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ÜNİVERSİTESİ

T.R.

ISTANBUL COMMERCE UNIVERSITY

SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
AFRICAN STUDIES

THE CHINESE MODEL OF NEOCOLONIALISM IN
AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF ANGOLA

MA Thesis

EDA HAMDUN

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Abstract

This study examines China-Africa relations through the framework of neocolonialism. The methodology in this study is carried out at Angola sample level, based on the document scanning method. Angola has been used as a model country to analyze if it is a neocolonialist in African-Chinese relations. In its connections with Africa, China is using new tools. It fills the gap in Africa while increasing its own power by offering what other powers do not. Neocolonialism is one of the main instruments of foreign influence. Neocolonialism in China-Africa relations will be evaluated by using four criteria: political ties, economic ties, military appearance, and personal-institutional networks. Borrowing, resource-based loans, aid, and the Chinese diaspora are the new tools that China employs through Angola. According to the study, Angola, which is highly dependent on Angola's natural resources, has become increasingly economically and financially dependent on China's new tools.

Key Words: Neo-colonialism, China-Africa, dependency, foreign influence

Özet

Bu çalışma yeni sömürgecilik perspektifinden Çin Afrika ilişkilerini analiz etmektedir. Bu çalışma belge tarama yöntemine dayalı olarak Angola örneği düzeyinde yürütülmektedir. Angola'nın model ülke olmasıyla Afrika-Çin ilişkilerinde yeni sömürgeci olup olmadığı bir ülke üzerinden incelenmiştir. Çin Afrika ile olan ilişkilerinde yeni araçlar kullanmaktadır. Diğer güçlerin vermediğini Afrika'ya vererek Afrika'daki boşluğu doldurmakta ve kendi gücünü artırmaktadır. Yeni sömürgecilik dış etkinin ana araçlarından biridir. Çin Afrika ilişkilerinde yeni sömürgecilik siyasi ilişkiler, ekonomik bağlar, askeri görünüm ve kişisel-kurumsal ağlar üzerinden dört farklı parametre etrafında değerlendirilecektir. Çin'in Angola üzerinden kullandığı yeni araçlar ise borçlanma, kaynak temelli krediler, yardımlar ve Çin diasporasıdır. Çalışmada Angola doğal kaynaklarına hayli bağımlı olan Angola'nın ekonomik ve finansal olarak, Çin'in kullandığı yeni enstrümanlarla daha bağımlı hale geldiği görülmüştür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yeni sömürgecilik, Çin- Afrika, bağımlılık, dış nüfuz

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List of Abbreviations

Acronyms and Abbreviations	Definition
AU	African Union
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CATIC	China National Aerospace Technology Import and Export Corporation
CDB	China Development Bank
CIF	China International Fund Ltd.
CNOOC	China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC	China National Petroleum Company
CPIC	China Power Investment Corporation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
ICBC	Industry and Commercial Bank of China
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NRGI	National Resource Governance Institute
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PLA	People's Liberation Army
RBLs	Resource Based Loans
SAFE	State Foreign Exchange Administration

SOE	China's State Economic Enterprises
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UN	United Nations
UNITA	Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola
US	United States
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

INTRODUCTION

The worst always happens to Africa. This is happening because or despite the fact that the continent has played a role in the development of the modern capitalist world. “Each stage in the journey of the capital takes Africa hostage” says Kenyan writer Thiong’o (Thiong'o, 2021). Another Kenyan academician Mazrui states that Africans made a large contribution to the construction of industrial civilization of the West over the last three hundred years. The continent helped to build the prosperity of Europe and North America. However, Africa does not owe much to Europe in terms of its own industrialization progress. Mazrui claims that while Europe became part of the demolition process in Africa, African slaves became part of Western production technology (Mazrui, 1996, pp. 159-160).

Indeed, Africa has been subjected to colonization by invading powers for centuries. The continent has been exploited in various forms firstly human, then land and natural resources, since the 15th century. The main theme was the transfer of the minerals and ores of the continent to the center. Colonization of the continent helped to establish and develop Western civilization, and to maintain this order with post-independence neo-colonial forms.

The colonization process reached to the top with the Berlin Conference which took place from 1884 to 1885. Europeans divided the continent into colonies according to their spheres of influence without having any information about the local conditions of Africa. Europe’s pursuit of rapid and increased production in the industrial revolution led to colonization of Africa.

After the Second World War national consciousness increased within the African people and independence movements began to emerge. During the 1950’s and 1960’s most African countries began to gain their independence. On the other hand, as the colonizing countries no longer wanted to bear the cost of running their colonies, they began to look for ways to indirectly keep the countries connected.

After gaining their independence a relative relief appeared within these African nations because during the 1960s the world experienced global prosperity. However, it didn’t last long. The countries faced many political, economic and social problems. The artificial borders and corrupted economies, set-up by the former colonial masters without

considering ethnicity, geography, social and cultural differences left the newly independent states to deal with the wreckage. African countries mostly became dependent on foreign aid and loans in order to improve their economies.

As African countries gained their independence, they became involved in many cooperation models to take advantage of globalization and develop their economies. Unfortunately, many studies have shown that these new cooperation models have so far not been successful in developing Africa and eliminating poverty. Although the contribution of Western aid to the development of Africa has been extensively researched in the literature, the contribution of China's development aid to Africa and its developing commercial relations to the continent has not been studied much in recent times. Studies that analyze China-Africa relations in general are divided into approaches that claim China and Africa gain in this relationship within the framework of the win-win policy, and approaches that see China as a neo-colonial in Africa. This thesis aims to examine the second approach.

China has existed for more than five thousand years and is one of the oldest states in the world. As of the beginning of the 20th century, the Chinese economy was on the offensive. China is currently an ascendant power and has the second largest economy in the world whereas Africa, a continent of 54 countries, is still developing.

With China's transition to a capitalist economy in the 1980s, it sought further economic expansion in parallel with the growth of its economy. Over the past decades, China has become Africa's largest trading partner and a major investor in the continent. However, this rapid rise has been criticized by many European and American politicians, scholars and journalists. The biggest criticisms from the West have been that China's approach to the continent (namely not to interfere in internal affairs while giving loans and not to complicate the recipient countries in matters such as human rights as the West does) has wasted years of efforts to reduce corruption and exploited the continent's resources (Harper, 2017). China is accused of supporting some dangerous regimes in Africa and destroying the country's economies with debts that are difficult to repay (Chan, 2007, p. 6). Some studies claim that China's ongoing aid and investments have reached a level which is in many ways dangerously close to colonialism. The US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warned Africans against Chinese loans, stating that they "promote

addiction, exploit corrupt deals and endanger their natural resources" (BBCNews, 2018). In addition, the rapid Chinese population growth in the continent in recent years has drawn close attention. Their appearance on the continent is an indication that China can be perceived as neo-colonial in Africa (W.French & Polgreen, 2007).

Although China-Africa relations date back to ancient times and there is evidence that relations were established in these periods and there was trade (Bayram, 2021, p. 70), so that an analysis of current relations can be divided into three periods. The People's Republic of China, founded in 1949, started to support African states for ideological reasons as they gained their independence from the European colonizers in the 1950s. The first period, from 1955 to the beginning of the 1970s, was the time when political and ideological interests were dominant, independence was supported, and colonialism was opposed. China supported the independence movements, for example in Angola and Mozambique. However, since China itself was not rich at that time, it could not give as much financial support as USA or the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as a result of this support, the African countries which China had become close to, supported it by voting for the permanent membership of China instead of Taiwan in the United Nations General Assembly.

Moreover China supported the non-aligned movement, which formed outside the two poles, during the Cold War period. After the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955, China positioned itself as the leader of the 3rd World countries (Bayram & Emiroğlu, 2016, p. 503). Therefore, especially during the cold war years, China saw itself as a natural ally of the Africans positioning its foreign policy as anti-Soviet revisionism and anti-Western imperialism (Zheng, 2010, p. 271).

In the second period between the 1970s and the early 1990s, a relationship process focusing on trade and economic cooperation is observed. We can say that one of the turning points in China's foreign policy was that, with the liberalization that started in China in 1978, the trend in foreign policy was that the economy took precedence over politics. The early 1990s was another turning point and marks the start of the third period. China, which was an oil exporter until 1993, started to seek reliable sources from external providers after this point (Ulker, 2016, p. 148). China, which became a net oil importer after 1993, wanted to diversify its sources since the oil resources in the Middle East are

under the control of the USA. For this reason, it also evaluated markets such as Nigeria and Sudan, which other countries hesitate to enter due to the perceived political and economic risks (Bayram, 2021, p. 95). In this third period, from the 1990s to the present, a process in which multi-faceted cooperation has been developed by focusing on mutually beneficial development and international cooperation can be seen. In short, long-term intermittent relations gained a continuous acceleration, especially after the 2000s. This new relationship model of China and Africa includes new big changes. It also raises many criticisms and questions (Addis & Zuping, 2018, pp. 1-3).

David Brown attributes China's interest in Africa to the following reasons: firstly on the economic front to securely supply energy and strategic raw materials, and to benefit from the African market, which is predicted to rise even higher in the long run. The other two interests are more political: gaining the support of African countries at the UN and ensuring Taiwan's diplomatic isolation in the international arena (Brown, 2012, p. 2). With its growing economy, reaching energy and mineral resources targets has dominated China's political strategy. Besides, its soft power and the use of public diplomacy have been integral tools of this strategy.

China needs African's resources in order to continue its economic development and meet the needs of its huge population. For instance, due to the rapidly increasing population, changing dietary habits, rapid urbanization, air and soil pollution due to industrial activities, has brought about very important food safety problems in China. For this reason, heading to the African continent, which is home to 60 percent of the world's arable land, China has bought or leased 240 thousand hectares (Bayram, 2021, pp. 96-97). Furthermore, China has high demands for raw materials in order to maintain its on-going industrialization plans. In order to make this resource transfer, China provides foreign aid to chosen countries or country groups, develops its public and political relations and adopts the principle of mutual benefit. Chinese foreign aid policy claims to meet African countries developmental and basic needs. To date Chinese foreign aid, usually in the form of grants, zero-interest loans, development loans and deferrals, amounts to tens of billions of dollars.

China's resurgence in Africa has been much discussed in recent years. These emerging relationships is a cause for concern to the former colonists. Some in the West

question China's rising role in the continent and criticize it claiming that China is trying to colonize the continent, ironically in the same manner that Western colonizers in previous centuries. Others argue that China is simply establishing strict business ties that will help China get natural sources without intervention into African's states sovereignty (Zheng, 2010, p. 271). Whereas yet others argue that African states consider China as more than just an economic partner and can offer an alternative development model to that provided by the West.

In many studies, China's interest in Africa is explained as access to the consumer market, cheap manpower, business partnership, providing alternative opportunities for poverty reduction, balancing the power of the UN and gaining the support of African countries. Critics of China, on the other hand, view China as a new invader and neo-colonialist. They see China as dangerous both for the international community and for African interests. Chinese firms are regarded as the cause of political insecurity, lack of good governance and human rights violations (Addis & Zuping, 2018, p. 7). For example, politicians like Hillary Clinton and David Cameron have warned Africa against the authoritarian capitalist Chinese invasion (Khoo, 2011).

This study aims to examine China's approach to Africa in the context of neocolonialism. The concept of neo-colonialism was institutionalized by Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, in his book "Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism." According to this, the state subject to neocolonialism, although seemingly independent, is covertly economically and politically managed from the outside (Nkrumah, 1965, p. ix). Nkrumah says the neo-colonizers are looking for not only raw materials, but also markets exclusively for their products, while the old style colonial masters were primarily concerned about supplying their manufacturing industry. Neo-colonialism has broken-up large states to establish smaller and less viable countries with increased dependence on external forces, be they governments or multinational corporations. This study will try to discuss the relationship between China and Africa from this perspective.

In this study, in which China's neo-colonialism will be examined through its political, economic, military, personal-institutional relations with Africa, how China has used neo-colonial tools in these countries in the example of Angola will be analyzed in

the fourth chapter. The nature of Chinese influence in Africa through: the increasing Chinese population on the continent and the debt trap created by the large amount of credit provided through development programs and Resource Based Loans (RBLs), will all be examined. The debt problem of Africans to China is seen as a kind of neocolonial tool. As Thomas Sankara, former President of Burkina Faso, warned in his speech at the African Union Summit; “Debt has its origins in the origins of colonialism. Those who lend us money are those who colonize us. .. Debt is neo-colonialism in which the colonists turn themselves into 'technical assistants” (Sankara, 1987).

It will not be examined in detail in the study, but there is something useful to mention here: How Africans interpret this intense relationship with China. The perspectives of Africans on Chinese investments and Chinese model development can be generally divided into two groups. Those who see the Chinese development model as a more positive and exemplary model for themselves and find the system of doing business with Chinese companies more attractive than that of Western companies. Acceptance of China's involvement in Africa has been aided by many infrastructure investments and development projects which provide positive images about China to the African public. Moreover, China doesn't interfere with internal or international relations policies of African countries. Consequently, Africans do not see China as a typical colonizer. However, there are also negative impacts of involvement in Africa. Because of the cheaper cost of Chinese goods local producers cannot compete with Chinese companies in the market. There is also the problem of transparency in the business agreements between Chinese companies and some corrupted bureaucrats (Bayram, 2021, pp. 126-127).

Most of the studies in the literature focus on the economic relations between China and Africa, which have expanded especially since the early 2000s and made China the number 1 trading partner for Africa (Mureithi, 2022). In this study, not only economic relations will be examined, but also whether this relationship can be seen as neo-colonial through political, economic, military and institutional-personal networks. Neo-colonialism in the political arena is to enable the exploited country to act as it wishes by the exploiter through economic methods. Since the 1950s, when China saw that African states gave it legitimacy in the international arena at the UN, it has been getting their votes and support by using economic instruments such as aid and credit.

Many western observers state that China is seizing resources in Africa and abusing its local workforce. Besides that, they criticize China as a neo-colonial state since China has a bad influence over African countries' national industries and Chinese industrial activities in Africa harm ecological environments. On the other hand, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao denies this accusation, saying that the hat of neocolonialism cannot be worn on the head of the Chinese (Junbo & Frasher, 2014, p. 185).

Neo-colonialists import resources, raw materials, and unprocessed products at extremely low costs while simultaneously exporting manufactured items to colonized areas. The colonized countries' competitive advantages in terms of price and quality of goods severely undermine the colonized countries' traditional or newly developing industries. As a result, the local industry cannot compete with similar goods produced by colonial powers. Regarding this competition, how China affects the African manufacturing industry and furniture industry will be seen in the third part of this study. The colonized countries' economic relations with the colonial power are generally dependent relationships based on single goods. When this relationship is severed or broken, the colonized countries will face financial difficulties. According to Junbo and Fisher, it is complex and difficult to claim that a country's backwardness, underdevelopment, or foreign dependency is solely due to colonialism in the global age. It is easy to find evidence that one or more of the aforementioned characteristics were practiced in the colonies by colonists during the colonial period. With globalization, however, systematic recolonization of a state by a state is no longer possible. This is due to the fact that it is currently difficult for any foreign government to openly exert comprehensive and tight control over another country's internal economic and political institutions (Junbo & Frasher, 2014, p. 186). As a result, unlike previous colonizers, China's application of modern tools will be evaluated through Angola in this study. These are concessional loans, foreign aid, resource-based debt and generally a growing Chinese influence.

This thesis tries to find out what neo-colonial features exist in the African-Chinese relationship in the case of Angola. In this study, Sino-Angolan relations, which have been increasing with the millennium, will be analyzed from a neo-colonial perspective. This approach has been taken because it was considered that it would be easier to examine the influence of China when choosing a specific country and focusing on it, as it would be

very difficult to understand over a whole geography whether there are neo-colonial features in China-Africa relations. Furthermore, there are limited resources in the literature on relations between China and Angola, therefore this study is important in terms of contributing to this deficiency. Chinese-African relations were examined in four different dimensions while looking for neo-colonial features. Afterwards, this will be deepened to examine financial dependence, debt relationship, resource-based borrowing, development aid and aid policies, and influence-population relationship, which are the instruments of neo-colonialism in Angolan-Chinese relations. Examining Angola as a case study is important in many respects. Angola and China's increasingly intense economic relations, Angola being China's number one oil exporter, the country's view as one of the largest debtors, and China still lending large amounts of money to this country despite all these huge debts cause China to be seen as a neo-colonial in Angola (Ebatamehi, 2018). Angola was also one of the 5 countries with the highest number of Chinese workers in 2015. Among countries like Algeria, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea and Congo, Angola alone was home to a fifth of Chinese workers (Atkins, Brautigam, Chen, & Hwang, 2017, p. 5).

1.1.Problem Statement

With globalization, increasing economic growth, development and eradicating poverty have become very urgent and important issues. African countries were aware of increasing their development and economic growth in order to benefit from globalization (Ajayi, 2001, p. 6). China's economic expansion created an opportunity to grow and develop for African economies that want to benefit from globalization as the Asian giant was in search of both new sources for its raw material source and new markets for its products. China benefits from this relationship, such as access to raw materials, new markets for product trade, establishment of investment relations that can generate significant profits as well as diplomatic influence over time. China's investments are generally focused on areas such as energy, raw materials, infrastructure and advanced technology. Infrastructure investments are very important for developing countries. For this reason, it can be said that infrastructure investments offer China the opportunity to access the resources of underdeveloped countries.

On the reverse side the question must be asked: What benefits do African countries gain from this relationship? In 1966, China's per capita income was much lower than countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe. By the 2000s, it overtook these countries rapidly creating a big gap between them (Gu & Humphrey, 2006, p. 2). On the back of its success in development, China is seen as a guarantee of future prosperity by African leaders. Some African states see China as providing an alternative development model and as a counterweight to the continent's conditional aid from the West for investment and development (Zheng, 2010, p. 273). In addition, China's loans and concessional aid has financed a wide spectrum of projects across the continent. There are studies showing that African countries also benefit from this relationship, such as receiving the "unconditional" development assistance they need. China has become the country that gives the most foreign aid and credit to the African continent.

There are studies showing that these developing and increasing economic relations have contributed considerably to the growth of the economy of African states. For example; Pigato and Tang found that China's rapid industrialization has fueled growth in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially those rich in resources (Pigato & Tang, 2015, p. 2). On the other hand, Elu and Price in their study state that Chinese investment damages African economies and destroys the manufacturing sector. Likewise there are different opinions and criticisms in the literature regarding the positive/negative consequences of the China-Africa rapprochement. Some scholars tend to see China-Africa economic cooperation within the framework of South-South cooperation, while others describe the relationship as ideologically based, and another group of critics interprets the presence of China as neo imperialist or colonialist. Regarding of neo-colonialism this study tries to understand the relationship between China and Africa. There are studies that claim that Chinese investments in Africa are often motivated by the exploitation of African natural resources and that they are extracted solely to sustain China's development. The methodology in these studies is carried out at the national level and then generalized to cover many African countries in terms of results (Ado & Su, 2013, p. 42). The objective to see whether there are neo-colonial features in African-Chinese relations with Angola as a model country stems from the recognition that for an accurate analysis the scope of the research must be limited.

1.2.Objective and Research Questions

The objective of this study is to analyze Chinese neo colonialism across the continent. This study aims to examine the nature of China-Africa relations and their effect on Africa. Is it in a system where one side gains absolute gain and the continental countries are exposed to exploitation, like the previous colonizers, or is it a mutually beneficial relationship as China's official discourse claims? Answers will be sought in the light of the following questions.

I.Can China's approach to Africa be considered neo-colonial as the Western critics claim? How does China compare to previous neo-colonialists, what are the similarities and differences?

II.How is China taking advantage of weak African states and institutions to advance the motives associated with neo-imperialism?

III.How can China's trade and development aid policy be considered neocolonial?

IV.To what extent does China-Africa cooperation contribute to and develop Africa? Is China becoming a competitor or complement to Western states?

1.3.Hypothesis

This thesis claims that China tends to exploit the resources by making the countries dependent on itself (as was the practice of the former colonial countries after the African states gained their independence), by using new tools in its relationship with the African continent.

1.4.Conceptual Framework

The concept of neocolonialism was included in my conceptual framework. Furthermore the rise of China can be better understood with the concepts of neo-liberalism and globalization.

1.5.Methodology

Based on the document analysis method, this study will examine the China-Angola relationship as a case study. It will also use critical method analysis with the help of documentary sources and data. In document analysis, which is also called documentary scanning, new data is obtained by examining existing records and documents. With this

method, the processes of finding, reading, taking notes and evaluating the sources for the determined purpose are covered. It is the collection, systematic examination and evaluation of official and private records (Sak, Sak, Şendil, & Nas, 2021, p. 230).

Documents published by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and Foreign Affairs and the China Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) will be used as the main source. These documents and official discourses will be examined in the perspective of neo-colonialism theory in the case of Angola. In addition, secondary sources such as English and Turkish official economic and trade data from sites such as OEC World, sipri.com, documents and texts collected from news sites will be used.

1.6. Importance of This Study

This thesis aims to contribute to academic relevance by increasing knowledge about the relations between China and African continent countries by examining neocolonial theory and China's involvement in Angola from this perspective. It has been observed that articles in the literature accusing China of being a neocolonial interventionist or occupier in Africa have been published with little evidence, often from a Western perspective. In studies reflecting the Chinese perspective, these accusations cause dissatisfaction by affecting the vested interests of the western world and the western hegemony has sharply reduced their activities in African countries (Addis & Zuping, 2018). Others state that the China-Africa relationship probably aroused the historical guilt of the former colonizers by highlighting the lack of development on the continent, and therefore they have tried to influence China-Africa relations. In this study, China will be evaluated according to different parameters. China uses new tools in its relationship with Africa by giving to the continent what the West did not, it fills in the developmental gaps and so increases its power. These tools are the Chinese diaspora, borrowing and hidden loans called RBL (Resource based loans). Neo-colonialism is one of the main tools of foreign influence, and China's African policy will be evaluated around 4 criteria based on this theory.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

We had become strangers in our own country (Gandhi) (Ferro, 2002, p. 391).

In this section after giving the definition of the term neo-colonialism, its practices and institutions, are explored through the works of authors like Sartre, Nkrumah and Ngugi. In addition, concepts such as neoliberalism and globalization, which are the economic systems in which these concepts are formed, will be included. This is because colonial movements are not independent of the phases of capitalism. Ngugi summarizes this situation as follows: Africa has been an integral part of the key phases in the development of the globalization trend of capital. The commercial phase returned to Africa as slavery, the industrial phase as colonialism, and the financial phase as neo-colonialism, the heart of globalization (Thiong'o, 2021, p. 30).

2.1. Neo-colonialism

Neo-colonialism will be the leading theory of this thesis to get a good understanding of the subject. This theory helps a broader understanding of China's approach to Africa. First, the emergence of neocolonialism will be discussed: the historical course, the end of colonialism, and the conditions that led to neocolonialism. In order to better understand these, the relationship of colonialism with the concepts of neo-liberalism and globalization will be explained in the next section. Finally, how tools of neo-colonialism are defined in terms of political, economic, military and institutional relations will be summarized.

When looking at the history of European colonialism, which lasted about a century in Africa, it can be seen that there are interpretations that different processes (such as World War II, the spread of communism, etc.) were effective in bringing about its end. In fact, independence movements of African countries were as a result of the Second World War. After the Second World War, the old superpowers lost much of their strength. Germany and Italy had lost the war and therefore faced sanctions. Spain had been weakened due to internal turmoil, while Britain and France even though they were among the victorious states with U.S. support, had suffered economic setbacks. When examining the colonial map, it can be seen that at the Berlin Conference in 1885 the USA did not

have any colonies. It seemed that the US was not able to accept the new world balance of power. The US would either enjoy the same colonial advantages as other countries or find other methods that technically enable this (Ferro, 2002).

Luraghi says that it is natural for people who are under the rule of colonialism to cherish the desire to achieve independence. The dissolution that started after the Second World War actually dates back to the establishment of the Soviet Union in Russia in 1917. President Vladimir Ilyich Lenin declared that “the colonial world had revived the capitalist world.” Then the communists started agitation to liberate the people under this oppression of colonialism, an initiative that bore fruit after the Second World War (Luraghi, 2000, p. 21). At this point, Altinbas also states that the dissolution process of the colonies is not only related to the wars of independence and the “humanness” of the Europeans, but that this process has naturally disintegrated as it had become expensive for the Europeans. It is certain that there were gains from the colonies, but the costs of the established systems after the war became difficult to maintain and the colonial owners thought that it would be more profitable to spend their expenses on their own lands, taking into account their deteriorating economies (Altinbas, 2011, p. 34).

Policymakers thought that one of the reasons decolonization would be an easy process in many ways was that the commoditization process of everything would go faster, not slower, with domestic governments. This situation also fits with the historical trajectory that has been ongoing since the beginning of the capitalist world economy (Wallerstein, 2020, p. 21).

The colonial states gained their independence during the 1950's and 1970's in the African continent and in some respects colonialism came to an end. However, this expiration was limited in name and form, and African countries continued to be exploited in terms of methods and purposes. This situation takes its place in the literature as neocolonialism, also known as economic colonialism (Dündar, 2020, p. 13). The former colonial states adapted to this new situation by correcting the old methods, developing and applying new methods. The colonial states of the past maintain their ties with their former colonies, through the creation of mixed communities (like Commonwealth) and companies, international and private funds, corporations and consortia, various aid and

development programs, commercial practices (various forms of unequal shopping, dumping, patronage, bad cargo practices, etc.) (Vahrusev, 1978, p. 60).

With the end of the classical colonial period, Europe's sole dominance over the colonies ended, and many global players began to keep the third world countries dependent on them with new ways of domination (Luraghi, 2000, p. 21). Neocolonialism can also be called the process in which developed countries continue their participation in underdeveloped countries in a way that harms the growth of that nation. The structure of neocolonialism, how this phenomenon emerged and where it originated will be analyzed.

2.1.1 Emergence of the Concept

The colonial period had provided the necessary economic growth and imbalance for Europe. Therefore, as both Mazrui and Thiong'o point out, colonialism gave rise to European capitalism. Loomba also says that without colonialism the transition to capitalism would not have occurred in Europe (Loomba, 1998, p. 4). The developments in the globalization of the economy since the 1960s have caused economies to overlap and integrate like bricks on the wall. Some of these former colonial countries have now fallen into a state of dependency or poverty that are reminiscent of their old situations (Ferro, 2002, p. 49).

Neocolonialism became very common after the Second World War because it was impossible to return to the pre-war situation. From the late 19th century onwards, the colonies were a source of wealth that could be used to alleviate class conflicts in capitalist countries. But most of the profits from the colony went to the capitalist class, not to the workers. The working classes, on the other hand, sometimes identified with the people of the colonies. The imperial powers conflicted with the workers on the inside and the colonials on the outside. Then, with a change in this policy, the power from the colonies began to be used to finance the Rafah State, not the capitalist class. It was understood that this goal could not be achieved by continuing the old colonialism, which would only provoke the colonial states, therefore neocolonialism was formed. Neocolonialism was to divide the former large unified colonial territories into a series of smaller states that lacked the ability to develop independently, and consequently had to rely on the old imperial power for defense and even internal security (Nkrumah, 1966).

In the 1960s, this concept began to be used to express the continuation of their dependence on political, economic, military and social aspects despite the apparent political independence of African countries. After Africans gained their independence, they realized that their country was subjected to a new colonialism by their former colonizers and some other developed nations. Neocolonialism was effectively the ongoing socio-economic indirect exploitation activities of former colonists in their former colonies.

The phenomenon of liberation from colonialism did not go beyond sovereignty change in many places, with a local president replacing foreign governors. Yet all sorts of economic ties continued, developing the old dependence in new forms for the common good of the metropolis and the upcoming local bourgeoisie. With this rupture, the flow of people increased, and the old relationships developed, although they were transformed. For example, French business partners in Algeria versus Algerian immigrant workers in France (Ferro, 2002, p. 49).

2.1.2. Definition of the Concept

In this section, the description of neo-colonialism will be evaluated via different aspects. The subject of this study does not include the history of colonialism or Western colonialism in Africa in order to maintain the integrity of the study. Therefore, definitions of colonialism in the broad sense will not be included in this study. Yet, for a brief definition, Luraghi describes modern colonialism as the subjugation of technically backward people, whose economy is based on agriculture and crafts, by more advanced technical nations (Luraghi, 2000, p. 18).

Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, can be said to be one of the first to notice neocolonialism, first mentioning it in his 1963 speech at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Nkrumah, Face2FaceAfrica, 1963). Then he gained international attention with his book *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, published in 1967. In this book, Nkrumah described the ongoing dependencies of the African states that had just gained their independence. The book emphasizes the realization that colonialism has not yet been abolished in Africa. Neocolonialism is generally shaped around Nkrumah's writings. Nkrumah is one of two authors who take different perspectives on the concept of neo-colonialism since the end of the colonization period,

the other being Franz Fanon. Of course, they are not the only authors to write about this concept. Satre (Satre, 2001) and Noam Chomsky (Chomsky, 2015) both warn about aid and foreign direct investment which target to reduce poverty and increase welfare in African countries (Segell, 2019, p. 189). Nkrumah, also, states that the aid that the former colonialists will provide for the development of the newly independent states is one of the different ways to return the profits obtained from colonialism. Nkrumah points out that foreign capital is used for exploitation, not for the development of less developed parts of the world. For this reason, he writes that these investments increase, rather than reduce, the gap between the rich and poor countries of the world (Nkrumah, 1965, p. x).

The concept of neocolonialism, in its most general form, refers to those who have political independence, but that dependency and/or colonialism continues through indirect methods. Altinbas says that in the neo-colonial order, there is no need for the lands to be occupied anymore, the control method is based on economy and culture (Altinbas, 2011). Nkrumah describes neocolonialism as “The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside” (Shaw, 1982, p. 241). He defines neocolonialism as a system of states that are formally autonomous but whose political policy and economy are dependent and bounded on external political and economic influences (Nkrumah, 1966, p. 7).

This definition was made by the head of a state that had gained its sovereignty. After a certain stage, Nkrumah realized that the former colonial powers found it unnecessary to control internally, instead they helped those countries to develop, and instead of their own visible assets, they used the invisible management of big banks such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Ferro, 2002, p. 572). He argues that “the neocolonialism of today represents imperialism in its final and perhaps its most dangerous stage. Neocolonialism is also the worst form of imperialism.” Nkrumah has drawn a link between imperialism and neocolonialism and says that neocolonialism is the highest and worst form of imperialism. He writes that those who practice it do not take responsibility, but those who are exposed to it are the target of uncontrolled exploitation (Nkrumah, 1966). Neo-colonialism has surrounded society in political, religious, ideological, economic and cultural areas.

As has been touched on above, the relationship between foreign investment and aid, Nkrumah notes that neocolonialism uses foreign capital to exploit rather than to enrich underdeveloped countries. He argues that investments in these countries increases, rather than reduces the gap, between rich and poor internally and also with other countries. The struggle against neo-colonialism is to prevent those holding financial power from using it in a way that impoverishes and prevents development. Neocolonialism means power without responsibility for those who practice it, exploitation without compensation for those who suffer from it. In colonialism, colonial power had to explain and legitimize its actions abroad, at least domestically. This does not happen in the new colonialism, which is why neo colonialism can be considered as more dangerous than classical colonialism.

Neo-colonialism, like old colonialism, wants to export the conflicts of capitalist countries. According to Nkrumah the success of this policy is the widening gap between rich and poor countries. However, the internal conflicts of nations show that neocolonialism cannot be sustained as a permanent world policy. In the neo-colonial states, if the conditions caused by neocolonialism cause a rebellion, the local neo-colonial government may be sacrificed only to be replaced by an equally obedient one. Neocolonialism increases competition between the great powers. No matter how politically independent they are, the colonial states cannot easily replace their master with another. This competition of colonists first shows itself in the field of aid. When this multilateral aid begins, the neo-colonial masters encounter hostility from different interests in their own countries. Nkrumah says that "Aid, therefore, to a neo-colonial state is merely a revolving credit, paid by the neo-colonial master, passing through the neocolonial state and returning to the neo-colonial master in the form of increased profits" (Nkrumah, 1965, p. xv). When the neo-colonial region is dragged into economic chaos and misery, this time real revolts begin. The neo-colonial powers then provide funds to be used only for military purposes. These weapons fall into the hands of their opponents and increase social misery (Nkrumah, 1965, p. xvi). Nkrumah states that neocolonialism, summarized in this way, was a system established in different parts of the world before it was applied to Africa. This system did not help in raising living standards in countries that were subservient to it (Nkrumah, 1966).

Afisi (Afisi, 2022), defines neocolonialism as the aim of subjugating their former colonies to capitalism, neo-liberal globalization through covert practices of socio-economic and political activities of former colonial rulers. Attah states that after countries became independent, colonialists guided their economic policies and foreign firms continued to dominate the economy. Multinational corporations have made themselves indispensable for the growth of the economy. Thus, the country has become fragile and underdeveloped by all kinds of foreign firms and the local bourgeoisie cooperating with the global powers. This has reinforced the inclusion of the rentier economy in the maelstrom of world capitalism, characteristic of neo-colonialism and dependency (Attah, 2013, p. 75).

Halperin states that the definition of neocolonialism was originally a term used by European states to maintain their dependence on Africa. However, she says that it is difficult for us to look for this asymmetrical relationship, as China is a newly developing country in its past relations with the continent. China has been in South-South solidarity with African countries since their independence. On the other hand, China's rising power and the instruments it uses in the international arena have recently begun to be questioned in the perspective of neo-colonialism (Halperin, 2020).

2.2. Agents, Institutions and Practices of Neo colonialism

What could be the methods and forms of neo colonialism? The mechanisms (tools) for the continuation of neocolonialism are many and vary according to the situation. Nkrumah gives different examples of this. For example, troops of the imperial powers may garrison the territory of the new colonial state. Or, more often, neo-colonialist control is applied economically. For example, the neocolonial state may have to buy the goods of the imperialist power. It does this by excluding the products of other competing brands. The old colonial powers usually control the region they previously controlled in the new period (Nkrumah, 1966).

Haag actually defines neocolonialism as a new interpretation of colonialism. However, the difference here is the mechanisms used to sustain dependence (Haag, 2011, p. 9). This control can be through price control over manufactured goods, capital control, intervention in policy in various ways, conditional aid to pursue the donor country's commercial interests, technical assistance to nearby governments, defense agreements

(Haag, 2011, p. 10). The main theme of neo-colonialism is to ensure that newly independent colonies remain politically and economically dependent on their former colonial masters. In this new situation, economic dependency is preferred instead of using military means or force (Afisi, 2022).

According to Michael Parenti (2011), neocolonialism is also a system in which the development potential of small states disappears and the capital of developed countries increases when technologically developed countries establish relations with less developed countries (Afisi, 2022). Neocolonialism is a type of colonialism that maintains the dependence of the other. At this point, Salsabila and Kusumawardha state that some characteristics are practical for the continuation of neocolonialism. These are the indirect economic and political control through the use of economic aid, investment and monetary instruments, and the continued dependence of the lower countries on the upper ones. Neocolonial countries use their economic policies, monetary policies, transnational companies, global institutions or multilateral relations as indirect means of control (Salsabila & Kusumawardhana, 2021, p. 158). A country may theoretically appear to be independent but politically and economically governed by external forces. Such an implementation requires a well-coordinated effort by developed countries to curb the growth of developing countries. Ensuring that developing countries protect raw materials and cheap labor is included in this effort (Salsabila & Kusumawardhana, 2021, p. 158). In the era of globalization, foreign direct investment and foreign aid are used as instruments of neocolonialism. Foreign investments are used for exploitation rather than the improvement of underdeveloped countries. Salsabila and Kusumawardha argue that the countries where foreign investment takes place are politically and economically dependent on the will of the donor countries (Salsabila & Kusumawardhana, 2021, p. 155). At this point, Nkrumah says that these investments contribute to widening the gap between rich and poor countries. Parenti also points out that neo-colonialism compromises the development potential of underdeveloped countries and this relationship contributes to the capital increase of developed countries (Parenti, 2011, p. 4). Therefore, neocolonialism is understood as a form of domination that is recognized as the further development of capitalism rather than direct rule using the practice of capitalism (Salsabila & Kusumawardhana, 2021, p. 159).

The neo-colonial concept was used to express the constant dependence of states formed after the Second World War on foreign powers. Over time, this concept has been expanded as developed countries try to create influence abroad, as they had in the colonial period (Salsabila & Kusumawardhana, 2021, p. 159). Attah states that many African states are very dependent on international capital due to their fragile economic structures, and therefore they are considered neo-colonial states (Attah, 2013). This means that these countries are economically dependent not only on primary goods, foreign loans, aid and investment, but also on the economic dominance of multinational corporations. Neocolonialism today is no longer limited to the great powers. Today, developed countries want to increase their influence over poor and underdeveloped countries. In most cases, African countries voluntarily allow their countries to be highly dependent on foreign capital (Salsabila & Kusumawardhana, 2021, p. 160).

In this thesis, the tools of neocolonialism will be examined under four headings.

1. Political alliances (political influence)
2. Economic relations and cooperation
3. Military material
4. Personal and Corporate Networks

It is important for us to choose the concept of neocolonialism when considering Chinese-African relations for the following reason. Although the concept of neo-colonialism is used to explain the dependent relationship situation of European colonialism after the independence of Africa, with globalization new powers in international politics, newly developing economies, and raw material-rich countries in a liberalized economic atmosphere, provide are a new form of colonialism through developing dependency. The example of China is interesting in this respect. As will be seen in the following sections, China, as the development financier that Africa needs, has actually made Africa indispensable for the raw material and market that its growing capitalist economy needs. When the reciprocity relationship, especially seen in China-Africa relations, advances with African elites and in the interests of Chinese companies, it is the exact equivalent of Ferro's definition of neo-colonialism as "any kind of new economy relationship that realizes old dependencies in a new way for the common good

of the exploiting country and the local new bourgeoisie". Whether or not the Chinese-African relationship has a new colonialist character within the framework of these four articles will be examined. China's influence on policy making process and impacts on international diplomacy will be covered under political alliance. Nkrumah, Sartre and Chomsky all draw attention to foreign aid and FDI as neo-colonial tools. The extent to which China uses these instruments in its relations with the continent will also be investigated. Foreign direct investments, foreign aid, loans, hidden borrowings and trade volumes will be examined under economic relations. China's military relations with African countries will be reviewed and finally personal and institutional networks of bilateral relations will be analyzed.

2.3. New World Order, Globalization and Neo-liberalism

To understand neo-colonialism, it is necessary to understand the economic environment of the world. While defining neo-colonialism, in this section the economic trend of the world in order to make sense of China's relationship with Africa will be examined. An attempt is made to shed light on the past and present of Africa with the new concepts of colonialism, which is the new penetration policy of the old masters, with colonialism and later African states gaining their independence.

It does not seem possible to understand processes such as colonialism, neo-colonialism, neoliberalism and globalization independently from capitalism. Colonial movements are a product of commercial capitalism. As Kenyan writer Ngugi says, the first phase of the capitalist production era was the commercial phase, which took its capital from the slave trade and fed it at the same time. This phase led to the accumulation of capital and the industrial revolution took place. The industrial phase of 19th century capitalism brought about the struggle for colonization, which meant a market for raw materials and manufactured goods for those in the race to complete their industries. Industrial capital later turned into financial capital. Ngugi states that at this stage, money is now a commodity that provides privileges to foreigners. The national defense walls were torn apart at this stage (Thiong'o, 2021, p. 29).

Capitalism, which has developed since the 16th century, has become commercial capitalism, which is the first form of capitalism pointed out by Ngugi, with many developments. In that phase, the state economy, focused on the decrease in imports and

the increase in exports, acted with the motive of owning precious metals (mercantilism). The desire to become a rich and powerful state led to colonial expansion (Aydemir & Güneş, 2006) In the 18th century, Adam Smith explained the liberal system. The criterion of wealth is profitability by producing highly demanded products with high efficiency. The possession of precious metals and colonies is essential to ensure exceptional productivity and high profits in the production of industrial capitalism seen in this phase (Gençoğlu, 2013).

The conflict between Africa and Europe during the colonial period was essentially the conflict between the advanced capitalism of that period and the pre-capitalist village economies. The characteristic of capitalism, colonial capitalism, is unbalanced regional development. The colonial economy created single-product economies by converting mining and arable land from food production to the cultivation of raw materials such as coffee, tea, sisal, and cocoa for export, thus both serving and complementing the colonial country's economy. In short, it can be said that the colony as a whole provided raw materials to the imperial center in all phases of capitalism, the rural areas of the colonies supplied the cities with food and labor (Thiong'o, 2021, pp. 22-23).

2.3.3. Globalization

Neo-colonialism in the globalizing economy has been one of the many basic discourses promoting the activities of large countries in the global economy. It is analyzed that the great powers are trying to maintain their neo-colonial activities under the concept of globalization. Instead of directly ruling a country militarily and politically, neo-colonialism uses more advanced capitalist practices and globalization (Salsabila & Kusumawardhana, 2021, p. 155).

Globalization is not a new phenomenon. Since its emergence in the 16th century, it has challenged and replaced feudalism. It became a feature of capital, which is the determining and dominating power of social and economic production. Discoveries and colonial attempts occurred at the same time as the birth of capital. Today, globalization is the maturation of a tendency and process peculiar to capitalism (Thiong'o, 2021, pp. 28-30). Globalization has been defined in different ways from different perspectives. The process of globalization, its history, scope and intensity are the most discussed topics in the literature. Globalization is an economic as well as a political, technological and

cultural phenomenon. Globalization is not a single process, it is a combination of complex processes (Giddens, 2000, p. 25). Since ancient times, various parts of the world were connected to each other for reasons such as conquests, long-distance trade and maritime trade. There was movement, interaction and dependence of people from one place to another (Adbib, 2012, p. 14).

Many scholars emphasize that the more recent globalization process has had a greater impact on the world's political, economic, and socio-cultural patterns. The biggest difference in world trade is seen in the level of flow of finance and capital. In the new global economy, fund managers, banks, large companies as well as millions of individual investors can transfer large amounts of capital to the ends of the world with a single click. With this move, the stability of the countries' robust economies may be shaken. For this reason, many scholars, such as Giddens, state that globalization, as it stands, is a newer and more striking change than experienced in previous periods (Giddens, 2000, p. 23).

In short, globalization is a process in which people, goods, services, technology, ideas and cultures flow much faster and more effectively since the industrial revolution. Changes in the modes of transportation and communication in this period changed human activities to a great extent compared to the past. It led to very rapid developments in trade and communication. These inventions and developments have radically changed and accelerated people's interaction, communication and lifestyle with the emergence of the internet (world wide web). When these changes are compared with the effects of globalization in previous periods, it is seen that people are closer together than ever before. Many ideas have become more universal now, thanks to these great developments in communication and especially on the Internet. At the same time, capital flows and rapid increase in international trade were made possible by these factors. The fact that national cultural pieces have become a part of life in many parts of the world is also a part of globalization (Worldwide recognition of Bengali curries, American burgers, Latin dances etc.) (Adbib, 2012, p. 15).

Contrary to these, it should be noted that there are still many parts of the world in which these processes have not been experienced. It has been seen that the free trade that emerged with globalization has destroyed the underdeveloped countries and the local subsistence economy. A region whose economy depends only on a few products sold in

the market is affected very quickly by price fluctuations and technological developments (Giddens, 2000, p. 25). For example, while economies in most African countries depend on a single product or two, it has been difficult to resist globalization. It is emphasized that the economic booms and collapses in Africa are far beyond control as a result of globalization by external economic conditions (Edoho, 2011, p. 114). Also, in many regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, where there is a lack of infrastructure and access to clean water, globalizing elements such as television and the internet can be a dream. Economically, it is also stated that the participation of TNCs¹ in the economy is insignificant and zero in many poor countries. In the neoliberal order, international investments take place in regions where capital is ready, and resources are promising. For this reason, it may not be correct to conclude that the effects of globalization are felt the same and strongly all over the world today (Adbib, 2012, p. 16).

2.3.3.1. Globalization in the Economy

Economic globalization is a concept that expresses the intensification and increase of mutual economic interaction all over the world. The cornerstones of the 21st century economy are giant transnational corporations, international economic organizations, and large regional trading systems. These have occurred as markets expand and new links are formed between national economies (Steger, 2006, p. 61). The beginning of globalization in the modern sense is a new international economic order that emerged with the Bretton Woods agreement at the end of the Second World War. The protectionist policies implemented in the interwar period led by the USA and Great Britain were reversed. In the Bretton Woods system, the US dollar was tied to a fixed value of gold. At the end of this conference, the international world met three new economic organizations, these are the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The World Trade Organization was established in 1995, replacing GATT (Steger, 2006, p. 63).

The Bretton Woods system, which remained in effect for 30 years, has been described as the golden age of controlled capitalism. From the collapse of the system in

¹ TNC: Trans National Corporations

the 1970s to the 1980s, global economic instability emerged with high inflation, high unemployment, public sector deficits and energy crises. In the 1980s, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan implemented neoliberalism, which is against the intense state intervention, propagated by the British Economist Keynes (Steger, 2006, p. 66). With economic globalization, liberalization of financial transactions has taken place. This meant liberalizing interest rates, removing credit controls, and privatizing state-owned banks and financial institutions.

Washington Treaty: a neocolonialism

The IMF and the World Bank demanded that countries they gave loans to follow the structural adjustment programs in return for giving them the loans they needed. These neoliberal policies were expressed as the Washington Agreement and aimed at reforming the economies of the countries so that the borrowing countries could pay their debts and become better off. Steger (2006), sees this program as a neocolonialism when its conditions are applied. The development of desirable debtor countries in structural adjustment programs has been rare. When it comes to the 1990s with such an international economic conjuncture, it can be seen under which changing economic conditions, China-Africa rapprochement and rapidly developing relations exist.

International monetary institutions were called neo-colonialists in the domestic policies of those countries, with very strict rules they imposed on the countries they lent to, which also restricted those countries from performing the public services they needed so much (Hanson & J.Hentz, 1999). In the article where Hentz and Hanson describe the relationship between neoliberalism and neocolonialism through Zimbabwe and South Africa, they try to explain the definition of neocolonialism from the perspective of underdeveloped countries. They may adopt their bad policies with the argument that foreign powers are a positive effect on the nation.

Globalization and neo-colonialism

In the globalizing economy, neocolonialism has been one of the many basic discourses that define the activities of great countries in the global economy. It is analyzed that the great powers are trying to maintain their neo-colonial activities under the concept of globalization. Now, instead of ruling the country using direct military and political

force, neo-colonialism is used through more advanced capitalist practices and globalization (Salsabila & Kusumawardhana, 2021, p. 154).

2.3.3.2. Globalization, China and Africa

In this section, the background to the rapid relationship between the continental countries, which have been colonized and newly colonized by the West for many years, with China will be emphasized. It is certain that globalization has affected the relations between China and Africa. The continent, which the West alienated by decreasing its aid and investments, gained momentum in its relations with China in the 1990s.

Edoho (2011) says that globalization has contributed to marginalization of Africa's economy. Edoho states that as a result of this marginalization, the African economy finds its relations with China reasonable. The decline of the West's investments in Africa, the decrease in technical and foreign aid, the increase in brain drain has worsened the economy in Africa. (Edoho, 2011, p. 104) The new vacuum created by the West, which left the continent at the end of the Cold War, was filled by China (Edoho, 2011, p. 105). Edoho's claim is that the economic vacuum created by the West as it left Africa is a cold war phenomenon combined with globalization. The economic vacuum did not arise from decolonization, but from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and globalization as the defining feature of the 21st century. The US and EU left Africa, diverting their attention from Africa and directing their foreign aid and economic aid to the rebuilding of Eastern Europe, leaving an economic vacuum that is now being filled by China. The West has failed to help Africa overcome structural barriers to relieving its poverty and reversing its marginalization. Against this, countries became dependent on loans from the International Monetary Fund with devastating terms. China, on the other hand, made no provision when investing in Africa, providing technical and foreign aid, or allowing African goods to access its market (Edoho, 2011, p. 112).

2.3.2 Neo-Liberalism

Neo-liberalism, which started to take a strong place on the political and economic agenda in the late 1970s, changed the world's economic, cultural and social order tremendously. Contrary to the mercantilist policies implemented in previous years (mercantilist policies aim to create a foreign trade surplus by limiting imports and make

the country rich in this way), neoliberal policies imposed the prescription that economic growth and poverty reduction can only be achieved when countries are integrated into the global economic system. Although these policies have led to very important developments in the economies of many countries in 'the West', South East Asia and Latin America, they have caused great deterioration in the socio-economy of other countries such as Tanzania and Mexico (Adbib, 2012, p. 17). Neoliberalism has its origins in Adam Smith and David Ricardo's concept of classical liberalism. Liberal thought is the minimization of state control, which is balanced and shaped by the supply and demand of the market, thus ensuring the most effective distribution of resources. The system advocating free competition sees the opposite as an intervention in the natural efficiency of the market (Steger, 2006, p. 64).

The 1980s and 90s were a time when the wave of neoliberalism spread to all developing countries. International financial institutions were identified as the main policy condition for the diffusion of economic growth strategies (Hanson & J.Hentz, 1999, p. 479). The conditionality of international monetary institutions has been portrayed as neocolonialism in borrowing countries. The IMF determines the economic policies of the third world. A state that has to have its economic policies approved by another state means that it has handed over a part of its sovereignty to the inspector who gave the approval (Thiong'o, 2021, p. 32). Today, globalization and neoliberalism has become a practice of neo-colonialism with its applications of capitalism. As China's economy embraced globalization, it expanded with the scope of trade and investment activities meaning Africa has become an increasingly important economic partner (Cheng & Shi, 2009, p. 102).

By applying all these concepts to a practical understanding of the Sino-African relationship, especially neocolonialism, it can be seen whether this approach to the economy is related to the domination and control of African states and the motivations of the Chinese. Another consideration is the impact of Chinese foreign policy and political economies in the global context. For this reason, the concepts of globalization and neo-liberalization have been the focus. This paper argues that, in terms of the concept of neo-colonialism, it is possible that these relations will not have any neo-colonial characteristics or it is also possible that there is a relationship of domination and control, in our study between Africa and China and in particular Angola.

CHINA AS A NEO-COLONIZER IN AFRICA

The rise of China from one of the world's poorest countries to the world's second largest economy (Yueh, 2019, p. 19) has transformed not only the world's most populous country, but also the global economy. China abolished its centrally planned economy with the market-oriented reforms it initiated in 1979. While China has been the production factory of the whole world, since 2014, it has become a net capital exporter by making more than it receives with foreign direct investments. This meant that it became a major economy with companies mature enough to invest abroad. The clearest manifestation of these foreign investments of China can be seen in the Going Global initiative launched for Chinese companies in the early 2000s and the One Belt One Road (BRI) initiative launched in 2013. China's interest in Africa fills some of the gap by supporting important infrastructure gaps in the global economy, especially with the BRI initiative (Yueh, 2019, pp. 19,28).

China having now reached the "infinite" supply of raw materials required by its economic development, has begun to develop and increase its capacity to use influence in most parts of the world (Holslag, 2009, p. 23). Holslag notes that Beijing has made an effort to brand itself as a responsible actor on the international stage. In 2005, Foreign Minister Zi Zhaoxing said, "The vigorous pursuit of peace, development and cooperation by the peoples of all countries has created a wave of history. China's diplomacy has come a long way, serving domestic development and contributing to world peace and joint development" (Alden & Alves, 2008). His statement shows this effort (Holslag, 2009, p. 25). Due to this foreign policy, China strives to maintain good international relations and participate in global organizations.

From the very beginning, China has built its relations with Africa within the context of of South-South solidarity and win-win cooperation rhetoric. Focusing on neocolonialism, a Chinese discourse on maintaining state sovereignty in trade and aid agreements within African regimes is emphasized (Langan, 2018, p. 90). Chinese official discourse emphasizes mutual respect and win-win cooperation between sovereigns. Despite this rhetoric by Beijing, legitimizing African inclusion, there is a portrait of the Chinese threat drawn by Western media and politicians. Accordingly, China is seen as a neo-colonialist who does not care about human rights and focuses only on raw materials

from the continent. Langan states that contrary to the interventionist nature of the West, on the continent, China is perceived as a prudent actor that establishes relations with African countries for mutual industrialization and infrastructure-based development (Langan, 2018, p. 91). For example, some academicians say that China's aid, large amounts of development financing, thriving economic relations, and the steady increase in military presence show that China has succeeded in filling the gap left by the West on the continent (Mishra, 2020).

Academicians like Rotberg against their colonial criticism of China state that China does not "really" want to exploit Africa, but has mercantilist aims on the continent. Saying that he greedily searches for valuable raw materials such as oil, timber, platinum, copper and diamonds, Rotberg adds that no world power has the same appetite as China, the world's largest nation state, which grew by an average of 10-11 percent every year, including during official colonial times. He emphasizes that this relationship is a mutual need, that China cannot grow without Africa, and that Sub-Saharan Africa cannot develop without China (Rotberg, 2008, p. 1).

The main activities that show China as a colonialist are as follows:

1. One of the main factors driving China to Africa is the search for resources and materials. Meanwhile, China also exports a large number of processed goods to Africa. China's business model is described as one that seizes Africa's materials and resources, but leaves behind environmental degradation, corruption and unemployment.
2. Goods exported to Africa have superiority over African goods due to high quality and reasonable price.
3. China's strongest trade and investments with Africa appear to be limited to just a few countries and industries and areas.
4. Chinese state-owned companies are becoming decisive on the core industries of some countries in Africa. For example, Chinese oil companies have become key players in Sudan. In order to balance this, Sudan had to open oil exploration tenders to other countries.

As in the classical colonial period, China focuses on raw agricultural resources, low value-added products and raw chemicals in its imports from Africa. Finally, China's

activities have had many negative social and political effects on Africa, such as degradation of the natural environment, abuse of human rights, corruption, and lack of respect for local culture (Junbo & Frasher, 2014, p. 194). For example, Beijing says that African companies can audit Chinese companies, but there is information that Chinese companies are generally audited by Chinese auditors. China brings its bad habits, its own way of doing business to the continent, taking advantage of, or benefits from Africa's underdevelopment and its non-institutionalized structure.

In recent years, the average annual economic growth of African countries has been 5 percent, and China's contribution to this rate is 20 percent. This shows that China, as a major economic partner of Africa, is an increasingly important market for African exports. Infrastructure investments are at the heart of Africa's economic development, poverty alleviation, and social modernization. It is also extremely beneficial for African integration and non-African cultural exchanges. China is a major player in the development of Africa's infrastructure. Chinese companies dominate the construction industry in 35 African countries, with a larger market share than Italy, France, and the United States combined, concentrated in Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Junbo & Frasher, 2014, p. 197).

In this section, these neo-colonial criticisms/claims brought about by China's rising interaction with Africa is examined under four headings. In fact, an analysis will be made of these relations around the question of whether China is a "responsible" great power in international politics as a rising economic power, as mentioned at the beginning, or whether it is a colonial power that prioritizes its own interests and is always on the high side of the leverage. While doing this, four parameters which are seen as the tools of neocolonialism will be used: political, economic, military and institutional relations. In its political relations with Africa, does China influence their decisions in both national and international politics and make them dependent on itself? Does it establish relations with countries that expect investment from it and cannot grow without its help? Are economic relations a win-win or cooperation in which all sides make progress, within the framework of South-South rhetoric cooperation? What is China's military outlook on the continental arms trade? Finally, what kind of relationship is reflected in bilateral relations between individuals and various networks?

3.1. China and Africa Political Relations

It is important to recognize that China is not a new actor in Africa. For this reason, China's remarkable emphasis in shaping its foreign policy towards Africa is in the context of historical relations. China's relationship with Africa dates back to the 15th century (Alden & Alves, 2008, p. 43), and in some sources it is seen that Chinese scholars take this relationship back to the Han dynasty (Addis & Zuping, 2018, p. 1) (Bayram, 2021, p. 69). The visits of the Chinese led by Zheng He in the 15th century to Africa were not made for colonialist purposes and their diplomatic courtesy during the visits had a positive effect. For this reason, while emphasizing that China will rise on peaceful foundations today, just as it was not a colonial power in the past, it references Zheng He's expeditions (Bayram, 2021, p. 70). The reason why China emphasizes history so much in relations is that, with its emergence as a global power, it wants to develop positive relations with Africa, unlike the Western states' attitude that humiliates and exploits Africa (Alden & Alves, 2008) (Bayram, 2021). Beijing wants to portray China as a state that will not endanger the interests of poor countries by emphasizing its peaceful rise, as opposed to single power transitions in the past (Alden & Alves, 2008, p. 43). This emphasis is also important in preventing Western sources from portraying China as a game-changing threatening actor in Africa (Langan, 2018, p. 91).

It is possible to compartmentalize the relations between China and Africa as follows:

1. The first period focused on ideology in the 1950s and 1970s.
2. With the 1980s, the period when China focused its attention on Western states with its reform policies, and its relations with Africa were limited at the economic level.
3. With the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the period when China-Africa relations deepened in economic terms.

In the first period, while both Chinese and African states had just gained their independence, mutual political support was very important in the international arena. Mutual political support, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism were the main issues in bilateral relations. In the second stage with the 1980s, although China turned its face to the West due to reform, it continued to interact with Africa, being aware of the importance

of its economic relations. During this period, the principles of equality and mutual benefit, emphasis on practical results, economic development and diversity in form were promoted to African countries. During the 1990s, China-Africa relations were actively developing with new conditions and Chinese investments in Africa began to increase (Chun, 2013, p. 11).

China's engagement with Africa is found in the policies and previous historical relations since the mid-1950s. Official relations between China and African states began at the Bandung Conference in 1955. It was a good opportunity for China, as the founding of the People's Republic of China coincided with the African declaration of independence. In the early period of modern relations, China realized that African states were its natural allies in the international arena (on Taiwan at the UN).

At the beginning of modern political and economic relations, which coincided with the Cold War era, Beijing was following a policy close to Moscow, which helped it to get close to the 3rd World Countries through the Non-Aligned Movement. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, private meetings were held with representatives from Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Egypt and Sudan. China's aim at this conference was to create a sense of shared historical unity against western colonialism in order to build a new international power (Yu, 1988, p. 324). Prime Minister Zhou Enlai visited African countries in 1963-1964 and used a discourse that reflected the ideological orientation of China at that time (Bayram, 2021, p. 71). This trip (Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Somalia, Mali, Morocco, Guinea, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic) was an opportunity for China to personally introduce itself internationally to Africa and the 3rd World. It gave China a chance to directly lay out its policy towards Africa (Yu, 1988, p. 851). In the same period, there were also visitors from African governments to China. During these visits, Zhou emphasized that China and African countries met at the middle ground regarding the anti-imperialist struggle, and pointed to the shared developing country categorisation of African countries and China, which he refers to as poor friends.

In 1954, China declared the "Five Principles of Peaceful Living" as the principles of mutual respect for its territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit. These principles covered relations with African states and were very attractive to new countries. The

mutually beneficial principle of this new South-South cooperation and the policy based on these 5 principles would help resist the threat of foreign intervention by the neo-colonial powers (Alden & Alves, 2008, p. 47). According to these principles, Jinyuan (1984, p. 248) outlined China's main goal in Africa as follows:

1. To support the struggle of Africans to gain their independence and protect their national sovereignty against colonialism, imperialism and hegemony.
2. To establish and develop relations with African countries on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and cooperation.
3. To support governments pursuing a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment, and to provide them with technical and material support to the extent of China's capacity.
4. Advocating for the resolution of conflicts between African countries through peaceful negotiations, raising African solidarity and opposition to interference by foreign powers.
5. To support the efforts of African countries to develop their national economies and their search for a new global economic order.

Thanks to these principles, relations with the continent did not stop even in the chaotic times when China was experiencing a cultural revolution. As a matter of fact, the number of African countries that had diplomatic relations with China increased by 22 percent in that period, reaching 100 percent (Jinyuan, 1984, p. 249).

In the following years, China signed and implemented infrastructure, economic aid and technical assistance agreements to African countries. These equipment supports and aids were made without interest and unconditionally, to be repaid over a long period of time with Africa's exports. This policy has remained unchanged for years, reminiscent of the current African-Chinese model (Alden & Alves, 2008, p. 49).

During this period, China completed the construction of the Tamzam Railway together with the Tanzanians and Zambians. Beside, some aid projects were also carried out during this period (Jinyuan, 1984, p. 249). The Tanzania-Zambia railway was China's largest foreign aid project (More than \$600 million) (Yu, 1988, p. 854). This is one of the projects that became China's soft power in Africa at that time, and this project, which was

not undertaken by other countries due to its high cost, proved that China could increase its influence in the continent when other powers were ineffective (Bayram, 2021, p. 74).

Why, with independence, was China so eager to maintain and develop its relations with African states when it was not yet economically developed? It is important to know that China always has some political and strategic reasons behind these policies. It can be said that China-Africa relations in this early modern period are based on 3 interests of China.

1. Spreading their own ideologies/policies on Third World countries
2. Recognition and support in the international arena
3. Support in the Sino-Soviet conflict

According to Mao's strategy, in the capitalist and socialist bipolar world, Asia, Latin America and Africa were the intermediate zone. For this reason, China saw itself as a leader For Third world countries that had given China a space to realize their own political ideologies. According to China's own ideology, those who have achieved their freedom should help those who have not yet achieved their freedom. Therefore, China believes it has a responsibility to help the African people gain and defend their national independence. China has provided financial aid, including military aid, to countries such as Algeria, Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe, which have been fighting for years, to gain their independence (Jinyuan, 1984, pp. 249-250).

Secondly, it was the recognition and support of China as the only legitimate government in the international arena. The biggest contribution to China's regaining its seat in the UN was thanks to African states (Jinyuan, 1984, p. 250). It can be understood by this the effectiveness of the aid provided. In 1961, the Republic of China (Taiwan) helped Africa recognize and support Taiwan with the Vanguard Project, an agricultural technical assistance program. In 1963, 19 African countries recognized Taiwan. This event made China realize that African votes were the deciding factor in the General Assembly at the UN and were a factor in the recognition of China rather than Taiwan (Yu, 1988, p. 851). In 1971, at the UN, China replaced Taiwan with the help of African states' votes. At the international organization level, China was grateful for Taiwan's representation and support from African states in China's human rights issues. China and

Africa have had mutual interests on UN reform and negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Cheng & Shi, 2009, p. 92).

The third factor explaining China's growing interest in Africa was the Sino-Soviet conflict. During the Cold War, the conflict between China and the Soviets was a breakdown of ideological differences created by different interpretations and practices of Marxism and Leninism (contributors., 2022). In the post-Stalin era, Sino-Soviet relations had turned into hostility. After that, China fought not only against American imperialism but also against Soviet revisionism in Africa (Bayram, 2021, p. 73). trying to exclude the Soviet Union from Africa. For example, in the mid-1960s China supported a number of African groups such as Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Totel de Angola (UNITA) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), while opposing other groups such as Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) which were supported by the Soviet Union (Yu, 1988, p. 851). Furthermore, the majority of African states voted to withdraw Vietnamese occupation troops from Cambodia and also against the armed aggression of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Having carried out reforms in its economy since 1978, China began to implement programs for the international market economy. Communism as a political system was not abandoned, but the liberalization process in the economy was started. While China grew 4-5 percent annually under Mao, it grew at an average of 9.5 percent a year between 1978 and 1992, when the reforms began (Ulker, 2016, p. 147). In this period, China adapted its African policy to the new conjuncture it was in, reducing support for armed conflicts, refraining from taking a clear position in the face of hot conflicts, refusing many projects and aid requests from African states.

Table 1. China's foreign aid to Africa, 1980-92 (US\$ million)

Year	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Amount	157	412	390	309	223	262	230	306	60	224	375	303	345

Source: (Cheng & Shi, 2009, p. 90)

The table shows the data on China's foreign aid to Africa in the period between 1980-1992, which although it fluctuated remained at largely the same level. In this period,

China's Gross National Product more than doubled and its annual trade increased from 4.4 billion dollars in 1981 to 10.3 billion dollars in 1988. During this same period, China was camouflaging its withdrawal of foreign aid from Africa with the rhetoric of South-South cooperation (Cheng & Shi, 2009, pp. 89-90). In line with this rhetoric, the trade volume between China and Africa increased from 300 million dollars to 2.2 billion dollars (Bayram, 2021, p. 75). China also began to receive foreign aid from Japan and some Western European states and the value of Africa to China fell because it does not appear an important economic indicator on the poor continent (Cheng & Shi, 2009, p. 90).

After the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, in which hundreds of demonstrators lost their lives, the pressure of Western states on China to not violate human rights increased. In critical moments, as seen in the latest turmoil, it was the Third World countries that showed support and sympathy for China. For this reason, China again needed the support of these countries and there were visits from Chinese governments to Africa. These visits were to reassure China's re-entry amongst the Third World countries and carried the message of abandoning its pro-Western trend. After these visits, only 20 of the 137 countries with which China had relations reacted negatively to the Tiananmen events. African, neighboring Asian and Latin American countries stressed that this is China's internal matter and that other countries should not interfere (Cheng & Shi, 2009, p. 91).

In line with its enormous economic growth in the 1990s, Beijing expected China to be seen as a major power, but this also drew some criticism. In a 1995 report, Swaine and Henry noted that "it is exploitative for China to improve its global reputation and for Beijing to develop its relationship with most 3rd World countries in order to increase its bargaining power with the United States, particularly on economic and political issues" (Swaine & Henry, 1995, p. 87).

After the Cold War, the importance given to Africa by both the West and Russia decreased. China has filled this gap by increasing its activities in the continent. The disappearance of the rivalry between the two superpowers on the continent has also led to an increase in economic relations. With this rise, trade relations between China and African states have intensified (Bayram, 2021, p. 76). China conducts great power diplomacy in international politics. This effort is based on China's idea of peaceful

ascension. It is claimed that seeking recognition of China's interests in the continent as a world power with both great power diplomacy and peaceful rise will cause more internal affairs in Africa (Cheng & Shi, 2009, p. 95).

Cheng and Shi state that China is aware of its limited power projection capabilities. For this reason, China is developing a loosely organized multilateral question to gradually increase its influence on the continent. Economic ties will strengthen with increased foreign aid from China. Beijing aims to create a good image with this. Thus, he will continue to express his opinion on African issues. The Darfur crisis is a good example of this. Because China insisted that this crisis be resolved through diplomatic means, it stated that great power intervention should be deterred and its local and regional interests should be respected. However, when this approach was not well received by the West, China became involved in the UN's peacekeeping operation and began to provide financial and other aid, and the pressure on China decreased (Cheng & Shi, 2009, p. 95).

Some African states perceive the claims made by Western states about the lack of democracy and violation of human rights in African countries as interference in their internal affairs. For this reason, they support China's view that the "right to survival" and "right to development" take precedence over individual human rights. China's policy of non-interference has been an exception in the Darfur crisis in Africa. Violence in Sudan began to spread in Chad. In 2006, when diplomatic relations between Chad and China began to be established and an oil deal was signed, Chad stated to China that the rebels in Darfur should be stopped from crossing into its territory. In 2007, Chad's foreign affairs minister asked China to pressure China to end Khartoum's armed support for Chadian dissidents during a visit to Beijing (Holslag, 2009, p. 25).

3.2. Economic Relations and Corporation

While China's ideological and political concerns shaped foreign policy between the 1950s and 1970s, from the 1980s onwards China actually entered into an open interaction with all African states. This reform of China and the globalization of the economy directly affected Africa. In this period, at the beginning of the 1990's, the economy took precedence over the foreign policy of China. Contrary to the emphasis on the solidarity of the 3rd world countries in the Mao period, economic interests were at the forefront in this period. The material impact of this foreign policy change on growth and

trade within China-Africa ties, and statistical data on economic relations are confirmed (Langan, 2018, p. 93). After the 2000s, China's assistance, bilateral trade volume and development aid to Africa increased and continued to increase on a much larger scale.

While in terms of oil production China was a self-sufficient country until 1993, it became a net oil importer after this year because of both the growth of its economy and the inevitable increase in population, and it began to seek reliable sources (Ulker, 2016, p. 148). Energy needs were not the only reason for its drive towards Africa. The desire to transport its own surplus production to international markets was also effective in this. With their strength in electrical appliances, clothing and other household goods, Chinese businessmen believe that China's export structure is meeting demand in Africa, where price is more important than quality (Cheng & Shi, 2009, p. 102). Of course, government incentives are also important for these private companies to enter the international arena.

With a decision taken in 2002, China implemented the "Going Global" policy to encourage the expansion of Chinese companies around the world in order to increase overseas investments. With China's outward global investment strategy, the number of Chinese multinational companies has increased in Africa. (Mumuni & Murphy, 2018, p. 13) There is an overwhelming number of both state-owned and private multinational companies in the growing economic interaction with Africa. China's State Economic Enterprises (SOE) announced that they had invested 14.7 billion dollars as of 2012 (Mumuni & Murphy, 2018, p. 12). Today, SOEs and the private sector have reinforced Beijing's role in trade, infrastructure projects and investment. Most of the Chinese firms focused on mining, construction and manufacturing as investments. State-owned companies such as China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and China Power Investment Corporation (CPIC) have made huge profits with investments in Africa reaching tens of billions. SOEs have generally been extensively supported by the Chinese government. Therefore, the increase of these institutions in Africa is the result of a well-executed, coordinated strategy by the Chinese government, supported by political and financial institutions (Mumuni & Murphy, 2018, pp. 15-23). Chinese private enterprises are concentrated in Africa mainly in manufacturing, services, commercial services, retail, banking, mining, leasing, shipping, warehousing and postal services. Mining, retail, leasing and commercial

services, manufacturing and shipping, storage and mailing services account for 70 percent of China's FDI in Africa (Junbo & Frasher, 2014, p. 193).

The activities of Chinese firms in Africa were supported by both a number of financial institutions and government ministries and agencies. In order to manage investments, China Development Bank and China Exim Bank and institutions such as the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the State Foreign Exchange Administration (SAFE) were established. CDB played a major role in granting African development projects loans. These institutions have laid out all the policies to encourage and support Chinese companies in their business. (Mumuni & Murphy, 2018, pp. 12-15) With China's Going out policy in 2001, Chinese companies developed themselves with government incentives. This enabled them to compete in the international arena and to increase China's overseas investments (Mumuni & Murphy, 2018, p. 13).

Today, with the Going Global policy, foreign investment is one of the main points of the Chinese government. With China's accession to the WTO in 2001, it also initiated the 10-year development plan. This plan (which is part of the Going Global policy) included increasing Chinese direct investment, increasing construction and engineering projects abroad, and exporting labor. The emphasis is on Going Global policy, mostly focusing on China's inclusive policy goals in Africa and its overall impact, and views emphasizing that the policy reflects China's colonial nature (Mumuni & Murphy, 2018, p. 13). Alden and Alven, on the other hand, pointing to the turn in China's foreign policy in recent years, state that China's energy concern is not a secret and that this need is playing an increasingly important role in its foreign policy (Alden & Alves, 2009, p. 4).

3.2.1. Impact of Economic Relations to African Countries

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established by China and African states as a cooperation system (South-South) between developing countries created for collective discussion and dialogue. FOCAC is defined by official channels as, "... a mutually beneficial economic cooperation with a pragmatic depiction of cooperation and equality, to strengthen consultation and promotion of political dialogue" (focac.org, p. 2009). FOCAC regularly organizes summits and although there is a high level of participation from many African countries, there are some criticisms that bilateral

economic relations are different from the results of these summits. The impact of these growing economic relations between China and Africa on the economic growth and development of African countries is significant. Some scholars cite that China has an insignificant or negative impact on economic growth and factor productivity for African countries. They say that China's economic interests in its access to critical resources are more dominant, that Africa's trade with China is focused on China's interests in Africa, and that China makes the African economy worse (Mia, Yushi, & Borojo, 2020, p. 2).

Elu and Price found that increased trade with China had no direct impact on the country's overall productivity. In fact, it can negatively affect overall productivity, making it difficult for Africans to work towards industrialization. They found that for sub-Saharan manufacturing firms, increasing trade with China does not help them transfer technology and managerial knowledge and skills that increase productivity at the firm level. (Elu & Price, 2010, p. 590) For example, the study states that China's furniture and clothing imports have replaced domestic production in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is both related to the inability of domestic companies to compete with the import power of China and the fact that China does not transfer technology in these areas. Interestingly, in another industry, metals and mines, the opposite is true. China provides Chinese foreign direct investment and technology transfer to Sub-Saharan African machinery and metals industries to optimize local mineral production needed for mine safety (Elu & Price, 2010, p. 591). Elu and Price came to the conclusion that as the bilateral relations increased, no technology transfer would take place except for the metal and machinery sector. This is a reminder that during the colonial period, the Western colonies did not provide any infrastructure services other than the ports, railways, hospitals and schools (where the white settlers served) they built to work the mines and to support the services of the white settlers while they were in Africa, facilities through which they claim to have brought "civilization". This lack of infrastructure would be a reason to facilitate the integration of China into the continent, which met Africa's greatest need, in the coming years.

Another study found that China's foreign direct investment had a negative effect on technological transfer in Africa. In this study which examines the effects of China's trade and investments in Africa, it was found that Chinese investments were generally perceived as positive in the economy, but had a negative effect on technology transfer. While the contribution of Chinese investments to employment is positive, the impact of

Chinese investments on local industrialization is mixed with self-confidence and concern. While three out of five people say that China creates jobs, they all agree that there is no technology transfer (Shen, 2013, p. 16). Wang et al., in their study, state that even in underdeveloped African countries, Chinese technology transfer is limited by language barriers and skills mismatch (Wang, Mao, & Gou, 2014, p. 240). He claims that Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) is now domestically focused to increase local productivity and strengthen domestic production in China. For this reason, Wang et al. state that the technology transfer of China's FDI is limited.

Miao et al.'s hypothesis is that the effect of Chinese aid on the total factor productivity of African countries is positive depending on the institutional environment of African countries. (Mia, Yushi, & Borojo, 2020, p. 10) The criticism of this is that developing countries, including African economies, will gain maximum benefit from foreign trade if they have better institutional quality (Mia, Yushi, & Borojo, 2020, p. 8). Financial aid is more effective when the country has strong institutions (Mia, Yushi, & Borojo, 2020, p. 21). He concludes that Sino-African trade supports factor productivity when African countries improve their institutional quality. Countries receiving financial aid cannot achieve the expected results due to weak policies. In their study, Burnside and Dollar presented a paradigm that argues that financial aid works in countries with sound institutional and macroeconomic environments. In poor countries with sound economic policies and their direct implementation, aid accelerates growth. However, in distorted economies, aid is used for inefficient government spending (Burnside & Dollar, 2000, p. 847). In other words, financial aid in countries where there is no corruption, good transparency and governance can help the country to grow. There is a conditionality here. In order for China's investments and aid to Africa to have a positive impact on the African economy, African states must have a good institutional structure (Mia, Yushi, & Borojo, 2020, p. 22). From such an inference, in the current situation, we can state that the win-win policy of China in its relations with Africa does not work well, due to both Africa's own state structure and the peculiar form of Chinese foreign policy. The poor institutionalization of Africa shows that this aid does not have a positive effect on the economy, while the fact that Chinese FDI does not transfer technology other than mines cannot develop economies. We can say that while China gains from this bilateral relationship, Africa cannot.

3.2.2. China's Aid and Its Aims

Although China is among Africa's new donors, it has come a long way. The principles of aid are different in China because it is not a member of the DAC. China's aid to Africa began with military assistance to liberation movements during independence struggles. This aid has evolved through time (Kiala, 2010, p. 26). According to the declaration published by the Chinese State Council in 2011, Chinese foreign aid is divided into three; Grants, interest-free loans and concession loans (PRC, 2011). Grants are used in projects and areas such as hospitals, schools, water wells, social welfare projects, human resources, technical works, emergency humanitarian aid, and in-kind assistance. Interest-free loans, on the other hand, are used in the initiatives of the recipient countries to build public infrastructure and increase their livelihoods. The term of use of these loans is 20 years, including 10 years of repayment, 5 years of use and 5 years non-refundable. These loans are given to countries with excellent financial conditions. Concessional loans are used for projects that create social and economic opportunities, medium and large scale infrastructure projects, mechanical and electrical products, complete facilities, technical services. The interest on these loans is lower than the benchmark rate of the People's Bank of China, which is arranged by the government as a financial subsidy. The interest rate is between 2-3 percent and the repayment is 15-20 years (China's Foreign Aid, 2011). Looking at how the repayments of these loans are made, an example is an application in China that continues today and even puts countries such as Uganda into difficulties (seizing the airport, etc.). About 56 percent of China's loans to Africa from 2000 to 2011 were covered by commodities (Mia, Yushi, & Borojo, 2020, p. 7).

In September 2005, an aid package to support developing countries was announced by President Hu Jintao. Accordingly, China offered 39 countries to remove tariffs on their exports to China. Secondly, it expanded aid to poor countries with heavy debts and less developed countries, also deleting all repayments of low-interest and interest-free government loans from China. Third, over the next three years of this package, it offered \$10 billion in loans and export buyer loans to support developing countries and encourage bilateral joint ventures between businesses. Fourth, it provided medical assistance and was committed to providing training to support human resources (Cheng & Shi, 2009, p. 93). While China accused Taiwan of conducting bribery and dollar diplomacy in its relations with Africa, it also offered financial rewards to maintain

and consolidate diplomatic relations with Africa. For example, during 2001 governmental visits to Africa, \$2.4 and \$3.6 million worth of grants and interest-free loans were offered to Tanzania and Zambia, respectively. This aid was used to change the allegiances of African states with ties to Taiwan (Cheng & Shi, 2009, p. 101).

3.2.3. Economic Relations Current Situation

Following the principle of mutual benefit and reciprocity, China has been promoting trade facilitation and multi-faceted, comprehensive and balanced Sino-African trade for years. China has increased its cooperation in customs, taxation, inspection and quarantine conditions to improve trade in bilateral relations. By the end of 2020, China's investment in Africa exceeded 43.4 billion dollars. More than 3500 Chinese companies, 70 percent of which are private, operate in Africa. China's direct investment in Africa reached \$2.59 billion. While the bilateral trade volume was \$12.14 million in the 1950s, it rose to \$100 million in 1960 and exceeded \$1 billion in 1980. The bilateral trade volume, which exceeded 10 billion dollars in the 2000s, reached over 100 billion dollars in 2008. In 2010, it reached 114.81 billion dollars (Council, 2011). In the White Paper published by the Chinese State Council in November 2021, it was announced that the annual trade between China and Africa increased to 185.2 billion dollars despite the bad economic conditions of the Covid 19 epidemic. These figures are presented as proof of confidence in the future development of Chinese operators in Africa. Indeed, China has been Africa's largest trading partner for 12 years. Since 2000, China has imported 1.2 trillion dollars of goods from Africa and exported 1.27 trillion dollars of goods to Africa (Xinhua, 2021). According to the 2017 McKinsey report, it is expected that China will earn 250 billion dollars from Africa by 2025. In addition, the McKinsey report states that there are more than 10 thousand Chinese companies on the continent (Sun, Jayaram, & Kassiri, 2017, p. 13). State-owned firms operate mainly in sectors such as energy and infrastructure, while private firms are mostly market-oriented. One-third of Chinese firms operate in manufacturing, a quarter in the service sector, and about one-fifth in the trade, construction and real estate sectors (Sun, Jayaram, & Kassiri, 2017, p. 10).

3.3. Military Affairs

China is also, in her own words, very “constructively” concerned with peace and security issues in Africa. More than 80 percent of China's military peacekeeping force is stationed in Africa. The Chinese naval fleet took part in approximately 2000 escort missions with foreign ships in Somalia. Stating that Africa will support peace and security issues within the framework of FOCAC, China promised the African Union free military aid worth \$100 million and an additional commitment of \$80 million within 5 years in the statement made by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the UN in 2015. This is seen as a badge of China's policy, which states that it is not indifferent to African issues and aims to solve Africa's peace and security problems by promoting development (Yuxi, 2021). China's aid and investments in Africa's security are very important to provide safe investment areas. China wants to protect its economic investments in Africa and build a reputation as a world power (Herbert, 2021). China's military outlook on the continent is not new. Since the independence of African states, it has supported many armed struggles, for example assisting the Tanzanian army in the 1960s and providing military aid to anti-Soviet groups such as ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and Frelimo in Mozambique (Mishra, 2020). China has provided medical protective equipment to the South African National Defense Force to assist in the fight against Covid 19 and financed a \$30 million training center to the Tanzanian military (Mishra, 2020). In 2003, China sent aid that included engineering, transportation and medical support as part of the UN Peacekeeping mission to Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Most of the Chinese personnel in Africa took part in small units performing unarmed roles such as medical and engineering support. It sent its first troops to the UN mission in Sudan (UNMISS) in 2012 and sent troops to Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013. In 2017, it opened the first submarine base in Djibouti, a logistics supply point in an area where China fights piracy. It also strategically allows the Horn of Africa to oversee other maritime transport routes and strategic activities. It gave police training in Liberia in 2014 and in 2016 shared intelligence to counter terrorist activities in Nigeria as well as donating patrol boats to the Ghanaian army to combat maritime piracy (Herbert, 2021).

In 2021, news broke that China will have a permanent naval base in Equatorial Guinea. Tanchum comments that supplementing China's military power on the continent with such new bases will undermine the dominance of other powers, along with Beijing's

already significant economic impact (Tanchum, 2021). China has not placed a heavy military presence openly on the continent unlike France and the United States but rather has made clever moves by integrating military and security elements into its African states and economic partners, making China's defense presence in Africa a part of the continent's development. In 2017, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti. This is interpreted as a move to consolidate the security presence in the base continent. China also supplies more troops to the UN Security Council's peacekeeping missions than all other permanent members combined (Tanchum, 2021). Increasing China's military aid to the continent is considered as important as capacity-building aid for economic and social development. China-Africa military cooperation takes the form of intelligence exchange, law enforcement training, peacekeeping missions, conflict mediation, military personnel training, and commercial weapons sales (Velthuisen, 2021). China was the third largest arms supplier in the region between 2015 and 2019, exporting mostly small and light weapons to African countries. It also started selling advanced weapons such as the first unmanned aerial vehicle to be used in operations against the Boko Haram terrorist organization in Nigeria. These weapons are seen as rivals to those from the USA, they are cheaper and can be given to any country (Mishra, 2020).

3.3.1. History of Military Relations

In terms of military and security, China-Africa relations were shaped around independence and revolutionary movements in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1990s and early 2000s, this relationship evolved into a more pragmatic one, as in areas such as politics and economics (Shinn, 2008, p. 155). Since the late 1950s, China has given various support and aid, including weapons, to the struggles of African liberation groups. For example, China immediately recognized the government of the National Liberation Front in Algeria and supported them with arms and also trained insurgents from Guinea-Bissau in 1960. Leaving a good impression on the continent with the early support they gave to the liberation organizations, China trained freedom fighters in many countries such as Tanzania, Ghana and Congo (Shinn, 2008, p. 156). It can be said that with the military aid in the 1960s and 1970s, China aimed to gain international legitimacy to Africa and to establish unity against western imperialism and Soviet hegemony (Shinn, 2008, p. 157). Between 1967 and 1971, China supplied Africa with 245 major weapon systems which was equivalent to 5 percent of Africa's arms imports at that time. During this

period, the weapons that African states bought from China were worth \$42 million. China was in 7th place among arms suppliers on the continent. Tanzania had the largest share of this import with 83 percent, followed by Algeria, Congo and Guinea. In the early 1970s, China replaced Canada as Tanzania's main arms supplier, and it also trained the Tanzanian army by building a military base in Dar es Salaam. Between 1967 and 1976, China's arms sales to Africa amounted to 142 million dollars, and this rate rose to 2.8 percent (Shinn, 2008, p. 158). Between 1955 and 1976, approximately 2,600 African military personnel were trained by China. In the 1980s, China focused its military arms sales on new countries, resulting in a significant decline in arms sales in African countries (excluding Egypt) (Shinn, 2008, p. 159). The biggest attraction of Chinese weapons to Africa was their low price and even though the weapons were inferior in quality to others, they were easier to maintain and use, and were similar in system to Soviet-Russian weapons. Between 1989 and 1999, the African-Chinese arms trade amounted to 1.3 billion dollars (Shinn, 2008, p. 160).

3.3.2. Reasons for China's expanding military presence on the continent

China's security strategy in Africa is focused on energy, mineral and timber resources. This turns into a desire to strengthen the stability of African states that sell and have the potential to sell these substances to China (Shinn, 2008, p. 155). Therefore, countries that export raw materials to China rank high in Beijing's close security relationship (Shinn, 2008, p. 156). The reason for this security strategy is stated as the need to ensure the security of China's economic investments and to protect the security of Chinese citizens, whose numbers are increasing every year. It also builds a reputation with security issues as a rising economic power. With its mission to protect civilians, China aims to increase its soft power on the continent. The Blue Line of Defense documentary, about a Chinese peacekeeping infantry battalion guarding a refugee camp in South Sudan, shows how Chinese soldiers protect and interact with African natives. As in this movie, which is equipped with a benevolent image, China wants to create strong empathy by using its soft power very well. With its ever-increasing military capacity on the continent, China wants to protect its security interests. Peace and stability of African states is important for continued access to the growing African market (Mishra, 2020).

China's security strategy in Africa supports its commercial interests, helps professionalize its military, improves the Peoples Liberation Army's (PLA)'s operational readiness and military access, secures its massive investments in the continent, and ensures the safety of its citizens on the continent. It also tries to balance relations by establishing a relationship away from mere trade. It reinforces the image of a developing great power responsible before the international community (Mishra, 2020). China is concerned that other powers on the continent are increasing their military presence. Between 2000 and 2006, the US increased the number of its forces in Africa from 220 to 1000. China interpreted the establishment of AFRICOM, the US African command in the region, as a means of balancing the US cold war. For example, India is expanding its military presence on the continent. On the East African coast, Kenya signs defense agreements with Madagascar and Mozambique. It also launched joint training programs with Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa (Holslag, 2009, p. 26).

3.4. Personal Corporate Networks

Guanxi is a belief system that describes how China's diplomatic partnerships have developed. It describes how reciprocity is built through personal bonds and mutual obligations. The person who benefits from another's kindness must reciprocate it in order to keep the relationship going and to keep the person's goals safe. These are called win-win solutions and the term is frequently used in politics and commerce. Many Chinese political scientists point out that the Chinese Communist Party is held together by complex webs of intimacy, length of service, family and historical relationships. It is possible to see the same situation in African states. This situation can cause institutions and laws to remain in the background in the bilateral relations established between China and the continental states (Nantulya, 2021).

Nantulya points out that African leaders are using *guanxi* to force Chinese partners to invest in their own personal projects. They found that the majority of Chinese-funded projects, in 49 countries between 2000 and 2012, went to the region where African presidents were born. African leaders are directing Chinese aid to their native region to increase their chances of remaining in power. The same study also examines the regional distribution of World Bank investments and finds no evidence that WB financing fits the distribution of leaders' birth regions. According to the researchers, this is due to China's

approach to delivery of aid based on demand rather than need (Dreher, Fuchs, Hodler, Parks, Raschky, & Tierney, 2019, p. 45). China's aid allocation is motivated by a desire to access natural resources in recipient countries. African leaders who must compete for power are favoring those who vote for them to stay in power. These rewards are in the form of access to resources (Dreher, Fuchs, Hodler, Parks, Raschky, & Tierney, 2019, p. 46). Therefore it is possible to say that at this point, China's aid coincides with the desires of African leaders.

Before the World Bank approves a project, it subjects the project to cost benefit analysis whereas a demand-driven approach is preferred when distributing aid by China. The most important feature that distinguishes China from western aid is the principles of not imposing any political conditions or interfering with political conditions while providing aid (Dreher, Fuchs, Hodler, Parks, Raschky, & Tierney, 2019, p. 47). Sudan is a good example in this regard, Sudan has used billions of dollars of Chinese financing for projects in the region known as the Hamdi Triangle. This region, between the cities of Dangola, Sennar and El-Obeid, is known as the political base of the ruling National Reference Party. The hometown of President Bashir, Shendi, is located in this region on the banks of the Nile (Dreher, Fuchs, Hodler, Parks, Raschky, & Tierney, 2019, p. 48). Another example of this was seen in Kenya's crazy railway project. Kenyan politicians and elites wanted to implement the most expensive railway project since Kenya's independence in order to win the elections. Chinese financiers were ready to support the \$3.6 billion project, but the Kenyan Court of Appeal declared the project illegal after too much criticism from the public and opposition about the cost and efficiency of the project (Nantulya, 2021).

For the vote that recognized China's seat by the UN in 1971, Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, stated that "They stood with us and felt morally obliged to respond" for China, indicating China's continued support for African liberation struggles since the 1950s. Between 2009 and 2018, Chinese leaders made 82 visits to 40 African countries. There were 222 visits to China from African leaders. With all these visits and networks, China is counting on African support. In 2020, 25 African states were in the bloc that ratified China's Hong Kong National Security Act against 27 Western states. In the same year, no AU member state signed the German letter condemning China's policies in Xinjiang. In order to develop a sense of reciprocity, China

invested in African states before opening a military base in Djibouti, and between 2008 and 2016 the PLA conducted 294 interactions in 40 African countries. As a result of these efforts to establish rapprochement, there was no condemnation or criticism from any African country when the base was established, which came after the AU Security Council President's decision and warning stating that the continental countries were concerned about foreigners opening a base in their country. With all his visitation and relief efforts, China had won the Africans' trust (Nantulya, 2021). As can be seen from these examples, the *guanxi* effect for African leaders means gaining financial rewards, while for Chinese companies it means gaining benefits and increasing their influence.

With great greed and appetite, China is pursuing a policy focused on resource diplomacy in Africa. Although it is not clearly a colonial concern, it consumes the resources of the continent with very wide possibilities. The limited technology transfer (it only shares in the mining sectors) while distributing aid, its "on demand" approach shows that China does not offer a development model as stated in the official discourse. On the other hand, the non-institutionalized structures of African countries may facilitate this situation with their corrupt practices such as bribery and corruption. Here again, the effect of the African middle-class man, whom Fanon criticizes in his book *The Wretched of the Earth* and Ngugi's *Return to Self*, as mentioned in the section on personal corporate networks. (Fanon, 2020) This middle class (local bourgeois), who cooperates with the colonialists and thinks not of their own country but rather of their own interests, appears as the ruling class in relations with China. They simply channel Chinese finance to help their own projects in order to maintain their own rule. As in the case of Sudan, China uses aid, bilateral trade and soft power resources to access resources, while Sudanese leaders use Chinese aid to consolidate, reward and re-elected their bases. The so-called win-win situation, that does not trickle down to the people equally and that the elites benefit from, is also a kind of colonialism. The exploitation of African states by China, the exploitation of the people by the ruling elite. In the preface to Fanon's book, Sartre argues that neocolonialism is a vagabond dream of metropolises or, if any, it is a pseudo-bourgeoisie already brought to power by colonialism (Fanon, 2020, p. 20). As all of these anecdotes demonstrate, China's interest in Africa is related to some African bureaucrats and their interests. China's neo-colonial power, influence, interest is realized through the involvement (cooperation) of some African bureaucrats and leaders. The African elite

and neocolonial China both benefit from mutual agreements rather than the interests of the people.

CHINA IN ANGOLA


Analyzing Angola as a case study provides us to see what neocolonial features China has in its approach to Africa. Angola seems an excellent example to show how China has become a new colonialist power in Africa, especially because there are four important characteristics of Chinese interest. The four essential features of China's engagement in Africa, which were covered in the previous section, are political relations, economic links, military relations, and personal-institutional interactions. Angola's relationship appears to have all four of these critical neocolonial characteristics. In addition to these, other neocolonial features that distinguish China will be examined in this case study. In the case of Angola, the application of aid, credit, and debt instruments that distinguish China from traditional colonialists will be analyzed.

4.1. Angola is oil-rich but impoverished

Angola was a Portuguese colony from 1620 to 1975. After independence, a civil war began between MPLA (People's Movement for Angola's Independence) and UNITA (National Unity for Angola's Complete Independence) and the country witnessed a 27-year civil war between these two organisations. Throughout the Cold War, the two poles supported the country's internal war² with 4.5 million Angolans being displaced during the country's 27-year civil war and approximately 1 million Angolans died as a result of conflict and war-related causes. Angola continues to receive international aid for peace and security and with the end of the civil war, when stability was re-established, international aid financiers have started to provide aid for poverty reduction and development (Kiala, 2010, p. 3). Despite having a relatively high GDP per capita, Angola has 28 percent of the population living in extreme poverty and 40 percent living below the poverty line (Kiala, 2010, pp. 4-5). It is a war-torn country that is also one of the poorest in the world, having been dominated by corrupt politicians for many years. In contrast, it is extremely rich in oil and is also one of the world's three fastest growing oil exporting countries, with foreign investors eager to invest (Mouawad, 2007). Angola is Africa's second and the world's 16th largest oil producer, producing around 2 million barrels of oil per day. The country's economy is heavily dependent on oil revenue with

² MPLA was supported by USSR and Cuba while UNITA by US and South Africa.

about a third of Angola's GDP based on the oil industry and almost all of the country's exports consisting of crude, refined oil and natural gas. In the first quarter of 2021, foreign direct investment in the oil industry was 1.6 billion dollars. Over 90 percent of the oil in the country is dominated by large international oil companies, while the state oil company has a share of only about 2% in the crude oil market. The figure illustrates the oil export data from Angola in the last quarter of 2020 in terms of percentage exported to relevant countries. China has been the largest oil importer from Angola for more than a decade, with about 72% of crude oil exports from Angola in 2020 being sent to China (Faria, 2021).



Source: (Statistica.com, 2021)

Angola is Africa's seventh largest country, with a land area of 1,246,700 km divided into 18 states of various sizes (García-Rodríguez, García-Rodríguez, Castilla-Gutiérrez, & Major, 2015, p. 160). It has a diversified variety of natural resources, including diamond, iron, bauxite, gold, uranium, and natural gas deposits. There are few fertile agricultural lands. The large oil reserves found have been an important source of income for the state in recent years due to the high market prices governed by oil (García-Rodríguez, García-Rodríguez, Castilla-Gutiérrez, & Major, 2015, pp. 162-163). On the other hand on the developmental statistics Angola has a very low literacy rate, and its health system is insufficient and highly dependent on non-governmental organizations

(NGOs) and external funding. Many reasons have led to the health system's insufficiency, including low quality products and low health coverage, a lack of human resources, a poor management system and a lack or difficulty in coordination within the private sector, food insecurity, and inadequate hygienic conditions (García-Rodríguez, García-Rodríguez, Castilla-Gutiérrez, & Major, 2015, p. 164). As a result, the whole country has a high mortality rate with diseases such as cholera and polio still found. Moreover, Angola's healthcare system is weakened as a consequence of the country's civil war.

Angola also suffers from weak economic management and poverty. Transnational businesses and certain countries (particularly France and the United States) have collaborated to create a political elite in Angola that is accumulating money that prevents most of the population from accessing oil. One of the instruments of this elite is the national oil company Sonangol, which serves the interests of the elite and businessmen around President José Eduardo dos Santos. During the final years of the war, the International Monetary Fund estimated that over \$1 billion in oil revenues was lost from governmental accounts per year. President dos Santos was first on a list of the country's wealthiest persons published in the Luanda newspaper in 2003, followed by a deputy, two officials from the president's office, an ambassador, a chief of defense staff, and a minister of public works. Rafael Marques, an Angolan journalist, claims that the government has grown its income by exploiting the country's natural resources and lucrative industries like telecommunications (García-Rodríguez, García-Rodríguez, Castilla-Gutiérrez, & Major, 2015, p. 167). According to the corruption perception index published by Transparency International in 2021, Angola ranks 136th out of 180 countries. (CPI, 2021) However even though Angola's prosperity has not been properly distributed throughout the country, its GDP has grown to eighth position in Africa (García-Rodríguez, García-Rodríguez, Castilla-Gutiérrez, & Major, 2015, p. 168).

As a political administration Angola is a one-party state that was established with the 1975 constitution under the leadership of one party. In 1978, the president and vice president were ousted, but it took until 1991 to appoint a new president. In 1992, the new constitution was proclaimed, which was a modified version of the 1975 document. The current constitution of the country, which came into force in 2010, abolished the prime minister. Instead, it added the presidency office and strengthened the presidency. The direct election of the President was eliminated in this constitution, and the presidency was

instead appointed by the leader of the party that received the most votes in the parliamentary elections (Smith, 2022). Angola became a one-party state under this system, in which the people could no longer elect their president or vice president. Regardless, China's official news agency, Xinhua, interpreted the constitutional revision as a beneficial, democratic, and modern improvement for the country. Angola is currently a state where democracy is weak despite elections and the constitution, and the executive has little control over the president. Oil reserves are controlled by the government and political leaders. Supporting an authoritarian leader might therefore be favorable for China's interests. China will support whoever controls these vital resources (Thompson, 2012, p. 65).

When the civil war ended in 2002 with the Luena Memorandum, based on the 1994 Lusaka Accord, the MPLA government's main concern was reconstructing the war-damaged infrastructure (García-Rodríguez, García-Rodríguez, Castilla-Gutiérrez, & Major, 2015, p. 163). Angolan leaders sought international funding for the National Reconstruction Program in 2002, after the 27-year civil war ended. However, Angolan leaders disliked the terms of aid offered by traditional Western bankers, instead turning to China (Schmitz, 2020, p. 478). The country has since devolved into a massive construction site for national rebuilding with China playing a critical role in the country's reconstruction.

4.2. Political, Military and Economic Relations of Angola with China

Angola's relations with China began in the early 1960s, during the country's struggle to be free of Portuguese colonialism. During this time, China provided military assistance to the three major liberation movements in Angola, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), UNITA, and the MPLA. However, from 2002 onwards, bilateral relations began to be trade-oriented (Kiala, 2010, p. 19).

In the 1960s, China provided diplomatic and military support to the MPLA during the Cold War. With the Organization of African Unity's recognition of FNLA (Angolan National Independence Front) and UNITA, China began to support these two organizations. After FNLA chief Holden Roberto met with Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yu in Kenya in 1963, and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi met with Minister Mao Zedong in China in 1964, more than 450 tons of weapons were shipped to FNLA military

bases. Savimbi also received military training from China, which followed Mao's discipline, and 112 Chinese military instructors were sent. Chinese weapons were brought into the UNITA-controlled territory between 1992 and 2002. Relations with the MPLA deteriorated as a result of China's support for its rivals. (Emmanuel, 2009, p. 364) China did this during those years to counterbalance the Soviet-backed MPLA. In other words, tensions and rivalry between the Soviets and China led China to initially refuse to recognize the MPLA, which declared Angola's independence with Soviet support in 1975 (Emmanuel, 2009, p. 366).

Relations between China and Angola were officially established in 1983 with China establishing an embassy in 1984. Angola's President, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, visited China in 1988 (The first visit at the presidential level) and Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao reciprocated with a visit to Angola in 2006 (Emmanuel, 2009). Even before 2005, the number of Chinese workers in Angola outnumbered the number of Portuguese and Brazilians, who had previously dominated the foreign labor market.. Currently Angola has a population of roughly 33 million people, the fertility rate is 5.55, and the population is expected to exceed 50 million by the end of 2034 (Angola Population 2022, 2022). According to data, there were 22,868 Chinese employees in Angola in 2019 (Idris, 2021). After gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, the ruling MPLA, which is closely allied with the Soviet Union and Cuba, received little financial, military, or technical support from China compared to other post-colonial African socialist regimes. China had supported both the MPLA and UNITA among other liberation organizations in Angola's civil war. Angola's support for these groups in the civil war is seen as China violating its own (sacred) principle of non-interference as regards Angola's internal affairs (Corkin, 2011, p. 170). However, as seen in the China-Africa relations section, China considered the aid it provided to countries that were trying to gain independence during these periods as a duty within the framework of its own ideology. During these years, trade relations were at a lower level, like China's relationship with Africa in this period. However, the partnership between China and Angola has grown increasingly since 2004 (Corkin, 2011, p. 169).

4.2.1. Trade Between China and Angola

While the volume of Chinese-Angolan trade was initially low, it has increased over time. In 2001 Angola became China's 4th biggest trading partner in Africa, in 2011 it reached \$27.7 billion, making it China's second largest trading partner after South Africa. and currently it is China's largest trading partner in Africa. This is really due to China's need for crude oil, it has replaced the United States as Angola's main trading partner. However, there is a significant deficit in China-Angolan trade. For example, in 2005, China's trade surplus was \$6.2 billion (exports to Angola were US\$6.58 billion, while imports from Angola were only US\$0.37 billion.) Then, in 2011, China's imports from Angola reached US\$24.92 billion, and its exports decreased to US\$2.78 billion. This large gap in foreign trade figures is due to China's imports of Angolan oil. Vehicles, machinery, electrical products, and steel are the most common Chinese exports to Angola (Junbo & Frasher, 2014, p. 189). While China's exports to Angola totaled US\$1.75 billion dollars in 2020, Angola's exports to China totaled US\$12.7 billion dollars in the same year. Crude oil (US\$12.1 billion), petroleum gas (US\$468 million), and granite (US\$24.2 million) are the main exports of Angola to China. China, on the other hand, exported US\$342 million in machinery, US\$263 million in metals, and US\$245 million in textiles. In terms of product exports, China has a greater comparative advantage than Angola (oecworld).

The elite in Angola benefited from China's non-interference in the country's internal affairs. After all, Angola was at the bottom of the corruption index, even though it improved that level by two points in 2021 (García-Rodríguez, García-Rodríguez, Castilla-Gutiérrez, & Major, 2015, p. 172). On the other hand, a Chinese diplomat said that both SOEs and some private Chinese enterprises engage in methods such as creating networks with local politicians as well as other elites to get access to development aid projects even when their projects are not needed. This claim, which has been confirmed by a foreign affair official and a former diplomat, is also evidence of how Chinese corporations are attempting to profit from Beijing's strategic political goals by manipulating local politics. Corkin quotes a consultant's statement, "If you do a feasibility study, you won't get the project, but if you develop relations with the political elite of the government of the subject country, you will get the project without even having to do feasibility" (Corkin, 2012, p. 477).

According to Corkin, the strategic cooperation created between Luanda and Beijing happened at a time when both countries were in desperate need of financial and oil resources, respectively. China means demand for Angolan crude oil and the willingness to extend a line of credit to Angola. It also means that, following the financial crisis and fluctuations in oil prices, China has become a significant trading partner for Angola (Corkin, 2011, p. 176). According to the World Bank's 2020 Ease of Doing Business report, Angola ranks 177th out of 190 countries. As a result, the majority of Chinese construction companies access the Angolan market via a tightly managed high-level bilateral arrangement between the Angolan government and China Exim Bank or China International Fund Ltd. (CIF). Due to its relative lack of infrastructure and decades of civil war legacy, Angola is not a good place for export-oriented production. It was also not previously an attractive market, with a population of 16 million people, in 2011 and almost 80% of the population deemed impoverished (Corkin, 2011, p. 177). As a result, in his paper, Corkin claimed that China's FDI stock in Angola was more limited than in other resource-rich countries (Corkin, 2011, p. 176). He claimed that oil is the primary industry in which Chinese firms are interested in investing. Despite this, the Angolan government rejected applications from Chinese national oil corporations due to their lack of experience in oil exploration (Corkin, 2011, p. 177).

4.3. China's Aid Policy Toward Angola

Despite being the continent's leading oil exporter, Angola is impoverished. Oil-backed loans are frequently used to rebuild and develop its infrastructure (Kiala, 2010, p. 313). Although China has become an important development partner in Africa, there are criticisms towards it. One of the most common complaints is that China's aid to Africa will result in unsustainable debts. It is also claimed that this aid will have a negative impact on administration and the ecological environment (Kiala, 2010, p. 314). China Exim Bank and China Construction Bank contributed US\$145 million to Angola's reconstruction in 2002. This assistance was used to repair the Luanda railway and upgrade the electrical systems in cities such as Luanda, Lubango, Namibe, and Tombwa. This aid was followed by a US\$2 billion oil-backed loan. Credit conditions in China's aid appear to be less interfering in domestic politics and more business-based when compared to the IMF's aid. However, China's assistance was not completely unconditional. Unlike IMF funding, the precondition for loans allocated to Angola's development and reconstruction

projects is that Chinese firms receive 70% of the projects. Angola also agreed to export 10,000 barrels of oil to China per day. Over a 12-year period, the loans were distributed in two installments, each costing slightly over US\$1 billion and at an interest rate of 1.5 percent. Until 2004, the first half of the loans were quickly placed on the market. After consuming approximately US\$837 million in second-stage funds in Angola, it received a new loan of US\$500 million from China in 2007. Exim bank provided an additional US\$2 billion loan to finance public investment in 2007. By 2009, China has provided another US\$1 billion to Angola's agriculture industry through the China Development Bank. In 2010, the credit line was expanded by an additional US\$4 billion. As of 2010, China's total credit to Angola was US\$9.5 billion. Between 2005 and 2010, China's aid to Angola was more than the total contributions of the DAC (Development Assistance Committee) members. This rapid and exponentially expanding assistance was dubbed "Angola model" (Kiala, 2010, p. 316). Both in development theory and among international donors, the Angola model established an example. A new approach for accelerating infrastructure development has emerged: exchanging resources for services (Kiala, 2010, p. 327). Concessional loans make up a large part of Angola's development aid from China, therefore there are concerns that most of China's concessional funding would result in a fresh wave of debt (Kiala, 2010, p. 317).

Loans from China offer both advantages and disadvantages for Angola. Although the conditions are different, these Eximbank loans are not cash and would only be used to purchase goods and services from China. As a result, the real cost is usually higher than the published rate. This has a negative impact on the country's prices for goods and services. Another criticism is that China's construction projects do not create jobs or help to reduce poverty. Because, as previously stated, 70% of the projects for which the loans will be used are granted to self-sufficient Chinese construction firms that import their entire workforce. Despite this, Angola's ongoing engagement in Chinese loans was due to the country's urgent and significant finance needs to support its rapid development agenda. Nevertheless, with China's financial assistance at the correct time, the construction of important national highways and the rehabilitation of the Luanda railway became possible. One of China's most ambitious projects was the rehabilitation of the railway that connects the port of Lobito with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. Other major projects included a new airport and a railway project connecting

Luanda to Malange, a big town in the interior of the country. In 2006, four agreements worth US\$273 million were signed between Angola Telecom and three Chinese companies CMEC, Alcatel Shanghai Bell and Huawei (Aguilar & Goldstein, 2009, p. 1555).

However, conditionality should not be confused with a lack of control. This level of supervision is evident in frequent reviews by Chinese authorities, including visits in 2005 by Yang Zilin, President of China's EximBank, and Zeng Peiyang, Vice Premier. Furthermore, Angolan officials made frequent visits to China to brief them on the progress of the loans they were receiving. According to some Angolan public officials, Chinese authorities are "extremely rigorous and demanding" when it comes to utilizing the credit line and fulfilling its conditions. Another example of the complications of Sino-Angolan relations is the criticism by certain Angolan authorities that Chinese corporations ignore Angolan companies, even those belonging to Angola's elite. Aside from this trade discriminatory approach, they also complain that Chinese enterprises are creating flimsy constructions known as cardboard structures (Aguilar & Goldstein, 2009, p. 1558).

Critics contend that the large quantity and importance of Chinese employees in Angola's construction industry impedes skill development. They claim that Angolans are underemployed, even if they are hired for low positions. Angola's investment law specifies that investors should encourage national Angolans to gradually take up management and other responsibilities. As a result, the two issues raised above are legitimate (Kiala, 2010, p. 323). Besides, it is said that China's development aid to Angola does not include any technology transfer and has a minor influence on employment creation (Kiala, 2010, p. 23). Another criticism is that the conditionality of Chinese loans restricts the growth of local construction industries. According to the terms imposed by China Exim Bank, at least 50% of the project supplies should be met by China. In addition, Chinese companies which conduct the projects must be repaid with low-interest loans. As a result, the Chinese have an unfair advantage in Angola's local construction industry (Corkin, 2012, p. 476).

4.4. Resource-backed loans (RBL's) in Angola

Resource-backed loans (RBL), in which a country uses its natural resources as a direct source of repayment or as a guarantee of repayment on the loans received, are known as the primary type of payment. Borrowings from another government or state-owned sector, private sector, international financial institutions by a central government or a state-owned company are undertaken through the resources of the borrowing country (natural minerals, commodities, tobacco, etc.). Income from that source is deposited into an account opened by the lending country in exchange for a loan. Although this type of debt went back to Peru's guano-backed borrowing in the 19th century, it became more common in the 21st century as resource-rich countries began to use it frequently. These RBL revenues are used to finance infrastructure projects. Infrastructure projects are the most common sectors financed through RBL. Some of the very large loans are for more than one infrastructure project. In Angola, for example, when it received its first RBL from China's Exim Bank in 2004, used it for 50 different projects, each costing an average of US\$40 million, such as construction of schools, hospitals, power lines and water supply networks, as well as equipment and vehicle supply (Mihalyi, Hwang, Rivetti, & Cust, 2022, p. 13).

If these borrowings are carried out effectively and transparently, if the loan has suitable conditions and if the infrastructure project is well chosen and implemented, in theory, this loan transaction is expected to make a positive contribution to the debtor country. However, RBLs can become quite burdensome if the borrower country has poor governance and capacity, and inadequate infrastructure projects are selected and executed. The debt cycle can become severe as the amount of RBL increases and this type of borrowing turns into an addiction. With the Covid 19 pandemic, the volatility in commodity prices has created concerns about the sustainability of the debts of developing countries (Mihalyi, Hwang, Rivetti, & Cust, 2022, p. 2). In the report they published, Mihalyi et.al extensively cover the question of which institutions and how this borrowing system can be best controlled. This report, which examines the current situation of RBL debts of Sub-Saharan countries, covers very wide topics such as terms of RBL debts, types of collateral, maturities, interest types, repayment plans, income allocation, transparency of borrowing countries, debt negotiations. According to the report central government-owned and state-owned natural resource enterprises are the primary

borrowers of RBLs (Mihalyi, Hwang, Rivetti, & Cust, 2022, p. 6). The primary sources of RBLs are state banks or development banks. China Development Bank and China Export Import Bank (Exim bank) are the top RBL lenders by volume. The Chinese state banks Exim Bank and CDB (with a contribution of \$17,000 and \$18,000, respectively) are the source of 76 percent of RBLs to Africa (Mihalyi, Hwang, Rivetti, & Cust, 2022, p. 7). A third source of RBLs are organizations that seek to protect existing investments and that adopt natural resource security as a form of investment security. These organizations show interest in sectors other than natural resources due to the related natural resources, and they are also faced with high risks due to the investment environment. For example, the China National Aerospace Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) provided Zimbabwe with US\$10 million for rural electrification equipment. The loan was to be paid out of Zimbabwe's tobacco exports. Although the loan does not belong to this business, the loan asks for certain income from tobacco revenues, although China is also involved in Zimbabwe's tobacco production. Likewise, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of China (ICBC) has made an RBL offer of 2.5 billion Us dollars to Angola for the construction of Kilamba Kiaxi New Town to be repaid with the revenue from Angola's oil sales to China SOE Sinopec. ICBC seeks certainty of oil revenue to support the debtor's repayment capacity and thus protect ICBC's investment. Such lenders often use sources that have the power to create a stable income area, such as tobacco from Zimbabwe and oil from Angola (Mihalyi, Hwang, Rivetti, & Cust, 2022, p. 8). Even if there is no investment in the sector, the only will is to include the income of a source that will be paid in a certain way. For this reason, there are also criticisms of this debt system that the country's resources are being eroded.

For example, Silas Olan'g, co-director of the Natural Resource Governance Institute Africa, criticizes the system saying: "There is potential corruption associated with these loans because the terms are unknown and at the end of the day it is very likely that all borrowed and committed in terms of the country's natural resources will not be repaid. The loan goes to pay off the loan" (Annor, 2020). While the medium-term contribution of RBLs in borrowing countries is visible, the long-term consequences are unknown. Another NRG Africa co-director, Evelyne Tsagoue, points out the risk of RBLs, saying, "African leaders used these loans to help achieve their own short-term

ambitions, but they borrowed heavily from their country and risked losing collateral that was worth more than the loan's value" (Kabore, 2020).

4.5. China's Debt Policy Towards Angola

Nearly two decades of debt accrued by Chinese policy banks (private institutions tasked with implementing the government's economic policies) have reached alarming proportions. In 2017, the continental countries owed Beijing more than 143 billion US dollars. (Alden & Jiang, 2019, p. 641). According to Alden and Jiang, China's status as a global power is based on its role as a manufacturing and service center, as well as its growing technological innovation capabilities. The Chinese economic state administration is estimated to have over US\$3.06 trillion in financial resources, allowing it to lend exceptionally effectively across countries and sectors. This lending mechanism, as well as the economic statecraft that underpins it, are part of a regime that relies on the use of financial instruments and other economic factors to support Beijing's foreign policy objectives. Loans, particularly concessionary loans, are an important tool for securing needed resources and providing loans for infrastructure development built by Chinese construction firms. Beijing's policy banks made concessional loans to 43 African countries between 2000 and 2011. The majority of these funds would be used to refund Chinese firms that began engineering, procurement, and construction projects. After 2012, debt increased, and Africa's debt to China reached US\$143 billion by 2017. This accounted for 22.9 percent of China's total foreign loans and 20.6 percent of the continent's total external debt (Alden & Jiang, 2019, p. 642). The majority of the Chinese loans are for infrastructure and energy, which are critical for Africa's long-term industrialization and economic growth. However, the short-term pressures of the continent's ever-increasing external debt necessitate immediate solutions (Alden & Jiang, 2019, p. 643).

China provides concessional loans and mortgages natural resources to Angola through Exim bank, in close relationships known as the Angola model. In addition to the aid and investments provided to Angola mentioned above, China made foreign investments of 4.4 billion US dollars in 2015 mainly to be used in the fields of oil, natural gas, communication and transportation. Most of these investments were made by Chinese companies. China has lent more than US\$60 billion to Angola. At the end of 2017,

Angola's debt to China amounted to US\$21.5 billion, accounting for half of Angola's total external debt (Kilic, 2019, pp. 86-87).

4.6. Chinese in Angola

This section of the research will examine the Chinese presence in Angola from the perspective of the workers. Chinese firms have frequently struggled with African labor unions. This is because China has weak and government-affiliated unions. Labor unions, on the other hand, are more powerful in Africa. China considers labor unions as a force that reduces productivity. Even in Angola, where labor unions are weak, the government has imposed strict labor laws (Corkin, 2012, p. 479).

Articles published on different times and for different countries may indicate contradicting information regarding whether the Chinese employ workers in the country in which they invest. For example, the "Angola Social Housing Project," launched in 2007 by the Chinese corporation CITIC in Luanda, Angola's capital, was a massive development project. It was expected that houses would be constructed for Angolan citizens between 2008 and 2012. (New homes for the new middle class). The Angolan government prepared a labor law before the project began. As a result, 8-hour work days and minimum wage protection were enacted. In addition, according to this law, 70% of the workers of international projects had to be met from the local workforce. However, Chinese laborers were mostly hired during the project's early stages. The number of Chinese workers in Angola increased from 32,328 to 41,493 between 2009 and 2011 (Ye, 2020, p. 9). In the second part of the project, the law seems to have been implemented. Chinese companies' local worker employment has increased dramatically. According to a McKinsey analysis published in 2017, 89 percent of the employees at 1000 Chinese companies interviewed in Africa were African local workers, with Angola being one of the model countries. If the government monitors the situation, it appears that Chinese companies will switch to hiring local workers (Ye, 2020, p. 10).

However, any project or bilateral government agreement, financed by China Exim Bank with a 70% worker quota set is excluded from the scope of this law. Furthermore, this 70% employment comprises only unskilled workers and China holds the majority of

Exim Bank's Angola projects. The bank's primary goal is to increase demand for Chinese goods and services. A World Bank official said, "Companies of major engineering projects in China operate in Africa just as they operate in China. They bring their own workers. So if a company from Guangdong wins a tender for a project in Ningxia, the company will recruit its own workers in Guangdong. So it's not surprising that Chinese companies don't use their local workforce and suppliers in Africa, he says. The reason for this is that Chinese companies work with the logic of turnkey projects. As a result, all inputs are procured from China. These companies have also applied the operational model they know in China to international initiatives (Corkin, 2012, p. 476).

When Schmitz visited Angola for field studies in 2013, she described China's outlook as follows: "The scope of Chinese activities was most visibly on the outskirts of Luanda." A semicircular highway that runs through the area is surrounded by construction company bases, restaurants, hotels, grocery stores, furniture and electronics retailers, truck and machinery dealers, building materials dealers, building materials wholesalers, auto repair shops, and several Chinese-built residences. For Angola's new middle class, complexes were establishing. The Chinese-funded Kilamba project, consisting of 750 housing towers, was located thirty kilometers outside of urban Luanda (Schmitz, 2020, p. 478). Luanda is home to the city's main Chinatown. Schmitz, illustrates how the city's look has altered as a result of the city's increased immigration from China over the last 20 years. Furthermore, as she points out in her paper, while addressing the compensation issue between Chinese management of company and a worker, that one of the harshest accusations towards Chinese corporations is that they treat their employees poorly. For example, Chinese employees of the Chinese firm mock government phrases such as "China Africa friendship" (Schmitz, 2020, p. 481). An elderly worker working at an oil depot is demanding compensation for illnesses he developed after breathing in smoke without wearing a mask over five years. When asked why he didn't wear a mask, he explained that the company didn't provide them with one. He is attempting to obtain compensation from the corporation as a result of his impairment to the point where his leg has been amputated. The plaintiff, who had been working in unsafe and unhealthy conditions on a low salary over the previous five years, finally received compensation to meet his medical expenditures (Schmitz, 2020, p. 482).

Chinese companies also do not respect the cultural differences of workers. Many Angolan local workers claim that Chinese companies do not give permission for death leave and religious practices because they think it will reduce production. It also appears that Chinese companies were delaying the training of the local workforce on the grounds which further delayed the completion of projects. In addition, Angolan workers generally earn 22-38 percent less wages than Chinese workers, however the reason given for why Chinese workers were more likely to be used despite higher salaries was because Chinese workers worked at a higher rate of productivity (Corkin, 2012, p. 480). Consequently, according to one Chinese businessman, while relations between China and the Angolan government are good, they are not so in daily interactions between management and workers (Corkin, 2012, p. 479).

CONCLUSION

China has a very important place with the African continent and specifically Angola, due to its ever-increasing trade and its contribution to infrastructure services. China's trade and aids contribute to the economic growth of continental countries. However, there is also a dependency situation. This study demonstrates how critical case selection is when evaluating China's approach to Africa. While China makes significant contributions to Africa as a whole, its relationship with some resource-rich countries may become more intensive and distinctive. Political, economic, military, cultural, and institutional relations are the fundamental concepts and tools of neocolonialism for controlling and influencing countries. In this study, a conclusion was drawn about what features of colonialism can be found in the relationship between China and Angola.

Different definitions of neocolonialism have been presented since the 1960s. In general, the meaning of this terminology is the development of a new approach in the indirect exploitation of a country's power by foreign countries. This exploitation, unlike traditional colonialism, is carried out through softer mechanisms rather than through direct political or military power. Even though a country is independent, we might observe traces of neocolonialism, as Nkrumah points out, if it is economically dependent on another country. What causes this economic dependency? The neocolonial country imports raw materials and unprocessed products at very low prices from the resource-rich country. In return, it exports processed goods and necessities to colonized areas and countries. For example, as shown in this study, while China has a foreign trade deficit in some years in trade with Angola, it is in a favorable position in terms of product diversity. It exports a diverse range of goods, from footwear to textiles, machinery and auto parts to furniture. Angola, on the other hand, is reliant on the export of a single commodity: oil. However, products from China have a negative impact on the local market due to both variety and price competition. That's because the goods of colonized countries cannot compete with the goods of colonial countries in terms of price and quality. For this reason, industry cannot develop in these colonized countries, and local businesses get into trouble. The same problem is seen with China's engagement with Africa. One of the charges directed at China was that it did not transfer technology to the countries in which it invested, negatively impacting those countries' local manufacturing sectors. However,

it does transfers technology to sectors that are vital for it, such as raw materials. Moreover, the colonized countries' economic relationship with the colonial power is limited to a few items and industries. When this trade relationship is disturbed or the inbound investment flow is interrupted, the exploited country's economy enters a slump or even a crisis. Angola provides the majority of China's oil and other raw commodities. Since 2008, fluctuations in oil prices have had a negative impact on Angola. Raw material price declines can have a far greater impact on these fragile economies. The colonial authority always controls crucial sectors of the colonized countries through overt or covert political control, cultural influence, and economic exploitation in the colonial country or territories. In the case of Angola, Chinese companies get infrastructure projects without even doing feasibility studies, and Chinese funds are primarily used to pay Chinese companies, and therefore local construction companies cannot get a share from this development.

The most advantageous aspect of the Chinese is that they provide loans and aid that the Westerners do not. And they do so "unconditionally," supposedly without interfering in the receiving countries internal affairs. The fact is, however, that this unconditional situation does not mean that it is fully unconditional and uncontrolled. China is meticulous and demanding in meeting credit line terms. Furthermore, China, a socialist state with a one-party system, is more likely to back African autocratic governments that control natural resources. Indeed, Chinese aid and loans are conditional, as well as its on demand assistance. In order to access the resource, China can provide the assistance that the authoritarian governments desire without conducting a feasibility study. In order to win tenders, Chinese companies may develop relationships with local politicians and create "new needs projects" without doing a feasibility study. In any case, it has been seen that the relationships developed between the elites operate within the framework of a win-win policy, benefiting both ruling parties, but not providing for the people of the poor countries. Political elites are conducting aid and credit agreements to strengthen their own authority with companies that implement Beijing's policies, providing safe access to resources, and investing in new infrastructure projects. Although there is no direct political participation or involvement in domestic politics, Chinese companies observed in China-Angola, and Africa relations, reflect Beijing's strategy, by establishing relations with the country's political elite and ensuring that project purchases

are made in accordance with their own interests. Undertaking projects without demand or need is an example of this, where Chinese corporations, who are only concerned about their profit margins, collaborate with the elites without even doing a feasibility study.

One of the most controversial aspects of Chinese engagement in Africa is that the Chinese bring their own people to work on the projects. Chinese companies are unwilling to hire from the local workforce gaining them a reputation for preferring to employ Chinese labor. In contrast, the findings of some studies in the literature show that these initiatives provide significant employment opportunities for local people. As can be observed in the housing project in Luanda, when Chinese enterprises are left to their own devices in terms of employment and are not controlled by government, they employ very few local workers. When labor quotas are created and enforced by legislation, Chinese enterprises' investments can indeed create job opportunities for local citizens.

In the past, in order to justify colonialism in Africa, the Europeans claimed they were exporting civilization to Africans who were technically more backward than themselves. In this case, what they called Africa the white man's burden, and it was widely accepted that they were spreading European civilization and religion to Africa. According to some Western bourgeois writers, even today Europe has positively developed Africa (by building railways, roads, hospitals, etc.) More truthfully, author Walter Rodney claims that all of these infrastructural projects were in fact funded by African taxation. He further points out that these institutions were mostly constructed to service white minorities or to extract mineral resources from the colonized country. He significantly asks the question, why didn't the Portuguese train even a doctor in Angola, when they stayed there for a century? Today, Beijing claims that they are developing African countries, accelerating economic growth, and developing bilateral trade within the framework of a "win-win" relationship. These links, however, are based on conditional loans from Chinese state banks, the work of Chinese companies, and workers imported from China by Chinese companies.

In general, the following evaluations and conclusions were reached in the study. From a political perspective, China provided military assistance to various parties in the Angolan civil war following independence. It was even seen that China sent more aid to other organizations against the Soviet-backed MPLA. After the 2000s, it is seen that

Beijing did not get involved in domestic politics. However, there is evidence of support for China's authoritarian single-party leader dos Santos's 2012 constitution. There are also traces of Chinese companies manipulating local politicians to win project tenders. Economically, China has demonstrated negative influence and control over Angola's labor market and local sectors. Furthermore, the long-term consequences of using important resources such as oil as debt repayments are unknown. As a result, this situation, sometimes known as creditor imperialism, may have many more repercussions in the future.

Angola is highly dependent on its natural resources, and as China's major trading partner, purchasing its resources and building its infrastructure strengthens its ties with China. This intense relationship based on more credit/capital from China makes Angola more dependent on China. At this point, the traces of economic and financial neo-colonialism can be seen in this relationship. In Angola, China follows a model of dependency and economic exploitation. Unlike other colonizers, it does so using its own unique tools. These include credit packages, loans and aids, massive infrastructure expenditures, as well as oil and natural gas (RBL's) in exchange. It also has a negative impact on the labor market and domestic sectors. As a result of its findings, this study has identified that there are in fact neocolonial features of China in Africa and Angola.

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