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**SYRAIN REFUGEES MIGRATION AND THEIR IMPACT ON TURKEY IN
THE 21ST CENTURY: PEACBUILDING OPPORTUNITIES, 2022**

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ISTANBUL, 2022

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SYRAIN REFUGEES MIGRATION AND THEIR IMPACT ON TURKEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PEACBUILDING OPPORTUNITIES, 2022

ABSTRACT

This study is carried out after 11 years of the Syrian civil war that had started in 2011 within the scope of the Arab spring protests. The objective of this study is to investigate the effect of Syrian refugees on Turkey's economic and social structure. The Syrian civil war not only caused the deaths of large numbers of Syrians and the destruction of cities, but also led to the most significant refugee influx to Europe since the Second World War. However, the volume and effects of this influx, which is expected to affect Europe, pale in comparison to the refugee crisis in Turkey. The ongoing wars in Syria and the inability to find a solution still leave Turkey face-to-face with various difficulties. Syrian refugees, who have migrated to Turkey in general and Istanbul in particular in the last ten years, have had a serious impact on Turkey's social and economic structure. The serious economic crisis in recent years and the rise of the Syrian immigration leads the increasing discontent of the Turkish society. This reaction may cause conflicts between Syrian refugees and Turks living in the region. The aim of this study will be presented as a theory of "Protection Motivation Theory" to demonstrates the possibility to provide harmony, tolerance, and a peaceful atmosphere between Syrian refugees and Turks. Turkey's protection, inspection, service delivery, cooperation, social cohesion, economy, and activism are all important contributions to reduce the burden of Syrian refugees on the Turkish state and decrease the immigrant crises there. This study adopts quantitative research methods in the shape of surveys and qualitative research methods using related articles. The sources of the data are mainly from credible organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Turkish Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management.

Keywords: Impact, Presence, Syrian refugees, Peacebuilding, Turkey.

SURİYELİ MÜLTECİ GÖÇLERİ VE 21. YÜZYILDA TÜRKİYE'YE ETKİSİ: BARIŞ İNŞASI FIRSATLARI, 2022

ÖZET

Arap baharı protestoları kapsamında 2011 yılında başlayan Suriye iç savaşının 11 yıl sonrasında gerçekleştirilen bu çalışmanın amacı, Suriyeli mültecilerin Türkiye'nin ekonomik ve sosyal yapısına etkisini araştırmaktır. Suriye iç savaşı sadece çok sayıda Suriyelinin ölümüne ve şehirlerin yıkılmasına neden olmakla kalmamış, aynı zamanda İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan bu yana Avrupa'ya en önemli mülteci akınına da yol açmıştır. Ancak Avrupa'yı etkilemesi beklenen bu akının hacmi ve etkileri Türkiye'deki mülteci krizinin yanında sönük kalmaktadır. Suriye'de devam eden savaşlar ve devam eden göçe çözüm bulunamaması Türkiye'yi halen çeşitli zorluklarla karşı karşıya bırakmaktadır. Son on yılda genel olarak Türkiye'ye, özelde İstanbul'a göç eden Suriyeli mülteciler, Türkiye'nin sosyal ve ekonomik yapısını ciddi şekilde etkilemiştir. Son yıllarda yaşanan ciddi ekonomik kriz ve Suriyeli göçün artması, Türk toplumunda

yükselen bir hoşnutsuzluđuna yol açmaktadır. Bu tepki, Suriyeli mülteciler ile bölgede yaşayan Türkler arasında çatışmalara neden olabilir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Suriyeli mülteciler ve Türkler arasında uyum, hoşgörü ve barışçıl bir atmosfer sağlama olasılıđını ortaya koymak için “Koruma Motivasyon Teorisi” üzerinde durmaktır. Türkiye'nin sağladığı koruma, denetim, hizmet sunumu, işbirliđi, sosyal uyum, ekonomi ve aktivizm, Suriyeli mültecilerin göçmen krizlerini azaltmak için önemli katkılardır. Bu çalışma, anket şeklinde nicel araştırma yöntemlerini ve ilgili makaleleri kullanarak nitel araştırma yöntemlerini benimser. Verilerin kaynakları ağırlıklı olarak Birleşmiş Milletler (BM), Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliđi (BMMYK) ve TC İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü gibi güvenilir kuruluşlardan gelmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Etki, Varlık, Suriyeli mülteciler, Barışın İnşası, Türkiye.

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS	
TIKA	Turkish International Cooperation and Developing Agency
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UN	United Nations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
HIU	Humanitarian Information Unit
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease
IDPS	Identity and Privacy Strategies
ECHO	Extended Care Health Option
FIP	The Law on Foreigners and International Protection
AKP	Justice and Development Part
HLFS	Household Labor Force Survey
ISKUR	Turkish Institute that provides jobs and employees
ESSN Strategy	Emergency Social Safety Net
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
AFAD	Emergency Management Authority
KOSGEB	Small and Medium Enterprise Development Organization
UNDP	UNICEF
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
PKK	Kurdistan Working Party
EU	European Union
CCTE	Contingent Money Move for Instruction
TR	Turkey
MHP	Patriot Development Party
CHP	Conservative Public Party
HDP	Individuals Progressive Alliance
RPP	Republic People Party
USD	American Dollar
İYİ Parti	Good Party
PDOFLSS	Provincial Directorates of Family, Labor, and Social Services
MOFLSS	Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. SYRIAN MASSIVE IMIGRATION TO TURKEY

Not only has the Syrian civil war led in the destruction of a nation, but it has also resulted in the biggest massive immigration that Europe has seen since World War Two. In truth, the magnitude of this inflow, which appears to be menacing Europe, pales in contrast to Turkey's refugee issue. The continuance of the continuing battles in Syria, as well as the absence of answers, present Turkey with a variety of issues.

To begin with, it is becoming increasingly clear that, even though the war ends, returning refugees to their home places would be difficult in the foreseeable future, and those were already adapted. This situation has compelled the Turkish government to prioritize several extremely difficult, sensitive, and complex issues, such as providing opportunities for refugees to relieve their stay in Turkey but rather adjust to life in Turkish society, along with meeting refugees' urgent needs for education, health, housing, employment, public services, and other relevant needs. Since ninety percent of refugees living just outside of the refugee camps and are still in near contact with the local community in different cities such as Istanbul, Hatay, Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Adana, Mersin, they are already connected with each other also the cohesion and integration in this community have become the priority issues.

Moreover, the continuation of the conflict, as well as the improbability of refugees ever returning to their home countries, necessitates the establishment of a permanent and societal power cohesiveness. To sustain social cohesiveness, the motivations that shape the local community's attitude toward immigrants should be thoroughly explored from both a local and a national perspective. On the firsthand Turkey can no longer base its Syrian policy only on "temporariness" or "temporary protection." Any detail that is postponed, deferred, or ignored for the sake of "temporariness" may cause huge issues in the future. As a result, while doing what needs to be done in terms of domestic and foreign policies regarding Syrians coming back to their country, it is also vital to recognize the reality that a significant portion of them would prefer to stay permanently in Turkey, necessitating the development of several living-together

strategies (HUGO 2014, p.8). Social cohesiveness is dependent on the host country people' perceptions of refugee groups, as well as attitudes created because of locals' preconceptions and immigrant groups' views. Social cohesiveness is defined as the degree of closeness and cooperation between sections of the community (Berkman and Kawachi 2000, P.175) Therefore, this specifies the development and management of good attitudes towards this crisis.

The Syrian refugee crisis highlights the inadequacies of today's international asylum and protection system, while also providing a chance for the international community to put the notion of "burden sharing" into action. States, international institutions, and non-governmental associations (NGOs) should work together on a global scale to address the social, cultural, economic, political, and geopolitical technological aspects of the Syrian refugee crisis. While Turkey's reaction has been exceptionally generous thus far, its capacity to accommodate and assist more refugee flows is limited. As the situation worsens, a real useful and forward-thinking reaction will necessitate greater international cooperation and assistance. UNHCR has made significant commitments to Turkey's Protective climate for Syrian refugees, outstandingly by focusing on the lawful and institutional structure expected for Syrians to enroll and get social administrations. As the Syrian populace proceeded to increment and spread the country over, UNHCR was very delayed to change away from the case the board and camp model, however started to adjust in 2014 and 2015, first by making public venues, and afterward by increasing Community put together assurance based with respect to Urban Strategy. (UNHCR 2016, p.16)

Furthermore, Turkey's status as an emerging player may be attributed to the country's continuous political and economic progress in the early years of the twenty first century as well as the erosion of the Western rule-based order orderly liberality, this has provided regional actors with opportunities to expect relative economic stability and security certain functions that have historically been assigned to the great powers during the cold war. Turkey also has some similarities with several other developing powers and the relative experience of the fast economic expansion stability, as well as a continuous political transition reform. As the global becomes increasingly multipolar, throughout this decade, Turkey has used its religious, ethnic, and linguistic systems, as well as cultural links, to build its soft power, both regionally and nationally. Turkey's stature as a regional player has risen, especially in light of the Arab Spring's

ability to spark crises and conflicts on its own. These teachings, together with country's standing as candidate for the European union and steadfast NATO partner as well as a buffer state for the western Turkey's role in promoting regional peace and stability strengthen its image as a link between geographical areas as well as cultural divisions. Approximately 2.7 million Syrian refugees are housed in Turkey, as a result while the economic and international power shifts may have aided Turkey's recent efforts, the country's conceptions and approaches to peacebuilding is strongly influenced by the country's experiences with instability. (UNDP 2021, Turkey)

Finally, Protection Motivation Theory original purpose was to help explain individual human responses to fear appeals, and it was applied in Germany by the (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Institute for International and Security Affairs) as a response for the long-term asylum of Syrian refugees. People defend themselves based on two variables, according to the protection motivation theory: risk appraisal and coping appraisal. Risk evaluation assesses the severity of the issue, whereas coping appraisal explores how one responds to the circumstance. Security assessment includes the perceived severity of a risky event as well as the perceived likelihood of occurrence, or vulnerability. Perceived response efficacy, or an individual's anticipation that taking the recommended action will eliminate the danger, and perceived self-efficacy, or belief in one's capacity to carry out the recommended courses of action effectively, are components of coping evaluation. This theory will be used in this study to illustrate the possibilities of fostering cooperation, tolerance, and peace between Syrian refugees and Turks also Protection, inspection, service delivery, collaboration, community stability, economics, and advocacy in Turkey are all vital contributions to reducing the burden of Syrian refugees on the Turkish state and reducing the immigration crisis there.

1.1 Research problem

Turkey's essential decisions have been represented by two essential issues, first security and second soundness. Following World War, I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, modernization by means of arrangement with and enrolment in Western organizations was viewed as significant to recuperating the security and solidness that had been lost over the earlier years. Non-obstruction and regard for power, two of Turkey's fundamental international strategy

standards, have additionally arisen in this unique situation. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Republic's maker, essentially affected Turkey's interior and outside international strategy. One of his assertions, specifically the adage "Harmony at home, harmony on the planet," grabbed my eye." Turkey's worldwide movement has been directed by this methodology, from its initial introductions to peacekeeping during the 1990s to its present peacebuilding drives. Previous Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu concurred, saying that Turkey has attempted to foster a proactive international strategy in view of interior harmony and steadiness. Since the Arab Spring spread to the Levant, finishing in a horrendous nationwide conflict in Syria and ethnic social removal in Northern Iraq (Davutoğlu 2012, p.14), this ideal has been seriously stressed. These issues have impacted Turkey's security and strength. Practically all self-destruction assaults in significant urban communities in the southeast, the Turkish capital Ankara, and the country's fundamental city Istanbul have been associated with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria cells that crossed the permeable southern boundaries after June 7, 2015, general races. New engagements between Turkish security powers and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) have gone with this, the two of which are hazardous to Turkey's dependability (Hacıoğlu, 2014). Turkey's solitary unfamiliar activity during the Cold War was during the 1980s when it interceded a debate among Iran and Iraq. After the unwinding of Cold War limitations, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) was made determined to foster Turkish relations with recently free Turkish states. Turkey's initial introduction to global peacekeeping was during the 1990s when it sent troopers to United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping missions. Then, at that point, Tika was imagined as an instrument of Turkish delicate power by means of monetary, social, and philanthropic participation. Notwithstanding, because of inward weakness and an accentuation on a harder, security-driven vision of military investment, it mulled as an office for quite a bit of this period. (Gur 2012)

Finally, an emphasis on mediation and religiously sensitive activities distinguishes Turkey's social peacebuilding efforts. Officials have underlined the importance of mediation not just on an inter-state level, but also on a local one, via daily activities and encounters with communities and refugees. This might vary from community comfort to environmental protection, with

government officials believing that mediation and conversation are practices that support their own declared national ownership concepts. This idea of programming that is culturally and religiously sensitive. (Yildiz and Gur, 2012; Gur and Cakir, and Baris et al., 2013). Program development and monitoring are hampered by a lack of consistency in coordination and execution of concepts and goals. These studies highlight peacebuilding because of intervention, without taking into account the role of civil society and how their contributions have influenced internal peace initiatives at various phases with Syrian refugees. This thesis will aim to focus on the gap created by the impact of Syrian refugees on Turkey by concentrating on the influence of Turkey on several stages of peacebuilding in Turkey, such as protection, monitoring, service delivery, socialization, facilitation, social cohesion, and advocacy. There are also recommendations regarding trust, peacebuilding, and solutions with Syrian refugees in Istanbul /Turkey, without affecting the Turkish civilization, demographic changes, economy, social security, and social stability.

1.2 Research Questions

1. What is the impact of the presence of Syrian refugees in Istanbul / Turkey?
2. What is the contribution of Turkey in peacebuilding with Syrian refugee's crises?
3. Will Turkish Society agree with the "Protection Motivation Theory" in order to maintain the safety for the Turkish community?

1.3 Research Methodology

1.3.1 Research strategy:

- This study relies on qualitative data and articles from credible organizations such as the United Nations, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the United Nations Development Programmed, European Union, World Bank, Turkish International Cooperation Developing Agency, and Turkish Government. Filters are made to restrict data and articles made in recent 10 years

(beginning of Syrian crisis) and data related to Syrian refugees' impact on Turkish country only.

- This study adopts a quantitative data in the shape of survey including 20 questions, with multiple choice answer on each question that aimed to investigate the impact of Syrian refugees on the Turkish society, as well as their opinion mainly in the Protection Motivation Theory. This survey was sent electronically via mail to various Turks and results were collected in a specified deadline.

1.3.2 Inclusion criteria

- Date of publication from 2011
- Articles opened by access
- Articles about Syrian refugees' migration just in Turkey

1.3.3 Exclusion criteria

- Date of publication before 2011
- Not free opened articles
- Studies on Syrian refugees in other countries

1.4 Limitation of the Study

This study is limited by the small sample size that answered the survey, also the small number of articles included since it is a recent issue, as well as it is looking forward to the future to better enhance Turkish society dealing with Syrian refugee's issue.

1.5 Significance and Structure of the Study

This study concerns the influence of Turkey on several stages of peacebuilding in Turkey, such as protection, monitoring, service delivery, socialization, facilitation, social cohesion, and advocacy. It also makes recommendations to benefit and build peace from the presence of Syrian

refugees in Istanbul and Turkey, affecting the Turkish civilization, demographic changes, economy, social security, and social stability. The findings may also contribute to literature that academicians interested in conducting more research on this topic may use. This paper might be used as a resource for researchers, students, and others. The UNHCR, the United Nations, NGOs, the Turkish government, Istanbul Municipality, the international community, and even other people who have a close interest in benefiting from the presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey and the ways of peacebuilding with those refugees in the near future, The study, in particular, might be beneficial to Turkish society. Specially To take positive actions toward peacebuilding and benefiting because of the existence of Syrian refugees in Turkey, the 's minister of Society Affairs and Human Rights, the Ministry of National Planning, and the Law society, and also Non-Governmental Institutions (NGOs), and both nationally and internationally researchers on the subject would then refer to the this study as just a review of the literature.

The thesis is organized into four chapters. Chapter one provides a brief introduction about the importance of the impact of Syrian refugees in Turkey and there should be an alternative framework of peacebuilding in Turkish states that are facing the Syrian refugees crisis. In this endeavour the chapter establishes a conclusion that the Turkish society continue to be conceived and indeed operate, from a reflection of a "cultural Idea" even though it is the most important point of the research because the cultural way is unfortunately should not affect the culture of turkey. This chapter argues that existing debates should focus on the presence of those Syrian refugees and their future existence, regarding their impact on social stability, legal protection, and the economy. Debates that emphasize the localization, demographic changes, and cultural specificity of Turkish society are expected to provide a new insight into peacebuilding. This will assist in rethinking ways in which benefiting from Syrian refugees can be approached without affecting the "Turkish culture" conceptualizations. The chapter also provides details on the research methodology and the significance of the study.

Chapter two discusses the theoretical framework of peacebuilding in Turkey with Syrian refugees and the framework of benefiting from their existence.

Chapter three discusses the impact of the existence of the Syrian refugees in Turkey/Istanbul towards Turkey, in this chapter the analysis of governmental policies towards the presence of Syrian refugees in Istanbul territories, also this context is significant also for the hosting community performance with respect to the Syrian refugees within the international community operate. Secondly, it will foreshadow Syrian refugees' existence in Istanbul and their impact on social stability, legal protection, health care, food security, demographic changes, Turkish culture, and finally the economy.

Chapter four highlights the role of peacebuilding and benefiting from Syrian refugees in turkey as avenues of protection for Turkish society; monitoring the crise; Social cohesion; socialization to peace; facilitation to open a new way of peace, all of those under the approaches for peacebuilding in Turkey, developing this peace, developing peace agreements, transforming attitudes, protection for Turkey, also peacebuilding tools in Turkey/Istanbul, and challenges. This will be evaluated through critical analysis of the carious programmes and interventions of peacebuilding in turkey with respect to Syrian refugees' existence, also another evaluation through a questioner including headings and subheadings about this issue and submitted to the Turkish society.

Chapter five focuses on the findings, discussions, conclusion, and recommendation of the study.

1.6 Contextualizing Syrian refugees in Istanbul

Istanbul is a significant city in Turkey that spans Europe and Asia across the Bosphorus Strait. It is located on the Bosphorus Strait in Turkey's northern western area. Istanbul is Turkey's biggest city and main seaport. It encompasses the Golden Horn, a natural harbour. Istanbul, Turkey's largest city was formerly known as Byzantium and Constantinople. Istanbul is strategically significant since it is located on the European continent. Istanbul is Turkey's cultural, economic, and finical centre, and it is also recognized as a megacity due to its huge size. In addition, Istanbul designated as an alpha global city. Surprisingly, Istanbul was named an European Capital city for culture and sport (Keyder, 2021, p.3-9)




Figure 1 Turkey-Syria: Numbers and Locations of Displaced Syrians Government of Turkey, USG, UNHCR, OCHA, press reporting, HIU 2016)

Source: (USG, UNHCR, OCHA, Press Reporting, HIU 2016)

The purpose of figure 1 is to explain the huge number of Syrian refugees that migrate to Turkey and the registered once also to obtain the locations of the displaced Syrians in Turkey in 2016. The number of forcefully displaced persons in the globe reached 80 million in 2020, the most since World War II. 26 million of them abandoned their nations owing to violence or persecution. Syria had the biggest number of refugees, accounting for 6.6 million individuals. Turkey now It is the nation's top refugee host state, with over 3.6 million Syrian refugees. Many Syrian refugees have experienced potentially traumatic events such as bombs, threats, incarceration, torture, injures and witnessing the death or injury of close ones.

Furthermore, they are vulnerable to prejudice, economic hardship, and social isolation. In 2020, the COVID- 19 outbreak intensified the hardships of Syrian refugees in Turkey due to a rapid and significant decrease in income production prospects and access to services. (HIU, 2021)

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF SYRIAN REFUGEES MIGRATION

Syrians that lost their homes in their were allowed to enter Turkey when they started showing up at the Turkish-Syrian line in the spring of 2011. Those with identifications were permitted to enter Turkey to no one's surprise, while those without were confessed to transitory evacuee camps. As the quantity of exiles or visitors as they were known in expanding forma, the public authority raised a growing number of camps along the boundary to shield them. The public authority of Turkey gave transitory insurance to Syrian outcasts on October 11 making it the principal country nearby to do as such. This mirrored Turkey's entryway strategy, non-refoulement strategy, and obligation to giving fundamental philanthropic help to exiles. Regardless, as the quantity of outcasts kept on ascending throughout the late spring of 2012, outstandingly on account of the heightening battling in Aleppo and its environs, the limit of the public authority run camps started to diminish. The Turkish government has started to limit the access, bringing about the foundation of in excess of 20 transitory camps along the Syrian side of the line for people anticipating induction to Turkey. (Okyay 2017, p.829-846)

In the meantime, a rising number of Syrians escaping the contention in the northern Syria started to enter Turkey through supposed informal intersection focuses, joining the positions of Turkey's developing non-camp outcast populace. IDPs have as of late gone to bootleggers as Turkey closes both informal and official intersection destinations inferable from the breaking down security circumstance on the Syrian side of the boundary, it is essentially useless that the line among Syria and Turkey has been very permeable all the time. Crossline pirating was continuous even before the Syrian evacuee emergencies started, yet it has strengthened as the level of Syrians holding on to cross has expanded. Rates have been recorded around then going from 15 to 30 Turkish Liras which implies around then (7 to 16 USD) to pass from Syria entering Turkey and from 30 to 100 TL (16 to 51 USD) to cross a contrary way. In the in the meantime, Turkey needs to permit Syrians with authentic international IDs to enter the nation unreservedly and get residency cards. The intersections are supposed to be used by transients leaving Syria, yet in addition by military assailants going between displaced person camps and Syria. As per

regular reports, these warriors come to the camps for family visits, rest and diversion, during one period there were reports of contenders conveying arms while moving from one spot to another inside Turkey (Utami 2015) but developing worries about security and grumblings from the nearby populace prompted a clampdown, and such contenders are not generally allowed to carry weapons in Turkey.

At long last, the truth of the matter is that Syrians cross the Turkish line needing earnest clinical consideration affects Turkey's provincial wellbeing frameworks. A significant piece of Turkey's transitory assurance strategy, as will be investigated further beneath, has been the arrangement of medical care to Syrian outcasts. This is seen on the boundary with the vehicle of harmed and incredibly sick regular folks, as well as warriors, to Turkish emergency clinics. Whenever troops regular citizens are harmed fighting inside Syria, they are conveyed to the boundary, where Turkish ambulances transport them to clinics. They are in this way shipped off care homes for harmed troops, which are purportedly paid for by outside nations (Lawson 2014, P.1351)


2.1 Response to the Influx of Syrian Refugees in Turkey

The all-encompassing objective of this assessment is to dissect United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) response to the progression of Syrian refugees into Turkey from 1 January 2014 to 30 June 2015 (UNHCR, 2015) It assesses the degree to which predefined targets were reached, including explanations behind progress or disappointment, recognizes holes in assurance and help, and which factors in program plan and execution brought about ideal results. It is essential to take note of that it doesn't incorporate non-Syrian outcasts in Turkey, crossline tasks from Turkey into Syria, on forward and short-lived travel to Europe. The assessment, drove by Universally The board Gathering, occurred between December 2015 and Walk 2016 in Geneva and Turkey. The assessment group talked with a different range of UNHCR staff in all field locales, as well as Turkish nationals and occupants. (UNHCR 2015, Difficulties in securing/helping displaced people in Metropolitan regions "Turkey") The assessment, drove by Universalialia The board Gathering, took held in Geneva and Turkey from December 2015 to Walk 2016. The assessment group talked with UNHCR staff from all field destinations, as well as Turkish public and nearby legislatures, UN offices, funders, Worldwide and public non-administrative gatherings, and scholastics.

Insurance has generally been UNHCR's primary worry in Turkey. Helping the public authority's administrative structure alteration and the public authority's administrative system adjustment and the public authority's apparatus for Syrian displaced person registration two objectives were. By the center of 2015, 1.8 million Syrian displaced people were enlisted at a fundamental level at a section that this would be reachable or reasonable utilizing UNHCR's conventional and more through techniques, by giving them levels of assurance and admittance to taxpayer driven organizations only every once in a long while found in a first refuge country and to a huge measure, this was made conceivable by the patient, relaxed, and versatile help of UNHCR insurance laborers, especially an extremely surprising approach and educating group regarding nation officials. (Douglas, Levitan, and Kiama 2017, p.34-54).

While Syrian refugees are now being welcomed with open arms by both the Tukurish government and the Tukurish people, this cannot continue. Taken for granted in terms of both the political and the economic, Turkey's economic circumstances may suddenly change as well as at any moment the refugee welcome is dressed in thin when it becomes more obvious that the refugees will spend some time turkey and compete more overtly with Turkish nationals seeking jobs, housing, and government services, particularly in areas with significant refugee populations and the local economy is under pressure. Predicting and managing social cohesiveness. The purpose is to raise funds for UNHCR in a more efficient manner existing of outreach. (UNHCR 2015, p.15).

Additionally, the obligation here for UNHCR is to track, screen and moderate the risk of social pressures and likely clash among outcasts and their host networks. During the appraisal, the



Total Persons of Concern by Country of Asylum [JSON](#)

Location name	Source	Data date	Population
Turkey	Government of Turkey	2 Jun 2022	65.8% 3,763,864
Lebanon	UNHCR	31 Mar 2022	14.7% 839,086
Jordan	UNHCR	31 May 2022	11.8% 675,040
Iraq	UNHCR	30 Apr 2022	4.5% 258,965
Egypt	UNHCR	30 Apr 2022	2.5% 141,303
Other (North Africa)	UNHCR	31 Dec 2021	0.7% 41,742


assessment group talked with UNHCR and its accomplices, government, colleges and non-administrative associations in regard to social cohesiveness, and how steps UNHCR has moderated the risk of social struggle. This segment of the UNHCR study gives a various pertinent component of this subject, like controlling popular assessments of Syrian exiles, association with nearby authorities, displaced person portrayal, and help to have networks, the capacity of public venues as scaffold manufacturers, social propriety, and ultimately advancement of long haul jobs for refugees.(UNHCR 2015, p.98) UNHCR suggest that UNHCR Turkey ought to work together with its accomplices to make an Essential correspondences Activity intend to help the security and arrangements began, as they suggest somewhere else, with an attention on friendly attachment and an auxiliary spotlight on gathering pledges (UNHCR 2015, p100).

Source: (UNHCR, Government of Turkey 02 Jun 2022)

While Syrian refugees are currently getting a warm greeting from both the Turkish government and the Turkish public, this can't be underestimated in light of the fact that Turkey's political and monetary setting might change. The displaced person welcome is becoming slight as obviously outcasts will stay in Turkey for quite a while and will finish with locals for business and public administrations, especially in areas where exile numbers are high, and the nearby economy is tested. Expecting and overseeing future social attachment difficulties will require dynamic commitment with nearby state-run administrations, more grounded exile portrayal, proactive vital interchanges with social union as the objective instead of UNHCR raising money, and more successful effort from existing local area, enormous and clear venture by entertainers and NGOs in Turkish towns disproportionally affected by Syrian outcasts to get to the authority work market. (UNHCR 2015 p. 115).

As seen in figure 2 according to UNHCR and Government of Turkey, by 2 Jun 2022 65.8% which is 3,763,864 of total 5,720,000 of Syrian refugees in the world have been located Turkey

Figure 3 Registered Syrian Refugees in camps in Turkey 2022 (UNHCR, Government of Turkey)



02 Jun 2022)

Source: (UNHCR, Government of Turkey 02 Jun 2022)

As seen in figure 3 and according to UNHCR and Government of Turkey, by 02 Jun 2022 278,322 population of males and females in all ages of Syrian refugees have been registered in camps in Turkey.

2.2 Civil Society and Syrian Refugees

The function of civil society actors in greeting and accepting migrants at the regional level is critical that could have ramifications influence on local as well as global reaction into long-term refugee camps too high frequently the issue of refugee support is being tackled and investigated. in a up down fashion which eliminates fundamental organization is invisible civic The constitutional justification of society is undeniably important, legislation on refugees formulation, big-scale organization empathetic aid, as well as advocating for financing from the donor agencies is carried out at the national level and on a global scale. Nonetheless, as legislation of small-scale humanitarian aid, local government the success of social programs is dependent on interactions of civil society regarding refugees. Moreover, this study focuses on how civil society organisations react to, and in some circumstances help, the existence of refugees inside their community is a significant aspect in refugees' capacity to seek aid and achieve a a respectable levels of poverty. This works both ways: how a host community's public

participation responds to the presence of refugees has a significant influence on its own nature and dynamics. (Mackreath & Sagnic 2017, p.9).

The presence of Syrian refugees in lining nations presently makes as an extended displaced person circumstance, as indicated by Fresh's definition - that is, outcasts who have been someplace far off, banished in shame for over five years and have no prompt possibility of tracking down a drawn-out arrangement through wellful bringing home, nearby coordination, or resettlement. As indicated by the UNHCR, 2.45 million Syrians they live in troublesome circumstances with restricted admittance to data, enrolment, and public administrations like training and medical care. Just people with substantial residency licenses are allowed to sign up for government funded schools. Others can take an interest in instruction as visitors or as understudies. research papers and INGO circumstance gives an account of Syrians in Turkey have been given consistently, demonstrating the country's gigantic number of Syrians' presence in the country. This exploration has would in general focus on how Syrian's fare in Istanbul, how the Turkish government handles Syrians, and Turkish inhabitants' perceptions of Syrians There has been a dearth of focus on how Turkish society is altering or changing and evolving of the Syrian population here, and the intermediate to long run impact that these changes in society has on Syrians and Turkish society. This study intends to fill this void by collecting information on the most recent developments in Istanbul's communal society regarding Syrian refugees. (Viscomi and Lady 2018, p.106 - 116).

The tireless Syrian presence in Turkey, as well as in encompassing host countries Lebanon and Jordan, and how those nations are managing this presently, is raising two fundamental worries with respect to the idea of displaced person help. One is a get away from momentary compassionate help and toward programs equipped at adapting to longer-term difficulties. It's anything but an effortlessly characterized hole despite the fact that it has been north of a long time since the principal huge quantities of Syrian exiles showed up in Turkey, there are as yet those with critical compassionate requirements who can't be excused, as well as those with more settled essentially like work, economy, training, and language. Much aversion in taking on this incredibly lengthy progress has additionally been incited by the benefactor organization's

suggestions, particularly as far as exile arrangements, which are innately engaged towards emanant circumstance help. (Viscomi and Lady 2018, p.106 - 116).

Thus, the change to expanded strategies requires new compassionate associations likewise in specific conditions, entertainers. The second is only an affirmation that, with a consistently expanding number of exiles living beyond true camps or casual settlements, the job of host countries, especially networks and neighbourhood foundations inside have nations, in it is presently progressively vital to help outcasts. In December 2014, previous UN High Magistrate for Exiles António Guterres upheld for a new "help engineering" for outcast help, mirroring the colossal strain that the Syrian evacuee emergency has put on the worldwide philanthropic apparatus (UN, 2014)

There are clashing perspectives on who is answerable for supporting outcasts, with numerous in Turkey guaranteeing it is the global local area's liability and assuming that the state is abandoning its liabilities by empowering, straightforwardly or in a roundabout way, a space for common society to work. Discernments and assumptions for worldwide, public, and neighbourhood players about what common society ought to do in Turkey shape the space in which it works, as well as the conceivable outcomes of a future space. The manners by which Turkey's reactions to Syrians are advancing mirror a few major issues inside the nation, including the nation's developing mentality and relationship with global entertainers, disarray above job corresponding in same society, and the stage of Syrians as displaced people as an issue of public versus private obligation. The Turkish geographic imperative on the meaning of exile in the 1967 New York Convention blocks their case for displaced person status (Web, 2013). As a component of Turkey's administrative restoration as a feature of the proceeding with EU participation interaction, refuge and movement rules have additionally been altered. The Outsiders and Worldwide Security Regulation (Yabanclar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu) was passed in April 2013 and came full circle in 2014. This regulation allowed Syrians a new, exceptional status that of transitory security (LFIP 2014, p.91).

As of not long ago, all Syrians were dared to be qualified for such 'transitory insurance' in Turkey, which infers that any Syrian individual mentioning worldwide security is permitted to A Turkish area and wouldn't be expelled to Syria without their decision. Starting in mid-2015,

the public authority started briefly impeding various intersections with Syria before forever notwithstanding them to all aside from seriously harmed Syrian outcast candidates in October 2015. In January 2016, Turkey carried out a visa necessity for Syrians dropping via air or ocean from third nations, as well as a work grant regulation for Syrians who had remained in Turkey for over a half year. In addition, answering with the presence of Syrians happens with regards to an undeniably intricate world of politics, both at home and abroad. Universally, the EU-Turkey Joint Activity Plan, settled upon in October 2015 and formally executed on Walk 20, 2016, specified that for each Syrian traveller got back to Turkey, one Syrian currently in Turkey who had not endeavoured to enter the EU wrongfully would be resettled in the EU, actually transforming exiles into political and security pawns. Numerous global common freedoms and evacuee privileges associations have contended that the treatment of Syrian exiles by European nations penetrates universally perceived rules, experiencing the same thing, and from the initial migration of Syrians into Turkey by means of the two countries' open boundary, Turkey's continuous 'cordiality' towards the 2.754 million Syrians on its dirt has been heartily lauded. (Mackreath and Sağnıç 2017, P.10)

The issue of Syrians long haul stay is additionally especially petulant, with banter about whether to go for the gold, a few players see adversely as absorption, or harmonization, which is the favored expression of DGMM. Harmonization alludes to a kind of mix wherein the transient gathering holds its social character while residing together as one with the host local area. Before a bombed overthrow in Turkey on July 15, the public authority had conveyed befuddling messages about its expectation to give identity to Syrians dwelling in Turkey. (Mackreath and Sağnıç 2017, P.11)

In any case, adversaries of the decision of Justice and Development Party (AKP) are worried that President Erdogan is endeavoring to lay out the Syrian people group as a devoted supporters for the future another politically charged move and with regards to progressively limited citizenship privileges for Turkish residents during the neighborhood of crisis. Following the bombed endeavor, Syrians have encountered developing frailty on account of their contribution in the inward political emergency. These apprehensions change from being by and by designated in present overthrow viciousness on displaced person encouraging groups of people being

harmful by post-upset cleanses. Besides, considerate society in Turkey is extremely divided, and its fundamental grouping is ambiguous and dependent upon a few understandings. The flood of Syrians into the country has progressively concentrated of a changed range of players, who might be approximately alluded to as common society, yet who's gathering just assists with underlining the imprudence of such a solitary expression. State associations, non-state bunches ready to work along various political philosophical viewpoints, freedoms-based gatherings, philanthropic specialist co-ops, 'religious' gatherings, trade guilds, fortitude gatherings, volunteer projects, Syrian projects, and people are among these entertainers. (Mackreath and Sağnıç 2017, P.10)

The response of civil society to the entry of Syrian migrants into Turkey might be considered as a period of self-reflection for Turkish civil society players. There are also concerns about the role of civil society in a more politically centralized country, as well as attitudes regarding migrant groups. Our research suggests that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that are fewer, less organized, and have less relationships with the state provide more integrated, situation support. Despite similar goals, some members of civil society are nonetheless focused with existing divisions. The study avoids blaming any one actor for all the problems. Instead, one of the most extremely rare cases has been the identification of similarities between various players' methods and comparable solutions to address these concerns. Turkey has reached a point where the integration of Syrians must be openly debated and planned. There is a need to comprehend the role of municipalities, as well as the involvement of various social groups (such as Kurds, Alevities, and Christians) with the Syrian populace. The impact of major differences in aid between areas should be studied as well (Mackreath & Sağnıç 2017, p.70 – 72).

2.3 Turkey's Syrian Refugees Resilience

Facilitating Syrians' access to self-sufficiency while maintaining social cohesion with host communities, and doing so in a tough economic situation, will be a major issue for the Turkish government and its allies for the foreseeable future. Turkey has proved that it has the resources, capacity, and international assistance to successfully respond to the displacement crisis by developing and implementing a comprehensive policy framework to accommodate the world's biggest refugee population. The expression of a strong political desire, supported by significant

fundings, and translated into action through public policies like as the harmonization plan and the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Exit Strategy, is a critical strategy precondition for supporting refugees' economic participation. However, it is equally critical to recognize that they are simply first moves in that direction. Indeed, the plans remain wide, and will require robust coordination structures to promote coordinated programming across government agencies, the UN and other development partners, and the business sector. This will need stressing a four-pronged strategy, in accordance with the ESSN Exit Strategy priorities, and the two developed above on expanding interaction with the private sector and investigating digital livelihoods opportunities Over the last few years, it has been critical to refugees to obtain extra revenue to cover very basic necessities. Nevertheless, given the overall expense of such initiatives as well as the uncertainty surrounding their lengthy viability, access to cash and regular work remains the fundamental barrier to greater cooperation for people and homes affected by the Syrian conflict. Refugees who have yet to find adequate job continue to depend here on Turkish government and civil society, preventing them from completely integrating into their host societies. The recent COVID-19 epidemic has emphasized the vulnerability linked with casual or temporary job prospects, with several refugees and host population experiencing an abrupt loss of income:

First, the major difficulty remains better connecting refugees to the labour market through improved profiling and referrals to unskilled jobs on the one hand, and skill level enhancement on the other. While livelihood partners have constructed substantial programming in recent years, this is far from the case owing to the travel, off the essential scale for refugees to become employed by big Turkish firms Many of Syria's most skilled citizens have fled to Europe. Second, business-support programs must go beyond simply placing refugees in small firms in return for company development assistance and funding Greater integration of structural and infrastructure investments (Kirişci, 2020) How the EU and Turkey Can Encourage Self-Sufficiency 2020 (Interviews with Government Officials, 2019).

Localized efforts are required in various value chains. economic sectors, as well as industrial, manufacturing zones develop cluster effects capable of absorbing both work and fresh information firms, including Syrian firms Agriculture is another example. economic sector in

which structural investment would have a direct impact provide chances for refugees (Kirişci, 2020).

This is especially important for Turkey to maintain its recent development achievements. can get over the middle-income level, particularly as the increased availability of inexpensive labor may reduce organizations' investments in machinery and equipment and impede growth. Productivity. Investing in manufacturing in areas where refugees are present when a labor is available and host communities are less Willingness to work might result in a win-win situation. Several authorities contacted for this research emphasized the importance of this local in Gaziantep, emphasis had already occurred to a significant extent. This altered the country's economic and production structure because of the refugee reaction, to the extent of drawing an in comparison to other domains, foreign actors provide an unusually large amount of assistance and investment. This strategy would necessitate the decentralization and localization of the ESSN Exit Strategy, as well as the empowerment of local governments to spearhead such local development activities, as well as international commitment beyond the present EU FRIT window (Government Officials, 2019).

Third, although the presence of refugees might be viewed as an advantage to spur local development, host communities must also be fairly supported. The general unease of a large portion of the Turkish population about the potential long-term presence of refugees, the accumulating frustration over unemployment issues, and the prevalence of misinformation and misperception all provide fertile ground for tensions to rise on economic issues and support for the government's proactive policy to dwindle. As a result, the overarching policy of the Turkish institute that provide jobs and employees called (ISKUR) and other government entities to distribute benefits equally should be maintained. In order to promote attitudes and tolerance, the quota system, which encourages regular interaction across populations through mixed workplaces, should be used. The flexibility demonstrated in quota enforcement might be extended further by tailoring the quota by province, sector, firm size, or ownership. Because fostering intercommunity trust is a new responsibility for Turkish institutions and the private sector, any accessible evidence on social cohesion and employment programs that the foreign community can give would be a significant asset to this endeavour (UNDP, 2016).


Fourth, the present emphasis on formalization is critical to ensure both good working conditions for refugees, enough income access, and fair competition among job seekers. Recent inspection and employer awareness initiatives, as well as the pragmatic approach of the Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Services, have achieved significant gains in Istanbul that might be replicated abroad. However, one of the key barriers to formalization noted by ISKUR is ESSN recipients' proclivity to combine ESSN benefits with informal income, which corresponds to many businesses' preference for cheaper, informal labour. In this regard, the ESSN Exit Strategy must be supplemented with genuine examination of the best manner to finally halt cash transfer to the least vulnerable section of the ESSN caseload, while the remainder of the population continues to receive payments would continue to rely on outside aid this planning should encompass not just articulating the sequencing of skill training and job matching support in addition to ESSN support, but also how this would work this should therefore be done in tandem with encouraging local development in some regions Other degree programs, most notably the one being piloted by the Ministry of Social Affairs and It took several years of planning for the World Bank to establish a presence in Lebanon. work prior to installation, Identifying the geographical locations of the intended beneficiaries, as well as the value chains and industrial development programs appropriate for these regions, is very important. The future EU FRIT socioeconomic contracts are intended to clarify this. To present, relatively limited information is known on the utilization of the EUR 245-million grant from the EU FRIT to MOFLSS for this purpose, as well as its relationship to other socioeconomic 139 UNDP, ILO, World Bank, and United Nations Peacebuilding, Employment Programs, and Peace, 2016, 140 DGMM Statistics on Temporary Protection, June 2020, support programs, number of children under temporary protection aged 10 to 18. However, because the ESSN Programme and the majority of socioeconomic support will now be delivered outside of the UN and the 3RP coordination framework, considerable investment in strategic planning and coordinating arrangements will be required to generate the necessary synergies. Furthermore, while the Turkish labor market is likely to absorb the bulk of the refugee work force, it should be noted that more than one million

Box 3 – Key Numbers on Refugees’ Livelihoods



3,589,289

Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey



911,106

Syrians refugees active in the labor force



157,000

Estimated Syrian refugee women working




Estimated Syrians working Syrian refugees of working age



800,000

Work permits issued to informally **132,497**



2,100,000

Syrians since 2016



2,000,000

Number of refugees (all nationalities) estimated to be living under the poverty line



Estimated refugee boys working **191,000**



10,000

Estimated businesses employing more than 70,000 people



Estimated businesses established by Syrians more than 70,000 people



1,800,000

Beneficiaries of the ESSN cash transfer programme
 Estimated job opportunities needed to enable the least vulnerable refugees to exit the ESSN programme

Source: (Revel, World Bank and ESSN Program 2020)

individuals will require social assistance beyond the time frame of the current EU FRIT support. The extra issue will be to provide work possibilities for the 640,000 Syrian youngsters who will enter the labour market in the coming years. (UNDP, 2020, <https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27>).

Deepening interaction with the private sector and investigating options for digital livelihood shave the potential to contribute to each of the strands outlined above. Given the magnitude of the challenge, even minor contributions should be leveraged to further release the resilience and potential displayed by Syrian refugees and their host communities. These two ideas are particularly fitted to the problems of the Turkish scenario, since they can provide possibilities for Turkish and Syrian businesses and individuals, therefore relieving labour market pressure. Digital livelihoods are especially promising because they involve autonomous, long-term job-creation dynamics that have the ability to develop both within Turkey to help the most vulnerable migrants and globally by opening up new markets. The COVID-19 pandemic has offered an opportunity to demonstrate not only their relevance and adaptability, but also the readiness and capacity of governments and international partners to actively increase efforts in that area. As a result, the two innovations proposed in this research will serve to further promote Turkey's refugee response as a best practice, as well as contribute to global debates on how to assure more predictable and sustainable responses to displacement, as specified in global compacts.

2.4 Public Perception of Syrian Refugees in Turkey

Inhabitants of Istanbul will generally interface Syrians with both physical and social dangers. There is not kidding dread that Syrians are hurting locals' work open doors, adversely affecting the segment funds to be paid to their high rates of birth, gambling with Turkey's advanced way of life, making it hard for local people to utilize public spaces and administrations, developing degrees of sexual assault against ladies and youngsters, representing a fear-based oppressor danger to the nation, and penetrating the Turkish government. Principle discoveries and Strategy suggestion, even the individuals who support the strict fellowship account, the greater part sees

Syrians as a financial weight and feels that displaced people are dealt with better compared to Turkish nationals (Morgul, Savaskan and Mutlu 2021, p.101)

There are, nevertheless, considerable variances in judgments based on party affiliation. Syrians are perceived as less of a danger by AKP Parti and HDP supporters than by other voter groupings. Republic People's Party (*RPP*) and Good Party (*İYİ Parti*) voters, on the other hand, had higher than normal levels of danger, almost every issue is influenced by perception.

Istanbul occupants have a negative demeanour toward worldwide transients inside their city. The typical inclination for Syrian displaced people was 2.44, 2.42 for Armenian workers, 2.85 for Uzbek outsiders, and 3.31 for African settlers, likewise as per estimations taken with a "feeling thermometer" going from 0 "Extremely pessimistic, cold inclination" to 10 "Exceptionally good, warm inclination". (Kirişci 2014, P.11)

Despite the city's incessant show as a "worldwide city" or a "capital of societies," this information propose to an extremely huge current of xenophobia in Istanbul. The greater part of Istanbul residents is reluctant to shape social bonds with Syrian travellers. Just 21.70 percent of individuals said they would be fine with a Syrian family migrating into their area. Also, the individuals who say they would invite a Syrian evacuee as a neighbour or companion represent just 26.06 percent and 25.48 percent of the example, separately. The HDP allies are the most responsive to associating with Syrian exiles, while the CHP and Good Party (*İYİ Parti*) individuals are the most un-open. Just 35.49 percent concur that Ankara went with the right choice by laying out the entryway strategy for displaced people during the early long stretches of the Syrian nationwide conflict. At the point when we analyse citizen gatherings, we see that AKP Parti, MHP, and HDP electors support this strategy more than Republic People's Party (*RPP*) and Good Party (*İYİ Parti*) electors. Indeed, even among AKP Party supporters, in any case, not exactly half acknowledge the entryway strategy. (Kirişci 2014, P.12)

When inquired, "Considering that the outfitted clash in Syria has not finished, where do you think the most proper spot of home for Syrian right now in Turkey?" the vast majority of our respondents picked one of two choices: "They ought to be resettled in safe zones that will be laid out inside Syrian boundaries" or "They ought to be resettled in evacuee camps that will be

laid out in Turkey." Eminently, simply 18% picked "They ought to be allowed to pick their own place of house," while around 20% picked "They ought to be extradited without respect for their security." When these remarks are separated by party inclination, İYİ Parti opinions, with 63% of them being negative. (Kirişci 2014, P.12)

According to the data, Istanbul residents are reasonably accepting of the social services and help offered to Syrians. Proposals for assisting Syrian refugees in learning Turkish, providing proper schooling for Syrian children, ensuring refugees receive general health screening and immunization services, and offering social aid to Syrian families in need. Disapproval is more popular than approval. Even in the most contentious matter, these findings indicate to a very serious problem a strong xenophobic current despite the city's reputation, recurring representation as a "world", "City" or "Cultural Capital" Only 35.49 percent of people believe think Ankara made the correct decision by putting in place an open In the United States, there is an open-door policy for refugees. Syria's civil war in its early years war Less than 40% of those polled reject social aid the regulation Nonetheless, CHP and İYİ Parti supporters are visible. lower-than-average levels of support for measures in question (Morgul, Savaskan & Mutlu 2021, p.102)

This mission ought to include valuable encounters of outcasts from different age, orientation, instruction, and expert classes to challenge the pattern of depicting Syrians as a solid gathering and to give a more exact depiction of them. Syrians ought to be shown not as reliant casualties of a nationwide conflict, but rather as multi-layered people attempting to keep up with their lives regardless of the annihilation they have persevered, as people with desires like every other person and battling to understand those fantasies. The Transitory Insurance status ought to be changed to incorporate the option to work, and refugees ought not be expected to get an extra consent to work. Existing limitations empower casual work and give a prolific field to work abuse. This unique gap low-wage individuals against penniless exiles, subverting social attachment. Albeit public help for giving work grants to Syrians is currently generally low, this can be expanded by illuminating people in general about the advantages regarding such a regulation. To let the political apprehensions free from individuals who support resistance groups, the most common way of conceding citizenship to outcasts ought to be straightforward,

and the quantity of refugees granted citizenship ought to be imparted to general society consistently. Notwithstanding, given the far and wide resistance to allowing exiles citizenship, moderate measures, for example, residency and work grants ought to be concocted to overcome any barrier among citizenship and brief assurance (Murat 2020, p.214).

2.5 Approaches to Peacebuilding

Ambassadors in Turkey are tireless in their conviction accept that economy is ideal than help. Those Ambassadors make a monetary development, in a perfect world through different cultural cooperation, as an essential piece of peacebuilding, with one negotiator expressing, “Ambassadors don't think peacebuilding could accomplish its objectives assuming there is no financial recuperation and interest of the whole piece of society in the program.” (Sazak, 2015, P.4).

Authorities feel that monetary speculation gives monetary options in contrast to wrongdoing and outrageous philosophies, and that it advances public responsibility for. A significant number of the endeavours considered by Turkish authorities to be peacebuilding tasks are subsidized by Turkish advancement help. Turkey's True Improvement Help (ODA) was among the biggest among rising countries in 2013, totalling 3,307 billion USD. ²⁷ This shows a practically 30% development somewhere in the range of 2010 and 2013, as well as ten times increment from 2002 to 2010. Considering Turkey's investment in a few global endeavours, the ODA reserve conveyed 3,156 billion USD in respective guide. (Gür et al., "Turkish Development...", 8.)

Turkish multilateral commitments added up to 151 million USD in correlation, showing the country's inclination for two-sided support. Turkey has extended its activities into a portion of the world's most vexing questions. Syria, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, and Afghanistan got the most ODA in both 2012 and 2013. While Turkey gives help to non-Muslim countries like Ukraine, Macedonia, and Kenya, the greater part of the State's activities is centred around Muslim larger part nations, a significant number of which are named least evolved or delicate. Instances of Turkey's primary and social peacebuilding methods might be found in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Balkan countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Specialized limit programs, infrastructural projects, and the arrangement of fundamental administrations make up the vast majority of Turkey's underlying peacebuilding drives. This common idea of valuable

development among Turkish state foundations and non-state elements has profound recorded beginnings. Secretly funded altruistic advancement has for the most part focused on the development of designs and framework, as well as the arrangement of administrations like schools, emergency clinics, and mosques, since the Ottoman Domain. (Bikmen 2008, P.232 - 243) Two-sided specialized help added up to 225 million USD in 2013. (Gür et al, "Turkish Development", 22-23)

This includes support for a variety of training programs across the world, such as those for Kosovo's judges and prosecutors and medical training programs with the Somali Ministry of Health. (Ibid: 51, 164.) Infrastructure projects, such as the renovation of governmental buildings or the construction of schools and roads, are widespread in all the nations in which Turkey is involved. (Yıldız & Gür 2013)

Such infrastructural and innovative collaboration projects have all the earmarks of being pointed toward helping fundamental administrations like clinical and legal quality. As per Turkish authorities, such drives straightforwardly help state-working by legitimizing the state's power and making administrations more successful. They are anxious to call attention to, in any case, that their help should be considered to be objective, taking note of, "We can simply give them some specialized skill with no inflexible recipe." All things considered; it is the host country's models that will characterize how they will proceed." (Turkish Ambassador in Vienna and Sazak 2015, P.7) Specialized help and limit building projects are additionally highlights of Turkey's international strategy.

In cultural harmony making the greater part of these drives give preparing and specialized help to help monetary strengthening and appear to be in good shape jogged on the neighbourhood level by means of regions and networks. Turkey's structural and social rebuilding initiatives may be seen in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Balkan nations like as Bosnia - Herzegovina and Kosovo. These are only a couple of instances of nearby drives focusing on monetarily enabling networks. Other social peacebuilding tasks in the instruction region, like providing innovative gear for secondary schools and universities, incorporate specialized help (Türkiye Bursları Grants, 2016)

At last, Turkey's social peacebuilding endeavours are recognized by an attention on intervention and strictly touchy drives. Authorities have underscored the need of intercession, at the between state level, yet additionally at the neighbourhood level, by means of regular exercises and associations with inhabitants. This could go from local area discussion to discussions with administrative specialists about two-sided drives. Turkish specialists accept that intercession and exchange are methods that advance their own expressed public proprietorship thoughts. These ideas may likewise be utilized in the idea of socially and strictly touchy programming. Turkey's way to deal with peacebuilding has advanced throughout the past 10 years, from the essential state-driven security contribution of the 1990s to a more far-reaching worldview that incorporates both state-building and social peace-making. This has been helped by a change in common military power relations starting around 2000, as well as a more extensive perspective on security that considers human requirements. The present peacebuilding tries length from specialized help for legislative administrations to instructive and strict drives. This has been created couple with new international strategy drives that feature both intercession and fortified monetary relations as practical peacebuilding measures that benefit both Turkey and beneficiary nations. Notwithstanding Turkey's veritable aims to advance harmony and solidness in its space and all through the world, Ankara's ability to complete this vision has critical blemishes. An expected 2.7 million Syrian refugees, a resurgence of battle with the Kurdistan Working Party (PKK); is a Kurdistan insurgent political group and armed guerrilla force headquartered in the rugged Kurdistan areas of southeaster Turkey and northern Iraq. The PKK has used guerrilla warfare in the Kurdistan-Turkish conflict since 1984 (with multiple peace agreements during 1993 and 2013–2015). Although the PKK initially aspired a separate Kurdish state, its goals altered in the 1990s to independence and improved Kurdish liberties inside Turkey. As well as the Islamic State, or ISIS, is a terrorist group that arose in 2014 as a branch of al Qaeda. It swiftly seized control of huge swaths of Iraq and Syria, flying its black flag and announcing the establishment of a caliphate and establishing strict Islamic authority. IS infiltration profound into the country's metropolitan places, progressing political unpredictability in the repercussions of the November decisions, and a retreating economy generally present genuine difficulties to Turkey's peacebuilding tasks' supportability. (Shinn 2015 P.17)

Considering Turkey's regarding the Assad system's endurance in Syria, Ankara's acknowledgment of the gravity of the issues it is endeavouring to address all through the world, as well as its impact over the particular gatherings in the countries, gives off an impression of being disintegrating. As such, Turkey's international strategy manner of speaking limit jumble takes steps to drive the country away from "no issues with neighbours" and into the dangerous zone of "no neighbours without issues." (Sassounian 2014)

Several fundamental organizational problems have also prevented the Turkish government from fully fulfilling its potential to improve the quality and breadth of its peacebuilding operations. Coordination issues are the most persistent of these barriers. The problem was first noticed in a 2012 report (Murphy & Sazak 2012).

The shortfall of institutional preparation and interaction understanding inside associations, for example, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (*TİKA*) further influences correspondence and participation between field workplaces and Ankara. In such cases, the quality and viability of the nation programs oftentimes rely upon the person in the field office: assuming the individual allocated to a country office is truly intrigued by the mission, *TİKA* tasks in that country frequently produce more meaningful outcomes for the recipients (In the same place).

This absence of consistency in coordination and reliable use of standards and objectives affects program improvement and checking. There is a bungle between the glory and manner of speaking encompassing Turkey's contribution and the genuine viability of the tasks did. While *TİKA* makes insights on the quantity of members or hardware taking an interest in specialized help programs accessible to general society, further inside and out data on how these projects are picked or their effect isn't made accessible. Before, there have been cases of peacebuilding drives, for example, framework tasks or preparing, being directed without contact with neighbourhood specialists or exploration on other help bunches working in the locale. Notwithstanding these issues, there is the similarly harming issue of supporting abroad exercises. The surge of Syrian displaced people, for instance, has cost the express an expected 8 billion American Dollar (USD) and came about in around 2 billion USD in diverted assets from worldwide exercises (Wood and Sazak 2016, P.4-9).

Critical Turkish assets have been redirected from high-profile endeavours in temperamental countries, for example, Somalia along these lines. Besides, the Turkish lira's unpredictability versus unfamiliar monetary standards, as well as constant political unsteadiness, has negatively affected the monetary soundness expected to support funding for Turkey's peacebuilding programs. The new abdication of Ahmet Davutoglu as Top state leader, who had figured out large numbers of Turkey's new international strategy ideas, adds to the vulnerability over the country's peacebuilding methods' practicality and solidness. (Woods, Auveen, Sazak, and Onur 2015, P.7)

The concepts and legal foundation because of the policy which is called as the open-door policy were first developed in a fragmented and improvised fashion, with an emphasis on humanitarian help and addressing needs. The refugees' fundamental requirements also in October 2011, following the government severed ties with Syria's government, it announced the continuation of Syrian refugees will receive temporary protection. The first parts of this policy appeared in the agreement was signed in March 2012 and included a commitment for this open-door policy, nonrefoulement, and humanitarian aid. It was the catastrophe, and The Prime Ministry founded and operated the Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) with the adoption of the disaster management and emergency strategy in these camps. in the establishment of a disaster and emergency management strategy as of the end of 2016, Turkey has 26 camps, which housed around 250,000 refugees. However, as the number of Syrians grew, the authorities began to let them to live outside of the camps and in metropolitan areas. This decision was a watershed moment in the public's handling the migrant's crisis, those migrants start by pouring across towns, and mainly Istanbul. Due to a lack of planned economy, Syrians relocated anywhere people wished, and by January 2014, the vast majority of these refugees had left the shelters. (Batalla and Tolay, 2018).

In this regard, the government released a thorough rule in 2014, specifying the limits of asylum status and requiring refugees to enroll in order to profit of public healthcare as well as other essential services.

2.6 Protection Motivation Theory:

Protection Motivation Theory is one model that explains why people engage in unhealthy practices and offers suggestions for changing those behaviors. It is educational and motivational. Protection Motivation Theory original purpose was to help explain individual human responses to fear appeals, and it was applied in Germany by the (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Institute for International and Security Affairs) as a response for the long-term asylum of Syrian refugees. People defend themselves based on two variables, according to the protection motivation theory: risk appraisal and coping appraisal. Risk evaluation assesses the severity of the issue, whereas coping appraisal explores how one responds to the circumstance. Security assessment includes the perceived severity of a risky event as well as the perceived likelihood of occurrence, or vulnerability. Perceived response efficacy, or an individual's anticipation that taking the recommended action will eliminate the danger, and perceived self-efficacy, or belief in one's capacity to carry out the recommended courses of action effectively, are components of coping evaluation. (Hoffman and Samuk 2016, P.5)

The Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services (MOFLSS) and its Social Service Centers, in collaboration with local authorities, continue to play an important role in providing protection-oriented services and connecting people to other service providers. Provincial Government departments of Migration Management are taking the lead in organizing the local response in several provinces. Furthermore, Provincial Directorates of Family, Labor, and Social Services (PDOFLSS) are becoming more involved in directing the protection response, working with civil society groups and other stakeholders, and enabling service provider referrals. (Hoffman 2016, P.6)

Moreover, “Protection Motivational theory” implementation process goes under the following principles:

1. Assistance and service delivery through national and local institutions
2. Undertake outreach activities to raise awareness and connect the people in need to available services

3. Strengthen referrals between service providers and support the necessary institutional capacity to follow up on referrals
4. Provide training (for example, language, vocational and skills training) only with a clear pathway and link to self-reliance and harmonization (access to job market, access to higher education, social engagement, and participation)
5. Support provided by partners will consider other actors providing support to the refugee response of Turkey to ensure complementarity in the response.

According to the “Protection Motivation Theory” which is recommended to maintain a peaceful environment between Syrian refugees and Turks, including Turkey's protection, inspection, service delivery, collaboration, social cohesion, economics, and activism. The aim of the “Protection Motivation Theory” is to make the Turkish society interact with Syrian refugees especially the children once and help them to have the ability to go back to their origin country in the future in the shape of awareness campaigns and social seminars, for example those awareness's could be done in the near future where the targeting age group of Syrian refugees is the children's aged between (5 -14), then according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2022 there is 100,000 Syrian children between 5 -14 age in Turkey, if we divided them per 1 years which means 12 months, then $(100,000 \text{ children} / 12 \text{ months} = 8,333 \text{ Children} / \text{month})$, then divided them per number of weeks in the months $(8,333 \text{ children} / 4 \text{ weeks} = 2,083 \text{ children})$, then those children divided them per the number of cities in Turkey where they exist $(2083 \text{ children} / 11 \text{ cities} = 189 \text{ children} / \text{city})$. Finally, with the help of the international humanitarian organizations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the Turkish Government. 189 children of Syrian refugees living in Turkish cities (Istanbul, Gaziantep, Hatay, Sanliurfa, Adana, Mersin, Bursa, Izmir, Konya, Ankara, and Diger) can get the awareness in a day every week within one year. So a survey should be taken into consideration the opinion of the Turkish community regarding their agreement with the working on this theory within the future.

CHAPTER THREE

3 REFUGEES PRESENCE IN ISTANBUL TERRETORIES

3.1 Governmental Policies Toward Syrian Refugees

3.1.1 The concepts and legal foundation of the policy:

which is known as the entryway strategy, was first evolved in a divided and ad libbed style, with an accentuation on philanthropic assistance and tending to need. The exiles' principal necessities were likewise in October 2011, following the public authority's disavowed Syrian government, it declared the continuation of Syrian refugees would get impermanent assurance. The initial segments of this approach showed up in the arrangement that was endorsed in Walk 2012 and incorporated a guarantee to this entryway strategy, nonrefoulement. In any case, as the quantity of Syrians developed, the specialists started to allow them to live beyond the camps and in metropolitan regions. This choice was a turning point in the public authority's treatment of the exile emergency, as travelers filled towns all around Turkey, particularly Istanbul. Because of an absence of an arranged economy, Syrians settled any place they satisfied, and by mid-2014, the heft of these exiles was residing outside the camps (Batalla and Tolay, 2018).

In such manner, the public authority delivered an intensive rule in October 2014, determining the details of transitory insurance and forcing the need that refugees be enlisted to profit from the public wellbeing and other public administrations (Gazete, 2014)

Be that as it may, the displaced person status regulation keeps Syrians from getting citizenship and from applying for individual evacuee status. Thus, the Turkish government offers "uncommon citizenship" to Syrians who are briefly secured. However, this methodology is politically disagreeable, the public authority might pass regulation that would clear the way for Syrian refugees to acquire citizenship as a drawn out arrangement. The situation changed indeed after 2014, with the appearance of ISIS and the commitment of Russia and Iran in the interest of Damascus' administration, compounding the helpful emergency. These enhancements

brought about a critical expansion in the quantity of Syrian outcasts in Turkey, which has a huge populace of Syrian refugees. Because of the European movement emergency, in 2015 and 2016, just about 1,000,000 Syrian and different refugees entered the EU through Turkey, as well as different courses. Subsequently, the "EU-Turkey Proclamation" was given it in Spring of 2016, It prompted the EU giving monetary guide to Turkey, which in the long run added up to 6 billion euros to subsidize programs for Syrian refugees in return for Turkey executing those means to forestall one more movement into Europe (European Commission, 2015) (European Advice, 2016).

The EU likewise consented to move one Syrian evacuee for each unlawful outsider Turkey gets back to the EU, to stretch out visa progression to Turkish nationals, and to start Turkey's deferred EU confirmation process. It likewise brought about the groundwork of the Office for Outcasts in Turkey (FRIT), which upholds exercises going from the development of new schools to the reinforcing of the insurance limit of an assortment of partners in Turkey, as well as basic money support projects, for example, the Crisis Social Safety Net (ESSN) and Contingent Money Move for Instruction (CCTE). (European Commission ESSN, 2021) (European Commission CCTE, 2021).

Notwithstanding these projects that address essential necessities, there is a developing acknowledgment of the need for programs that empower displaced people to gain admittance to real livelihoods. The European Commission Office for Outcasts in Turkey (FRIT revised's) essential idea proclamation requested programs "with an accentuation on offering supported financial help and vocation prospects inside Turkey" (European Commission Office for refugees in Turkey, 2018). Essentially, the public authority took on the "Leave Procedure from the ESSN" in 2018, perceiving that Syrians with Impermanent Safeguarded Status are more gotten comfortable Turkey and calling for changes to permit refugees to diminish their contribution with social help "by supporting their variation to the work market" in Turkey. On January 15, 2016, the Turkish government instituted regulation permitting Syrians with transitory security to work in the conventional area, dependent upon business sponsorship. This was a huge advance forward in upgrading outcasts' admittance to jobs. Despite the fact that around 3.7 million Syrians are presently getting transitory insurance in Turkey, just 63,789 Syrians had

been granted work licenses starting around 2019. The latest year for which openly available information is accessible. Moreover, it is obscure the number of the around 95,000 Syrians with residency status in Turkey ought to be remembered.

3.1.2 EU Deal with Turkey:

As is notable, the European "emergency" of Syrian transients started distinctly in 2014, when the exiles showed up in Europe. Following 2015, the EU's endeavours were focused on stopping the displaced person flood and laying out huge and broad participation game plans. Thus, they wanted to arrive at an arrangement in view of monetary help with the countries in the Mediterranean bowl facilitating exiles, basically Turkey. The "Turkey-EU Arrangement," struck by Turkey and the EU on Walk 18, 2016, was the main move in the EU's "externalism" plan beginning around 2016. The arrangement's similarity with worldwide and EU regulation, the kind of arrangement it proposes, and its guarantees and achievements have all been quarrelsome. In addition, the arrangement depends on the goal of keeping transients from entering the EU through Turkey in return for monetary help from the EU is assisting refugees in Turkey.. Hence, arrangements embraced state for "agreement of the EU part states," in which the EU maintains a strategic distance from any institutional responsibility. In spite of the fact that there are sure political commitments in the arrangement, for instance: visa progression, restoring participation conversations, monetary help has been the main part of the interaction. One more significant precept of the understanding that Turkey assigned "protected third country for exiles" by UN structure of Turkey's restoration accord. Such a manner, when the exchange was finished and since going also on 4th of October, 2016 EU, has drawn a qualification between people who travel through the EU and the individuals who don't, "Syrians" as well as "non-Syrians" in Turkey. This "1 to 1 rule" executed for those migrants, under which Syrians who travelled to the EU, by means of Turkiye may be gotten back to Turkey. (EU Facilities for Refugees in Turkey 2018, P.7)

Be that as it may, for Syrian again back to Turkey, one Syrian from Turkey who meets the UN Delicacy Models would indeed be relocated to EU, with a cap of 70,000 resettled outcasts each year. Be that as it may, this strategy fizzled attributable to contrasts over global regulation consistence, share issues among EU part states, and execution challenges. Thus, all extra shelter

searchers found traveling to the Greek islands from Turkey will be reviewed, as Turkey is viewed as the protected third country under the readmission arrangement. As different objectives of the understanding, for example, visa progression and the re-foundation of Turkey-EU relations, slipped delayed, the title was modified to (Monetary Help Program for Displaced people in Turkey). Accordingly, the EU as an element isn't limited by any responsibilities, and it has formulated an extremely simple answer for a hugely convoluted issue: Turkey was entrusted with shielding the EU from displaced people. As such, the EU would confine refugees in Turkey in return for a monetary guide bundle from the EU. Subsequently, Europe has diminished its costs to an absolute minimum, while additionally guaranteeing that Turkey faces the political, security, and social perils that could follow from an enormous exile inflow. The main lawful reason for the Turkey-EU Understanding is that Turkey has been considered a solid third country for outcasts, and the readmission arrangement has been used in this unique circumstance. Then again, Turkey which has a geological limitation under the Geneva Show and can't give evacuee status to non-European transients, doesn't meet this status as far as outcast right, likewise there are a few extra complaints and purposes behind this dilemma. The general spending plan facilitated with the Monetary Help Program is 6 billion EUR (three billion EUR for the 2016-2017 financial year and three billion EUR for the 2018-2019 financial year). The underlying tranche included 1 billion EUR from the EU spending plan and 2 billion EUR from the Part States (European Gathering, 2016). The subsequent tranche included 2 billion EUR from the EU financial plan and 1 billion EUR from the Part States. In this specific circumstance, the program centres around six fundamental regions: helpful help, relocation control, wellbeing, civil framework, and financial help. Be that as it may, before execution, the program was endorsed, with its entire rainy-day account of 3 billion EUR for 2016-2017 focused on 72 activities with quantifiable results. As per progress, 2 billion EUR has previously been paid, and the excess will be paid until mid-2021, when the tasks remembered for the Monetary Help Program are finished (Appointment of the European Association in Turkey, 2020). The arrangement among Turkey and the EU seems to have stopped the movement of refugees into Europe. By the by, it ought to be noticed that people who guarantee this is an exceptionally "fruitful" exchange don't think about the other outer conditions. It is essential to recollect that the essential driver of the displaced person flood is Instead of the Turkey-EU Understanding,

the moving elements in Syria are to blame. Russia, Iran, and China set populace strategies. Because of the moving international climate, Turkey, ISIS, and Kurdish groups have discouraged the progression of new exiles. The greater part of the Syrians in Turkey who were intending to venture out to Europe had proactively done as such. After 2017, the Syrian populace in Turkey developed almost altogether as a result of births. In the interim, the obstructing of the Balkan course, which can be portrayed as a post-present day push back training more severe Mediterranean insurance, and the desperate circumstances wherein the people who came to the Greek islands yet couldn't travel to Europe decreased the interest in change to Europe. Notwithstanding, it ought not be disregarded that the displaced person game plan has brought about various horrible political occasions in Turkey, as well as increased "Against European" and "Hostile to Western" tendencies among the Turkish public. For this situation, a captivating dynamic has emerged among Turkey and the EU, albeit the EU has remotely forced everything going on, Turkey has medium to communicate it in its inner and global approaches. Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the EU or its part states assume a critical part to the EU's advantage by giving monetary guide to Turkey to haven searchers. Nonetheless, it is likewise significant for Turkey. The continuation of this monetary guide, which represents a large portion of the monetary weight associated with bearing the cost of safe haven to refuge searchers. Schooling, wellbeing, lodging, insurance, limit advancement, and different administrations are urgent in Turkey for both Turkey and the exiles. Thus, it is important that these assets, which were planned for a considerable length of time as 3 in addition to 3 billion be kept up with. In such manner, the EU as an establishment is no doubt the recipient. In the interim, certain EU Individuals, most remarkably Germany, are expected with the monetary help program. (International Crises Group 2018, P.11)

In any case, the evacuee status regulation keeps Syrians from getting citizenship and from applying for individual exile status. Accordingly, the Turkish government offers "excellent citizenship" to Syrians who are briefly safeguarded. However, this procedure is politically combative, the public authority might pass regulation that would clear the way for Syrian displaced people to acquire citizenship as a drawn-out arrangement. The situation changed by and by after 2014, with the approach of ISIS and the commitment of Russia and Iran for the

benefit of Damascus' administration, compounding the compassionate emergency. These upgrades brought about a critical expansion in the quantity of Syrian displaced people in Turkey, which has a huge populace of Syrian outcasts. Because of the European relocation emergency, in 2015 and 2016, just about 1,000,000 Syrian and different displaced people entered the EU through Turkey, as well as different courses. Therefore, the "EU-Turkey Proclamation" was given it in Spring of 2016, it prompted the EU giving monetary guide to Turkey, which in the end added up to 6 billion euros to finance programs for Syrian refugees in return for Turkey executing those means to forestall one more movement into Europe (European Commission, 2015) (European Advice, 2016). The EU additionally consented to move one Syrian exile for each unlawful foreigner Turkey gets back to the EU, to stretch out visa advancement to Turkish nationals, and to start Turkey's deferred EU confirmation process. It likewise brought about the groundwork of the Office for Outcasts in Turkey (FRIT), which upholds exercises going from the development of new schools to the reinforcing of the insurance limit of an assortment of partners in Turkey, as well as basic money support projects, for example, the Crisis Social Wellbeing Net (ESSN) and Contingent Money Move for Training (CCTE). (European Commission ESSN, 2021) (European Commission CCTE, 2021).

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resuscitating enrolment conversations, monetary help has been the main part of the interaction. One more significant principle of the arrangement is that Turkey has been assigned as a "protected third country (International Crises Group 2018, P.18)

For every Syrian got back to Turkey, one Syrian from Turkey who meets the UN Delicacy Rules would be resettled in the EU, with a cap of 70,000 resettled outcasts each year. Nonetheless, this strategy neglected to owe to contrasts in worldwide regulation consistence, quantity issues among EU part states, and execution challenges. Therefore, all extra refuge searchers found traveling to the Greek islands from Turkey will be reviewed, as Turkey is viewed as the protected third country under the readmission understanding. As different objectives of the arrangement, for example, visa advancement and the re-foundation of Turkey-EU relations, slipped delayed, the title was changed to (Monetary Help Program for Displaced people in Turkey). Subsequently, the EU as an element isn't limited by any responsibilities, and it has formulated an extremely simple answer for a colossally convoluted issue: Turkey was entrusted with safeguarding the EU from exiles. All in all, the EU would confine displaced people in Turkey in return for a monetary guide bundle from the EU. Accordingly, Europe has decreased its costs to an absolute minimum, while additionally guaranteeing that Turkey faces the political, security, and social perils that could follow from a huge evacuee inflow. The main legitimate reason for the Turkey-EU Arrangement is that Turkey has been considered a solid third country for outcasts, and the readmission understanding has been used in this specific situation. Then again, Turkey which has a geological limitation under the Geneva Show and can't give outcast status to non-European transients doesn't meet this status as far as evacuee freedoms, likewise there are a few extra complaints and explanations behind this situation. The general spending plan composed with the Monetary Help Program is 6 billion EUR (three billion EUR for the 2016-2017 financial year and three billion EUR for the 2018-2019 financial year). The underlying tranche included 1 billion EUR from the EU financial plan and 2 billion EUR from the Part States (European Gathering, 2016).

The subsequent tranche included 2 billion EUR from the EU financial plan and 1 billion EUR from the Part States. In this specific situation, the program centers around six fundamental regions: compassionate help, movement control, wellbeing, civil foundation, and financial help.

In any case, before execution, the program was endorsed, with its entire just-in-case account of 3 billion EUR for 2016-2017 focused on 72 activities with quantifiable results. As per progress, 2 billion EUR has proactively been paid, and the excess will be paid until mid-2021 when the ventures remembered for the Monetary Help Program are finished. The understanding among Turkey and the EU seems to have ended the movement of exiles into Europe. By the by, it ought to be noticed that people who guarantee this is a profoundly "fruitful" exchange don't think about the other outside conditions. It is vital to recall that the essential driver of the outcast flood is as opposed to the Turkey-EU Understanding, the moving elements in Syria are to blame. Russia, Iran, and China set populace approaches. Because of the moving international climate, Turkey, ISIS, and Kurdish groups have blocked the progression of new exiles. The vast majority of the Syrians in Turkey who were intending to go to Europe had previously done as such. After 2017, the Syrian populace in Turkey developed almost altogether due to births. In the interim, the impeding of the Balkan course, which can be depicted as a post-present day push back training of more severe Mediterranean insurance, and the critical circumstances where the people who came to the Greek islands however couldn't travel to Europe decreased the interest in progress to Europe. Notwithstanding, it ought not be disregarded that the exile plan has brought about various negative political occasions in Turkey, as well as elevated "Hostile to European" and "Against Western" tendencies among the Turkish public. For this situation, a charming dynamic has emerged among Turkey and the EU, albeit the EU has remotely forced the present circumstance, Turkey has medium to communicate it in its inner and global arrangements. Beyond question, the EU or its part states assume a huge part to the EU's advantage by giving monetary guide to Turkey to haven searchers. In any case, it is likewise significant for Turkey. The continuation of this monetary guide represents the majority of the monetary weight associated with bearing the cost of safe haven to refuge searchers. Schooling, wellbeing, lodging, assurance, limit improvement, and different administrations are urgent in Turkey for both Turkey and the displaced people.

Therefore, it is important that these assets, which were planned for a considerable length of time as 3 in addition to 3 billion be kept up with. In such manner, the EU as a foundation is likely the recipient. In the interim, certain EU Individuals, most strikingly Germany, are expected with the

monetary help program. In any case, for every Syrian got back to Turkey, one Syrian from Turkey who meets the UN Delicacy Standards would be resettled in the EU, with a cap of 70,000 resettled refugees each year. Nonetheless, this strategy neglected to owe to contrasts in global regulation consistence, share issues among EU part states, and execution challenges. Therefore, all extra refuge searchers found traveling to the Greek islands from Turkey will be reviewed, as Turkey is viewed as the protected third country under the readmission arrangement. As different objectives of the understanding, for example, visa advancement and the re-foundation of Turkey-EU relations, slipped delayed, the title was modified to (Monetary Help Program for Displaced people in Turkey). Thus, the EU as an element isn't limited by any responsibilities, and it has concocted an extremely simple answer for a colossally convoluted issue: Turkey was entrusted with shielding the EU from displaced people. At the end of the day, the EU would confine displaced people in Turkey in return for a monetary guide bundle from the EU. Accordingly, Europe has diminished its costs to an absolute minimum, while likewise guaranteeing that Turkey faces the political, security, and social perils that could follow from a huge exile inflow. The main lawful reason for the Turkey-EU Arrangement is that Turkey has been considered a protected third country for displaced people, and the readmission understanding has been used in this specific situation. Then again, Turkey which has a geological limitation under the Geneva Show and can't give displaced person status to non-European travellers doesn't meet this status as far as outcast privileges, likewise there are a few extra complaints and explanations behind this quandary. The general spending plan composed with the Monetary Help Program is 6 billion EUR (three billion EUR for the 2016-2017 financial year and three billion EUR for the 2018-2019 monetary year).

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and the leftover will be paid until mid-2021 when the tasks remembered for the Monetary Help Program are finished (Designation of the European Association in Turkey, 2020).


The understanding among Turkey and the EU seems to have stopped the relocation of outcasts into Europe. By and by, it ought to be noticed that people who guarantee this is an exceptionally "fruitful" exchange don't think about the other outside conditions. It is essential to recollect that the essential driver of the displaced person flood is Instead of the Turkey-EU Understanding, the moving elements in Syria are to blame. Russia, Iran, and China set populace strategies. Because of the moving international climate, Turkey, ISIS, and Kurdish groups have deterred the progression of new outcasts. The vast majority of the Syrians in Turkey who were intending to head out to Europe had previously done as such. After 2017, the Syrian populace in Turkey developed almost altogether in view of births. In the meantime, the impeding of the Balkan course, which can be portrayed as a post-present day push back training of more rigid Mediterranean security, and the critical circumstances where the people who came to the Greek islands yet couldn't travel to Europe diminished the interest in progress to Europe. Notwithstanding, it ought not be disregarded that the displaced person game plan has brought about various horrible political occasions in Turkey, as well as increased "Against European" and "Hostile to Western" tendencies among the Turkish public. For this situation, a captivating dynamic has emerged among Turkey and the EU, albeit the EU has remotely forced the present circumstance, Turkey has medium to communicate it in its inside and worldwide arrangements. For certain, the EU or its part states assume a critical part to the EU's advantage by giving monetary guide to Turkey to refuge searchers.

Nonetheless, it is additionally significant for Turkey. The continuation of this monetary guide represents the greater part of the monetary weight associated with bearing the cost of safe haven to shelter searchers. Training, wellbeing, lodging, assurance, limit advancement, and different administrations are pivotal in Turkey for both Turkey and the displaced people. Accordingly, it is important that these assets, which were planned for quite some time as 3 in addition to 3 billion be kept up with. In such manner, the EU as an establishment is undoubtedly the recipient. In the meantime, certain EU Individuals, most prominently Germany, are expected with the monetary help program. (Designation of the European Association in Turkey, 2020).

As of April 2022, there were around 3,761,267 Syrians chasing "impermanent security" in Turkey. Moreover, starting around 2011 Turkey has been exposed to a huge deluge of turncoats from adjoining countries, especially Afghanistan and Iraq. The Unified Countries High Commission for Outcasts (UNHCR) announced 367,000 non-Syrian shelter petitioners in September 2018. (DGMM) assessed the general number of individuals who applied for worldwide assurance somewhere in the range of 2010 and 2018 at 478,309. This implies that the quantity of individuals under global insurance in Turkey has expanded from 58,018 out of 2011 to now when just the people who are lawfully enrolled are counted. These evaluations, which outperform 5.02 percent of Turkey's populace, infer that Turkey's "open entryway strategy" for Syrians has without a doubt been reached out to other shelter candidates also. Moreover, it is perceived that "casualness" is a main pressing issue, especially among non-Syrian shelter candidates. Despite the fact that Turkey accepted stopped its "open entryway strategy" in 2016 and has since raised a mass of in excess of 900 kilometres along its Syrian, Iraqi, and Iranian boundaries to battle psychological oppression and limit sporadic relocation, passage leave exercises across Turkish lines proceed. In spite of the wall, this situation prompts extreme defects in Turkey's boundary security. In any case, the evacuee status regulation keeps Syrians from getting citizenship and from applying for individual displaced person status. Subsequently, the Turkish government offers "outstanding citizenship" to Syrians who are briefly safeguarded. However, this system is politically disagreeable, the public authority might pass regulation that would clear the way for Syrian refugees to get citizenship as a drawn-out arrangement. The situation changed by and by after 2014, with the appearance of ISIS and the commitment of Russia and Iran in the interest of Damascus' administration, intensifying the helpful emergency. These enhancements brought about a huge expansion in the quantity of Syrian outcasts in Turkey, which has an enormous populace of Syrian exiles. Because of the European movement emergency, in 2015 and 2016, just about 1,000,000 Syrian and different exiles entered the EU through Turkey, as well as different courses. Subsequently, the "EU-Turkey Proclamation" was given in Spring of 2016, it prompted the EU giving monetary guide to Turkey, which in the long run added up to 6 billion euros to subsidize programs for Syrian exiles in return for Turkey executing those means to forestall one more relocation into Europe

(European Commission, 2015) (European Chamber, 2016). The EU additionally consented to move one Syrian evacuee for each unlawful migrant Turkey gets back to the EU, stretch out visa progression to Turkish nationals, and start Turkey's deferred EU affirmation process. It likewise brought about the underpinning of the Office for Displaced people in Turkey (FRIT), which upholds exercises going from the development of new schools to the reinforcing of the insurance limit of an assortment of partners in Turkey, as well as basic money support projects, for example, the Crisis Social Wellbeing Net (ESSN) and Contingent Money Move for Training (CCTE). (European Commission ESSN, 2021) (European Commission CCTE, 2021).

As is notable, the European "emergency" of Syrian transients started uniquely in 2014, when the exiles showed up in Europe. In 2015, the EU's endeavours were focused on stopping the exile flood and laying out critical and broad participation courses of action. Thus, they wanted to arrive at an understanding in view of monetary help with the countries in the Mediterranean bowl facilitating refugees, for the most part Turkey. The "Turkey-EU Arrangement," struck by Turkey and the EU on Walk 18, 2016, was the main move in the EU's "externalism" plan beginning around 2016. The arrangement's similarity with global and EU regulation, the kind of arrangement it proposes, and its guarantees and achievements have all been quarrelsome. Besides, the arrangement depends on the target of keeping transients from entering the EU through Turkey in return for monetary help from the EU for exiles in Turkey. Accordingly, the arrangement has embraced the state of an "agreement of the EU part states," in which the EU stays away from any institutional responsibility. Even though there are sure political commitments in the understanding, for instance, visa progression, resuscitating participation conversations, monetary help has been the main part of the cycle. One more significant principle of the arrangement is that Turkey has been assigned as a "protected third country for outcasts" by the UN system of Turkey's readmission accord. In such manner, when the exchange was finished and since going into force on April 4, 2016, the EU has drawn a qualification between people who travel through the EU and the individuals who don't, as "Syrians" and "non-Syrians" in Turkey. The "1 to 1 rule" was carried out for Syrians, under which Syrians who travelled to the EU through Turkey would be gotten back to Turkey. (International Crises Group 2018, P.14)



DISTRIBUTION OF SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION BY TOP 10 PROVINCES

Figure 5 T.R. Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management Distribution of Syrians under Temporary protection by year

Source: T.R. Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, 2022

<https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>

DISTRIBUTION OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN THE SCOPE OF TEMPORARY PROTECTION BY PROVINCE

NO	PROVINCE	REGISTERED	POPULATION	TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE LIVING IN THE CITY	RATE OF THE NUMBER REGISTERED SYRIANS TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE LIVING IN THE CITY	NO	PROVINCE	REGISTERED	POPULATION	TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE LIVING IN THE CITY	RATE OF THE NUMBER REGISTERED SYRIANS TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE LIVING IN THE CITY
1	ADANA	254.593	2.263.373	2.519.966	10,18%	42	KAHRAMANMARAŞ	96.177	1.171.298	1.267.475	7,59%
2	ADIYAMAN	23.286	632.148	655.434	3,55%	43	KARABÜK	1.765	249.287	251.052	0,70%
3	AFYONKARAHİSAR	12.591	744.179	756.770	1,66%	44	KARAMAN	826	258.838	259.664	0,32%
4	AĞRI	1.290	524.644	525.934	0,25%	45	KARS	189	281.077	281.266	0,07%
5	AKSARAY	4.258	429.069	433.327	0,98%	46	KASTAMONU	2.681	375.592	378.273	0,71%
6	AMASYA	1.455	335.331	336.786	0,43%	47	KAYSERİ	83.635	1.434.357	1.517.992	5,51%
7	ANKARA	100.433	5.747.325	5.847.758	1,72%	48	KIRIKALE	1.969	275.968	277.937	0,71%
8	ANTALYA	4.248	2.619.832	2.624.080	0,16%	49	KIRKLARELİ	1.039	366.363	367.402	0,28%
9	ARDAHAN	124	94.932	95.056	0,13%	50	KİRŞEHİR	2.060	242.944	245.004	0,84%
10	ARTVİN	71	169.543	169.614	0,04%	51	KİLİS	109.087	145.826	254.913	42,79%
11	AYDIN	8.482	1.134.031	1.142.513	0,74%	52	KOCAELİ	56.643	2.033.441	2.090.084	2,71%
12	BALIKESİR	5.056	1.250.610	1.255.666	0,40%	53	KONYA	123.734	2.277.017	2.400.751	5,15%
13	BARTIN	571	201.711	202.282	0,28%	54	KÜTAHYA	2.010	578.640	580.650	0,35%
14	BATMAN	16.035	626.319	642.354	2,50%	55	MALATYA	32.331	808.692	841.023	3,84%
15	BAYBURT	171	85.042	85.213	0,20%	56	MANİSA	14.231	1.456.626	1.470.857	0,97%
16	BİLEÇK	656	228.334	228.990	0,29%	57	MARDİN	91.872	862.757	954.629	9,62%
17	BİNGÖL	1.179	283.112	284.291	0,42%	58	MERSİN	243.411	1.891.145	2.134.556	11,40%
18	BITLİS	1.137	352.277	353.414	0,32%	59	MUĞLA	11.773	1.021.141	1.032.914	1,14%
19	BOLU	4.496	320.014	324.510	1,39%	60	MUŞ	1.713	405.228	406.941	0,42%
20	BURDUR	9.175	273.716	282.891	3,24%	61	NEVŞEHİR	13.867	308.003	321.870	4,31%
21	BURSA	184.560	3.147.818	3.332.378	5,54%	62	NİĞDE	7.150	363.725	370.875	1,93%
22	ÇANAKKALE	5.098	557.276	562.374	0,91%	63	ORDU	1.169	760.872	762.041	0,15%
23	ÇANKIRI	810	196.515	197.325	0,41%	64	OSMANİYE	42.607	553.012	595.619	7,15%
24	ÇORUM	3.532	526.282	529.814	0,67%	65	RİZE	1.324	345.662	346.986	0,38%
25	DENİZLİ	14.093	1.051.056	1.065.149	1,32%	66	SAKARYA	15.800	1.060.876	1.076.676	1,47%
26	DIYARBAKIR	24.511	1.791.373	1.815.884	1,35%	67	SAMSUN	10.248	1.371.274	1.381.522	0,74%
27	DÜZCE	1.686	400.976	402.662	0,42%	68	SİİRT	4.747	331.980	336.727	1,41%
28	EDİRNE	1.091	412.115	413.206	0,26%	69	SİNOP	464	218.408	218.872	0,21%
29	ELAZIĞ	13.230	588.088	601.318	2,20%	70	SİVAS	3.648	636.121	639.769	0,57%
30	ERZİNCAN	278	237.351	237.629	0,12%	71	ŞANLIURFA	427.191	2.143.020	2.570.211	16,62%
31	ERZURUM	1.183	756.893	758.076	0,16%	72	ŞİRİNAK	14.904	546.589	561.493	2,65%
32	ESKİŞEHİR	6.477	898.369	904.846	0,72%	73	TEKİRDAĞ	12.610	1.113.400	1.126.010	1,12%
33	GAZİANTEP	463.387	2.130.432	2.593.819	17,87%	74	TOKAT	1.218	602.567	603.785	0,20%
34	GİRESUN	464	450.154	450.618	0,10%	75	TRABZON	3.681	816.684	820.365	0,45%
35	GÜMÜŞHANE	250	150.119	150.369	0,17%	76	TUNCELİ	74	83.645	83.719	0,09%
36	HAKKARİ	5.093	278.218	283.311	1,80%	77	UŞAK	3.290	373.183	376.473	0,87%
37	HATAY	430.639	1.670.712	2.101.351	20,49%	78	VAN	2.170	1.141.015	1.143.185	0,19%
38	İĞDIR	82	203.159	203.241	0,04%	79	YALOVA	3.869	291.001	294.870	1,31%
39	ISPARTA	8.253	445.678	453.931	1,82%	80	YOZGAT	5.545	418.500	424.045	1,31%
40	İSTANBUL	544.296	15.840.900	16.385.196	3,32%	81	ZONGULDAK	721	589.684	590.405	0,12%
41	İZMİR	149.889	4.425.789	4.575.678	3,28%						

Figure 6 Distribution of Syrians Under Temporary Protection by Province

Source: T.R. Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, 2022

(<https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>)

Since Turkey's topographical hold under the Geneva Show limits the granting of displaced person status to non-European haven searchers, most Syrian exiles in Turkey are conceded brief assurance. Besides, people who left enormously inferable from the conflict to an adjoining country are expected to return home after the conflict is finished. In spite of the fact that they are regularly alluded to as outcasts or refuge searchers, Syrians in Turkey might be isolated into three kinds. As is notable, the European "emergency" of Syrian travellers started distinctly in 2014, when the refugees showed up in Europe. In 2015, the EU's endeavours were focused on stopping the exile flood and laying out huge and broad collaboration courses of action. Therefore, they intended to arrive at an arrangement in light of monetary help with the countries in the Mediterranean bowl facilitating exiles, for the most part Turkey. The "Turkey-EU Arrangement," struck by Turkey and the EU on Walk 18, 2016, was the main move in the EU's "externalism" plan starting around 2016. The arrangement's congruity with worldwide and EU regulation, the kind of arrangement it proposes, and its guarantees and achievements have all been antagonistic. In addition, the understanding depends on the goal of keeping travellers from entering the EU through Turkey in return for monetary help from the EU for displaced people in Turkey. Consequently, the arrangement has embraced the state of an "agreement of the EU part states," in which the EU maintains a strategic distance from minimal organizational accountability. Despite the fact that agreement has some political obligations, for instance, visa progression, resuscitating enrolment conversations, monetary help has been the main part of the interaction. One more significant precept of the arrangement is the fact that Turkey is already assigned as "protected third country for exiles" by UN system by Turkey's restoration accord. In such manner, when the exchange was finished and since going into force on April 4, 2016, the EU has drawn a differentiation between people who travel through EU and individuals who don't, as "Syrians" and "non-Syrians" in Turkey. The "1 to 1 rule" was executed for Syrians, under which Syrians who travelled to the EU by means of Turkey would be gotten back to Syria. The first and biggest class comprises of people who looked for refuge in Turkey after April 2011 and were allowed transitory security status by the DGMM in the wake of giving their "biometric" data, with an absolute in April 2022. The subsequent classification comprises of 99,642 persons that showed up in Turkey, preceding 2011 and are remaining with a "home license." This third classification comprises of roughly 50,000 Syrians who showed up in

Turkey before to 2011 yet have not yet been enlisted. (ERTUNÇ, KÜÇÜKÇAVUŞ, ALP, APİŞ, and HAZNECİ 2018, P.32)

3.2 Refugees Presence Impact on Turkish Sectors

3.2.1 Refugees Impact on Social Stability

As per information from the Turkish Coast Watchman Order on unpredictable movement via ocean, a sum of 176,758 sporadic travelers were caught somewhere in the range of 2011 and 2017, with Syrians representing 62% of them (110,011). As of August 1, the quantity of undocumented Syrian travelers endeavoring the ocean course was 47 out of 2011, 347 of every 2012, 3,101 out of 2013, 8,418 out of 2014, 68,711 out of 2015, 22,988 out of 2016, and 6,399 out of 2017. Notwithstanding the continuous discussion, it is obvious that people escaping viciousness and passing keep on endeavoring to arrive at Europe through the Mediterranean. Simultaneously, the emergency has exacerbated the carrying business to risky levels. Thus, endeavors to battle pirating have raised, and as per information from the Turkish Coast Gatekeeper base camp, 646 transient dealers were captured by Turkish security specialists among 2011 and August 1, 2017. The drop in the quantity of endeavored intersections, be that as it may, didn't forestall a gigantic expansion in that frame of mind of passings. Passings have expanded as travelers who are frantic to arrive at Europe and the people who direction pirating have started to pick more risky courses. Albeit the quantity of people passing on in the ocean was 3,500 out of 2015, it has ascended to 5,000 out of 2016. As such, 13-14 people a day die in the ocean while endeavoring to escape. One more key issue that strikes a chord when displaced people and security are considered is the many "security" dangers that refugees would cause in the general public where they look for asylum. As is commonly known, perhaps the main dread communicated all through the world is that significant convergences of outcast assaults will lead neighborhood individuals to lose their work because of the modest workforce that displaced people address, as well as security issues starting from evacuee networks. Worries here are centered around travelers, yet in addition on the possibility of an unregulated air arising, making good conditions for fear-based oppressor gatherings and coordinated criminal organizations.

Then again, it isn't startling that there are crooks in a populace of more than 3.4 million individuals, paying little heed to where they live on the planet. Because of the meetings led in the areas visited for this report, we found that there are no huge public request issues brought about by Syrians; cases in which Syrians have been involved frequently begun from aggression among themselves, and offended parties were viewed as Syrians generally speaking. This perception made in the field was likewise measured in a news articulation gave by the Service of the Inside on July 5, 2017 (MALKOÇ, TUNÇAK, YÜRÜK 2018, P.67-68)

According to public opinion polls, Turkish attitudes toward Syrian refugees are largely hostile and may be hardening. According to surveys performed in Istanbul and Ankara between 2009 and 2015, unfavorable attitudes towards immigrants have risen. Only 15% of the population in Istanbul When asked if they thought the presence of immigrants in their city was seen positively, six years later, the number of those who believe this has increased. The response rate had grown to 34%. In Ankara, the percentage of those who said "definitely" was higher. The percentage of people who said "no" increased from 20% in 2009 to 35% in 2015. (Economics Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, 2017).

Most Turkish residents feel that the inflow of Syrians has had a negative impact. According to a study conducted in October 2017, 78% of residents said Syrians had made their nation less safe (Syrians Agenda Study, 2017). Another national survey, published in December 2017, revealed that 75% of Turkish citizens did not feel they could coexist peacefully with Syrians. A December 2016 study of Turkish citizens in Istanbul indicated that 72% were uncomfortable facing Syrians and 76% expressed little sympathy for the migrants (Suriyeli Mültecilere Yönelik Alg and Tutumlar alışmas, 2016).

However, both the internal opposition and Syrians seeking citizenship claim that the citizenship procedure is opaque (Crises Group Interviews, 2017). This problem may resurface before the 2019 elections as the opposition has often warned that the administration may be resettling Syrians to dilute the opposition vote in specific areas (Crises Group Europe Report 2016, P. 18-19). Politically marginalized groups feel the government utilizes Syrians to accomplish political agendas both at home and abroad.

Also, dangers to social security, the inconsistent messages In July 2017, a rush of negative titles about Syrians moved throughout the media, starting with conflicts in Ankara ignited by web-based gives an account of July 3 that a Syrian had assaulted a Turkish young lady. Consistently, hostile to government media locales asserted that transients were "attacking" Turkey's sea shores, leaving piles of refuse, and attacking ladies (Cumhuriyet, 2017).

Syrians are in like manner careful about the Turkish police. They claim that when local people are associated with fights with settlers, policing them the opportunity to be vindicated. They never call the police to report violations or dangers since they fear removal, or basically in light of the fact that they are skeptical. Moreover, most police divisions need Arabic-talking officials, rather relying upon Syrians, once in a while youths, who communicate in the two dialects and the region governorate's translators, on the off chance that they can be found. Dissidents, as well as Kurdish and different minorities, are worried that specialists are enlisting MHP-subsidary teenagers. Neighborhood pioneers are regularly quick to see which gatherings are powerless and where pressures are building. They ought to be plainly allocated the occupation of early advance notice. Ankara ought to give guidelines to nearby authority's lead representatives, city chairmen, police bosses, and neighborhood headmen on the most proficient method to perceive and keep pressures from raising. Headmen in outcast weighty regions ought to be approved to enroll Syrian assistants to assist them with streamlining quarrels and distinguish possibly perilous circumstances. Syrian people group pioneers can likewise assist with districting lead representatives and city hall leaders address evacuee gives all the more really. As a general rule, displaced people and their host networks don't associate that much. (Emergencies Gathering Meetings, 2017).

3.2.2 Refugees Impact on health care

The increasing migration of vulnerable populations leaving the warzone brought several problems to Turkey's healthcare system and socioeconomic determinants of health. In Turkey, the increasing prevalence of infectious diseases and other public health-related consequences of war (Hargreaves, 2016; Doganay & Demiraslan, 2016; Eskiocak, 2013)

An insufficient number of healthcare professionals, and overcrowding of hospitals and emergency services. (Özdoan, 2014) (Savas et al., 2016) (Tekeli, Yesil, Altner, Gulacti et al Özdemir et al, 2017)

For example, advocate the significance of integrating Syrian physicians and nurses into the health system based on a model that is being followed in Turkey.

1. Making health facilities incapable of providing service by attack, falling in service capacity.
2. Decrease in food production, cost of food, decrease in storage and processing capacity, emergence, and prevalence of nutrition problems.
3. Demolition in infrastructure
 - Decreased water supply capacity, insufficient access to safe water.
 - Reduction in waste disposal capacity, poor sanitation conditions, environmental pollution from combat vehicles.
 - Reduction in communication capacity.
4. Housing problem
 - Demolition of houses, unsafe housing conditions.
 - Health and security created by displacement for internal or external migration problems.
 - Health problems (acute respiratory tract infections, diarrhoea, measles, parasitic diseases, malnutrition, nutritional deficiencies, increase in sickness and death) caused by temporary settlement in camp areas.
5. Stopping of production, inadequacy, depletion of stocks.
6. Reduction in income Decreased purchasing power, Black market.

Here the impact is on the public and private Turkish hospitals, and if we look closely at the absorptions in Turkish hospitals of medicines and medical supplies and even places and rooms, we find that most of these refugees have replaced many, and because of their serious conditions in which they were entering Turkey and then entering emergency to hospitals led to the depletion

of many supplies and even draining the energies of nurses and doctors. On the other hand, when we see that most Turks do not speak Arabic, they have faced big problems with Syrian refugees despite the presence of many different international and regional bodies specialized in this issue, and if we look at the period of Covid-19, the medical situation has become tense in the whole world and not only in Turkey, but here Syrian refugees also had a great impact on the capabilities and responses in Turkish hospitals. (YÜRÜK 2018, P.70)

3.2.3 Refugees Impact on Economy

3.2.3.1 Employment

Even when the economy is performing relatively well, the labour market of Turkey reveals significant structural difficulties that impede formal employment creation:

- Even though Syrians were not shown in the figures, the workforce is expanding at one rapid pace.
- Informality in employing is popular
- The wage increase is roughly the same as the median salary
- Companies worry that their employees lack the requisite skills, also that their employees work excessive hours, restricting their opportunities for successful acquisition
- Distinctions in rates of unemployment persist

Inside Turkey "formal business" implies that representatives are enrolled with the Government backed retirement Foundation, that related assessments are paid, that the base compensation, working hours, and working circumstances are followed, and that laborers reserve the option to partition pay and joblessness protection benefits. The Turkish work market, then again, has a double design: in 2019, close to 66% of all representatives were ostensibly utilized and covered by work regulation, while 33% were casually utilized. Familiarity is more pervasive among independently employed and paid family laborers, yet the quantity of casual workers among breadwinners is 18%, a sizable portion of the workforce. Provincial incongruities in joblessness rates proceed (Uyasal and al, 2020).

7.4 million people, receive much less than prevailing minimum wage, the EU uses several Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS2) regions to define regions (Pelek, 2018).

Late concentrate on the ramifications of raising the lowest pay permitted by law on the Turkish work market shows that when the lowest pay permitted by law rises, business moves from formal to casual positions. Moreover, when the lowest pay permitted by law rises, more modest, lower efficiency endeavours are bound to forsake the market (Acar and Bossavie, 2019). This information propose that casualness is inescapable, which is ascribed to some extent to the unfortunate efficiency levels of these work. The has proposed that the genuine most reduced pay allowed by regulation be kept sub optimal efficiency increments to diminish work costs, especially for low-gifted or potentially youthful representatives (OECD, 2021) Such a program will unquestionably help organizations in moving from casual to one more sort of business, which is classified "formal work," in this manner widening the duty base.




Figure 7 Impact of Syrian refugees on job loss

Source: Middle East Strategic Centre, 2021

According to the study of Middle East Strategic centre as seen in (Fig.7) 64% of Turks loss their job because of Syrian refugees in Urfa, where it was 100% of loss jobs in Kilis, also it was a high percentage of 87% in Hatay of losing jobs, and 40% in Antep. This study shows that the

increase of losing jobs is caused by the migration of Syrian refugees and filling the place in the Turkish employment.

3.2.3.2 Effects on the Economy

Entrepreneurs are disappointed by the rising number of unregistered Syrian firms, which incorporate road vendors and shops selling contraptions or frill, supermarkets, eateries, beauty parlors, and pastry kitchens (Crises Group Europe Report number 284 2018, P.19)




Figure 8 Impact of Syrian refugees on wage rate

Source: Middle East Strategic Centre, 2021

According to the study of Middle East Strategic centre on the impact of Syrian refugees on wage rate as seen in (Fig.8) the highest one was 86% in Urfa, while 54% in Kilis, whereas it was 78% in Hatay, and Antep 84%, this means that Syrian refugees lead to a huge impact on the wage rate and lead to this huge increase.




Figure 9 Impact of Syrian refugees on rents percentage

Source: Middle East Strategic Centre, 2021

According to the study of Middle East Strategic centre on the impact of Syrian refugees on rents, the huge impact was in Hatay where it was 100%, and 99% in Urfa, where this impact was 89% in kilis, and at the end 97% in Antep, this because of the huge number of Syrian migrants came to Turkey and there persistent need for shelters to live.


For instance, Turkish bistro proprietors in Fatih, a key Istanbul area, whined that they couldn't contend with Syrian outlets that resisted the disallowance on smoking inside. A business in another Istanbul region, Sultangazi, said that untaxed, unregistered endeavours could give higher wages, blaming them for alluring away staff. (Crises Group Europe Report number 284 2018, P.20)

To draw in unregistered Syrian firms into the proper area, specialists ought to eliminate the administrative noise expected to get a permit, lower enrolment costs, and make procedural data more accessible. Syrians additionally have a more troublesome time acquiring finance than Turkish inhabitants. Syrian firms, in contrast to Turkish-claimed organizations, can't acquire credits from the Little and Medium Endeavours Advancement Association (KOSGEB) or the Economy Service. (Crises Group Europ Report number 284 2018, P.20-21)

Syrians are additionally experiencing issues acquiring bank credits, doing unfamiliar exchanges, or simply opening a record. Financial backers, threatened by administrative boundaries and dicey of improvement possibilities, loan little microfinance to Syrian organizations. Be that as it may, Syrian endeavours might have a colossal impact. As indicated by a June 2017 report by Building Markets, an American-based non-administrative association, Syrians in Turkey have contributed more than \$330 million and laid out north of 6,000 legitimate organizations since 2011. According to similar review, these organizations utilize a normal of 9.4 Syrians, by far most of whom recently worked in the casual area. As indicated by experts, there were around 8,000 enrolled Syrian firms in Turkey as of December 2017; the quantity of unregistered ventures is assessed to be more than 10,000. Worldwide funders are searching for techniques to help evacuee claimed little and medium-sized organizations succeed. Syrians also have more difficulty obtaining financing than Turkish residents. Syrian companies, unlike Turkish-owned companies, are not eligible for small and medium business loans. (UNDP, 2017)

Finally, the possibility of receiving funds and technical support may motivate Syrian entrepreneurs to register their enterprises and provide official employment possibilities for other Syrians. Another alternative is to support Turkish-Syrian joint companies, which has the added benefit of encouraging more engagement between Syrians and Turkish residents.

(a) Number of 5-14 years old workers






Figure 10 (a) & (b) Underaged Workers among Syrian refugees in Turkey

Source: Lwis Penido Caro 2020 and HLFS 2017

Figure 7 (a) depicts the extrapolation findings, with total amount of Syrian child workers projected to be 127,140 see portion (a), of that which 109,328 are males. Figure 7(b) also depicts projected sex & time of life job shares for girls and boys aging 5-14. These numbers are hypothetical and are presented solely for informational reasons. Then, the seriousness and urgency of the situation if these statistics are close to being accurate demands further research on the subject. The reasons for this urgent need for knowledge are, first and foremost, humanitarian; these youngsters should be attending education in order to have the fullest good start in life. Furthermore, completing universal education opens a door to graduate degrees and a greater variety of prospective job chances. Aside from obtaining a tentatively conclude about how many Syrian children work, collecting knowledge on such children's family conditions as well as the industry. (Caro 2020, P.11)

3.2.4 Effects on Demographics:

In many socioeconomic dimensions, the Syrian refugee community is quite unusual. One of these characteristics is its age distribution, which is substantially smaller than that of most other

governments and is at the same level as that of several sub-Saharan African countries. In reality, the average life expectancy of Syrian refugees in Turkey is 23.0 years, comparable to that in Ethiopia and only a few decades longer than in Angola (20.6), Zambia (20.7) or the Republic of the Congo (20.8). (21.7). These statistics are in stark contrast to the average age of Turkish citizens, which stands at 33.0 years, in line with other growing countries. (Caro 2020, P.4)




Figure 11 (a) & (b) Syrian refugee population and age distribution.

Source: Lwis Penido Caro 2020 and HLFS 2017

The tender child of the majority of Syrian refugees has a direct effect on the balance among Turkish natives and refugees. In reality, whereas Syrian refugees constituted 4.1 percent of total of the Turkish-born population in 2017, the proportion between those aged 0-24 increased to 6.3%, as seen Figure 1 (a). Wide-base population pyramids, such as the one demonstrated by Syrian migrants, provide short-term challenges and long-term difficulties to society; at the moment, the large number of children need more. Services for education Despite a relatively small (due to the time it takes to create new schools), the number of places. So, the proportion of children per school expected to grow, reducing educational quality and increasing costs, causing tensions, particularly in overcrowded classrooms. (Caro 2020, P.4)

CHAPTER FOUR

DISCUSSION

SYRAIN REFUGEES MIGRATION AND THEIR IMPACT ON TURKEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PEACBUILDING OPPORTUNITIES, 20221:

Responding to the social influx of Syrian refugees facing urgent humanitarian needs early, providing temporary assistance has been the focus of the Turkish authorities until now. Conceptualizing and implementing permanent alternatives is difficult. Our thesis is on the following questions: what is the impact of the presence of Syrian refugees in Istanbul / Turkey? And what are the opportunities of the “Protection Motivation Theory” in demonstrating the possibility of providing harmony, tolerance, and a peaceful atmosphere between Syrian refugees and Turks despite the difficulties? Please check and fill out this questionnaire. Taking participation in this survey is entirely optional. There are no known dangers connected with this project. If you are uncomfortable completing any of the questions, you may leave the questionnaire at any moment. It is critical that we hear your thoughts.

Figure 12 Age




Figure 13 Education

Eđitim
100 responses




Figure 14 Employment Statues

Çalışma durumu
100 responses




Figure 15 The influx of Syrian refugees has created tensions both in border areas and elsewhere in the country

Suriyeli mülteci akını hem sınır bölgelerinde hem de ülkenin başka yerlerinde gerilim yarattı
100 responses




Figure 16 What best describes "Syrians" residing on Turkish territories?

Türkiye topraklarında yaşayan "Suriyelileri" en iyi ne tanımlar?
100 responses




Figure 17 Syrian refugees in Turkey “should be seen not as a burden, rather as a group that can produce significant economic growth for themselves and their host communities,”

Türkiye'deki Suriyeli mülteciler “bir yük olarak değil, kendileri ve ev sahibi topluluklar için önemli ekonomik büyüme sağlayabilecek bir grup olarak görülmeli”

100 responses




Figure 18 When talking about peace building “Syrians” residing on Turkish territories are making an important contribution in skills training and self-reliance.

Barışın inşasından bahsederken, Türkiye topraklarında ikamet eden “Suriyeliler” beceri eğitimi ve özgüven konusunda önemli katkılarda bulunuyorlar.

100 responses




Figure 19 When talking about peace building “Syrians” residing on Turkish territories are making an important contribution in being participators in peace-building elections and referenda

Barışın inşasından bahsederken Türkiye topraklarında ikamet eden “Suriyeliler” barışı tesis eden seçimlere ve referandumlara katılım konusunda önemli katkılarda bulunuyorlar.

100 responses




Figure 20 When talking about peace building “Syrians” residing on Turkish territories are making an important contribution to the development of peace agreements

Barışın inşasından bahsetmişken Türkiye topraklarında ikamet eden “Suriyeliler” barış anlaşmalarının geliştirilmesine önemli katkılarda bulunuyorlar.

100 responses




Figure 21 when taking about Turkish Economy, do you think there is a direct impact from Syrian refugees on Turkish economy?

Türkiye Ekonomisini ele alırken Suriyeli mültecilerin Türkiye ekonomisine doğrudan bir etkisi olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?

100 responses




Figure 22 Do you think that Syrian refugees affect Turkish Currency?

Suriyeli mültecilerin Türk Parasını etkilediğini düşünüyor musunuz?

100 responses




Figure 23 Do you think Syrian refugees have impact on social stability?

Suriyeli mültecilerin sosyal istikrara etkisi olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?

100 responses




Figure 24 Do you think Syrian refugees have impact on efficiency of Health care?

Suriyeli mültecilerin sağlık hizmetlerinin verimliliğine etkisi olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?

100 responses




Figure 25 Do you think Syrian refugees have impact on food security?

Suriyeli mültecilerin gıda güvenliğine etkisi olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?

100 responses




Figure 26 Do you think Syrian refugees affected the Turkish Culture?

Suriyeli mültecilerin Türk Kültürünü etkilediğini düşünüyor musunuz?

100 responses




Figure 27 Have you ever had a direct contact with Syrian refugees?

Suriyeli mültecilerle hiç doğrudan temasınız oldu mu?

100 responses




Figure 28 What is the kind of this contact?

Bu temasın türü nedir?

100 responses




Figure 29 Do you think that Turkey plays a role as a Transit for Syrian refugees to reach Europe?

Türkiye'nin Suriyeli mültecilerin Avrupa'ya ulaşmasında bir geçiş rolü oynadığını düşünüyor musunuz?

100 responses




Figure 30 When the Syrian Crises Ends, do you think that Syrian refugees will return to their country of origin?

Suriye krizi bittiğinde Suriyeli mültecilerin kendi ülkelerine döneceğini düşünüyor musunuz?

100 responses





Figure 31 Question about the agreement with "Protection Motivation Theory"

Suriyeli mülteciler ve Türkler arasında uyum, hoşgörü ve barışçıl bir ortamın sürdürülmesi için "Koruma motivasyonu Teori" önerilmektedir. Bu teorinin anlamı, Türk toplumunun Suriyeli mültecilerle özellikle çocuklarla bir kez etkileşime geçmesini sağlamak ve onların kültürleri hakkında daha fazla bilgi sahibi olmalarına, onlara eğitimin önemini öğretin ve gelecekte kendi ülkelerine geri dönebilmelerine yardımcı olmak, bilinçlendirme kampanyaları ve sosyal yardım seminerleri şeklindedir.

100 responses



4 RESULTS

The results of the above survey done showed 100 responses. Concerning the age there were 64 responses between 25 and 34 years old, 14 responses between 35 and 44 years old, and 2 responses between 45 and 54 years old. (Fig 9) The majority of responses gained (80%) have license, 11% have a degree, 6% haven't completed their schools, and 2% of them are graduate. (fig 10) However, concerning their employment status, most of them (76%) are students, 21% are employed, 2 are freelancer and one of them is unemployed. (Fig 11)

The analysis of the results gained from answering the above questionnaire showed that 75 % totally agreed that Syrian refugee's influx had created tension on the borders and other areas of Turkey, on the other hand 12 % didn't agree. (Fig 12) Most of the answers about 76% described Syrians in Turkey as refugees, however 6% considered them immigrants, and the rest 18% are separated equally in their thoughts to consider them either citizens or displaced persons. (Fig 13)

On the other hand, opinions were different about whether Syrian refugees in Turkey are important for themselves as well as their host community. So, 41% somehow agreed, 25% strongly disagreed, 21% didn't agree, 10% absolutely agreed, and 3% agreed. (Fig 14)

Concerning peace building, 57% of those who answered the survey didn't agree that Syrians in Turkey contributed in skill training, 31% strongly disagree, 11% absolutely agree, and only one of them somehow disagree. (Fig 15) On the other side, there were different opinions concerning their contribution in being participators in peace building. 43% didn't agree, 32%strongly disagree, 21%absolutely agree, about 3% somehow disagree, and 1 who found himself somehow

agreeing. (Fig 16) And the final point when talking about peace building was their contribution in the development of peace agreements, 58% didn't agree on that contribution, 30% absolutely agree, 11 % strongly disagree, and only one somehow disagree. (fig17)

Concerning the effect of Syrian refugees on Turkish economic status, 50 % absolutely agree that there was a direct impact from Syrian refugees on Turkey's economy, 29% didn't agree, 16% strongly disagree, 3% agree, and 2% somehow disagree. (Fig 18)

When asking about the affection of Syrian refugees on Turkish currency, 72% absolutely agree that there is an influence, 18% didn't agree, 6%strongly disagree, 3% agree, and one somehow disagree. (Fig 19)

However, when asking about their opinion on the impact of Syrian refugees on the Turkish social stability, 67%absolutely agree, 12% didn't agree, 14 % strongly disagree, 5% somehow disagree, and 2% agree. (Fig 20) Approximately, the results were similar when asking about the impact of Syrian refugees on health care system in Turkey. (Fig 21)

Also, results showed that 46% agree that Syrians have an impact on Turkish food security, 23% absolutely agree, 16% strongly disagree, 12% didn't agree, 3%somehow disagree. (Fig 22) Whereas the majority of responses 95% showed that Syrian refugees have an impact on the Turkish culture including lifestyle, traditions. (Fig 23)

Results showed also that 85% of the respondents had contact with Syrian refugees (fig 24) 43% of them had the contact in work industry, 28% stated other than the mentioned kind of contact, 16% met Syrians as students, 12% had a contact due to renting issues, and one of them employed Syrian refugees. (Fig 25)

Moreover, analysis of the results when asking whether Turkey plays role as a Transit for Syrians to reach Europe showed that, 54% somehow agree, 20% didn't agree, 12% absolutely agree, 8% strongly disagree, and 6% agree. (Fig 26)

Then, when asking about their opinion if Syrian refugees in Turkey will return back to their country after the crisis ends, results were uneven, 48% didn't agree 34% strongly disagree, 12% somehow agree, 4% agree,1% somehow disagree, 1% absolutely disagree. (Fig 27)

Finally, when asking about Turkish opinions about the "Protection Motivation Theory",74% agree with this theory 11% slightly agree, and 15% slightly disagree (Fig 28).

So as a result of this survey 74% of Turkish people agreed to depend on the “Protection Motivation Theory” in order to enhance the peace in the Turkish environment in the future, and nonetheless if policymakers and Turkish government take this theory into consideration and apply it into the real life, it will correspond to the desire of Turkish community where it will help them decrease the negative impact of the Syrian refugees on Turkish sectors and increase the Syrian self reliance.

5 CONCLUSION

Finally, Turkish government should begin with a policy plan for the “day after” the Syrian crises ends, when the stability returns to the country. Turkey is currently providing temporary protection to Syrian refugees, which in theory ends with the conflict, while the exact circumstances cannot be seen before, it would be useful to think through different options of what will happen with Syrian refugees in Turkey. Four main areas for understanding the major concerns of this study, by understanding the effect of Syrian refugees on Turkish territories, channels to decrease these effects, the degree of bridge between Syrians and Turkish citizens to continue in peace, and to remove the fears of the future. These four worlds are tightly intertwined, and further study is needed to fully appreciate the complexities. However, it must be viewed from a peaceful perspective, which is divided along governmental, social, and economic lines. At the end as the increase of Syrian refugees, the consequences of Syrian refugees on Turkish territories are increasing. Moreover, the results of the survey and the current severe of economic crisis, as well as the rise in the number of refugees, have heightened Turkish society's concern, this attitude maybe often leads to incidents between Syrian refugees and Turks residing in the region. As this study showed in the above survey in (Fig.28) 74% of the responses of Turkish society had agreed with the importance of the “Protection Motivation Theory”, this implies that among the implementation of this theory in real, the Turkish society will demonstrate the possibility of providing harmony, tolerance, and a peaceful atmosphere between Syrian refugees and Turks, including Turkey's protection, inspection, service delivery, cooperation, social cohesion, economy, and activism which are all important contributions to reduce the burden of Syrian refugees on the Turkish state and decrease the immigrant crises there.

6 RECOMENDATIONS:

According to the “Protection Motivation Theory” is recommended to maintain harmony, tolerance, and a peaceful environment between Syrian refugees and Turks, including Turkey's protection, inspection, service delivery, collaboration, social cohesion, economics, and activism. The meaning of the “Protection Motivation Theory” is to make the Turkish society interact with Syrian refugees especially the children once, by providing for them trainings, awareness, and seminar campaigns (for example, language, vocational and skills training) only with a clear pathway and link to self-reliance to know the importance of education then having the ability to go back to their origin country in the future, those awareness's could be done in the near future where the targeting age group of Syrian refugees is the children's aged between (5 -14), then according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) there is 100,000 Syrian children between 5 -14 age living in Turkey. Finally, with the help of the international humanitarian organizations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the Turkish Government. Then every 189 children of Syrian refugees living in Turkish cities (Istanbul, Gaziantep, Hatay, Sanliurfa, Adana, Mersin, Bursa, Izmir, Konya, Ankara, and Diger) can get the awareness in a day every week within one year, at the end the “Protection Motivation Theory” will succeed, and the fears from increasing the impacts of Syrian refugees on Turkish territories and the appearance of an unpeaceful environment will disappear. Also, this “Protection Motivation Theory” could be applied for other ages groups from Syrian refugees.

1. It is important to teach Syrian children's the importance of education. Moreover, the role for the quality of education in the upcoming future since Syrian students are enrolled in public schools her it is necessary to provide the number of physical facilities and teacher capacities as well as those teachers should be specially trained for Syrian's children culture and the effects of the war on them.
2. To avoid Syrian children's, go to streets and work inappropriate works, financial assistance should be provided to them and help those children's to enter schools, then they are able to learn and think more about their culture and their origin, provide training (for example, language, vocational and skills training) only with a clear pathway and link to self-reliance and harmonization (access to job market, access to higher education, social engagement and participation) thus this new generation of people will become educated, non-aggressive and will not affect the Turkish society, finally peacebuilding could be achieved and they will be able to help their families to go back to there origin countries in the future.
3. Awareness for helping Syrian children know more about their culture this will help them in returning to their origin country in the future.

4. Armed conflict continuous to drive millions from their homes every year, finding ways to prevent and resolve conflicts through non-violent means is an essential part of this study in reducing irregular migration and conflict induced displacement, the peacebuilding aim of this study cannot be achieved without the work with communities and governments to address the drivers of armed conflict often disputes over land and property, these drivers are typically complex and are often rooted in historical grievances. Undertaking a conflict analysis, understanding, in detail, the distinct local context is essential in developing peacebuilding programs this analysis is the bases for developing a 'theory of change' describing a logical pathway surfacing key assumptions connecting the desired changes with the actions required to enact that change then preventing violence, restore and sustain peace, in so doing the endorsement of the contextual factors that drive displacement and outward migration which includes the (Community-based conflict Management), and Demobilisation and Reintegration program (DDR) collectively those can play a key role in establishing the conditions to resolve conflict-induced displacement. Moreover, the DDR program supports states to design and implement a realistic framework of peacebuilding.
5. Register refugees that face violence in their countries and refer them to services such as health, social care, education, or training, helping them re-establish family and social connections, and when appropriate, investing in projects that benefit receiving communities, because leaving such those people will be a threat to the security of the country then peace keeping cannot be accomplished.
6. Rebalancing resource disparities, establishing positive livelihood alternatives or building community infrastructure to empower communities in building social cohesion and address locally defined needs in areas where non-state armed groups or violent extremist groups are operating especially in borders, also supporting such programs that address the structural and individual that drive people to join such groups, these factors are multi-faceted and specific to local contexts, influential individuals may help the recruitment process by glamourising violent extremism. Those who feel marginalised are particularly susceptible to their messaging and systemic poverty provides an economic incentive for individuals to pursue violent extremism, because those armed

groups feed on discontent and will exploit any gaps, where the governate security inside Turkey as well as the borders of Turkey is important, that what is called peacekeeping for the state.

7. Work in concert with stabilization, disaster risk reduction and development of goals to reduce drivers of irregular migration.
8. About the economic: To ensure effective and sustainable sectoral and geographical investments, it is important to expand formal investment opportunities for Syrians, enhance consultation and incentive systems, and build specialized consultation centers in municipalities and industry-trade rooms for this purpose. Because the nature of economic activity necessitates it, it would be beneficial to enact laws that allows businesspeople with temporary protected status to roam freely. Furthermore, increased local concern about Syrians receiving preferential treatment in regulatory obligations to start businesses may be a cause of contention for local business owners functioning in the same location, ending in unfair competition. For the reasons outlined above, it is critical to take this topic seriously to avoid outbursts and maintain a quiet work atmosphere.
9. The possibility of receiving funds and technical support may motivate Syrian entrepreneurs to register their enterprises and provide official employment possibilities for other Syrians. Another alternative is to support Turkish-Syrian joint companies, which has the added benefit of encouraging more engagement between Syrians and Turkish people.
10. Support the Turkish government, both financially and technically, in implementing long-term integration programs for Syrian refugees, particularly in education and employment

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