

T.C

ISTANBUL COMMERCE UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

DEPARTMENT OF AFRICAN STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MASTER'S IN AFRICAN STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN PEACE BUILDING IN SOMALIA

MA THESIS

ABDIWAHID ALI AHMED

200009869

ADVISOR : DR. LECTURER. BAŞAK ÖZORAI

ISTANBUL, 2020

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ABSTRACT

The transformation of the international system from a bipolar system to unipolar system during the 1990s substantively ended interstate wars on one hand but also saw the emergence of intrastate conflicts. The internal dynamics of these intrastate conflicts increased the complexities of peacebuilding efforts as issues of international law such as state sovereignty deterred the direct intervention of states in the internal affairs of other states. Consequently, practitioners in peacebuilding have had to rely on alternative mechanisms such as civil societies as viable partners in conflict resolution. Although civil societies have been extensively explored in peace initiatives in other parts of the world, research on civil societies in Somalia remains limited. This thesis therefore adopts an in-depth qualitative analysis of the role of civil societies in Somalia's peacebuilding initiatives. The thesis lays emphasis on thematic areas including protection of civilians from violence; monitoring of conflict; advocacy for human rights; inter-group social cohesion; socialization to peace values and democracy; facilitation of open dialogue; and as entry points for peacebuilding.

Key Words: Somalia, Civil Society, Peacebuilding, Conflict

ÖZET

1990'larda uluslararası sistemin iki kutuplu sistemden tek kutuplu sisteme dönüşümü, bir yandan devletler arasındaki savaşları önemli ölçüde sona erdirmiş, ancak aynı zamanda devletler içi çatışmaların ortaya çıkmasına da şahitlik etmiştir. Devlet egemenliği gibi uluslararası hukuka ait hususlar, devletlerin diğer devletlerin içişlerine doğrudan müdahalesini engellediğinden dolayı, bu devletler içi çatışmaların iç dinamikleri, barışı tesis etme çabalarını daha karmaşık bir hale getirmiştir. Sonuç olarak, barış tesis eden uygulayıcılar, çatışmaların çözülmesinde kullanılabilecek ortaklar olarak sivil toplumlar gibi alternatif mekanizmalara güvenmek zorunda kalmışlardır. Dünyanın diğer bölgelerindeki barış girişimlerinde sivil toplumlar kapsamlı bir şekilde araştırılmış olsa da, Somali'deki sivil toplumlarla ilgili araştırmalar sınırlı kalmıştır. Dolayısıyla bu tez, Somali'nin barışı tesis etme girişimlerinde sivil toplumların rolünün derinlemesine niteliksel bir analizini benimsemektedir. Tez, sivillerin şiddetten korunması; çatışmanın izlenmesi; insan haklarının savunulması; gruplar arası sosyal uyum; barış değerlerine ve demokrasiye doğru sosyal entegrasyon; açık diyalogun kolaylaştırılması da dahil, barış tesis edilmesi hususunda giriş noktaları olarak tematik alanlara vurgu yapmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Somali, Sivil Toplum, Barışın Tesis Edilmesi, Çatışma.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

CSOs	Civil Society Organization
EU	European Union
INGOs	International Non-governmental organizations
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
PHRNET	Peace and Human Rights Network
SNWO	Somali National Women Organization
TFG	Federal Government of Somalia
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
US	United States of America
HD	The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
COGWO	Coalition for Grassroots Women Organization
PHRN	Peace and Human Rights Network
SONSA	Somali Non-State Actors
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo.

CHAPTER ONE

ABSTRACT

The transformation of the international system from a bipolar system to unipolar system during the 1990s substantively ended interstate wars on one hand but also saw the emergence of intrastate conflicts. The internal dynamics of these intrastate conflicts increased the complexities of peacebuilding efforts as issues of international law such as state sovereignty deterred the direct intervention of states in the internal affairs of other states. Consequently, practitioners in peacebuilding have had to rely on alternative mechanisms such as civil societies as viable partners in conflict resolution. Although civil societies have been extensively explored in peace initiatives in other parts of the world, research on civil societies in Somalia remains limited. This thesis therefore adopts an in-depth qualitative analysis of the role of civil societies in Somalia's peacebuilding initiatives. The thesis lays emphasis on thematic areas including protection of civilians from violence; monitoring of conflict; advocacy for human rights; inter-group social cohesion; socialization to peace values and democracy; facilitation of open dialogue; and as entry points for peacebuilding.

Key Words: Somalia, Civil Society, Peacebuilding, Conflict

1 INTRODUCTION

The experience of European invasion, occupation and partition of Africa during the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference (Foster et al., 1988; Duthie, 2011; De Leon, 1986) paved way for the full colonization of Africa with the exception of Liberia and Ethiopia. The subsequent decolonization of the continent several decades later during the mid-twentieth century resulted in more civil wars than *civil* societies. Decades of colonial oppression and suppression did not nurture a socio-political culture that tends to institute change through a legitimising force (people) or by peaceful mechanisms such as debates, contestation or deliberation. Instead, Africa's post-colonial independence was a climate of political violence and chaos that in some instances, albeit unfortunate, resulted in genocides. According to PRIO armed conflict database, approximately 65% of all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa experienced conflict between 1946 and 2010 (Uppsala Conflict Data, 2020). Majority of these conflicts being civil wars (Cheibub & Hays, 2017; Nyadera et al., 2019).

The international community through multilateral institutions such as the UN have attempted to deploy peacekeeping missions to rebuild conflict ridden areas, several peace operations have been initiated in the present and past (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2000; Bove & Ruggeri, 2016; Johnson, 2017). More often, peacekeeping missions are followed by peacebuilding initiatives aimed at restoring a resemblance of normalcy and during the state reconstruction processes. However, the performance of the overall performance of peacekeeping missions in peacebuilding were not comprehensive enough. The dissatisfaction with the peacekeeping missions as the only mechanism in peacebuilding therefore gave rise to the emergence of civil societies peacebuilding processes.

Whereas civil societies are often associated as modern phenomenon, the idea traces its root to the classical era of philosophers such as Aristotle, John Locke and Jürgen Habermas. Increasingly, civil societies have evolved as viable frameworks to check the excess use of

power by states to oppress civilians by curtailing human rights and freedoms. As entities constituted of different actors operating independently from the state, civil societies tend to have different ideologies and approaches to peacebuilding from states. Moreover, despite this diversity and divergence in peacebuilding approaches from states, civil societies tend to often make explicit political demands on the state and also interact and operate within the framework of the laws established by the state.

In the post-World War era, civil societies have increasingly become a fundamental machinery of peacebuilding and conflict resolution particularly since the establishment of the UN Agenda for peace in 1992 that has seen civil societies play more roles in the negotiation of peace processes (Vogel, 2016; Paffenholz, 2014). In equal measure to the growth of civil societies in peace process, scholarship on the subject has also increased significantly over the last two decades (Kew&John, 2008; Vogel, 2016). This thesis therefore builds on the already existing research to explore the role of civil societies in the context of Somalia.

The increased role of civil societies in the last decade in peacebuilding and conflict resolution has been advanced by the shortcomings of the traditional mechanism of peacebuilding and conflict resolution that majorly involved military interventions in the 1990s. Studies such as Edwards (2009) and Paffenholz (2014) argue that the 1990s was the decade for civil societies and the emergence of non-state actors in conflict resolution. The traditional mechanisms of peacebuilding came under heavy criticism during this period because of the tendencies of some of the peace missions to be culturally insensitive; disregard local customs, traditions and norms; and largely ignorance of the local contexts of conflict-ridden areas (Donais, 2009; Richmond, 2005; Paris, 2002; Chandler, 1999). Constant criticism from scholars of the traditional peacekeeping mechanisms in peacebuilding influenced the international community to incorporate and support civil societies as part of their peacebuilding initiatives. Key among the arguments fronted was/is that local actors in peacebuilding are equipped with

the relevant networks, knowledge, and cultural understanding to approach critical issues from an approach that can ensure success of the peace processes or agreements. The participation of civil societies therefore is often perceived as solution of addressing the shortcomings of traditional peacekeeping initiatives such as military interventions.

This optimistic view of the role of civil societies in peacebuilding was evidenced by a wide range of scholarly works that established strong correlations between the incorporation of civil societies in peace processes and the durability of peace after conflict resolution (Kew&John, 2008) or the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement (Andersen-Rodgers, 2015). But even more significantly, the involvement of civil societies also aids in countering any accusations that peacebuilding missions are nothing more than enclaves of neo-colonialism. Several reports released by the UN (2005; 2012) document that civil societies are crucial in peacebuilding as they legitimize the processes and projects; mediate between state and conflict groups; communicate with the international community; highlight the perspective and priorities of local communities; and implement tangible peacebuilding programmes

.However, advocacy for civil society organizations has not been without opposition. Critics of this perspective to peacebuilding argued that civil society lacked independence and instead, are merely the implementers of Western agendas at the local level (MacGinty& Richmond, 2013; Jenkins, 2001; Hawthorn, 2001).

1.1 Research Problem

For three decades since 1991, Somalia has been embroiled in a prolonged civil conflict that has gradually transformed leading to loss of lives, displacement of communities and destruction of properties. Despite being a nation-state i.e. the composition of the state is dominated by a single ethnic group (Somalis), the conflict is yet to come to an end (Menkhaus, 2007). There has been a proliferation of actors not only in the form of militia and terrorist groups, but also external factors such as regional organizations, and other states

pursuing different goals and interests (Abbinik, 2008). As such, there has is the need for civil societies to intervene in the conflict as neutral actors focused only on achieving the ultimate goal of peacebuilding in Somalia. The concept of civil society and peacebuilding is quite diverse Nonetheless, involving civil societies in peacebuilding establishes a strong platform for the development of resilient peace. The operations of local governments, police or military forces, cannot proceed smoothly if local communities are not involved or their concerns adequately addressed (UNDP, 2013). In the context of Somalia, a report by the United Nations Development Programme (2015) highlights that any progress towards peace in Somalia will require the collaboration, cooperation and trust between local population and the authorities. Additionally, any peace process will require understanding between the different clans in Somalia with a special focus on challenges facing youths and their potential in peacebuilding in Somalia. However, recent studies (Warsame, 2017;Stearns & Sucuoglu, 2017; Nyadera et al., 2019; Emil &Philip, 2020)tend to focus on the evaluation of peacebuilding through regional organizations such as the African Union and role of independent external actors such as Turkey. These studies emphasize on peacebuilding from the basis of intervention without taking into consideration the role played by civil societies and how their contributions have impacted peace efforts at various stages. This thesis will therefore attempt to bridge this gap by focusing on the impact of civil societies are various stages of peacebuilding such as protection, monitoring, service delivery, socialization, facilitation, social cohesion, and advocacy in Somalia.

1.2 Research Questions

1. What are the main causes of prolongedcivil war in Somalia?
2. What is the contribution of civil societies in conflict resolution in Somalia?
3. How can civil societies contribute to peacebuilding?

1.3 Research Methodology

This study adopts qualitative methodology of research in the form of a desk study that appropriates secondary sources of data. Because of the reliance on these sources, the researcher uses data from peer-reviewed academic articles published by high impact journals, and books. The study is a contemporary topic and therefore the researcher lays emphasis on current data. Whereas the internet is also an important source of information, the study only appropriates data from renowned institutions such as the United Nations, European Union, African Union, World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund. However, exception is made regarding data on specific civil society organizations that can only be obtained from respective websites.

1.4 Limitations of the Study

This study is limited in terms of the data resources used to provide an analysis of the topic. The constant threat of insecurity posed by terror organizations such as Al-Shaabab has limited the scope of data collection particularly primary sources of data. As such, the study has heavily depended on secondary sources of data.

1.5 Significance and Structure of the Study

This study concern about the role of civil society in peace building ,the study will contribute to the body of the knowledge about the role civil society organizations in maintaining long last peace. The findings may also contribute literature that may be used by the academicians that are interesting to carry out for further study in this field. The study maybe reference for policy makers, researchers ,students, NGOs and even other people who have close interest on effect of civil society in peace building ,especially the study may be helpful for the Somalia federal Government (SFG) ,especially Ministry of society affairs and Human Right, Ministry of National Planning and Ministry of justice to take positive actions to civil society in peace building and also Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),both National

and International Researchers on the subject matter will also refer this study as a literature review.

The thesis is organised into four chapters.

Chapter one provides a brief introduction about the emergence of civil societies as an alternative framework of peacebuilding in fragile or states embroiled in conflicts. In this endeavour the chapter establishes a conclusion that civil societies continue to be conceived and indeed operate, from a reflection of a ‘western idea’ even though in fragile states, distinguishing civil societies from states can be blurry. The chapter argues that existing debates on civil societies often overlook how civil societies can be strengthened and delineated from corrosive politicization that may hamper their performance in peacebuilding. Debates that emphasize on the localization, independence, and cultural specificity of civil societies ignored the how the political voices from within which civil societies are established, are socially engineered. Consequently, political culture of society and in this context, Somalia is expected to provide a new insight. This will assist in rethinking ways by which civil societies can be approached outside the ‘Western’ conceptualizations. The chapter also provides details on research methodology, significance of the study, literature review, and theoretical framework.

Chapter two discusses the conflict in Somalia. To better under the role of civil societies, the chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the Somalia conflict by looking at the underlying causes of the conflict, its manifestation, why the conflict has been ongoing for over three decades, and its impact on the Somali society. This context is significant as it will provide an understanding of the kind of environment that civil societies within Somalia operate. Secondly, it will foreshadow what may perhaps be considered as intervention points for civil societies in peacebuilding and the best approach or mechanisms of peacebuilding for Somalia.

Chapter three highlights the role of civil organizations as avenues of protection of civilians from violence; monitoring of conflict; advocacy for human rights; inter-group social cohesion; socialization to peace values and democracy; facilitation of open dialogue; and as entry points for peacebuilding. Then chapter then provides an in-depth analysis of civil society organizations within Somalia and what impact they have had on peacebuilding. This will be evaluated through critical analysis of the various programmes and interventions conducted by the civil societies operating in Somalia.

Chapter four focuses on the findings, discussion, conclusion, and recommendation of the study.

1.6 Contextualizing Somalia

Somalia is located at the horn of Africa along the Indian Ocean and has the longest coastline in Africa measuring 3,333 kilometres. It stretches northward to the Gulf of Eden and occupies an important geostrategic route between Sub-Saharan Africa, Arabia and Southwestern Asia. During the colonial era, Somalia has been divided into five regions namely : French Somaliland (Djibouti) ,British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, Ethiopia (Ogaden), and the Kenyan northern Frontier district . As of 2019, the population of Somalia was estimated to be 15, 552,358.



Figure 1: Map of Somalia

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); USAID

While the Somalis fall under the same category of a tribe, they are nonetheless very segmented in several groups or clans and are estimated to be 99.9% Muslims. Economically, pastoralism, farming, fishing and remittance from Somalis living overseas are the biggest drivers of the economy.

2 Philosophical Background of Civil Societies

In an increasingly globalised world, civil societies have become associated with universal values such as good governance, human rights and democracy. Civil society groups have become part and parcel of discussions at both national, regional, and international levels.

According to Bisley (2007), there has been a dramatic growth and influence of civil societies seeking to drive a global agenda that identify human interests as common and not just nationalistic. World Bank (2010) defines civil societies as:

“The wide array of non-governmental and non-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious, or philanthropic considerations. Civil societies therefore encompass a wide array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations and foundations.”

However, civil societies have underwent significant evolution. Mainstream discussions on civil society point towards two narratives. First, civil societies emerged from the public discourse on civility and barbarity (Farrington, 2008) within the context of communities. Secondly, civil society narratives or conceptualization from the 18th and 19th century illustrates characterizes civil societies as complex and modern beyond the boundaries of civility but within the confines of democratic values.

Historically, the concept of civil society is associated with ancient Greek and Roman societies. Aristotle, who is an ancient Greek philosopher, argued that true fulfilment for individuals could only be achieved by participating in civic duties in the society commonly referred to as the polis at that time¹. Aristotle coined the concept of political community that stressed on civic virtues and participation of the good citizen in the politics of the polis because man was purposed to coexist in different communal environments within the polis. According to (Maier & Denzer, 1968) the polis as conceived by Aristotle represented a community of citizens coming together to achieve a virtuous and better life in a civil society or community. This approach became the foundation upon which civil societies became organized. Nonetheless, studies such as Schmidt (2007) and Adloff (2005) appreciate that

¹The Greek word polis (πόλις) means urban community as well as the ancient Greek city-state.

Aristotle's understanding of the civil society rested on the assumption that civil societies constituted males and free citizens who had acquired enough wealth and could create free time to deal with politics of the polis and in extension, public issues.

During the Middle Ages, the views held by Aristotle about civil society came under criticism particularly from Augustinus (354-430) who associated civil society with sin because it was characterised by self-interests and conflict. The polis which Aristotle had equated to civil society was perceived as evil. Augustinus argued that 'good' could only be from God and not through political participation as argued by Aristotle (Kaiser, 1969). However, it was the later translation of Aristotle's work in the 13th and 14th centuries from Greek to Latin by St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) that new understanding and interpretation of civil society was established. In Aquinas philosophy of civil society and transcendent community in God, just like Aristotle's, civil society was still associated with the state albeit with more choices of socialization and rules if compared to the ancient era.

In the 17th century, John Locke (1632-1704) was the first philosopher to emphasize that civil society is independent from the state. John Locke argued that individuals form communities to develop their social life and that the state has no right or say because the environment is un-political. As such, the primary role of such as civil society is to safeguard the rights and freedoms of individuals against the state or any intended interference of the state (Schade, 2002; Merkel & Lauth, 1998).

Another philosopher, Charles de Montesquieu (1689-1755) just like John Locke, advanced his framework on separation of powers between what he referred to as a political society (governs the interaction between the state and government) and civil society (regulates interactions amongst citizens). However, Montesquieu emphasizes that there ought to be a between social networks and state authority where the government (state) is regulated by law and limited by

the influence of independent organizations that operate both inside and outside the political order (Merkel & Lauth, 1998).

Alexander de Tocqueville (1805-1859) is perhaps one of the most significant theorists of the civil society concept through his extensive works (Tocqueville, 1982; 1996; Offe & Tocqueville, 2005) on how civil society organizations influence or are influenced by government. Tocqueville's conception of civil societies is founded on the idea of voluntary non-political societies or organizations that support and advance the course of democracy by undermining any attempts of tyranny of the dominant groups (Gabelaia, 2016). Tocqueville argues that these organizations or societies should be established on a voluntary basis from local, regional and national levels so that civic virtues such as trust, tolerance and honesty are integrated into the character of individuals (Putnam, 2000).

Renowned philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) provided a Marxist perspective of civil society by emphasizing on the probable role of opposition because they can act as 'public rooms' that are distinct from the state and markets where ideologies are contested. Gramsci argued that civil society is constituted of various organizations and ideologies which can both uphold and challenge existing political order. Gramsci's idea of civil society influenced opposition and resistance against dictatorships in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Lewis, 2002).

German philosopher Jürgen Habermas concentrated on the role of civil society within the public discourse. He argued that the function of highlighting the interests of the political cannot be completely left to political parties and as such, minority or marginalized groups need to develop mechanisms through which they can articulate their issues. Secondly, these alternative platforms in the form of civil society can assist political parties to get reliable and informed public opinion outside the confines of power structures (Habermas, 2015).

These philosophical roots that underlie the historical development of civil society demonstrate that to a large extent, civil society is almost exclusively a Western concept that is deeply tied to the historical political emancipation of citizens from the feudal states particularly during the 18th and 19th centuries. Alternative understanding of civil society that might have existed outside these feudal states including at different time are not yet reflected in the internal discourses or debates about civil society (Pouligny, 2005). Consequently, Lewis (2002) argues that there is still debate whether the concept of civil society that is largely Westernised can be transferable to non-Western states experiencing varying levels of democracy and operating under different economic models.

3 Literature Review

3.1 Civil Societies in Africa

According to a study by Gyimah-Boadi (1996), civil societies were in the forefront of pushing the democratization agenda in Africa during the 1990s. Despite the great significance of donors who provided substantial funding to these organizations and external influences such as the collapse of communism, it was the dedication and commitment of civil societies in the continent that started and sustained this transition from dictatorships to democracy. They became the drivers for political change in advocating for multiparty politics; respect for human rights and freedoms; preparations for competitive elections; and decriminalization of dissent against governments (Huntington, 1991).

A study by Lewis (2002), explores the question on the relevance of civil societies within the context of Africa. Lewis identifies four possible contexts in which civil societies can be relevant to Africa. First, he argues that civil societies are relevant in the context of an idea as part of political processes that support the universalist values such as democratization and respect for human rights and freedoms. Towards this endeavour, several civil society

organizations have emerged at local, national, regional and international levels to support and strengthen democratizations efforts. Secondly, Lewis (2002) also argues that perhaps civil societies may prove irrelevant to the African context because the circumstance at which the idea of civil society emerged in modern Europe is different from the African experience. As such, civil societies may just be one amongst a long list of policy frameworks exported from Europe to Africa. Thirdly, there is an adaptive view of civil societies in Africa in the sense that while the concept itself is foreign, it may adopt local meaning and should not be applied or interpreted so rigidly at either the level of analysis or policy implementation. Fourth, Lewis (2002) argues that maybe asking how relevant civil societies can be in Africa is perhaps the wrong question to ask altogether. This is because it has always been significant to the question of governance and citizenship in Africa and historically, the concept was widely used during the colonial era by European powers as an organizing principle. As such, it is not a priority to debate about the universal or domestic realities but rather, focus should be placed on the historical processes that shaped or nurtured civil societies in Africa.

3.2 Contemporary Debates on Civil Societies

Prior to the 1980s, civil society was relatively dominant both as a concept and in practice for a better part of the 20th century (Kock, 2004). However, as the global political environment started transforming because of the eminent and ultimate collapse of Soviet Union thereby marking the end of the Cold War, civil society became involved in the new reform agenda of democratization (Potter et al., 2004). During this period, civil society organizations were largely associated with social capital as a means of promoting development by governments, international agencies and umbrella non-governmental organizations. Although providing a measure for social capital were generally vague, the general view was that social capital constituted informal norms that advance cooperation in the society and this can be compared to the civic virtues talked about by Aristotle (Potter et.al, 2003).

In contemporary times, these civic values that are important to nurture democracy cannot be taught by the state or at the open marketplace like in ancient Greek or Rome. Walzer (1992: 104) argues that, “the civility that makes democratic politics possible can only be learned in the associational networks of civil society.” Other scholars such as Friedmann & Douglass (1998) also emphasize that civil society is an important component for democratic states to thrive because the different parts of our societies are interlinked through shared cultures, history, and memories. A study by Kymlicka (2002) provides a counterargument that civil society theorists demand and expect so much from civil societies which are largely voluntary organizations and that the primary role of civil societies is not to teach democratic civic virtues. On the contrary, people only join or support civil society organizations to pursue their values or engage with people who have common interests.

3.3 Civil Societies and Development

Research in peacebuilding and development has largely emerged as a response to the recognition that conflict is interconnected with development in the sense that establishing sustainable peace in societies are dependent on broad understanding of human security and development (McCandless & Karbo, 2011). Studies by Jantzi & Jantzi (2009) highlight that sustainable peace cannot be alienated from social and economic development. However, the different approaches to peacebuilding and their frameworks may challenge the implementation of programmes or initiatives for peacebuilding. Nonetheless, concerning the role of civil societies in peacebuilding and development, both share common approaches such as supporting, strengthening, and intervening through other local civil society organizations as legitimate actors for external intervention efforts in peacebuilding and development. A study by Verkoren & van Leeuwen (2012) argues that during the 1980s, civil societies had emerged as viable frameworks for development as they provided alternatives to government in providing services to communities. This trend continued well into the 1990s when an increase

in the number of fragile states was witnessed. Civil societies became a central component and agent of peacebuilding and development.

3.4 Peacebuilding

The understanding of peacebuilding continues to shy off from a single universal declaration mainly because peacebuilding can be conducted at different phases during a conflict. According to Boutros-Ghali (1992), peacebuilding is a post-conflict activity and as such, denotes those actions or initiatives aiming at identifying and supporting structures that can sustain and strengthen peace within the society and minimise relapse into violence. Another definition is provided by Miller & King (2005) who argues that peacebuilding is a process of building, strengthen, and reforming socio-political and economic institutions that sustain peace. These processes can be in the form of policies, programmes and any initiatives that support peace. A study by Tschirgi (2003) highlights that the purpose of peacebuilding is to prevent and resolve conflicts, consolidate peace and promote post-conflict reconstruction activities to prevent another outbreak of conflict. Peacebuilding efforts are target both immediate and underlying causes of conflict that may include environmental, cultural, structural, social, economic and political factors. For Lederach (1997), peacebuilding is a collection of various activities that precede and follow peace agreements.

3.5 Approaches to Peacebuilding

One of the fundamental questions in peacebuilding is the approach towards reinstating peace in the society. To achieve this, flexibility and creativity of actors is critical to not only develop mechanisms and institutions to stop and prevent any future outbreak of conflict, but also to ensure that any solutions to conflict are creative, sustainable and viable (Brand-Jacobsen & Jacobsen, 2000). To this end, the nature and quality of connections or relations that people have become the epicentre of nurturing peace (Lederach, 2005) because it is these ties that

build social energy to sustain peace. The process of peacebuilding often occurs in unpredictable conditions and can further be challenged other activities, processes, social connections or people who may not share similar views. As such, actors in peacebuilding require to develop three fundamental principles that include understanding the social geography of conflict areas; think about intersections; and be flexible.

Understanding social geography involves identification of anchor points that are connected and create a framework of relations. These anchor points can be in the form of geographical localities or processes that are central to social change for groups that may not share similar views. For instance, whereas it is important to examine the role of state and its political system as well as regional and international actors, it is also necessary that analyse and understand the society and how factors such as gender, media, or religion affect people. Understanding these variables will consequently expose the anchor points as contribute towards the establishment of a long-lasting or a peacebuilding model that is resilient for a particular context.

Secondly, thinking about intersections denotes the identification of building networks or relations that link the various relational aspects of anchor points together. These intersections are key in peacebuilding approaches because they create, strengthen and bind social spaces where individuals with similar or different views often interact naturally sometimes without noticing. These intersections can be found in schools, public transport areas, marketplaces or sports club. Powers (2010) highlights that this is true for religious institutions because often, they are deeply anchored within communities and represent a complex web of relations cutting across economic, social and political issues.

The third principle on flexibility refers to the ability to be able to adjust, adapt, respond and exploit emerging and context-based challenges (Lederach, 2005). Peacebuilders often pursue solutions hoping that they will permanent for any social or political change instead of

establishing self-sustaining platforms that can respond to changing environments through generation of creative processes and ideas that sustain peace. Indeed, in conflicts, peace builders can only rely on the fact that there are always emerging obstacles, issues and challenges and the most preferred means of addressing these difficulties is through permanent adaptation or flexibility.

As such peacebuilding approaches should also incorporate mechanisms and approaches that can guarantee peace through developing structures that can facilitate psychological healing and structural changes necessary to overcome injustices. Several scholars (Cheldelin&Druckman, 2003; Botes, 2003), argue that peacebuilding approaches therefore need to emphasize on inclusion the communities and institutional reforms to enhance social change and empowerment. Civil societies therefore become a critical component of this process as they can play critical roles in training, organizing sensitization programmes and acting as local peace commissions.

4 Analytical Framework

This thesis adopts a framework developed by Paffenholz and Spark (2010) on the role of civil societies in peacebuilding. During the 1990s, while the debate on the role of civil society dominated international discussions it was rather unclear the extent to which civil societies could be ideal for peacebuilding. Paffenholz and Spark conduct several analyses of conflicts and did the first testing of this framework in 2007 whereby some limitations were identified. The framework was again revised and four elements that include context, assessment, functions and conclusion. Regarding the context, it was identified that an analysis of country case be conducted by considering the social, political, cultural, economic, regional and global factors (Paffenholz, 2010). The aspect of 'functions' highlights seven potential roles that civil organizations can play in peacebuilding. These include facilitation; advocacy; protection;

socialization; monitoring; service delivery; and social cohesion. As facilitators, civil society can bridge communication between the state and the society or between various groups in the society that may be in conflict with each other. In advocacy, civil societies can bring up social, political, cultural and economic issues as part of the public agenda in the form of informal or government-linked advocacy. Protection largely involves safeguarding the public (communities) from overreach of government authority through establishing 'safe zones' or providing humanitarian assistance. Civil society groups can also play the role of monitoring through cooperation either with the state or other external non-state actors such as regional organizations to provide early-warning systems especially in areas that are prone to political or religious violence. The socialization role of civil societies pertains supporting and strengthening democratic attitudes amongst members of the community. Social cohesion entails supporting courses that help improve bridging of ties so that people can coexist in harmony. Lastly, service delivery involves providing humanitarian support that can be in the form of food or other basic goods and commodities. The element of assessment provides and overall analysis of all the seven functions. A comprehensive analysis is conducted through examining each of the seven functions by looking at the context, relevance, activities of the civil society and the effectiveness of such activities. Preceding this assessment is the conclusion that provides a general overview of the assessment of the functions collectively and how they contribute to peacebuilding (Paffenholz, 2010). This thesis will however concentrate on the element of 'function' as the basis of analysing the role of civil societies in peacebuilding in Somalia. Each function is analysed independently by evaluating the activities of civil organizations in Somalia towards such a particular role. The two elements of assessment and conclusions is not addressed due to the limitation of secondary sources of data which forms the basis of this research.


CHAPTER TWO

CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

5 Overview of the Conflict

Conflict in Somalia can be traced back to the collapse of the Somalia government in 1991. Armed rebels overthrew the government of Siad Barre. However, the collapse of the government in 1991 was the culmination of a sequence of political events both at the domestic and regional level that weakened the state of Somalia. Among these political events of experiences is the impact of colonial legacy. First, the partition of Africa into several states led to the division of Somalis into several other states such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia. This led to tense relations between Somalia and regional neighbours particularly Ethiopia largely due to an ambitious ideology of Somali nationalism in the form of a Greater Somalia that included those in other sovereign states such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.

Figure 2: Somalia Territorial Claims



On the domestic front, this nationalist ideology influenced a military build-up by Somalia in the hope of challenging regional neighbours to 'recover' Somali territories. This also saw

Somalia oppose the Cairo Declaration of 1964 established by the African Union to sanctify colonial borders as sovereign (Koko, 2007). In pursuit of this nationalist ideology, Somalia went to war with Ethiopia over territorial boundaries in 1977 , Somalia was close to achieve their strategic goal to that war but external actor such as Russia and Cuba gave help to Ethiopia that caused the defeat of Somalia .Defeat of Somalia to Ethiopia led to domestic political challenges as the government came under heavy criticisms

Also linked to colonial legacy is the system of governance that Somalia inherited at independence. The European-styled system of power distribution centralised in political elites was completely different from the Somali traditional power structure that was distributed in a clan structure. As such, political tensions were already rife between the national government and the leadership of the clans. This was exacerbated by the existing differences between clans some (Mudgu) of which received preferential treatment during the colonial administration particularly of the Italians and were therefore more empowered than other clans. According to Osman (2007), the promotion of members from ‘special’ clans in different regions during colonial administration gave them exposure and at independence, the new government of Somalia as largely dominated by members of these clans. Other clans particularly from Northern Somalia complained of marginalization and suppression by the government. This ultimately led to emergence of secessionist struggle that ultimately led to the declaration of independence by Somaliland from Somalia in 1991. Somaliland is however yet to receive international recognition in the United Nations.

The clan is the most significant social, political and economic structure in the Somali society. While in other African countries ethnicity forms the basic level of identity, Somalis identify themselves based on their clans. However, the politicization of the clan during and after the colonial era transformed the clan structure to a platform where political an economic power struggles are founded. During the reign of Siad Barre, clannism was extensively exploited to

enable some clans dominate national political and economic discourses while other clans experienced marginalization and suppression (Wam&Sardesai, 2005). Following increased opposition to Siad Barre's government after the Ogaden war that saw Somalia defeated and another attempted coup against his regime in 1978, Siad Barre resorted to dictatorial practices in an attempt to consolidate power. This only led to further clashes between the government and clans suspected to have been behind the attempted coup (Ahmed, 1999; Abdullah, 2007).

In as much as colonial legacies has played a role in the emergence and sustaining the conflict, it is perhaps the political and economic factors surrounding the government of Siad Barre prior to 1991 that led to the collapse of Somali as a state. Some of these include: the dependency of Somalia on its Cold War allies for basic developmental needs; the failing social economic policies of the government; a corrupt and oppressive government; and regional politics. It is noteworthy that the government of Somalia at independence was established through democratic elections until it was overthrown by Siad Barre in 1969 (Abdullahi, 2007). Even though this coup enjoyed some elements of public legitimacy in the earlier years due to revival of the dwindled economy, the government soon lost this legitimacy due to its authoritarian tendencies. Osman (2006: 44) argues that "the new regime curtailed freedoms and banned all social and political organizations, exercised heavy-handedness on the opposition and practiced extrajudicial detentions and persecution." Multiparty politics was suspended, and all the post-independence democratic achievements reversed, and the regime became more dependent on external political and military support to sustain itself instead of internal political legitimacy.

6 Manifestation of the Conflict

The collapse of the government of Siad Barre in 1991 marked the collapse of key institutions of governance. The consequent vacuum of power established by the lack of a legitimate power

structure led to the emergence of new actors such as warlords and militia groups backed by different clan factions and fighting for the control of resources all over the country. According to Healy and Bradley (2010), between 1991-1992, the resulting power struggles between different political actors in the country led to the displacement of over 1.5 million people and another 25,000 people who lost their lives. The extent of the conflict is best captured by the Failed State Index where Somalia has consistently ranked as the top country between 1992-1995 (Hansen, 2013; Daniels, 2012). Between the same period, the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorised the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNISOM) to address peacekeeping. Another UN resolution 794, was passed to establish The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) which is a multinational force sanctioned by the UN to address dire humanitarian crisis that had led to the death of over 300,000 people because famine and war (Nyadera et al., 2019).

However, the presence of military forces under the UNISOM and UNITAF despite being received well by the locals, later experienced hostility. This change in attitude was largely due to propaganda propagated by armed groups and individuals in the country who alleged that external intervention was part of a scheme to convert Somalis into Christians (Nyadera et al., 2019; Muravchik, 2005). This shift in attitude towards peacekeepers, increasing threats and insecurities to aid workers, and the shooting of an American Black Hawk helicopter that caused the death of US marine soldiers led to the withdrawal of aid workers and withdrawal of funds in 1995 thereby exposing civilians to bigger humanitarian and security risks.


After more than 15 years of violence since the collapse of the Somalia government during a that was characterised by fighting, anarchy, criminality, impunity and injustice, a new actor emerged in Somalia in the form of the Islamic Court Union (ICU) in 2006. This organization was established as a civil society organization comprised of businessmen to counter the warlords and other militia groups who had occupied Mogadishu (capital city of Somalia) by

striving at restoring some elements of law and order (Swart, 2007). The Sharia courts which were established by ICU were to judicate over cases of crime, oversee provision of education, healthcare service and basic public services.

However, the ICU evolved into a religious fundamentalist with a military wing that later became known as al-Shaabab. From 2006, al-Shaabab militants conducted attacks, assassination of political leaders and supported the ICU non-military wing to win influence over the US-backed Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (APRCT) (Íngiriis, 2018). The complete capture of Mogadishu by ICU and the defeat of warlords who had been controlling the capital city for over a decade was largely due to the tactical ability of al-Shaabab who had undergone military training as well the national exposure of the ICU which granted it more support from the locals too (Menkhaus, 2007).

A study by Nyadera et al., (2019) documents that the Somali conflict has transformed over time from being a civil war to include terrorism by the al-Shaabab terror organization. Whereas regional efforts to restore peace in Somalia has since returned, terrorism has now emerged to threaten any element of peace and security as well as reconciliation efforts in Somalia. The terrorist group has been involved in the death of thousands of Somalis as they seek to enforce Sharia law and establish an exclusive Islamic state in Somalia.

Figure 3: Al-Shaabab attacks and fatalities in Somalia (2007-2017)



Source: ACLED

7 Conflict Reconciliation Efforts

The conflict in Somalia has been on the focus of both local, regional and international actors who have repeatedly attempted to establish a peace agreement outside other existing military interventions between different actors involved in the conflict to restore law and order. Since the collapse of the government and outbreak of conflict in Somalia, there has been four major peace efforts initiated through the regional organization IGAD. However, these efforts are yet to exhibit or yield the intended result of ending conflict in Somalia.

7.1 Djibouti Peace Conference (1991)

The Djibouti Peace Conference was the first peace initiative launched after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. Djibouti as an immediate neighbour of Somalia organized a peace conference to mediate between the warring factions by inviting the two key actors known as Ali Mahdi and General Aideed (Lewis, 2002). However, this peace effort did not yield any result in as far reaching a peace agreement or any of the parties in attendance accepting a ceasefire to pave way for more dialogue. Nonetheless, this failure can be attributed to other several reasons. First, General Aideed who was one of the two leading actors in the conflict

did not honour the invitation and instead abstained from attending the conference. Second, the conflict was slowly transforming from an exclusively political issue to include other criminal groups who took advantage of the breakdown in law and order. As such, even if the conference could come to an agreement, there was no existing institutional framework that could oversee the implementation of such an agreement. In short, the Djibouti peace process had been convened absent any framework to guide the peace process in Somalia (Nyadera et al., 2019). Thirdly, the Djibouti peace process was also organised without the support of major regional neighbours and international powers with influence in Somalia such as Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya and Italy (Lyons & Samatar, 1995). In the case of Egypt and Italy, some representative of conflicting groups and particularly General Aideed were suspicious that the conference had been organised in the absence of neutral peace mediators. General Aideed was convinced that Egypt and Italy had the intentions to meddle in the process and support his rival Mr. Mahdi to take charge of a transitional government before elections are held once again (Adam, 2008). Other actors in the conflict such as the Somaliland National Movement also failed to attend having declared independence of Somaliland.

7.2 Ethiopia Peace Conference (1993)

Following the failure of the Djibouti Peace Process in 1991, another conference themed the Somali National Reconciliation Conference was convened in 1993. According to Bradbury (1994), this conference was organized by the UN following the military presence of the United States in Somalia. US presence had established an atmosphere of calm particularly in Mogadishu which the UN exploited to convene the peace conference in Addis Ababa (Lewis et al., 2008). The conference materialised in a peace agreement signed on 27th March 1993 and amongst other things, established a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and demanded the immediate stop to all ongoing fighting between the different factions in Somalia. Under a new transitional government, the peace agreement highlighted the prioritization of

institutional and administrative structures drawing representation from the 15 militia groups that had attended the conference. A Transitional National Council was mandated with overseeing the implementation process of the peace agreement that also provided for the selection of 3 representatives with one-woman position in each of the 18 regions within Somalia, one member from each of the 15 militia groups and 5 seats reserved for Mogadishu. Additionally, there were other provisions for a committee to draft a new constitution and undertake reconciliation and disputes resolution (Bradbury, 1994). These transitional administrative bodies were to serve for a period two years.

Even though the organization of the conference was largely dominated by the UN, few challenges emerged even before the conference was convened. First, even though conflict resolution processes often highlight the importance on inclusivity in peace discussions, civil societies in Somalia opposed the inclusion of militia groups in the talks. Secondly, whereas 15 militia groups were in attendance, 11 of them were from the same Mudug clan and as such, clan balancing was not achieved and several other key actors in the conflict were excluded (Elmi& Barise, 2008).

However, it was the ultimate exclusion and withdrawal of General Aideed that set the motion for the collapse of this agreement. The withdrawal of UNITAF from Mogadishu after violent clashes with General Aideed's militia marked the collapse of the implementation of the Ethiopia Peace Agreement (Lewis,2008).

7.3 Cairo Peace Conference (1997)

Approximately four years after the collapse of the Ethiopia peace process, the governments of Egypt, Yemen and Libya sponsored another peace conference in Cairo, Egypt. This conference was attended by 28 militia groups who were divided into two camps. One camp was allied to Ethiopia and the other camp allied to Libya (Elmi & Barise, 2006). The

conference focused on reaching a resolution that could see the establishment of a government of national unity before other contentious issues could be addressed. The argument for this was that having a government in place would have perhaps stopped the violence as other issues are addressed. However, differences again emerged on the form and structure of the government and one side led by General Aideed and supported by Ethiopia staged a walk-out of the conference highlighting that their views were not being taken into serious considerations (Elmi & Barise, 2006).

7.4 The Arta Conference (2000)

The collapse of the Cairo peace process sparked another ambitious effort from Djibouti through an initiative of President Ismail Omar to attempt and undertake another round of mediation amongst the Somali militia groups in 2000 (Lewis et al., 2008). Unlike other previous peace processes, the Arta Conference attracted support from both the US, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Italy, Egypt and Libya (Nyadera et al., 2019). The Conference established a Transitional National Government (TNG) and 60% of the 245 representatives to sit in the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) were selected from the former legislature of Siad Barre's government.

However, the selection of representative from the previous regime of Siad Barre to serve in the Transitional National Assembly was opposed by a vast majority of warlords. Moreover, the composition of the TNG reflected that political power structure would only be beneficial for the dominant clans. According to a study by Murphy (2011), TNG received support from the Hawiye clan but the elected president from Hawiye clans who controlled major party in Mogadishu have confronted great rejection from warlords who were dominant in Mogadishu. Ultimately, the Arta peace process also failed to achieve reconciliation neither stop violence in Somalia. This is partly because of the failure to once again not only focus on

the establishment of a central government but also other underlying issues such as existing disputes between farmers and pastoralists over water and grazing lands in Somalia.

7.5 Mbagathi Peace Conference (2004)

The Mbagathi Peace Conference was organised in 2004 under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The conference had taken place on the backdrop of emerging global challenges such as the 9/11 2001 attack on US that signified the emergence of the global war against international terrorism (Nyadera& Bincof, 2019). The instability in Somalia led to the emergence of perception by the US government that Somalia could be a potential host for al-Qaeda terrorist group or its affiliated sympathizers. The US government was therefore motivated to influence any outcome of a peace process so that any incoming administration in Somalia would be friendly to US foreign policy especially after the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1997.

However, the timing of the Mbagathi Conference was an effort a little too late. The TNG which had been established through the Arta Peace Process had already lost a significant portion of the Somali territory to militia groups. For many Somalis, TNG was just a product of external actors and militia groups exploited this attitude further through propaganda that external actors led Ethiopia and Kenya were imposing a legitimate government on the people of Somalia.

In the long run ,no tangible progress was achieved in the Mbagathi conference in as far resolving conflict in Somalia. The Mbagathi conference also failed because of issue of representation that was dominated by members from the Darod, Hawiye, Digil and Dir clans who were to appoint 61 representatives each to parliament while the remaining group comprised of smaller clans to appoint 31 representatives to parliament.

8 Salient Characteristics of the Somalia Conflict

8.1 State Collapse

One of the conspicuous characteristics of the conflict in Somalia is the collapsed state. For a better part of the conflict, Somalia was without a government and was absent in the participation on international issues. The overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991 marked the collapse of all the remaining institutional structures such as the legislature, judiciary and the disciplined forces (Menkhaus, 2003). While the last few years has seen progress in the reconstitution of the Transitional Federal Government, the vast part of the conflict period occurred in the absence of government. The vacuum established in 1991 resulted in chaos and total breakdown of law and order as well social coherence between different clans in Somalia (Menkhaus, 2013). As the state failed to provide security and other social guarantees, people looked inwards to their clans for social, political and economic protection. Unlike in other conflicts such as Syria, Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen and Libya, conflict in Somalia largely took place within the context of the civil society with multiple actors organised along clan affiliations.

8.2 Militarization

The collapse of the government and pursuit of security in an increasingly chaotic and anarchic environment led to the militarization of civilians in Somalia. The absence of central authority to oversee the maintenance of law and order, clans, individuals, criminal entities, businesspersons and sub-clans embarked on self-arming for purposes of both personal and group protection or to enforce law as they desired to suit their interests. The militarization of civilians and groups eradicated the little legitimacy and expectations placed on public institutions or any institutional culture pertaining to the respect of law and human rights. Without government control, weapons trade increased substantially through or across the

border by arms dealers for several years (Bruton, 2010). This accounts for the proliferation of arms in the hands of civilians and militia groups including the al-Shabaab in Somalia.

8.3 Clan Affiliation and Multiple Actors

The Somalia conflict is underlined by fighting between different groups over domination of political power and resources at the local, regional and national level. While al-Shaabab is one actors in the conflict, there are other several violent clashes that are inter-clan in nature between large clans or lineages. Two of such clans are the Hawiye and Darod clans who have engaged in violent clashes over control of political power in Somalia. Moreover, the conflict in Somalia is not only limited to clans. Within the clans, there are also intra-clan conflicts of various sub-clans fighting for more influence over the others (Koshen, 2007; Eno, 2007).

Regarding multiplicity of actors, terrorist groups such as al-Shaabab, warlords, militia groups, criminal gangs, individuals with business interests, religious courts and clan leader have all emerged as actors in the conflict. Uniquely, many of these actors have been shifting alliance from one group to the other depending on their interests which may be either political or economic in nature. Indeed, the multiplicity of actors in the conflict has hindered any efforts for peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Somalia due to the overlaying interests amongst the actors making it difficult for any peace agreement to accommodate the interests of all parties involved.

8.4 Lack of clear ideologies driving the conflict

The case of Somalia does not only involve actors who are pursuing different ideologies but also sometimes contradictory. Different actors constantly change their political, cultural, economic, religious and international ideological stance during the different phases of the conflict (Mwangi, 2012). The conflict is therefore simply not a conflict over the differences in political views. There are groups or individuals pursuing political power to maintain status

quo and in turn protect their economic or business interests. It is therefore imperative that a distinction is made between groups or individuals articulating and pursuing genuine political goals for the benefit of the Somali people and those who do the same to benefit their economic interests at the expense of the society or those with extremist objectives such as al-Shaabab.

8.5 Growing War Economies

The absence of functional institutions or a well-established government enjoying legitimacy influenced the emergence of widespread criminality throughout Somalia. The collapse of the government in 1991 established a culture of impunity where public resources are looted, banditry is rife and valuable real estates are occupied by militia groups from various clans. Control of valuable real estate has become an important aspect of the conflict as sources of income for militia groups. Additionally, militia groups have been involved in forceful taxation of small business as well as diverting the distribution of relief food aid. These economic wars have expanded to the coastal regions where piracy has emerged particularly in the Indian Ocean where vessels carrying heavy cargo have been attacked by Somali pirates from time to time (Percy and Shortland, 2013).

9 Impact of Somalia Conflict

9.1 Domestic Impacts

The conflict in Somalia has had extensive impact on the people of Somalia. These impacts can be broadly categorised into economic, humanitarian and political consequences. First, the prolonged conflict in Somalia has had a negative impact on the economic activities in Somalia. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Somalia has one of the highest poverty rates in the region. Violence has destroyed critical infrastructure necessary for economic activities and created an environment of fear among some Somalis largely due to extortion by al-Shaabab and other

criminal groups .According to a study by Dagne (2009), the unregulated economic system in Somalia has benefited only a people in the country with political power and enjoying protection from clan militia groups or al-Shaabab. This has rendered thousands of young people jobless and have been forced to rely on remittances from relatives who are overseas in order to survive.

Secondly, there has been a dire humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Somalia has not only been challenged by the over three decades of conflict but also drought and famine. As of 2017, more than 6.7 million people (an estimated 50% of the population) were considered as food insecure. Out of these, 3.2 million people have been categorised as in a crisis stage and over 3.5 million as food stressed. Conflict and famine have destroyed production of food, increased unemployment rates and drastically reduced the purchasing power of household families (UN, 2017).The humanitarian crisis has further been worsened by attacks and subsequent withdrawal or non-deployment of aid workers, high rates of inflation, continued violence and piracy in the Indian ocean (Dagne, 2009).

Politically, the conflict has disintegrated Somalia into different regions all claiming autonomy. In 1991, Somaliland declared independence immediately from Somalia after the collapse of the state. It however does not yet enjoy international recognition neither does it have any representation at regional organizations or international institutions such as the UN. In other regions such as Puntland and Jubaland relations with the Transitional Federal Government have remained tensed partly due to the influence of clan politics (Mulugeta, 2009).

9.2 Regional Impacts

The conflict in Somalia has had regional impacts. Formostly, it has created regional insecurity particularly through the threat posed by al-Shaabab. Regional neighbours such as Kenya, has

been a target of al-Shaabab attacks. The terrorist group launched several attacks between 2011 and 2014 in Kenya killing hundreds of innocent civilians. Some of these attacks targeted shopping malls such as the Westgate Mall (approx. 67 people killed); Garissa University (approx. 148 students killed); and Dusit Hotel attack (21 people killed) in Nairobi (Cannon&Ruto-Pkalya, 2019; Mair, 2019).

The conflict has also created a refugee crisis in the region. Neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Kenya host the largest number of Somali refugees. There are over two million refugees distributed across the region. The presence of refugees has created more pressure on the regional governments who are still facing international challenges such as low development and budgetary problems. But even more concerning, is that some of the refugee camps have been identified as hideouts for al-Shaabab terrorist cells. For example, the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya has been cited as one of the recruitment sites for al-Shaabab terrorist group which has been designated as the biggest national security threat to Kenya (Menkhaus, 2017; Hellsten, 2016). The ultimate deployment of Kenyan troops to Somalia in 2011 was due to increasing al-Shaabab kidnappings of tourists from Western countries in Kenya. These kidnappings were having a negative impact on Kenya's tourism industry which is one of the biggest GDP earners for the country (Olsen, 2018; Cannon&Iyekekpolo, 2018).

Thirdly, Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden have transformed into pirate hotspots grossly affecting the maritime economies of regional countries. The breakdown of law and order coupled with high unemployment rates turned many youths into piracy both in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Every year, more than 20,000 ply the route through the Gulf of Aden and has been one of the target hotspots by Somali pirates (Lucas, 2017).

CHAPTER THREE

10 CIVIL SOCIETIES IN SOMALIA

Civil society organizations are significant in all levels of contemporary peacebuilding initiatives. This has influenced the devotion of the international community towards the strengthening the operational and functional capabilities and capacities of civil society organizations particularly in conflict-ridden and fragile state or societies. Civil societies are considered as part of viable multi-dimensional framework in peacebuilding. The conventional understanding of civil society is that they provide a framework for voluntary and collective action around mutual interests, values, and purposes that are distinctive from that of the state, family or market (Paffenholz, 2015). These societies are constituted of several and diverse voluntary organizations and non-state actors that are not driven by economic goals or interests, largely operate independently from the state, reflect civic virtues and interact closely with the public. However, it is important to highlight that not all civil society organizations are necessarily ‘good society’ because these organizations are a broad reflection of the society. According to Paffenholz (2015), there are other civil societies that operate as polarised, sectarian and occasionally militant civil organizations.

Within the context of Somalia, the emergence of civil society organizations is the outcome of the Somalia civil war (Human Development Report, 2001; Bradbury et al., 2001). Previously, under the regime of Siad Barre, establishment and management of groups such as civil societies or other political organizations was criminal. Since 1960 when Somalia became an independent state, the first NGO’s established in Somalia were in the early 1980s after the Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia to respond to the humanitarian and refugee crisis (Human Development Report, 2001). However, whereas during the 1980s approximately 15

local non-governmental organizations were established and operating in Somalia, the figure drastically increased to over 320 NGO's by 1995 (Little, 2003).

The proliferation of NGO's during this period can be explained as the outcome of the collapse of government in 1991 and the subsequent famine between 1991-1992 that exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. Additionally, because of the collapse of the state, the previous law that forbade the establishment of political parties or civil organizations became null and void. As the conflict drew international attention, international humanitarian and civil society organizations moved into Somalia to assist. However, due to the complex nature of the Somali society, these international organizations needed local partners. As such, the establishment of civil societies in Somalia was not only a response to the crisis in Somalia but also, it became a financially profitable venture because of donor funding (Tiilikainen & Mohamed, 2013).

Nonetheless, majority of these NGO's or civil society groups did not last for because of the exclusive dependency on donor funding. Additionally, the strong clan inclinations within the Somalis, also influenced the nature of these civil societies in the sense that they were formed and organised along clans. Whereas establishing SCOs along clan affiliations can be effective because it creates a sense of safety, trust, cultural intimacy and establish effective networks, they can also be easily manipulated and misused. One the models fronted oftenly as a solution to the Somalia civil war has been the power sharing formula for the Transitional Federal Government that gives four dominant clans more say in government. Civil society organizations that are strongly to clan patronage structures are therefore very unlikely to challenge decisions or stances taken by the clan leadership (Menkhaus et al., 2010; Quinn & Farah, 2008).

During the thirty years of conflict in Somalia, civil society organizations and NGOs in general, have been criticized for having exploited the conflict for their own interests such as employment opportunities and avenues to acquire illicit funds through corruption. Moreover,

even though these organizations operate within Somalia, they have established their operational bases in Nairobi (Kenya) (Tiilikainen and Mohamed, 2013). For several local residents, civil society groups and NGO's play very minimal role outside the seminars organized and convened in high-end hotels, and several foreigners who come, ask questions, and go back without ever returning back with goods or concrete services that can address the need of the people (Shane & Farah, 2008). According to Tiilikainen and Mohamed (2013: 41):

“NGO business becomes elitism! NGOs and politicians are not connected to the people. NGOs have no governance, boards of directors do not exist, they are only names on the paper. They make reports that donors want to have, they use the same reports they have been doing for 20 years. We do not ask hard questions: What do you really do? There is no real civil society. NGOs go and discuss with the government one by one. NGOs have no power base, they exploit the resources. They should have an important role also in following up and guiding the government, but there is no common voice or a platform for advocacy.”

Generally, the Somalia civil society and non-governmental organizations scene is extensively fragmented. This is largely because of the lack of co-ordination and cooperation between the various organizations because of the need to compete for donor funding. The separation of Somalia into several regions all claiming autonomy such as Somaliland (declared independence in 1991), Puntland, South Somalia, and Central Somalia also undermine cooperation and collaboration between civil society groups. However, Quinn and Farah (2008) argue that women-led civil societies are increasingly taking a key role in bridging this gap because of inter-clan marriages. Menkhaus et al., (2010) highlights that some of the most active civil society organizations in Somalia are managed by women who are now part and parcel of peacebuilding initiatives as mediators and advocates of human rights and freedoms of women and the marginalised groups in Somalia.

Nonetheless, despite the glaring complexities facing civil society and other non-governmental organizations in Somalia, there are several others that are committed to peacebuilding initiatives, competent and have managed to source for funding internally within Somalia and from the Somali Diaspora groups that seek to contribute to peacebuilding and nation-building in Somalia.

10.1 Legal Framework for Establishing CSOs in Somalia

The government of the Federal Republic of Somalia is yet to develop a comprehensive and effective legislation on civil societies whereas the self-declared independent Somaliland has developed the Law on Non-Governmental Welfare Organization, Law no. 43/2010.184 to regulate civil societies (Maru et al., 2017). However, the civil societies organization legislation adopted by Somaliland has been criticised for demanding a long list of documents needed for registration. The requirement that employees of a civil society organization seeking to be registered should demonstrate knowledge and experience in the sector in which they work is considered as overly expansive as it interferes with freedom of expression that protects individual rights to advocate for change regardless of socioeconomic or political status (Maru et al., 2017). The Law also gives the Minister of National Planning and Development the authority to give decisions on registration of civil societies and other non-governmental organizations even though this authority can be misused because the decision to not register is final and not subject to a judicial review.

10.2 Approaches to Civil to Societies in Somalia

There are problems when defining civil societies in the context of Somalia (Constanini, 2012) and attempts by the international organizations are yet to yield more clarity. In 2002, Oxfam² adopted an approach to civil societies in Somalia to encompass traditional civil society and

²Oxfam is a confederation of 20 independent charitable organizations focusing on the alleviation of global poverty, founded in 1942 in Oxford, England.

urban-based civil society organizations. The traditional civil societies are comprised of community leaders and elders while the urban-based civil society groups are made up of academicians, peacebuilding organizations, NGO's, human rights organizations, professionals and community development groups.

This open-ended approach to civil societies in Somalia as a collective has proven to be problematic to not only scholars who are partaking research on civil societies in Somalia, but also to the prevalent donor strategies and other international NGO's operating within Somalia (Gundel & Allen, 2017). This classification allows for a wide range of actors who ought to be treated differently because of their roles and approach to civil issues. Nonetheless, the consequent of this classification led to the emergence of civil society organizations resembling 'cottage industries' that function as contractors mainly to meet the needs of humanitarian aid industry. In other words, several civil society organizations are not driven by civic virtues and any activities that they engage in, is mainly as means to obtaining donor funding and not necessarily to advance the legitimate issues or needs of the society.

Saferworld³ in 2007 having recognised the weakness and misrepresentative approach to civil society organizations in Somalia provided by Oxfam, suggested the term 'non-state actors (NSA)' (Saferworld & World Vision, 2014). However, NSA as a concept referencing civil society organizations also reflected a general classification of diverse groups that may be characterised by different feature and even conflicting interests. This classification of civil societies in Somalia without further clarification and contextualization may also imply to armed groups (Constantini, 2012). Based on the constructive criticisms on the definition of civil societies within the context of Somalia provided by both Saferworld and Oxfam, the

³Saferworld is an international non-governmental organisation with conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes in over 20 countries and territories in the Horn of Africa, the African Great Lakes region, Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus. It was founded in Bristol, UK in 1989

European Union Somalia Unit proposed a specific operational definition of Somali civil society organizations. This new operational concept defined civil societies in Somalia as:

“Collective actors (thus groups, not individuals), created voluntarily, with a membership that participate freely to the association, that are relatively independent from other institutions and that find their legitimacy in the fact they act and mobilise themselves to achieve a goal and to represent general or specific- but not private- interests” (European Commission, 2002).

Unlike the previous definitions provided by Saferworld and Oxfam, this new approach highlights that civil society organisations should be context specific in the sense that they have defined membership with clear mandates, purpose, and platform and can operate regardless of external funding.

10.3 Categories of Civil Societies in Somalia and Efforts in Peacebuilding

10.3.1 International Civil Societies/ Non-Governmental Organizations

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD)- is a Swiss-based private organization that specializes in activities meant to prevent, mitigate and resolve armed conflicts through conflict resolution processes such as dialogue and mediation. Since 2007, the organization has been involved in Somalia in peacebuilding initiatives such as facilitation of dialogues regarding the protection of civilians and access to humanitarian aid to communities. The organization was also instrumental in providing advisory services to the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and the mediation parties involved in the Djibouti peace process. Since 2012, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue has taken lead in facilitating dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the federal administrations to promote stability, cohesion, peace and transparent electoral processes. In 2012, following a request from the Transitional Federal Government, HD drafted the first Stabilization Programme schedule for South and Central Somalia regions. Between 2015 and 2017, the organization

also facilitated the National Leadership Forum (NLF) that focused on how to promote successful transition to democracy between the federal administrations and Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2020).

Danish Refugee Council (DRC)- is a humanitarian and non-profit established in 1956 in Denmark with presence in more than 30 countries. It is one of the biggest international non-governmental organizations and its Somali Programme is the largest amongst the six country programmes in the Horn of Africa and Yemen region .Its humanitarian and peacebuilding programmes are operationalised through sub-offices in Banadir, Puntland, Somaliland, Hirran, Bay, and Gedo regions. Danish Refugee Council has adopted peacebuilding from the context of human security that seeks to promote human rights and freedoms. In Somalia, DRC operates within the context of aiding refugees and internally displaced persons in both rural areas and urban centres. In partnership with other organisations such as Oxfam, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), Action Contre la Faim (ACF), CARE and World Vision, DRC developed the Somali Resilience Programme (SomReP) to promote peacebuilding through resilience at the community level in pastoral, agro-pastoral, and semi-urban households since 2013. Through this framework, DRC has implemented components of the programme in Gedo region and has supported 12,600 individuals (2,100 households) in building their capacities in economic production in order to build and contribute to resilience and peacebuilding in Somalia. Other programmes by DRC involve components of Gender Based Violence (GBV) protection and response, assistance to internally displaced people, and child protection (Danish Refugee Council, 2020).

In 2017, another programme was initiated by DRC to strengthen police accountability and access to justice in Somalia. The project which has a target implementation period of 4 years (2017-2020) aims at establishing peace in fragile parts of Somalia by strengthening the justice and security architecture. The project has adopted a community-focused approach by also

supporting processes that strengthen traditional conflict resolution mechanisms that are representative and have the capacity to address disputes and aligning them with the formal judicial processes in Central and South Somalia. The organization has also convened 7 Community-Police Dialogue and Cooperation forums in seven districts (DRC, 2017).

Interpeace- was established in 1994 by the United Nations as ‘War-torn Societies Project’ to help the international community and national actors to develop better frameworks for challenges emerging from post-conflict societies. However, the project transitioned from the UN and evolved into an independent non-governmental organization in the year 2000. Through its Interpeace Somali Peacebuilding Programme (TaloWadaag/ Social Contract 2017-2021), Interpeace develops opportunities for cooperation of different stakeholders to promote peacebuilding processes in Somalia. The TaloWadaag programme is purposely to promote the understanding and capacity of local civil society groups and citizens; increase the participation of women and youth in peacebuilding; and support democratization processes that are participatory, inclusive and responsive to the citizens and other stakeholders in peacebuilding. Between 2017 and 2019, Interpeace has collaborated with other local civil society organizations in Somalia to strengthen and launch both informal and formal peacebuilding frameworks and infrastructures in conflict areas such as CeelAfweyn, Burtinle and Galkacyo. The organization has also facilitated high-level discussions and consensus-building on the drafting of electoral law, increasing engagement and communication between local civil society and conflict actors.

Mercy Corps- is a US humanitarian and civil society organization that has been involved in Somalia’s peacebuilding initiatives. Through its Somali Youth Learners Initiative, the organization has been participating in projects that promote access to education and civic engagement opportunities for Somali youths. The underlying agenda for the organization is that providing these opportunities to Somali youths will discourage or reduce their likelihood

to join or support radical and terrorist groups such as al-Shaabab (Tesfaye et al., 2018). Under the programme’s component of improving access to formal secondary education, Mercy Corps has constructed 60 secondary schools in South Central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland that provided education access to over 45,000 Somali youths.

Table 1. Somali Youth Learners Initiative Key Achievements by Region

	Puntland	South Central	Somaliland	Totals
Schools constructed, expanded, or rehabilitated	17	21	22	60
Educators who successfully completed training, coaching, or mentoring	663	1278	1083	3024
Student clubs established	13	15	11	39
In-school youth leaders trained	215	899	136	1250
Out-of-school youth leaders trained	381	670	547	1598

Source: Mercy Corps, 2018

10.3.2 Local-Based Civil Society Organizations and Networks

The political, economic and social contexts of Somalia have extensively influenced the nature of civil societies. Whereas on one hand, some of these societies have emerged from genuine need to engage in peacebuilding and reconstruction, some societies also emerged primarily to benefit economically from donor funding from both local and international sources. Secondly, because some civil societies were established to address and represents particular clans, there operations and to some extent access to funding has rendered them weak. These factors contributed to the high number of local civil society groups operating in Somalia. Nonetheless, there are other several local civil society organizations operating independently or as a network of several civil society organizations to contribute in peacebuilding.

Coalition for Grassroots Women Organization (COGWO)- is an alliance of more than 30 local civil societies and organizations that support women in political, economic and social discussions. This network of local civil society organization was established in 1995 to promote the rights of women in Somalia in various regions such as Bakool, Banadir, Hiran, Lower Shabelle, Lower Jubba, Middle Shebelle, and Galgadud. COGWA has become an important actor in Somalia peacebuilding processes by connecting and representing grassroots civil societies with international donors such as Oxfam, UNICEF and EU. Besides mobilizing funds for grassroots Somali civil society groups from international donors, COGWO has also established structure to mobilise resource from diaspora Somali communities in Britain, Canada, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and the US. In 2007 for instance, the organization mobilized USD 190,000 that was distributed to 23 civil society groups (Sheikh & Healy, 2009).

Peace and Human Rights Network- was founded in 1997 by 29 civil society organizations in Somalia. PHRN has a strong agenda on peacebuilding through developing, advocating and supporting initiatives that support human rights and freedoms (Canada, 2017). Some of the techniques used by the organization in this regard is by supporting member civil society organizations to participate in projects, debates, conferences and campaigns that promote peace in fragile areas within Somalia (PHRN, 2007b). PHRN interacts at three levels: locally, through mobilization of communities to take in peaceful public protests such as peace marches or processions to raise awareness on communal issues pertaining development and peace; at the intermediate level- engaging other grassroots civil society organizations through workshops, summits and conferences. At the top level, PHRN acts as link between several civil society organizations, the government of the Federal State of Somalia and international institutions (PHRN, 2007a). During the Arta and Mbagathi conferences in 2000 and 2004, PHRN is one of the civil society organizations that participated in the processes.

Somali Non-State Actors (SONSA)- was previously known as the Somalia South Central Non-State Actors (SOSENSA) that brought together civil society organizations, community-based groups, professional organizations (doctors, teachers etc.) and other non-governmental organizations across Somalia to collectively pursue peacebuilding through political, economic and social initiatives. Through its focus on policy, SONSA has taken part in several high-level discussions at the national level and with the international partners in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Somalia. Among its key mandates, SONSA aims to improve social cohesion by promoting conflict prevention and peace building; promoting advocacy of policies that address the needs of communities at the local, regional and federal levels; initiate policies that empower local youths and women groups; and identify policies that fit within the local contexts to address poverty, healthcare, transport, water, human rights, security and education.

CHAPTER FOUR

11 DISCUSSION

11.1 How Civil Societies Contribute to Peacebuilding

Conflict resolution can only be as effective as the preceding peacebuilding initiatives that have the potential for establishing sustainable peace. Civil societies take different forms of associations and enables them to have the ability to represent various interests and values. These values and interests enable them to articulate, mobilise and pursue the aspirations of the society which they represent. It is a fact that civil societies on their own cannot be able to transform conflict, yet, it is also very difficult if not impossible for governments and international organizations to establish long-lasting peace without the engagement of the larger population (Galtung, 1969). Consequently, civil societies have emerged as viable frameworks of peacebuilding (Barnes, 2002b) through seven key functions that include protection, monitoring, advocacy, socialization, social cohesion, facilitation, and service delivery.

11.1.1 Protection

Stable societies that have functioning governments and working public institutions, it is the role of the state to protect citizens. However, societies coming out of a long phase of conflict are often fragile and the relations between the state and society can either be completely broken down, or the state itself can be in a situation where it is incapable of ensuring security of the society. It can therefore be very difficult for individuals to engage in peacebuilding if their security is threatened. Militia groups that participate in conflicts often escalate violence against civilians if they want to deter any peace process. Also, while state security machinery and structures can play an important role in protecting communities, they can also be part of

the problem. The deployment of military soldiers can often come too late or deployed with a mandate not adequate to provide security for the community.

Civil societies can therefore play a critical role of protecting the society through early warning and response systems. Civil society organizations are strategically placed to identify or detect causes of conflicts, the motivation of those fuelling conflict in the society, and, suggest specific solutions to address the existing challenges before outbreak of conflict. The ability of civil society organizations to have these insights can support the establishment and deployment of necessary resources that can address conflict at early stages.

Civil society organizations can also play the role of monitoring conflict initiatives that are aimed at aiding peacebuilding processes. The local nature of grassroots civil societies provide them with the requisite knowledge to address conflict through the wider societal dynamics that can deter the escalation of conflict. By using trustworthy and credible conflict monitors, civil societies can generate knowledge and analyses that is acceptable to conflict actors and holders. This information can therefore be used to develop strategies and solutions for conflicts in which the same civil society organizations partner with other stakeholders to ensure the implementations of peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms. The credibility of civil society organizations in conflict resolution mechanisms arise from their perceived non-partisan or multi-partisan nature because they represent both the interests of the civilian communities and those of conflict actors.

11.1.2 Waging Conflict Constructively

In certain instances, the existing power structures or political order may be very oppressive. Even though there may be absence of outright war or violence, the quality of life for many

individuals may be impaired by structural violence⁴ also combined with actual or threatened violence. Civil society organizations can play a significant role to transform these kinds of situations or conditions by bringing these conflicts to the open and escalating it through non-violent means to generate changes in the society. Mobilization along these lines often occur through triggering moments like arrests or murder of some members of the community that ultimately triggers an “enough is enough” response that sparks resistance or protests capable of challenging dominating powers in the society (Dodouet, 2008). By leveraging on the support of international human rights institutions and domestic judicial platforms, civil society organizations are able to pressurize governments and regimes to revert from undemocratic or unjust tendencies. Civil societies can also be used as reliable witnesses of human rights violations and this can assist in undermining the moral authority or legitimacy of those who abuse power in the society.

Waging conflicts constructively is therefore one way through which civil societies assist in peacebuilding through proactive means in the struggle for justice in the society. Activists have the capacity and ability to manifest the power to resist oppressive actors in the society by galvanizing mass movements as well as the power to expose oppressive actors in the society and delegitimize their authority. Additionally, civil society organizations have the ability to convince public opinion and decision-makers that there are other more constructive ways or means to address conflict or the underlying structural issues that lead to conflict.

11.1.3 Transforming Attitudes

Civil societies can transform conflict attitudes by re-framing and changing the perceptions about conflict in the society. Civil society organizations that operate at the grassroots level as peacebuilders in areas entrenched in conflict advance conversation formed on the basis or

⁴Refers to a form of violence wherein some social structure or social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs (See Galtung, 1969)

person/people to people dialogue across conflict belligerents. These discussions are often supported by the existence of some common factors such as identity (men, women, youths), occupational roles (farmers, herders, teachers, lawyers, journalists) or perhaps the existence of common experiences (ex-fighters, policymakers). The experience of having discussion with groups or individuals who have been perceived as enemies and understanding them as human beings and not just enemies can transform perception and shake their stances on hate. This may influence individuals or groups to perhaps reconsider looking for other alternatives apart from conflict, violence or war because there is an understanding that other people or groups from other communities are also seeking a reasonable solution to conflict.

11.1.4 Developing the Agenda for Peace

Civil society organizations can facilitate the development and shaping of public policies by identifying issues that have potentially been overlooked and as a result become contentious thereby causing conflict. They can shape policy formulation by examining and analysing these problems and providing recommendations that can assist in addressing the challenges. In other words, civil society organizations can identify the major problems that cause conflict in the communities because they deal directly with people at the grassroots level. Through dialogue and advocacy campaigns, civil society organizations have the potential to influence political will amongst individuals mandated with making public decisions to implement the policies and strategy frameworks meant to achieve peace within communities. As such, their initiatives meant to establish or increase public awareness about underlying problems that create conflict in the community, are also intertwined with actions meant to motivate decision makers to implement them. Achieving sustainable peace is beyond mere bring fighting to a stop. It also encompasses all the post-conflict activities meant to drive societies or communities towards a path of equitable and peaceful future. In this regard, it is not uncommon that civil societies have taken part in discussions for example in South Africa

(post-apartheid) regarding what sort of a society people want to establish. In other instances, such as Somalia, civil society ideas and peace recommendations have been adopted in directly in the peace mediation and negotiation talks about how to achieve sustainable peaceful societies.

11.1.5 Developing Peace Agreements

Civil society groups are often engaged as actors in formal peace negotiation agreements as representatives of the entire community or marginalised groups such as women, youths or people with disabilities. Peace negotiation mechanisms that provide for wider participation of civil society groups aim at establishing comprehensive peace agreements that address conflict in a wider or deeper context. Civil societies are very important during these peace negotiation processes because their influence is often driven by the genuine desire to establish sustainable peace than the pursuit of how power is shared amongst the major conflict actors. According to Barnes (2002a), there are three principles that guide the establishment of peace agreements. First, peace agreements can be negotiated through direct participation whereby all individuals in the conflict participate in the development and implementation of peace agreements at the local level. Secondly, peace agreements may be negotiated through consultative mechanisms where civil societies have an opportunity to provide their analyses of conflicts and recommendations. Thirdly, peace agreements can be negotiated through representative participation where political parties are engaged in negotiations.

11.1.6 Transforming the Consequences of Conflict

Civil societies can also play an important role in disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of conflict actors. In communities where conflicts are protracted, significant number of the community members are often armed or become highly militarised by the presence of militia groups, weapons or soldiers. To establish long-lasting peace in such

societies, it is important for disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration processes to occur. Civil societies can have a lead in this process particularly disarmament and re-integration into the community. Armed members of the community can unanimously surrender their weapons to civil society organizations without the fear of reprisal from the government because their identities have been revealed. Success in disarmament are enhanced if the collection of weapons from civilians and other armed groups is seen as promoting their interests and needs.

11.2 Challenges Facing Civil Societies

Civil societies face several challenges that undermine their effective performance. First, there is often lack of cooperation and complementary amongst civil society organizations. In Somalia for instance, umbrella civil society organizations engage in similar activities that are done by member organizations operating at the grassroot level. The effect of this is that civil society organizations end up in competition instead of cooperation and therefore posing a challenge to both civil societies and donor organizations. Whereas the presence of civil societies should be a strength in addressing the needs of communities, lack of collaboration deters their effectiveness.

Secondly, civil societies are also faced by the lack of voluntarism and civic engagement. The first generation of civil societies that emerged in the 1990s as Africa was undergoing democratization and drew membership from students and employees with basic incomes to cover their needs. However, civil society organizations established from the 2000s emerged at the backdrop of high unemployment rates. As such, engagement in civil societies was therefore seen as alternative to formal employment. However, this engagement is not necessarily influenced by the conviction to contribute to the interest of the society. Moreover, because individuals are committed to earning a living, they have limited time to volunteer in

civil organisations and their activities. This can perhaps account for the pre-dominant focus on short-term

12 Recommendations

Civil societies in Somalia are exposed to serious security threats including murder and arrests of journalists by both government security forces and terrorist groups such as al-Shaabab⁵.

The association of civil society organizations with other western international non-governmental organizations puts them in direct confrontations with groups such as al-Shaabab who despise western ideologies and systems of governance. The Federal Government of Somalia should therefore establish a taskforce of experts drawn from civil society organizations and professional bodies such as lawyers or advocated and review the action of government security forces towards civil society organizations and professional bodies such as journalism media in the wider context. Moreover, stringent penal codes need to be created to punish severely individuals who are caught perpetrating attacks civil society actors. Additionally, the government should find mechanisms that can safeguard the existing and stringent Anti-Terrorism laws from being misused to curtail freedoms of expression of the civil societies through detentions, arbitrary arrests and harassment.

The Federal Government of Somalia should also work with peacebuilding civil society organizations as part of opinion leaders in the society. This partnership should also include actors in the media industry who can provide positive media coverage of the efforts or initiatives by both government and civil societies. Without adequate media coverage, there can be potential low attention of the community towards initiatives of civil society

⁵ In 2013 seven (7) Journalists were killed and other 7 were killed in 2014. In 2012, a total of 18 journalists and media workers were targeted and killed, Perpetrators. In 2011 three (3) Journalists killed. Abdilasan Sheikh Hassan (Hiis) was killed in a daylight by members of the Somali government forces in Hamarjabab neighborhoods. Somali government later said suspects had been arrested in connection with the murder of Abdisalam, but were never brought to Court.

organizations. Media coverage is very significant for civil society roles regarding advocacy, monitoring, and protection. As such, media should be part and parcel of civil societies as partners in peacebuilding.

International donors providing support to local civil society organizations also need to conduct thorough audit on how aid recipient civil societies are constituted. The nature of a civil society can affect its effectiveness in the sense that those that are dominated by discriminatory and radical ideologies are more likely to be effective in peacebuilding. Donor organizations should therefore conduct thorough analysis of a given civil society before developing a financial support framework.

The civil societies in Somalia can also benefit for increased funding in order to increase and expand peace initiatives and facilitate the professionalization of peacebuilding initiatives. Inconsistent initiative in peacebuilding cannot contribute to peace. Additionally, there needs to a framework through civil organizations can be accountable to both local communities and the international donors. The overdependence on foreign funding has inculcated a culture in which civil societies lay more preference for accountability to donors than local communities. As such, donors should develop a system of funding that also ties civil societies to be accountable to local communities in which particular peacebuilding initiatives may be undergoing.

13 Conclusion

Civil societies can be very important partners in peacebuilding because they offer alternative and innovative solutions to conflict. Even though they are not a force for peace, the debates, programmes, community projects and initiatives created by civil society organizations are fundamental for peace and peacebuilding. Although Somalia has been in a state of dictatorship for two decades it is very difficult for Somali society easily adapt to democracy.

(Oxfam America, 2008) Around fifty two NGOs working in Somalia but how they are formed ,structured ,and operate do not work like other international NGOs . Civil society organizations in Somalia based on different objectives and conflict interests, some are built on clan interest they serve the interest of the clan, others are profit seekers .In addition to that some NGOs are an obstacle to peace building and development by serving other states. Nonetheless, despite the glaring complexities facing civil society and other non-governmental organizations in Somalia, there are several others that are committed to peace building initiatives, competent and have managed to source for funding internally within Somalia and from the Somali Diaspora groups that seek to contribute to peace building and nation-building in Somalia. Unfortunately these organizations seeking peace and development face many challenges which is include: lack of cooperation of and complementary amongst civil society organizations , lack of voluntarism and civic engagement and different interpretation of civil society .Some of the society believe it that civil society is from western ideology aimed at spreading Christianity .In general Somali has no effective NGOs working peace building they are only names on the paper they are using the same report they have been using last two decade we do not ask hard questions what do you really do ? NGOs go and discuss with the government one by one. NGOs have no power base, they exploit the resources. They should have an important role also in following up and guiding the government, but there is no common voice or a platform for advocacy.

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