districts. The electors' rule not only made it impossible to allocate seats to places, but it also made the exclusion of five categories acceptable. First off, because male-line tribal societies are biased towards women, it will end or drastically diminish the representation of women in parliament. The order of elections is another important factor. Unlike in the past, particularly during the trusteeship

administration from 1954 to 1958, when council elections were held prior to the national elections. Since this is no longer the case, it has unintentionally legitimized the practice of executive authority appointing mayors and governors.

Contrarily, the Law governing political parties are founded on a group of constitutional clauses that support a model for integration based on citizenship. In this instance, it is important to note that the political party system as a whole places importance on choosing candidates via a party-based voting method. The aforementioned indicates that these actions have caused a crisis in politics and elections in many regions. Various suggestions have also been offered for their HIPS-outlined electoral alternatives for 2020, including:

1. The Baydhabo idea
2. Kismayo's suggestion
3. MELP (Modified Enhanced Legitimacy Proposal)
4. CCP (Clan Constituency Proposal).

The entire aforementioned proposal has merit and offers a number of models for political parties to use when choosing their stakeholder candidates ahead of or during elections. It also identifies the type of sharing formula that should be applied by and allocated to participants in political districts. There are, however, many mistakes that go wrong, some of which are given below:

1. Absent gradualism
2. Party system's shortcomings
3. Does not address unresolved problems in other areas, such as Mogadishu and Somaliland
4. Increases corruption's likelihood or frequency
5. Not possible because there isn't a political consensus among political-party players.
6. It does not keep gender quotas in place.

4.2.1 Identifying the Root Causes of the Conflict

The battle, one of the most important wars since World War II, has caused the displacement of tens of thousands of soldiers, the disruption of vital infrastructure, and the disruption of the economic production base of more than 10 million people. In both countries, it has mercilessly rolled back recent milestones in political, social, and economic development. In this regard, the religious leaders suggested that in order to find lasting solutions to the issue, it is necessary to pinpoint the conflict's underlying origins, rather than just its outward manifestations. Some of the

actions that required discussion during the meeting include the following: Creating organizational, conceptual, and analytical components to examine and resolve the conflict's underlying causes in order to promote long-term peacemaking and the effective use of conflict resolution techniques; identifying the underlying causes of the violence will help in the development of frameworks for lasting peace in Somalia. Removing barriers to the parties' ability to communicate effectively locating potential peacemakers, establishing a reasonable mediation schedule, and assessing the achievements and failures of mediation.

4.2.2 Develop a Culture of Constituency for Peace in Somalia

The best way for both countries to organize their people for peace and foster an atmosphere of tranquility and coexistence must be discussed. To achieve this, religious leaders must engage in discourse about the best approaches to Educate the people about the need for wisdom in dialogue relating to the dispute; Encourage citizens to refrain from using haughty propaganda that denigrates and demonizes racial groups; bolster abilities to combat disrespects for all occasions of civilizations, religious, and human ties; Create a methodology for the psychosocial rehabilitation of refugees, returnees, and former service members.

4.3 Opportunities in Somalia's Political and Electoral System

The Horn of Africa's Somalia is a country with Mogadishu as its capital. It is also referred to as the Federal Republic of Somalia. A fairly well-liked party system is used in Somalia, which has a federal parliamentary republic government. One of the members of the easternmost region of Africa, Somalia holds a significant geopolitical location between sub-Saharan Africa and the nations of Arabia and Southern Asia. The nation has faced challenges and battled on numerous occasions, and because of this, it has a great chance of avoiding disintegration and division in the wake of numerous election crises and political conflicts over the years. As a result, regional nations and other African Nations have gotten involved in these issues to find amicable and long-lasting solutions to the Somalia crisis. A secure environment for its citizens, the rule of law, equal participation chances for all areas, and other factors have made effective governance necessary and contributed to the political reform of the government.

4.4 Threats to the Political and Electoral System of Somalia

Political disagreements surrounding the elections in Somalia pose a threat to the countries and the Horn of Africa's overall peace and stability. On September 17, 2020, all parties agreed to use an indirect (delegate model) electoral system; nevertheless, the agreement ultimately fell through and created serious problems, as evidenced by the events of February 19, 2021. The supervision of polling places in Jubaland, one of the regional regions has recently been the subject of a particularly delicate argument in Somalia involving the division of responsibilities between the Federal and Regional governments.

Other dangers to Somalia's system of government and elections include delegate selection and election officials' concerns over potential bias. Due to Al-Shabaab's continued presence in some regions of Somalia, the country is still at risk from the threats of terrorism. Violent clashes are also more likely when there are numerous security personnel and militias present, each of which has varying allegiances. The international community has contributed significantly to the election preparations in Somalia, but both their efforts and those of Somali individuals are currently thwarted by the current impasse.

4.5 Conflict Management: A Description of the Procedure and the Plan

It is simple to support peace in Somalia as a desirable conclusion by following the existing trend and doing so within the international community. It is therefore not difficult to formulate normative conclusions about how the ruling class ought to act if Somalia were to experience sustained peace: both the rulers and their adversaries must be answerable to and subject to the people. However, it is not so simple to conceptualize peace as a process that is balanced against strategy. This is because protagonists often view the relationships between their specific political agendas and their larger governing roles and responsibilities as straightforward relatives that can be easily reduced to the former.

We may view in Somalia, conflict resolution as a dynamic interplay between tactics and procedures in an effort to help overcome or decrease these challenges. Conflict management in Somalia can be viewed as the application of objective and critical norms, laws, and conceptions of political behavior in the actions of all parties, including both the public authorities who create and enforce the laws and regular residents. One rule's application to a certain activity is not the problem here. It also does not include transforming agent-centered reform initiatives into 'objectives' rules and norms. Instead, it is the creation or explanation of the process's components and forms via the

strategic (non-strategic) activities of different players. We reorient the Center of Analysis away from the two as distinct formations that engage in purely exterior connections with one another, emphasizing how strategy and process are both mutually formative and regulating of one another. This change in analytical emphasis serves to emphasize the crucial idea that broadly organizing more importantly, peace should be a political system than promoting it within the framework of a certain political party or administration's platform. Contrasted with steps for reforming the former, which is the main issue implemented under the direction of a particular ruling party are crucial in conflict management. These efforts can take many different forms, from efforts to draft a constitution to calling elections. However, the influence that a single party's action can have as a member of a system or field of activity oppositional groups engage in are allowed to freely participate is far greater than which impact it can have on its own. A process that is broadly inclusive should be created by articulating procedure and agency that can be maintained in it system or structure by any political party or administration functioning within it.

4.6 Process Transparency

Although the strategic actions of participants cannot be regarded in isolation from the series of constitutive factors and techniques used in the passage in Somalia, the former nonetheless maintain their relative autonomy, which may be understood accordingly. A single conflict management technique cannot adequately capture the range of actual and potential components that define process transparency. There is always "extra" potential in terms of quantity, variety, and articulation styles. History has its bounds, of course. In the economically struggling contemporary Horn of Africa, ideologically young and institutionally frail democracies cannot be expected to display the same range of features and modes of articulation as the historically rooted, enduring calm in Somalia in the West. Within the constraints imposed by history, there is still more potential for the openness of the conflict management process in nation-states than any participation method can fulfill.

4.7 Political Agency and Ideology

Agency in politics and philosophy are two separate but closely linked levels at which transparent or open processes can be examined. The former refers to the entire spectrum of important individuals, their activities, and their relationships about political transformation. Participants include both present and potential performers from both abroad and at home. The latter may be

related to groups of concepts, opinions, objectives, and problems that can be used in conflict resolution both competitively and cooperatively. It involves several ways of defining issues and various approaches to solving them. Actors and the conditions of any political event are likely to be unsure and unsettled. In comparison to rapidly changing and evolving forms, ideology and political power are less reliable organizations of actors' identities, beliefs, and aims

Politics are forced to be significantly more open as a result of this uncertainty, which can lead to peaceful situations. It will typically be distinguished by the presence of a network of organized actors and ideas; a single person or group of people typically be dominant. The prospects for political transformation and the issues with conflict resolution in relation to both organization and ideology are closed off to some extent by this determinacy. They can be understood in terms of this fundamental process tension. The aforementioned observations regarding the recognition of Somalia's conflict management issues also apply to the activities of goal-setting, task-setting, and problem-solving. Both its "issues" and its "solutions" can be viewed in great part as components, traits, and outcomes of its revolutionary context. They have developed and entered the scene as the expression and application of specific teachings. However, they have been able to translate their political projects for self-determination into ideas, objectives, and strategies for political work thanks to this extensive ideological mediation process.

It is ostensibly not applicable to conflict at this time. Everyone is aware that, given how popular peace is in Somalia right now, it is unwise to declare dictatorship to be the aim and objective of radical political movements. They may have chosen a political system to some extent while being strategically cognizant of the existing ideological "realities" in the world; nonetheless, they have not made any attempts to impose a constituent or model body of ideas, purposes, and values (Costantinos, 1996). This can be seen in the manipulation of the goals, objectives, and discourse to the point where they are more commonly used as components of a political recipe prepared by specific organizations rather than as features of a public forum for discussion and debate on conflict resolution. It manifests as a propensity to present answers in constriction, formulaic terms, largely avoiding the uncertainty of its diversification, and agreed-upon framework, and resisting the opening up of its reform goals and objectives for other formulations. As a result, the formulation of the ends which may be characterized by more openness and diversity and belong to a more nuanced branch of conflict resolution theory than any particular representations of any political group is subjected to an excessive amount of partisan closure.

4.8 Building Bridges between People, Religious Organizations, and the State

The ability of the religious institutions to build faith in the various governments of each party is crucial in realizing the goals of the two countries. If the organizations want to continue to be seen as credible by the general public and world community, they must talk about how this may be assisted. Extensive civic and peace is a key component of creating peace bridges between Somalia's people. The first and most important step in participation in peace and development is civic education, which is becoming aware of and understanding one's rights, obligations, duties, and responsibilities as a citizen as well as the immediate rules, laws, and governance structures within which one exercises citizenship. The Somalian people are united by their shared human heritage, religion, culture, and linguistic identity. The religious leaders should talk about how to use this strength in culture, spirituality, and history to advance inter-group peace and reconciliation. Building confidence and trust among the populace is essential for facilitating a process intended to bring about peace in Somalia. The active participation of grassroots organizations is essential.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

According to academic research, that takes a methodical approach, electoral violence frequently discourages Africans from voting (Bratton, 2013; Burchard, 2015). Also from the foregoing, it is inferred based on the finding that incumbent parties, among other things, discourage supporters of the opposition from voting on election day (Hafner-Burten *et al*, 2014). As a result, pre-election violence in Somalia serves as the motivation for these studies. Although pre-election violence is common in African nations, it is particularly prevalent in Somalia due to several crises that an opposition party orchestrates, including corruption and bribery of electoral officials, hiring of individuals to cause harm and unrest on election day, and others. This study also emphasizes how using electoral violence to motivate voters is a bad strategy for establishing a stable democracy. According to a study by Norris (2014), system supports is linked to perceived electoral integrity. On the other side, election fraud is found to be adversely correlated with system support by Norris (2014). This study supports these findings since it shows that those who believe that electoral violence is malpractice are less likely to support it, but people who believe that elections are fair and honest are more likely to support it and be happy with it.

Democratization of electoral system depends on if the mechanic of electoral reform is on the side of democracy, then the country will move towards a better political stability.

There have been many examples in the literature on how to democracy electoral system of a country can bring stability but unfortunately, many African counties are not in the positive side in this theory like Kenya Nigeria and so on.

Although it is necessary for every country to try to perform democratic election, now the problem is that, no matter to what extent your electoral law is, as long as you have pre-election violence in the street people are still afraid and that prohibits them from giving the right vote.

There must be some international instrument guiding and probably monitoring international survey on the election system like African unity, regional institutes, united nation etc.

The most crucial tool for advancing democracy, according to political scientist Thomas Carothers (2000), is aid the nations must embrace non-interventionist political strategies in order to repair their frail institutions through reliable mechanisms like non-governmental organizations (NGO) (Reno, 2000, p.287). this step will not be easy for country like Somalia because the government and its partners might not be Cooperate.

5.2 Recommendations

The Somalian government should:

1. Hold an election that is free from fraud and within the bounds of legal provisions that ensure that the right to vote is effectively exercised.
2. Putting in place a system of representations for upcoming elections that includes all citizens, including internally displaced people, minority populations, young people, and women.
3. Encourage the use of risk-reduction strategies to lessen the likelihood of electoral violence, such as instructing law enforcement personnel and security personnel in the right way to handle a peaceful protest.

Somali Authorities:

1. Ascertain that swift investigations into all assaults and instances of physical intimidation are conducted by independent, tr
2. trustworthy, and unbiased parties.
3. Make sure that any new legislation makes special provisions to encourage access for women, members of underrepresented groups, and young people to run for office and to protect them from discrimination.
4. Maintain the essential liberties and rights guaranteed by the Somali constitution, international law, and treaties to which Somalia is a party, including the freedoms of speech and association.
5. Make ensuring that non-discrimination and equality are incorporated in national legislation and put into practice.
6. Government and political party reforms should promote inclusion, effective involvement, and universal representation.

5.3 Area for Further Studies

The study proposes that the causes and effects of the electoral crisis in Somalia be investigated to know the harm it has caused and the measures which can be taken to reduce it completely. Also, the electoral violence and its challenges to democracy and governance in Somalia should be investigated

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