T.C

İSTANBUL TİCARET

ÜNİVERSİTESİ

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND AFRICAN STUDIES

Turkish Foreign Policy Strategies in the Sahel Region: The Case of Burkina Faso

Master's Thesis

Ibrahim Kanazoe

200023514

Istanbul, 2023

T.C

İSTANBUL TİCARET

ÜNİVERSİTESİ

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND AFRICAN STUDIES

Turkish Foreign Policy Strategies in the Sahel Region: The Case of Burkina Faso

Master's Thesis

Ibrahim Kanazoe

200023514

Advisor: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Başak Özoral

Istanbul, 2023

ABSTRACT:

The 1998 Turkish government's "opening to Africa" policy marked the beginning of a consistent political, economic, and social relationship with sub-Saharan African countries. This study focuses on the Turkish foreign policy strategies in the G5 Sahel countries in Africa which recently in 2014 decided to commonly tackle the security and development challenges faced by the Sahel region. These strategies are based on political, economic, and sociocultural cooperation that complies with the Turkish government's "opening to Africa" plan. This study asserts that Turkish foreign policy strategies have recently evolved from diplomatic relations, humanitarian assistance, and sociocultural activities, to economic, and security cooperation in the region. However, the latest growing influence of Türkiye in the Sahel region parks not only the interest of International Relations scholars but also raises concerns for international actors fearing that Türkiye's presence threatens their interests in this part of the continent. Accordingly, different international relations scholars have already made academic contributions to this debate. This study, however, finds that Turkish foreign policy strategies implementation is facing both local and international challengers in the region where local governments and international actors, failed to promote, peace, democracy, and economic development.

Keywords: Influence, International actors, Sahel region, Strategy, Turkish Foreign policy

SAHEL BÖLGESİNDE TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKA STRATEJİLERİ: BURKINA FASO ÖRNEĞİ

Özet:

1998 Türk hükümetinin "Afrika'ya açılım" politikası, Sahara altı Afrika ülkeleriyle tutarlı bir siyaset, ekonomi ve sosyal ilişkinin başlangıcı belirlemektedir. Bu çalışma, son olarak 2014 yılında Sahel bölgesindeki güvenlik ve kalkınma sorunlarını ortaklaşa çözmeye karar veren Afrika'daki G5 Sahel ülkelerindeki Türk dış politika stratejilerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu stratejiler, 1998 Türk hükümetinin "Afrika'ya açılım" politikasına uygun siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyokültürel işbirliğine dayanmaktadır. Aynı zamanda, Türk dış politika stratejilerinin son zamanlarda bölge içinde diplomatik ilişkiler, insani yardım ve sosyokültürel faaliyetlerden, ekonomik ve güvenlik işbirliklerine doğru evrildiğini anlatmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye'nin Sahel bölgesinde son zamanlarda artan etkisi, yalnızca Uluslararası İlişkiler araştırmacılarının ilgisini çekmekle kalmıyor, aynı zamanda Türkiye'nin varlığının kıtanın bu bölümünde çıkarlarını tehdit etmesinden korkan mevcut uluslararası aktörleri de endişelendiriyor. Bu konudaki tartışmaya farklı uluslararası ilişkiler akademisyenleri akademik katkılarda bulunmuştur ancak Türkiye'nin bölgeye olan ilgisini ve politikalarının sonuçlarını detaylı olarak inceleyen çalışmaların sayısı ve içeriği yeterli gözükmemektedir. Bu çalışma, Türk dış politika stratejilerinin Sahel bölgesinde uygulanmasının etkilerini göstermekte, yerel yönetimlerin ve uluslararası aktörlerin başarısızlığını, demokrasiyi ve ekonomik kalkınmayı teşvik edemediği hem yerel hem de uluslararası zorluklarla karşı karşıya olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Etki, Uluslararası aktörleri, Sahel Bölgesi, Strateji, Türk Dış politika

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All the letters could not find the right words, … All the words could not express, my gratitude, my love, or my respect, … However, I dedicate this thesis, to my family, my friends, to my teachers from kindergarten to high school, to my university professors, and special acknowledgment goes to Mourat Kiourt Mechmet and Başak Özoral.

Tables of Contents

Abstract: ……..…vii
Özet: ……..…...vii
Acknowledgments.……vii
Tables of Contents.……..vii
List of Tables...…….....vii
List of Figures.……vii
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations.…….....vii

1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION……...…..1
1.1.Background and statement of the problem ……2
1.2.The research aims and questions…….3
1.3.Relevance of the study……....3
1.4.Scope, Timeframe, and Methodology…… 4
1.5.Structure of the thesis ……5
1.6.Limitations ……..…..6
1.7.LITERATURE REVIEW ……..6
1.8.Overview ……6
1.9.Defining and Conceptualizing Foreign Policy Strategies ……..7
1.10. Theoretical Understanding of Turkish Policy Strategies in the Sahel Region ...8
1.10.1. Structuralism ……..8
1.10.2. Neorealism ……9

PART ONE: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN SAHEL REGION: AGENDA AND REALITY……..11

2.1. Introduction ……...11

2.2. The African Sahel Region in Turkish Foreign Policy Agenda …….…….....11

2.3. Sahel Countries and Socio-Economic Realities ……13

2.3.1. Burkina Faso ……...15

2.3.2. Chad ……15

2.3.3. Mali ……16

2.3.4. Mauritania ……..16

2.3.5. Niger ……...17

2.4. Historical Realities: From AOF to Sahel G5 Bloc ……17

2.5. Main Economic Activities in the Sahel Region …….18

2.6. Ethnic Problems and Corruption ……..19

2.6. Sahel region: Origin and Transit Route for Illegal Migrants to Europe …….20

2.7. Türkiye and Sahel Countries Relationship Before the Justice and Development Party…….……....21

2.8. Reasons for Paradigm Shift Under the Justice and Development Party ……22

2.9. The Core Components of Türkiye and Sahel Countries' Relations ……...……23

PART TWO: TURKISH LOW POLITICS STRATEGIES IN THE SAHEL REGION…….26

3.1. Introduction ……...26

3.2. Diplomatic Strategies.…….……...27

3.3. Turkish Diplomatic Actors in the Region …….……27

3.4. Turkish Humanitarian Strategies: Main Actors and Activities ……..28

3.5. Socio-Cultural Strategies: Main Actors and Activities …….31

3.6. Turkish Foreign Policy Strategies in Burkina Faso ……..34

3.7. The case of Maarif Foundation; Impeding the Potential Challenges…….34

3.8. Power in Maarif Foundation ……...……35

3.9. The Challenges in Burkina Faso ……36

3.10. Voices from Burkina Faso……37

PART THREE: TURKISH HIGH POLITICS STRATEGIES IN THE SAHEL REGION……41

4.1. Introduction ……...41

4.2. Economic Strategies ……..41

4.3. Turkish main economic actors in the region ……..42

4.4. The General Trade Situation between Türkiye and the Sahel Region ……..43

4.5. Interpretation ……49

4.6. Turkish Military Strategies in the Region ……..50

PART FOUR: CHALLENGERS ……..52

5.1. Introduction ……...52

5.2. The Sahel Region: A New Challenge for Türkiye ……52

5.3. Local Challengers: Governments, Armed band Groups, and Terrorists ……..…….52

5.4. International Challengers ……..53

5.5. Former colonial power; France, a Direct Challenger? ……. 54

5.6. Challenging the Status quo in the Region: A Revisionist State? ……....56

5.7. Mischief Foreign Policy Strategies in the region ……58

CONCLUSION ……62

REFERENCES…..……....64

List of Tables

Table 1: Shareholding of the agricultural production and agriculture performance in the Sahel countries ……. …… 19

Table 2: Corruption perceptions Index in the Sahel countries ……20

Table 3: Turkish diplomatic missions in sub-Sahara Africa between 1960 and 2002 ……21

Table 4: Turkish ODA in the Sahel countries in the Sahel region 2019 ……24

Table 5: Türkiye's NGOs and activities in the Sahel Countries in 2018 ……28

Table 6: The Turkish Maarif Foundation schools and dormitories in the Sahel region ……32

Table 7: Number of students from the Sahel region enrolled in Turkish universities 2020-2021……...33

Table 8: Turkish main active economic actors in the region ……37

Table 11: Türkiye's Total Exports to the Region in Millions USD ……38

Table 12: Türkiye's Total Imports from the Region in Million USD……39

Table 13: Türkiye's Total trade volume between the countries of the Region in Million USD..41

Table 14: Türkiye's Total Trade balance in the Region in Millions of USD ……42

Table 14: Freedom scores for Sahel countries and Türkiye (Total Score over 100) ……55

Table 15: 2021 corruption perceptions Index of Sahel Countries and Türkiye ……60

List of Figures…… x

Figure 1: African Sahel region ……17

Figure 2: Turkish Official Development Assistance value in the Sahel region in 2019 ……..77

Figure 3: Türkiye's Total Exports to the Region in Million USD……..…..39

Figure 4: Türkiye's Total Imports from the Region in Million USD ……..40

Figure 5: Türkiye's Total trade volume between the countries of the Region in Million USD …….....41

Figure 6: Türkiye's Total Trade balance in the Region in Millions of USD ……..43

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronyms and Abbreviations	Definition
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
UN	United Nations
Sahel G5 Bloc	Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
USD	Unites States Dollars
AIB	Agence D'Information du Burkina (Information Agency of Burkina)
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNOCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
FIDA	Fonds International de Development Agricole (International Agriculture Development Fund)
OIT	Organisation International du Travail (International Labour Organization)
AQMI	Al-Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique (Al-Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb)
USAID	United States Agency International Development
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

AOF	Afrique Occidentale Française (French Western African states)
AEF	Afrique Equatorial Française (French Equatorial African state)
CFA	Communauté Financière Afrique (African Finance Community)
MUJAO	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
MNLA	National Liberation Movement for Azawad
ISGS	Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
YTB	Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities
CNN	Cable News Network
AREVA	French multinational group
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
EU	European Union
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
IHH	Humanitarian Relief Foundation

1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background and statement of the problem

In the last decade, Türkiye is trying to enlarge its circle of friends in Africa by signing agreements, assistance, and cooperation. This initiative is in line with the Turkish current government's policy to orient its foreign policy strategies toward the Middle East and Africa (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). Indeed, Türkiye is becoming very active in working with the Sahel region in different areas including humanitarian, economic, political, and security. Simultaneously, the Sahel region is weakened by the austerity policies of international economic institutions of the IMF and World Bank, global warming, and chronic droughts. In addition, the region is paralyzed by the "Françafrique"[1] neo-colonial political system, political instability, terrorism, and humanitarian crisis. Despite its desert climate and poor economic conditions, the Sahel region in Africa recently attracts the interest of different international actors with different agendas. Notwithstanding the effort of international actors to promote development in this part of the continent, many people from this region need immediate humanitarian assistance. Accordingly, Türkiye is displaying a posture of economic partners, rather than economic competitors or a new colonizer in the region (Erdoğan, 2016). Turkish resident, Tayyip Erdoğan asserts in Antalya that "we don't see Africa from a colonial perspective" and this distinguishes Türkiye's relations with Africa from western countries' relations with the continent. This discourse is attractive and gives the impression of favoring equal and win-win partnerships between Türkiye and the countries of the continent.

Today many political, economic, and social institutions of Türkiye are very active in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Turkish foreign policy strategies, according to Mehmet Özkan an Executive Board Member at Turkish Maarif Foundation are characterized by development aid and humanitarian assistance (Özkan, 2014). Over the years, this characteristic has developed from humanitarian to security through economic cooperation with the countries of the region. Indeed, Türkiye has lifted the level of its relations with the countries of the region by signing military cooperation further at the state, regional, and international levels. Certainly, in addition to humanitarian and

[1] Françafrique is a set of networks made up of French and African officials, businessmen, and operatives who cultivate the confusion between private and public interests to make money, defend their interests, and pursue influence in France as well as in Africa. (Marchal, 2013, p.487)

socioeconomic cooperation, Türkiye is providing military support in the region by positioning itself as an alternative political, economic, sociocultural, and security actor to China, Russia, France, EU, and the UN, Aside from humanitarian activities in Burkina Faso, Türkiye is looking for ways and means to establish the Turkish Maarif Foundation to fulfill its foreign policy agenda and objectives in the region. This thesis offers an opportunity to evaluate the feasibility of the establishment of this Turkish international education actor in Burkina Faso.

1.2. The research aims and questions

This thesis aims to demonstrate that Türkiye is gradually becoming a serious international actor in the Sahel region in terms of socioeconomic, political, and security cooperation. In this matter, many experts, and scholars such as Hannah Armstrong, and Philani Mthembu, from the International Crisis Group, and Institute for Global Dialogue have made significant contributions to the academic discourse on current issues of international actors in the Sahel region. Nonetheless, the presence of Turkish foreign policy in the continent has already yielded some positive results in terms of humanitarian aid on the behalf of the international community, particularly in the Eastern part of the continent (Van den Berg & Meester, 2019). This presence appears as an obstruction to international actors in terms of diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation in the Sahel region (Armstrong, 2021). Considering Türkiye and the Sahel countries' relations, this thesis will focus on the theoretical and empirical analysis of Turkish foreign policy strategies in this geography by looking at the characteristics and the development of economics, politics, and social relations of Turkish actors within the region. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the different approaches used by Türkiye to build relationships with the countries of the region by opening a discussion on the following main question:

What are the aims and objectives of Turkish foreign policy in the Sahel region?

Does the presence of Türkiye represent a threat or an opportunity for the region?

What makes Turkish foreign policy strategies different from European countries' foreign policy strategies in the region? France for example.

This study will attempt to answer these questions in the following lines to make a modest academic contribution to the debate around the relationship between Türkiye, and the African Sahel countries.

1.3. Relevance of the study

This topic is an object of research simply because the Sahel region in Africa is recently experiencing the darkest moment of its political, economic, and security history. Ten percent of the population is living above the poverty line in Niger, and half of the population in Mauritania is poor (Berger, 2021). Indeed, the number of military coups in the region has recently increased mainly in Burkina Faso and Mali with eight and five coup d'états respectively. In addition to political instability, poor economic performance, and terrorism, the region has become a new area of international conflict between legitimate governments and secessionist groups, and armed groups to extend international powers.

However, this paper finds it necessary to study Turkish foreign policy strategies in the Sahel because it will help us to identify the aims and objectives of Türkiye in the region. Indeed, Türkiye is aiming to improve its economic development by looking for new economic partners and natural resource providers countries and significant natural resources are thought to underlie the Sahel zone. In addition, this research will help to understand Türkiye's strategies and behavior, by evaluating and interpreting its actions in this part of the continent. Türkiye has developed its relations progressively from humanitarian actions to an alternative economic and security partner. Moreover, this work will allow critical thinking about the actions of Turkish actors on the ground by examining the problems in the Sahel from various angles where political and economic problems are crowned by a growing threat of terrorism in the region. However, this thesis is impressed by the determination of the Turkish government to be present in the Sahel region despite the existing multiple challenges and is trying to understand the role of this country which is deeply influenced by western powers mainly France. Therefore, the situation in the Sahel necessitates cooperation and changes in terms of governance and partnerships. This work will permit us to look at the impact of Turkish foreign policy on the countries of the region on one part and the impact of this policy on France's relations with its former colonies of the region on the other part. Indeed, the presence of Türkiye in the Sahel region is a challenge vis a vis to socio-economic realities and vis a vis to the existing economic political system established by former colonial masters of the region.

1.4. Scope, Timeframe, and Methodology

Looking at the scope of this thesis, the research focuses on the strategies established by the Turkish government to extend its area of foreign policy. Certainly, diplomatic missions, economic activities, and humanitarian aids are the main elements driving the Turkish foreign policy in the region. Apropos of the timeframe, the research focuses on the period from the late 1990s to thus far. This period corresponds to the Turkish government's "opening to Africa" policy agenda in 1998. This was followed by the 2005 "Year of Africa" declaration policy adopted by Ankara where diplomatic missions were opened in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger between 2010 and 2013

Methodologically, the thesis is subjected to an objective assessment of the relations between Türkiye and the countries of the Sahel region based on diverse sources. These sources are multiple and diverse including primary and secondary sources. Indeed, primary data will be collected via the website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Nations report on the Sahel region in Africa, etc. However, the secondary data will be obtained through reports, articles, and books published by Turkish, African, and European scholars, experts, and research institutions. The thesis examines further the behavior of Türkiyein the Sahel region based on international relations theories such as structuralism and neorealism. In addition to, both quantitative and qualitative research methods while analysing different types of resources including group discussions, official governments' document, and expert articles to illustrate the presence of Türkiye in the Sahel region, this thesis would like to expand on the work of a focus group that discusses the importance of one Turkish foreign policy actor in Burkina Faso.

This thesis is a theoretical contribution to the discussion where the whys and the wherefores of Turkish foreign policy strategies will be subjected to empirical analysis. Indeed, the presence of Türkiyein the Sahel region will be discussed according to International Relations theories mainly from structuralism and neorealism perspectives. Moreover, the work will help to show some reasons that push the Turkish government to be visible in the Sahel in competing with western countries. The unit of analysis of this research is Turkish Foreign policy strategies in the Sahel region, which is trying to break down the existing economic, and security status quo established earlier between western countries and Africa. However, nonprobability sampling is the type of sampling that will be used in this research because Turkish Foreign policy strategies in the Sahel countries

are unique and delicately different from other international actors in the region. Indeed, a convenient sampling method will be used in this research because Turkish Foreign policy strategies are shifting from low politics to high politics in the region with military cooperation at regional and international levels. According to the research topic, "Foreign policy" is the identified variable that highlights the impact of Türkiye in the Sahel region. Nonetheless, the independent variable is "the Sahel region" where Türkiyeis developing socio-economic and political relationships, and "strategy" is the dependent variable in the research because the achievement of this policy will depend on it. However, Burkina Faso is the intervening variable in the research since it sparked the interest of the study.

1.5. Structure of the thesis

In addition to the introduction part where the structure, research aims, questions, relevance, and methodology of the thesis are underlined, this study will present a literature review and theoretical understanding of Turkish foreign policy and then be structured around three parts as follows: The first part presents Africa and the Sahel region in Turkish government agenda on one hand and the socio-economic realities of the Sahel countries on the other hand. However, the second part will go into findings and subject analysis by underlining Türkiye's low political power strategies in the region. Indeed, this part will address the political, humanitarian, and sociocultural strategies established by the Turkish government to develop its relations in the region. However, the second part will address Türkiye's high political strategies in the region by looking at Türkiye's economic and security engagement in the region. In addition to the conclusion, the last part will look at the different challengers threatening Türkiye and the Sahel countries' relations while gathering people's opinions from a focus group on the future of the Turkish Maarif Foundation. In Burkina Faso, the Turkish government is seeking ways and means to promote the country's cultural interests through the Maarif Foundation which is already present in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Indeed, this part will look at the challengers of Turkish foreign policy in the region by taking Burkina Faso as a case study where the Turkish Maarif Foundation is absent which could help to promote sustainable development in the locality thereby strengthening the relationship between the two countries. However, the activities of the Turkish Maarif Foundation in the Sahel region go in line with UN Millennium Development Goal in education (Akgün and Özkan, 2020). This goal aims to end poverty through education for all children in

developing countries. Indeed, Olivia Giovetti an American journalist noted that "*most adults living in poverty today missed out on basic education and education can open the door to jobs, resources, and skills that help a person not only survive but thrive"* (Giovetti, 2022). Therefore, education is a step toward sustainable development for the Sahel country and Türkiye had taken it as a strategy to improve its relations with the countries of the region.

1.6. Limitations

There are limited resources on Turkish foreign policy strategies in the African Sahel region. This thesis represents an important contribution to the development of the relationship between Türkiye and the countries of the region mainly Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger thereby forming the Sahel G5 bloc. This thesis also marks an important shift from one-sided political literature between the west and the rest by focusing on the relationship between Türkiye and the countries in the Sahel area. In addition, this study is limited but could be extended by comparing the Turkish foreign strategies toward two different countries on the continent. Indeed, the thesis could be conducted between Somalia and Niger from East Africa and West Africa to identify the similarities and differences in the bilateral relations approach. Therefore, this study invites other researchers to fill the gap by viewing the subject from another angle. Today, the ongoing post-covid-19 economic situation in the world and Türkiye is a subject of debate and can negatively impact the aims and objectives of Turkish foreign policy in the region.

1.7. LITERATURE REVIEW

1.8. Overview

Considering the recent social, economic, and security actions of Türkiye in Africa, it is important to look at the Turkish foreign policy strategies and their aims in the Sahel region. Indeed, the rapid spread of terrorism and the ongoing human trafficking and migrant smuggling to Europe via the region is nowadays raising the interest of international state actors, and international institutions including France, Russia, and the United States as well as the United Nations and the European Union. In the region, the country is engaged in different security cooperation with regional actors and international actors. In this regard, Turkish foreign policy strategies in the Sahel region are shifting

from low politics to high politics. This article focuses on the strategies implemented by Türkiye in bringing economic, social, and security stability to this part of the continent. Furthermore, the aim of this article is to show that Türkiye is breaking down the economic, social, and security status quo established earlier by western countries in the region. But the objectives of this writing are to assess the role of Türkiyeas a new actor in the region that can help African Sahel countries to regain peace and economic progress. The stance of this study is to raise awareness about the aims and objectives of Türkiye in the Sahel region by taking Burkina Faso as a case study.

1.9. Defining and Conceptualizing Foreign Policy Strategies

In the area of International Relations theories, the term foreign policy strategies are well known and broadly discussed by scholars as well as states' authorities. Indeed, it appears as techniques and processes that states establish to pursue their interests with other states. According to Valerie M. Hudson, foreign policy strategies refer to *"the strategies or approaches chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities"* (Hudson, 2008). By trying to implement its strategies over other states, they adopt different postures known as behavior to achieve their goals. States emphasize cooperation and diplomacy rather than intervention. The first idea falls into the framework of low politics to deal with the issue of humanitarian, political, and sociocultural in international relations. The second option is dealing with the survival of the state and therefore, calling for high politics where military intervention and economic cooperation are alternatively required. In the case of Turkish foreign policy strategies in the Sahel region and Burkina Faso, both low politics and high politics are implemented to achieve the country's interest. According to Keyman, the Turkish foreign policy strategies in the last two decades are characterized by the principle of "Moral realism" (Keyman, 2017). This principle is shaped by military engagement and humanitarian norms to promote Turkish interest in international affairs. In this respect, the Turkish military and Non-Governmental Organizations' cooperation for peace and development in international politics highlights the principle of realism and liberalism theories. These theories are known to be the dominant international relations theories. Realists such as Thomas Hobbes and Hans Morgenthau are in favor of state dominance rather than other international actors in an international system where anarchy is fundamental. However,

different theories including dependence theory, structuralism, and neorealism are also important in helping to understand TTürkiye'si behavior in the Sahel region.

1.10. Theoretical Understanding of Turkish Policy Strategies in the Sahel Region

For several decades, theories have become particularly important in explaining interstate relations. This research paper finds it necessary in the domain of International Relations studies to make a theoretical analysis of the Turkish foreign policy strategies in the Sahel region. In the principle of International Relations, realism, liberalism, and constructivism theories are panacea depicting the relations of great powers. Dependency theory helps to understand the relationship between developed and developing countries in International Relations. This study becomes particularly complex when trying to analyse the actions of an emerging power such as Türkiye in the Sahel region. According to Donelli: "*Turkey is an emerging power attempting to depict a different image to promote itself abroad, a portrait that is able to overcome the declining notoriety of recent years*" (Donelli, 2019:11). To this end, this study looks at Türkiye not only as an emerging power but also as a revisionist state which seeks to change the status quo in the region. Nonetheless, this part will attempt to understand the behavior of Türkiye in the Sahel region by using structuralism and neorealism as the appropriate approaches.

1.10.1. Structuralism

Structuralism is the refinement of Marxism and focuses on the structure of the global economic system. Indeed, structuralist such as Noam Chomsky believes that the unfair and exploitative current global capitalist system can be fair. In addition, they are against imperialism and the neo-colonialism system of western countries over southern countries. Indeed, "*structuralism is the grounds for moral critique of inequality and exploitation that capitalism produces within and between countries…. It allows us to view international political economy (IPE) from the perspective of the oppressed classes, the poor, and the developing Third World nations*" (Balaam and Dillman, 2014:79). Structuralists hold the view that the dependence theory between the core and the peripherals countries in the global political economy enslaves the developing countries of the developed countries. This dependence is based on colonial, financial, and multinational corporation systems established by powerful nations for their own interests.

Therefore, the European countries need raw materials from the Sahel countries to continue their economic and technological development. Considering this, Sahel countries will face difficulties to develop. Indeed, Wallerstein thinks that developing nations are not free to choose courses of action, indeed, they are determined to follow a structural system (Balaam and Dillman, 2014)

Structuralists believe that states exercise power over other states through ideology. Therefore, powerful states use education and communications media to legitimate their actions through people's hearts and minds and de facto convince people that the system is appropriate and just for them. Therefore, the socio-cultural activities of Turkish foreign policy actors such as Maarif foundation schools and Diyanet Vakfi in the region highlight the Turkish ideological power influence in the region. Certainly, Türkiye is looking at the situation in the Sahel region through the lens of a structuralist approach blaming the colonial policies of developing nations in developing countries. This argument is supported by Haşimi who thinks that poor people are victims of global injustice caused by mistaken policies of strong states and Türkiye naturally must help them in response to its new global political vision (Haşimi, 2014). However, there is a paradox between the natural resources within these countries and their level of development to the extent that one must ask where the Uranium in Niger on one hand, and the gold in Burkina Faso go? Nonetheless, the French multinational company, AREVA exports 60% of the total Uranium needs from Niger to France (Tertrais, 2014). In addition, Burkina Faso is producing twenty-eight tons of gold annually. (Vedie, 2020). Despite these natural resources these countries failed to develop and are exploited by international powerful states. This argument is also supported by the Turkish current president Tayyip Erdoğan during his recent visit to Angola on October 19^{th,} 2021. He asserts: "*Sadly, African natural resources have been exploited by the west. Indeed, France uses Africa as a colonial continent*" (CNN Turk, 2021). Considering this, Ankara addressed structuralist discourses to dispart itself from the west and called for win-win cooperation with the countries of the continent.

1.10.2. Neorealism

Unlike structuralists, neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt differently explain state behavior in the international system. They believe that the international system is anarchy and lacks central authority (Waltz, 1979). Accordingly, the best way

of state survival is neither power maximization nor security maximization but wealth maximization. Maximizing wealth help to invest in the military. However, a state can maximize wealth through cooperation and trade activities. Considering Turkish foreign policy strategies in the Sahel region, neorealists will assume that the economic activities establish between Türkiye and the Sahel countries aims to maximize economic profits through trade and cooperation maximize for survival ends. Maximizing economic. However, neorealists believe that the international system is formed by a few great powers each seeking to survive on its own. In addition, they believe that most of the time, weaker states prefer to balance against powerful states rather than a bandwagon to ensure their survival. Certainly, Türkiye is likely to implement a balance of power theory in the region by allying with the weaker states according to Türkiye's president's words in his last meeting in Angola (CNN Turk, 2021). In the same condition, weak states (Sahel countries) will prefer to balance rather than bandwagon for self-preservation and the protection of the values already possessed (Schweller, 1994). International relations theorists help to understand the relationship between states in the international system. However, the presence of Turkish diplomatic, humanitarian, and socioeconomic in the Sahel region is based on the Turkish government agenda which will be discussed in what follows.

PART ONE: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN SAHEL REGION: AGENDA AND REALITY

2.1. Introduction

Part one of this thesis examines the evolution of Turkish foreign policy in the Sahel region as well as the socioeconomic realities of a limited number of the countries forming the Sahel G5 bloc. Türkiye established political, economic, and cultural institutions in line with its 1998 "opening to Africa" policy agenda in the region where France, Russia, the EU, and other international actors have been very active in promoting cooperation and development for more than a decade.

2.2. The African Sahel Region in Turkish Foreign Policy Agenda

The year 2005 is declared to be "The year of Africa" by the Turkish government and marks the beginning of a new era for Türkiye and Africa in terms of political, economic, and cultural relations. Hence, Türkiye aims to diversify both the areas and the tools of its foreign policy with its own styles of promoting politics, economics, social, and defense partnerships with the countries in the continent (Özcan, 2017). Over the last two decades, Türkiye presented itself as a particular regional and global actor different from traditional European powers in terms of politics, economics, and security policy in Africa (Dahir, 2021). The current government has recently extended its foreign policy strategies from Eastern Africa to Western Africa and beyond. The idea of extending the area of Turkish foreign policy dates to the years before the Justice and Development era. In the framework of Turkish foreign policy strategies toward Africa, the Northern part of the continent has long and historical relations with Türkiye due to the Ottoman Empire. This Empire could not stretch up to an early age and the current Turkish authority has fought the means to spread politics, economics, and socio-cultural relations to the rest of the continent. In the Eastern part of Africa, Türkiye has taken advantage of the 2010s humanitarian and security situation in Somalia to propel itself into the international system. Indeed, the international community values the role of the Turkish government in Somalia in terms of economic development and humanitarian assistance (Van den Berg and Meester, 2019). In 2020, the bilateral assistance to Somalia was estimated at 25,98 Million Dollars. Nonetheless, Türkiye has developed a selective political and security strategy in Somalia which jeopardize the unity between Mogadishu and Somaliland (Cannon, 2021).

In the Sahel zone, Türkiye has rapidly developed economic, political, social, and security relations with the countries of the region under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). In the early 2010s, Türkiye established diplomatic missions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali Mauritania, and Niger to strengthen its relations with the region. These countries gained their independence from France in the 1960s but continue to maintain economic, political, and security partnerships with their former colonial master. The Sahel region is today the center of many issues including terrorism, refugees, drought, famine, political instabilities, etc. The presence of Turkish politics, economics, and sociocultural actors in the Sahel does not come as a major surprise according to the current situation in the Sahel region on one hand and the compliance of the Turkish government to redefine the country's international identity on the pro-Western state to an active and global actor on other hand (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). The Turkish government has recently developed significant relations in this part of the continent. These relations are based on bilateral and multilateral collaborations with the countries of the region on one hand and the institutions of the continent on the other hand. This situation has sparked the interest of other international actors such as Russia, the US, the United Nations, and the European Union. Indeed, the presence of Türkiye in this part of the continent in terms of politics, economics, and security strategies lets foresee momentum for partnership with the countries on one hand and obstructer for western powers on the other hand. But the Turkish government has shown its interest to develop political, economic, social, and security partnerships with countries, regional organizations, and international organizations within the region.

In the context of this research, the focus will be on the politics, economics, socio-cultural, and defense strategies elements directing the Turkish foreign policy in this belt of land. To these ends, it is necessary for the first line to define the Sahel region by giving a list of countries on one hand and examining the socioeconomic situation prevailing in the region on other hand. Moreover, the study will show the strategies established by Türkiye to implement its foreign policy in the region by stressing the evolution of Turkish main diplomatic, economic, and sociocultural actors which are flag bearers of Turkish relations in the continent.


In Burkina Faso, Turkish foreign policy is characterized by a double standard option and focuses on four priorities: Turkish airlines, national companies, Turkish multinational

companies, and Turkish humanitarian assistance. In addition to these priorities, this study will expand on the future of the Turkish Maarif foundation in the country.

2.3. Sahel Countries and Socio-Economic Realities

The interest bore by international actors in the African Sahel region is as very important as its area. The Sahel region covers an area of about five thousand kilometers belt of land below the Sahara Desert and stretches from Africa's Atlantic coast to the Red Sea (UNDP, 2015). This belt of land envelops some countries in Northern and Western Africa on one hand and Central and Eastern Africa on the other hand. The Western African countries that fall under the Sahel region are Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. Moreover, Cameroon and Chad are the two Central African countries counted among the list of countries in the Sahel region. Furthermore, the countries representing Eastern Africa in the region are Sudan and Eritrea. However, Mauritania and to some extent Algeria are on the list. The below figure shows the countries of the Sahel within the African continent.

Figure: 1: African Sahel region



Source: Sahel region, Africa (2017).

These countries are independent and undertaking unilateral as well as multilateral relations with the Turkish current government. Nonetheless, this chapter aims to analyse the general situation in the Sahel thereby shortening the list to five countries including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. These countries failed to develop since their independence due to diverse factors and de facto share the same fate in terms of security and socio-economic development. Indeed, most of the population in the region has difficulties accessing clean water, electricity, good sanitation, good infrastructure, and good communications technology (Kwasi and al, 2019).

2.3.1. Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso is a part of the Sahel region with an area of 272.967 km^2 and populated by 21.497.096 persons with a 2.89 percent of Growth rate in 2021. This population is very young and nearly half of it is under 15 years old (World Population Review, 2021). However, nearly 40 percent of the population live below the poverty line and more than 65 percent of the people over the age of fifteen are not literate. Furthermore, the GDP of the country is 18,3 billion USD and the trade balance is in general deficit (World Bank 2021). The mining industry represents 10,85 percent of the GDP and is the country's leading export product. Cotton is the second-largest export product characterized by 4 percent of the country's GDP (AIB, 2019). In addition to this low economic development, the country since 2015 is faced with an ongoing terrorist threat thereby hampering its development. Indeed, the country currently has 1.501.775 internally displaced people including 61.48 percent of children, 22.39 percent of women, and 16.13 percent of men (Chahed, 2022). The security situation of the country has created political instability where the 2020 elected president was overthrown by the national army on January 24^{th,} 2022. This military regime was recently in turn overthrown by a young military junta that aims to work with different partners for security, stability, and the development of the country. This situation threatens the interests of the traditional economic, social, and security partners of the country.

2.3.2. Chad

The Republic of Chad is a part of the Sahel region with an area of 1,284,000 km^2 and is populated by 16,43 million people. The growth rate is estimated at 3 percent and about 46.49 percent of the population is under fifteen years old. However, nearly 32 percent of the population over the age of fifteen can read and write, and approximately, 63 percent of the population is living in poverty (World population review. 2020). The country has one of the lowest life expectancies in the world (52 years) (Kwasi and al, 2019). The economic activities of the country are dominated by the exportation of Crude Petroleum. However, the country displayed a GDP of 10,829 billion USD in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). Like Burkina Faso, the Republic of Chad is confronted with terrorism and natural disaster that caused an internal displacement of more than 360.000 Chadians in 2020 thereby hindering its development (UN info, 2020). Unlike Burkina Faso, Chad is led by

the son of the deceased president Idriss Deby since April 20th, 2021, with the objective to ensure a peaceful political transition in the country.

2.3.3. Mali

The Republic of Mali is a part of the belt of land characterizing the Sahel region with an area of 1.246.814 km^2. The country had 20.933.072 people in 2020 with a GDP estimated at 19,55 billion USD in 2021 (World Bank, 2021). The population is characterized by its youthful age where more than 50 percent of the population is under the age of 18 (UNICEF, 2021). However, the unemployment rate in the country is 14 percent in 2020 and about 45 percent of the population is poor with 66 percent of illiterate adults (Afrobarometer, 2020). The primary economic activity of Mali is agriculture and the mining sector which contributes to 10 percent of the country's GDP (La Tribune Afrique, 2021). Since 2012, the country has embarked on a series of internal crises including military coups and terrorist attacks. In this stage, the country has registered more than 358.212 displaced people in 2021 (OCHA, 2021). Like Burkina Faso, the security dilemma in Mali created a popular uprising and military coup in the country in 2020. Thus, the country is subjected to sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the international community.

2.3.4. Mauritania

Mauritania is counted among the Sahel countries with an area of 1.030.700 km^2 and is occupied by more than 4 million people (FIDA, 2020). This population is young, and 40% percent are under 15 years old, and they are almost unemployed. The literacy rate in Mauritania is low and nearly 53 percent of the people ages 15 and above can read and write (World Bank, 2020). However, the GDP of the country is 9,239 million USD in 2021 and the mining sector is one of the engines of the economy (IMF, 2021). Fishing is one of the most important economic activities with 25% of the country's exportation (Kwasi and al, 2019). Unlike other Sahel countries, Mauritania has shown significant resistance to terrorist attacks. Indeed, the last terrorist attacks in Mauritania dated in February 2011 and were perpetrated by the AQMI group in Nouakchott. Since then, the government has taken measures to secure its borders and its population. Unlike Mali, Mauritania has been experiencing political stability since June 2019 under the newly elected president Mohamed Ould Cheich El Ghazouani.

2.3.5. Niger

Niger is another country on the list that occupies an area of 1.27 million km^2 and is populated by nearly 24 million people in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). However, the literacy rate remains low, and only 26,56 percent of people at age 15 and above can read and write (USAID, 2017). Like other Sahel countries, the population of Niger is young and nearly 58 percent of people are under 18 years old (UNICEF, 2020). The country has one of the highest fertility rates in the world at seven births per woman in 2019 (Kwasi and al, 2019). The country's GDP was estimated at 13.68 billion US dollars in 2020 and nearly 40 percent of its population is living in poverty (World Bank, 2020). Since 1971, the country is one of the leading countries in Uranium production in the world with more than four thousand tonnes (Tertrais, 2014). Today, Niger has faced insecurity due to terrorism and more than 249.945 people were forced to leave their villages in 2021 (UNHCR Niger, 2021). In addition to insecurity, poor governance has recently provoked a popular demonstration in the country.

2.4. Historical Realities: From AOF to Sahel G5 Bloc

The establishment of the Sahel G5 countries is for France the symbol of a revival of its colonial empire in Africa and the expression of nostalgia for the colonial period. Historically, the region is known for its famous library in Timbuktu, its richest man in human history Mansa Musa, and the place of Ghana, Mali, Songhay, and Kanem Bornu Empire (Walther and Retaillé, 2011). However, the 1885 Berlin conference provoked the creation of the AOF (Afrique Occidentale Française or French Western Africa) and AEF (Afrique Equatoriale Française or French Equatorial Africa) by France in the Sahel region for politics and economic purposes. Indeed, the AOF was created in 1895 with countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, etc. However, the AEF was formed by countries like Chad, Cameroon, Central republic, Gabon, etc. In the 1960s, these countries became independent from France but signed multiple agreements with their former colonial master in different areas including security, economic and cultural. In the area of security, France signed military cooperation with the countries in the Sahel region in terms of military intelligence and mutual consultation and established three military units in Mauritania, Mali, and Niger in the 1960s (Ongouya, 1980). Today, this cooperation has evolved in different ways according to the needs of the security context of each country. In the area of economics, the countries of the region are members of the

CFA franc zone except for Mauritania. Indeed, the CFA franc is a currency designed in France in 1945 and is today tied to the Euro at a fixed exchange rate (1 Euro equals 655.957 CFA). In addition, many multinational French companies are very active in the region including AREVA in Niger for Uranium extraction, and Shell and Total for fuel distribution. In the area of culture, the countries of the regions have adopted the French language as their official language.

Today, the Sahel G5 bloc formed with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger is the combination of the countries from the AOF and the AEF for security and development principles. This bloc was created in 2014 in Nouakchott by the state governments for security and development in the region. However, the Sahel G5 bloc has been supported by France to the extent that it is seen by many scholars as the founding father of this organization (International Crisis Group, 2017). From colonization to decolonization, France has tried to federate the countries of the region through military, economic, and cultural strategies to maintain its relations with its former colonies. Indeed, the AOF, CFA franc zone, and the Sahel G5 bloc are some key elements of France's foreign policy elements in the region.

2.5. Main Economic Activities in the Sahel Region

Despite the immense potential in human and natural resources, the development of Sahel countries depends on international institutions (IMF and World Bank) assistance. Agriculture and livestock are the main activities of the population in the region. These activities occupy more than 70% of the population in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger and over 50% in Mauritania. The population of this region regularly cultivates food crops such as cowpea, millet, and sorghum. However, cotton and groundnuts are cultivated for sale (cash crops). The arable land is very low and estimated at one and a half tonnes per hectare and the agricultural performances mainly depend on seasonal rains (Kwasi and al, 2019). In addition, farming, and pastoralism represent approximately 40% of the GDP of the countries in the zone (Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). Indeed, the population in the Sahel region is breeding sheep, goats, and cattle for consumption and for exportation.

Table 1. Shareholding of the agricultural population and agriculture performance in the Sahel countries

Country/ Agriculture and livestock	Burkina Faso	Chad	Mali	Mauritania	Niger
Population	82%	80%	79%	41%	87%
GDP	35%	25%	33%	25%	40%

Sources: France Ministry of Agriculture and Food Sovereignty, (2022).

The above table shows the percentage of the population of Sahel countries in Agriculture and livestock on one hand and the participation of these activities in the countries' economy on other hand. These activities represent the lifeblood of the economy of the region according to the number of people involved in the sector. However, the coexistence between agriculturalists and herdsmen has not been peaceful and recurrent conflict threatens the social stability in the region.

2.6. Ethnic problems and corruption

In addition to the economic conflict between agriculturists and herdsmen, ethnic problems and corruption are the main ills in Sahel society. Indeed, these problems are very common in all sectors of political, and social-economic activities in the region. Already at the time of independence, the republic of Chad faced a major problem between the Arab Muslims of the North and the Christians of the south that broke out in a civil war in Chad in 1980 (Joffe, 1982). In the same way, the post-independent Mauritanian society is divided into Arab and black Africans which led to a series of tension in the country between 1966 and 2011. (Boukhars, 2012). In the 1990s, the northern part of the republic of Mali is challenged by a secessionist Tuareg ethnic group for an independent state (Lecoq and Klute, 2013). In 2018, the terrorist attacks in Yirgou in Burkina Faso broke out into an ethnic conflict between the Mossi and Fulani group which cost the lives of 270 people in the village (Hagbert and al, 2019).

Corruption is one of the main problems that threaten the development of the countries in the region. Indeed, corruption is present in both the public and the private sectors of the Sahelian society. In the Sahel region, corruption is more practiced in public services including health, education, and the judiciary, and the countries have the lowest score according to Transparency International. Indeed, bribery is commonly practiced at all

levels in Burkina Faso, and police officers, public officials, teachers, and health workers are most likely to solicit bribes from the people (Ardigo, 2019). In 2018, Transparency International has checked the level of public sector corruption in 180 countries around the world and the Sahel countries displayed a low score. This low score highlights the gravity of the situation on one hand and the consequences of the practice on other hand. Indeed, corruption decreases democracy including accountability, political campaign, and free and fair elections. Table 2 shows that all the countries of the region have scored less than 50 and thereby expressing the low place of these countries in the world corruption perceptions index. Indeed, corruption affects the countries' economic growth and is an obstacle to rule of law.

Table 2: Corruption perceptions Index in the Sahel countries

Country	Burkina Faso	Chad	Mali	Mauritania	Niger
Score	41	19	32	27	34
Rank	78	165	120	144	114

Source: Transparency International, (2018).

2.7. Sahel region: Origin and Transit Route for Illegal migrants to Europe

In addition to ethnic problems and corruption, irregular migration to Europe is another challenge in the Sahel. Recently, the Sahel region has become the main origin and transit route for sub-Saharan young African migrants to Europe in search of better living conditions. In 2014, Mali was among the top three countries of departure for migrants to Europe with 10.000 migrants. In addition, the city of Agadez in Niger is the main transit place for African migrants to Europe with more than 250.000 migrants in 2016. According to statistics, 84% of sub-Saharan countries' international migrants originate from the ECOWAS area (Raineri and Rossi, 2017). From the Sahel region, they reach Italy and Spain through the Maghreb countries and the Mediterranean Sea. Many young Sahelian migrants left their countries due to a lack of job opportunities, basic human rights, social services, and general insecurity (Kwasi and al, 2019).

The economic and social consequences of irregular African young migrants to Europe are disastrous. In Europe, illegal migration through the Sahel region to European countries threatens the stability and development of Europe. The 2015 "refugee crisis" in Europe

led to the establishment of the EUCAP Sahel Niger in 2016 in response to the EU's broader security strategy toward illegal migration (Lebovich, 2018). In the Sahel region, the departure of youth provokes depopulation of rural areas on one hand and reduces agricultural production in villages on other hand. In addition, many young Sahelians have recently perished in the Mediterranean on their way to Europe.

2.8. Türkiye and Sahel Countries Relationship Before the Justice and Development Party

Before the Justice and Development Party, the Turkish foreign policy was directed by Türkiye's early Republican Party policy known as "Peace at home, peace in the world". Indeed, Türkiye was very concerned with internal problems including the Kurdish issue, border security, economic problem, secularism, and democracy. For this reason, Türkiye brought less attention to problems in Africa at an early age. Nonetheless, Türkiye is a founding member of the UN and therefore supports freedom and combating injustice. In fact, Türkiye supported the decolonization process in Africa and Asia. Türkiye recognized on behalf of the United Nations the independence of the new African states during the 1960s. Even though Türkiye did not show a big interest to establish economic, political, and economic relations with these new states in the Sahel, it established its first diplomatic mission without the region in 1962 in Lagos (Nigeria) (Daban, 2021).

Table 3: Turkish diplomatic missions in sub-Sahara Africa between 1960 and 2002

Countries	Opening Year	Current Ambassador
Ghana	1964 (Closed in 1981 and reopened in 2010)	Nesrin Bayazıt
Nigeria	1962	Hidayet Bayraktar
Senegal	1963	Ahmet Kavas
Kenya	1968	Ahmet Cemil Miroğlu
Democratic Republic of Congo	1976	Salih Boğaç Güldere
Somalia	1981	Olgan Bekar
Tanzania	1981	Ali Davutoğlu
South Africa	1994	Elif Çomoğlu Ülgen

Source: Daban, and Republic of Türkiye Foreign Affairs, (2021).

The above table displayed the Turkish diplomatic mission in sub-Saharan Africa between the years 1960 and 2002. Indeed, Türkiye established only eight Turkish diplomatic missions in sub-Saharan Africa during this period to mark its presence within the continent with less influence in terms of economics and humanitarian activities. However, this table shows that Türkiye did not establish a diplomatic mission in the Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) during this period. This region did not constitute an area of interest for the Turkish government before the 2000s. Certainly, Türkiye did not develop any economic, or cultural relations with the countries of the region before the Justice and Development Party and their relations are at their lowest point if not inexistent.

2.8. Reasons for Paradigm Shift Under the Justice and Development Party

In the last two decades, there is a general trend of increased African middle class and a growing demand for both qualities of human and physical capital. The authorities from these countries aim to improve urbanization, infrastructure, education systems, roads, health systems, clean water problems, and promote access to energy, and the internet. In 2018, only 21% and 69 % of the Sahel population had respectively access to improve sanitation and access to clean water (Kwasi and al, 2019). The recent rapid growth of Turkish political, economic, and cultural institutions in Africa and the Sahel region shows that Türkiye is not only making up for some very lost time in its relations with the continent but also is taking action to meet the increasing demand. In the 2000s, Türkiye accelerated its relations. In three years, the Justice and Development Party leaders have established five diplomatic missions and many business companies in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. This could be down to both economic and geostrategic reasons: Economically, the arrival in power of the Justice and Development Party led to significant economic growth in the first decade in Türkiye (Fradkin & Libby, 2013). This situation has shifted Turkish foreign policy strategies not only in the region but also in the world. Indeed, in the first decade, the government had enough resources to support external investments and provide humanitarian assistance to the countries in trouble. However, Türkiye is motivated to improve its economic growth by searching for new economic partners, new market opportunities, and natural resources from the Sahel countries through its multi-dimension foreign policy agenda.

Geostrategically, the Sahel region is coveted by many actors with various aims. Indeed, rebel groups, terrorists, and armed bands are the main sources of insecurity in the region. However, government and non-government organizations are those actors working to restore peace and development in the region (Somda, 2019). Nonetheless, Türkiyesupports the countries against insecurity in the region through the Sahel G5 bloc and therefore works for its security and development. However, the country's economic and military cooperation with Niger demonstrates the presence of an emerging competitor to international powers in the region.

2.9. The Core Components of Türkiye and Sahel Countries' Relations


Turkish Development Assistance in the Sahel region is based on five strategies: diplomatic strategies, humanitarian assistance, sociocultural development, and economic, and security cooperation. These strategies, however, come into account of the Turkish government's Official Development Assistance approach to developing countries. The development assistance strategy is the core component of the country's strategy and is implemented in two different forms depending on the situation. The first strategy is the Official Development Assistance (ODA) made by the Turkish government to promote development in the region. This strategy is operating in two forms including Bilateral Official Assistance (BOA) and Multilateral Official Assistance (MOA). According to the 2016 Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) report, the Turkish BOA in Africa was estimated at 102,64 Million including 12,91 million dollars in the Sahel region in 2018 (TIKA, 2016). The second strategy, however, is the Non-Official Development Assistance made by Turkish independent actors including NGOs and third parties. This Non-Official Development Assistance is complex and involves sometimes personal initiative, therefore, is out of official control and does not generate accurate data. This research paper will focus on both Turkish ODA strategies in the Sahel countries and Non-Official Development Assistance to understand Turkish foreign policy strategies and objectives.

Table 4 and figure 2: Turkish ODA in the Sahel countries in 2019

Table 4

Countries	Burkina Faso	Chad	Mali	Mauritania	Niger
Million Dollars	0,89	3,59	2,46	0,57	5,40

Figure 2



Sources: Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, (2019).

Figures 2 represent the Turkish Official Development Assistance in the Sahel region in millions of US dollars in 2019. According to this table, Türkiye has invested 5,40 million US dollars in Niger for different projects including clean water, sanitation, and education. In the same year, Türkiye disbursed 6,05 million US dollars to support development projects in Chad and Mali. From this table, Türkiye has invested less in Mauritania and Burkina Faso compared to Niger with less than 1,5 million US dollars in the two countries. In 2015, Türkiye was awarded as the second largest donor of humanitarian assistance in terms of the ratio of assistance to national income (Venkatachalam, 2019). For this reason, this investment in Niger shows that the humanitarian situation in Niger is

worse than in the other countries in the region. In addition, this investment in Niger shows also that the relationship between Türkiye and Niger is in good shape and favors diverse investment and cooperation. In contrast, the humanitarian situation in Mauritania and Burkina Faso is less critical than Niger and this expresses the low amount of investment in these countries. However, figure 4 shows the percentage of Türkiye's investments in the same year. This figure helps to clearly show the representation of Turkish investment in the countries in millions of US dollars. As result, Niger is the country with the highest rate (42%) of Turkish ODA in the region, and Mauritania and Burkina Faso have received the lowest rate (4% and 7%) of Turkish ODA in the region. Nonetheless, the living conditions of people in the Sahel region particularly in the rural areas are very hard due to global warming including regular droughts and famine. Taking this situation into account, Türkiye has developed low political strategies to assess the problems in the region in line with its foreign policy vision which will be discussed in the following parts.

PART TWO: TURKISH LOW POLITICS STRATEGIES IN THE SAHEL REGION

3.1. Introduction

This section examines Türkiye's low political strategies in the Sahel region and Burkina Faso while considering instruments of power in International Relations known as diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian forces. In addition, this section will show how Türkiye uses international relations instruments in the region to strengthen its relations with the people of the region on one hand and the state's authorities on another hand. The aim of the session is to provide a theoretical evaluation of Turkish low political strategies in the region. Indeed, low politics refer to state affairs that are not necessarily vital to the survival of the state. This study considers, political, humanitarian, and sociocultural actions are not necessarily determinants for the survival of the state. Nonetheless, Türkiye's low strategies in the Sahel region are unique compared to European powers. Indeed, Türkiye's foreign policy discourse is based on an apolitical approach and benevolent partnership (Venkatachalam, 2019). This approach distinguishes itself from western countries' approaches which have a colonial history with the countries of the region by rejecting any form of coercion in its exercise. In fact, Turkish foreign policy actors are dispersedly invested in the region in the humanitarian sphere. This sphere is the most essential element of Turkish strategies and appears as the direct answer to many basic people's needs in the region. Indeed, humanitarian aid is more than necessary in the region due to the recurring famine caused by the drought and the advancing desert. In addition to the hardship of the weather, the phenomenon of terrorism has caused insecurity and refugee camps in the region which necessitate immediate humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian aid in the region takes many forms including foods distributions, health services, water wells, education facilities, and orphans' projects.

Low politics can be associated with the concept of soft power in international relations theories. The two concepts are quite different but exclude coercive interstates relations. Indeed, Türkiye developed non-coercive relations based on diplomatic, humanitarian, and sociocultural actions undertaken by Turkish diplomats and NGOs in the region and Burkina Faso. The Turkish soft power relationship in the region is diverse in both form and substance and is characterized by individual policy rather than group policy (Dodo, 2016). The soft power relation implemented in Burkina Faso is like other countries in the

Sahel but is getting less investment than theirs in terms of humanitarian assistance, education facilities, and economics. Indeed, the most important Turkish humanitarian actions in the country are based on basic needs. This action aims to provide long and short-term humanitarian projects to provide better living conditions to people. But this action toward the country clearly falls short of people's and government's expectations according to the existing realities within the region.

3.2. Diplomatic Strategies

Turkish foreign policy strategies in Africa in general and the Sahel countries are based on diplomatic strategies. In 2008, the African countries including the Sahel supported ürkiye in gaining a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This position brings more power and reputation to Türkiye in the sphere of international politics (Aral, 2009). In the following years, Türkiye established diplomatic missions in the Sahel region to strengthen its relations with the countries of the region. This action could be seen as a mark of gratitude for their support of the victory of non-permanent members in the UNSC. In addition to diplomatic missions, Türkiye's liberal visa policy allows privileged Africans including scientists, leading figures, and businessmen to benefit from flexible Turkish e-visa (Açıkgöz, 2015). The relationship between Türkiye and the African Union (AU) on one hand and ECOWAS on the other hand facilitate the implementation of Turkish diplomatic strategies in the Sahel region. Indeed, Türkiye became an "observer status" and "strategic partner" at the AU. However, Türkiye is providing International Junior diplomats Training programs to the countries of the world including Sahel countries. (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). Besides this program, Türkiye initiates the Antalya Diplomacy Forum to bring countries together including Sahel countries to discuss issues related to socio-economic cooperation. Henceforth, Türkiye can rely on the support of Sahel countries in any eventual campaign for international politics.

3.3. Turkish Diplomatic Actors in the Region

In the annals of Turkish foreign policy, the relationship between Türkiye and the Sahel countries is made in the context of the Turkish authority to redefine the country's international identity from a pro-Western state to an active and global actor (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). The relationship between Türkiye and the listed above Sahel countries was

drowned up recently with the establishment of different political representations in different capitals of the regions in response to the aims and objectives of the Turkish current government. Since 2005, this government aimed at increasing its diplomatic relations with Africa by diversifying its foreign policy option (Özcan, 2017). Among these five countries, Bamako is the first capital city to inaugurate a Turkish embassy in the Sahel in 2010 under the leadership of Kemal Kaygısız. Today, the interests of Türkiye in Mali are defended by Murat Mustafa Onart since 2018. However, Nouakchott in Mauritania is the second capital city to receive Turkish authorities in the region. Therefore, in 2011 Musa Kulaklıkaya was assigned to guarantee the interests of Türkiye in Mauritania. This mission is assured by Mehmet Cem Kahyaoğlu since 2019. In the Sahel, Türkiye's International Identity operated on the same principle in 2012 with two new embassies in Ouagadougou and in Niamey. Aydin Sefa Akay is the first Turkish ambassador in Ouagagoudou and Nilgül Erdem Arı is the current Turkish official representative in Burkina Faso. In Niamey, Hasan Ulusoy set up the basis of Turkish relations and Mustafa Türker Arı ensure the sustainability of these actions since 2019. Following the establishment of Turkish representatives in Ouagagoudou and Niamey, N'Djamena is the last city in the region to hold Turkish political representation. Therefore, Ahmet Kavas was sent in 2013 to represent the Turkish government in Chad but today this function is assured by Kemal Kaygısız since 2020. These state authorities aim to promote a sustainable relationship between Türkiye and these countries by defending their country's interests at political, economic, and cultural levels. Türkiye's commitment to reorienting its International Identity is also characterized by the recent visit of Türkiye's President Tayyip Erdoğan to Chad in 2017, and to Mali and Mauritania in 2018. However, Türkiye's foreign minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu made a diplomatic visit to Niger in July 2020 (Republic of Türkiye Foreign Affairs, 2020). Nonetheless, the quick spread of Turkish representations in the region in the last decade underlines the principle of "Domino Theory" not in ideological means but in political and economic aims. But none of the Turkish government officials had visited Burkina Faso and this put into question the relationship between these two countries.

3.4. Turkish Humanitarian Strategies: Main Actors and Activities

In the humanitarian sphere, Türkiye has already proven its worth in Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, etc. Indeed, the country is one of the top three donor countries in the world after

the UK and the US with US$ 1.6 billion in 2013 (Gilley, 2015). Consequently, Türkiye has successfully established a prominent humanitarian strategy in the Sahel region and Burkina Faso. This strategy is characterized by humanitarianism to provide assistance and better living conditions to the people of the region. However, this strategy is primarily the combination of both humanitarian aid and development aid. The humanitarian aid strategy develops through the concurrence of local authorities and aims to deal with emergency basic needs issues in the region to save people's lives.

Expanding the geographical scope and increasing the volume of official aid is an indispensable part of Ankara's proactive foreign policy (Haşimi, 2014). In the Sahel region, droughts and famines are permanent due to unfavourable climate conditions. Additionally, the Sahel countries suffer from terrorist attacks, economic vulnerabilities, inequality, and political instability. This situation necessitates an immediate humanitarian response and therefore fosters the implementation of Turkish humanitarian strategies. In fact, both Official and Non-Official Development Assistance policies are applied since they have the same end. In the context of Humanitarian aid, Türkiye's foreign policy institutions developed short-term actions in collaboration with the local partners of the region to help the people of the region. The actions are numerous and diverse and therefore extend to many areas including subsistence, and health care. In the area of subsistence, Türkiye's NGOs distribute food during the Ramadan period, the "Kurban" period organization as well as *"Adak", "Akika", and "Şükür",* etc. Kurban, *Adak, Akika, and Şükür"* are specific animals slaughtered for religious beliefs. Moreover, they currently organize missions for free cataract operations in the region. These aids are personal and temporary initiatives but have a positive impact on the people of the region.

The humanitarian-development aid strategies in contrast seek to deal with the problem of the region with a long-term plan. This strategy aims to combat poverty and bring change to the region. This strategy is gradually developing in the Sahel region with the presence of the Turkish Maarif foundation schools in Niger, Mali, Chad, and Mauritania. Moreover, Turkish local NGOs have provided many water wills and mosques to the people of the regions.

Türkiye's humanitarian strategies in the Sahel and Burkina Faso somehow respond to the basic needs of the people. This credit goes to Türkiye's civil society organizations which are committed to assisting vulnerable people with basic human needs in the Sahel zone

and Burkina Faso. The list of Turkish NGOs working in the Sahel is exceedingly long, but it is important to mention some popular names (see table 5).

Table 5: Türkiye's NGOs and activities in the Sahel Countries in 2018

Area of Interventions / Institutions (Humanitarian actors)	TIKA	IHH	YUNUS EMRE INSTITUTE	DIYANET FOUNDATION	MAHMUT HÜDAYİ ASSOCİATİON	SADAKAT ASİ
Educational aid	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Orphan projects	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Ramadan food packages and iftar distribution	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ration distribution projects	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Social infrastructure	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Hernia and cataract surgeries	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Education assistance project	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Eid al-Adha aid	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Water wells	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vocational and Technical training program	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No

Sources: Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, (2018).

Table 5 shows a list of Türkiye's main humanitarian institutions and organizations and their activities in the Sahel region. Their areas of activity are different and aim to reduce poverty by strengthening the relations between Türkiye and the countries of the region. However, these institutions and organizations are continually active in short-term plan projects such as Ramadan food packages and Eid al Adha[2] cattle meat distribution. In addition, they are regularly active in water well drilling which helps to reduce the problem of water in the region. Furthermore, TIKA is outstanding among the other actors for its long-term plan project activities such as training and infrastructure building in the region. Turkish foreign policy actors enable the international visibility of their country in this part of the continent and therefore favors the relations between the people on one hand and both government on the other hand.

[2] Eid al Adha: Islamic ceremony of sacrifice

The humanitarian aid and development aid strategies engagement of Turkish humanitarian actors in the region highlights the Turkish foreign policy's "Soft power" paradigm in International Relations. Türkiye Humanitarian intervention differs from humanitarian aid and development aid by its "illegitimate" character. Indeed, humanitarian intervention is a military intervention that aims to save the life of innocent people in other countries from massive violence. But this intervention is seen as an abusive action and the diktat of the powerful institution (Heraclides and Dialla, 2015). For instance, many humanitarian interventions took place around the world under the UN Security Council or not, in the Central African Republic in 1979, Rwanda in 1994, Kosovo in 1999, etc. However, 67% of the general ODA provided by Türkiye in 2014 was devoted to the humanitarian field (TIKA, 2014)

In Burkina Faso, Turkish humanitarian policy strategies are more focused on humanitarian aid rather than development aid strategies. Indeed, the humanitarian approach developed by Turkish humanitarian organizations in this country is extremely limited compared to Niger and Chad. Certainly, the Official Development Assistance provided by Türkiye to the country is insignificant in statistics at 0,89 Million USD compared to Niger's 5,4 Million USD (TIKA, 2019). However, this approach is also characterized by a "moral mission" and aims to support Muslim communities in the region. Indeed, "Türkiye's intervention in Africa is framed as a moral mission, on the grounds that its citizens alone can intervene meaningfully in lives of certain (Muslim) populations in vulnerable countries where Euro-Americans are socially and culturally inept" (Venkatachalam, 2019).

3.5. Socio-Cultural Strategies: Main Actors and Activities

Alongside the humanitarian strategies developed by Türkiye in the Sahel countries, social and cultural strategies are also important and need to be considered in the Turkish foreign policy agenda. Indeed, there are many Turkish institutions working to promote social and cultural activities in the Sahel countries. Among those TIKA, the Foundation for Human rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), and Diyanet Foundation are some main Turkish actors in the field (Akgün and Özkan, 2010). The activities are diverse, but education is the most significant and therefore arouses attention to the country's international education goals. The most prominent educational organization is the Maarif Foundation created in 2016 by the Turkish government to promote Turkish cultural

interests abroad. These goals aim to provide quality education on one hand and to promote access to education for people within and without. The promotion of education policy by Türkiye in the Sahel region is composed of direct and indirect investment. Direct investments are determined by the actions undertaken by Turkish institutions on the ground to foster education and development. In this sphere, the Turkish Maarif Foundation is a leading institution that provides schools and dormitories in the region. (See table 9)

Table 6: The Turkish Maarif Foundation Schools and Dormitories in the Sahel Region

Countries / Infrastructures	Burkina Faso	Chad	Mali	Mauritania	Niger
Schools	0	6	31	9	9
Dormitories	0	1	1	0	2

Source: Turkish Maarif Foundation digital report, (2022).

Since 2016 Turkish Maarif Foundation has directly administrated fifty-five schools and 4 dormitories in the region. Indeed, the foundation is a state entity and has the power to conduct educational activities in name of Türkiye abroad (Akgün and Özkan, 2020). In the region, Mali has the highest number of schools and Niger has the highest number of dormitories. Unlike other countries in the region, Burkina Faso has officially neither a school nor a dormitory from TIKA or any Turkish government sociocultural institutions. The reasons are political, rather than social. In addition to the activities of the Turkish Maarif Foundation, TIKA supported cultural festivals in Niger and encouraged reforestation in Burkina Faso in 2014 (TIKA, 2014). In 2018, Türkiye's total investment in social infrastructure and services in the world was 635,5 Billion USD. In the list of countries with a high rate of investment, Niger accounted for 6,8 billion USD (TIKA, 2018)

Indirect investment is another strategy that promotes Turkish foreign strategy in the region. Turkish civil society actors well implement this strategy the YTB (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities), Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation, Diyanet Foundation, and others. These actors work to provide educational opportunities to students of the region. Indeed, every year these organizations provide scholarships to students around the world including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.

Along with these institutions, many students from these countries are pursuing their studies at different universities in Türkiye. (See table 7)

Table 7: Number of students from the Sahel region enrolled in Turkish universities 2020-2021.

Countries / Students	Burkina Faso	Chad	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Total
Male	231	1644	408	414	208	2905
Female	22	307	142	109	63	643
Total	253	1951	550	523	271	3548

Source: Turkish Council of Higher Education Statistics, (2021).

Table 7 shows the number of male and female students from the Sahel countries that are studying in Türkiye. Indeed, there are 3548 students in total in 2021 from these countries who are taking education in Türkiye. However, Chad has the higher number of students, in 1951, and Burkina Faso had the lowest number 253 students. Nonetheless, the total number of females taking education in Türkiyeis exceptionally low and is 643 students. Many of these students are enrolled in Turkish public universities and therefore benefit from the help of Turkish scholarships and sponsors. This policy helps to promote education in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) which is in line with the objectives of the "United Nations Millennium Development Goals on education[3]". However, the educational activities of these Turkish institutions toward international students in general and Sahel region students particularly help to promote a positive image of Türkiye abroad by emphasizing cultural and educational diplomacy (Akgün and Özkan, 2020). The development of social media has affected not only the social, economic, and political areas but also the areas of world politics and diplomacy (Donelli, 2019). The Turkish film industry is also another cultural instrument that helps to spread Turkish culture around the world. This industry has already proven its worth in the Middle East and is now extended to sub-Saharan African countries in general and Burkina Faso particularly. Indeed, the cinema industry is the instrument that emerging powers such as India, Brazil, and Türkiye are using to export peacefully their culture abroad by influencing other cultures. Recently in Burkina Faso, many of these Turkish series such as "Eternal Love"

[3] United Nations Millennium Development Goals: Quality education for sustainable development, 2030 vision.

(*Kara Sevda*) by Kerem Çatay and "Ms. Fazilet and Daughters" (*Fazilet Hanım ve Kızları*) by Murat Saraçoğlu broadcasted. These reality shows help to promote Turkish culture in the region. This strategy is known as cultural diplomacy in International Relations terms. Cultural diplomacy is a peaceful and cheapest way of exporting language, food, and way of life to different geography (Donelli, 2019). But the most significant aspect of cultural diplomacy is that people will learn the Turkish culture with less effort and without either a passport or a visa. However, the Social and cultural approach developed by Türkiye in Burkina Faso gained success in television rather than in classrooms. Indeed, the ineffectiveness of the Maarif Foundation in the country reduces the opportunities for investments in education. In the light of this situation, the question of the establishment of the Turkish Maarif Foundation in Ouagadougou will be discussed in the following part.

3.7. Turkish Foreign Policy Strategies in Burkina Faso

In this section, our research focuses on one of the most important Turkish foreign policy actors which aim to promote Turkish socio-cultural value through education. "After bread," said Danton "Education is the first need of the people". Like Danton, many people believe that quality education can help to end poverty and promote development in the world. In the Sahel region, the quality of education is in crisis thereby hindering the development of the region. To help with this problem, different Turkish foreign policy actors such as Yunus Emre Institute and the Maarif Foundation are the most popular actors involved in the development of education in the region. However, this study will focus on the Turkish Maarif Foundation whose absence in Burkina Faso is a malaise for the two countries. In addition, this study aims to help as a basis for future research regarding the feasibility of opening this education institution in Burkina Faso to eradicate poverty through education in the country and strengthen the relationship between the two countries.

3.8. The case of Maarif Foundation; Impeding the Potential Challenges

Recently, the Turkish Maarif Foundation is becoming an essential component of Turkish foreign policy. Since its establishment, this institution fails to operate in Burkina Faso. This study was based on a survey and bibliographical research to lift the veil on this situation to propose some solutions for the establishment of this state institution in

Burkina Faso by strengthening the relationship between the two countries. The focus here has been an examination of the question of the Turkish Foundation in Burkina Faso while showing the power of this institution on one hand and gathering a few comments on the situation from local people on other hand.

In the aftermath of the July 15th, 2016, failed coup attempts in Türkiye, Ankara has created the Maarif Foundation to strengthen and coordinate its cultural diplomacy within and without the country (Akgün and Özkan, 2020:60). Indeed, the Maarif Foundation is established in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger to manage education on the behalf of Türkiye in the region. However, this state institution is proving difficult to achieve its ends in Burkina Faso. But our stance is to show that Burkina Faso can improve its relations with Türkiye through this foundation which is proving its worth in the neighboring countries. To this end, this study will evaluate the power of the Maarif Foundation in the world and in the region. In addition, this research is to stretch the main challenges that will face this institution in the country. Indeed, this study looks at the situation and proposes solutions aiming to favor the establishment and the effective operation of the Maarif Foundation in the coming days in Burkina Faso.

3.9. Power in Maarif Foundation

Enacted by the law of June 17th, 2016, the establishment of the Maarif Foundation was supported by both the ruling Justice and Development Party and the main opposition Republican People's Party (Akgün and Özkan, 2020:60). Hence, the Maarif Foundation has the power to open and manage educational activities on the behalf of Türkiye abroad. In international relations, the sources of power on one hand, and the ways to exercise power on other hand are varied and multiple. Generally, originated from force, influence, and authority, "*power can be expressed through negotiation, setting agendas, and the creation of institutional bureaucracies and procedures*" (Barkin, 2006:18).

Regardless, there are numerous reasons for the existence of the Maarif Foundation as a state institution in Türkiye. In fact, the Maarif Foundation is founded to promote good education at all levels within and without the country based on human values including peace, love, cooperation, solidarity, humanity, and universality (Maarif Foundation catalog, 2020). In addition, the foundation is created to coordinate and internationalize the country's educational system and spread the image of Türkiye abroad. Nevertheless,

the activities of this foundation pertain not only to the country's development plan and government programs but also respond to the aspiration of the United Nations Millennium Developments Goals in education in developing countries. In short, the Maarif Foundation becomes the major showcase for Türkiye in terms of cultural diplomacy abroad.

In practice, the Maarif Foundation has become a global brand in education and plays a meaningful role in the progress of education in the world. Since its creation, the foundation helps to provide education in forty-nine countries and carried out different activities in 67 countries. Among those activities, Maarif Foundation students contribute to the 39th Turkish Day Parade in New York. In addition, it has provided a training program in journalism to Young Albania in 2018. In addition, the foundation has established 428 educational institutions in the world. Up to now, the Maarif Foundation has 49.112 students in the world. The number of dormitories provides to students by the foundation across the world is forty-four. However, the institution is present in 25 countries in Africa and has 20.000 students, 189 educational institutions, and 19 housing centers (Maarif News, 2022). However, Maarif Foundation is cooperating with 56 universities and 10 institutions around the world. In just under six years of existence, its influence is considerable and earned the trust of many governments around the world. In the Sahel region, it has superseded the "hizmet" schools in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.

3.10. The Challenges in Burkina Faso

Aside from the "hizmet" activities, the Maarif Foundation will be facing the realities of the education system in Burkina Faso in the coming days. Certainly, the system is far from being the best in the continent regardless of the causes of school failure in the country. Unlike the "hizmet", which created an "elite school"[4] for the elite class in the continent and Burkina Faso, the Maarif Foundation must provide a "school for all" and introduce rigor and discipline. Like the "hizmet", the Maarif Foundation must adopt a multifaceted approach including locals and former Burkinabe students from Türkiye within its agenda. Indeed, the foundation must recruit within its schools the best teachers

[4] School fees comprise between 3.500 and 8.500 Euro depending on the country in Africa. (Angey, 2015, pp.26)

in the country for good results and reputation. In addition, Maarif Foundation schools must think to establish both local and international exams such as SAT (Scholastic Aptitude Test) in Burkina Faso. This will be an added value to Burkinabe students who aim to continue their studies abroad including in Europe, and in the US. In addition, to attempt to provide secular education in Burkina Faso, the Maarif foundation must provide denominational (religious) schools in response to the expectation of the communities in the country.

In Burkina Faso, Maarif Foundation can rely on traditional authorities to achieve its objectives. Despite the modernization, traditional authorities play an important role in Burkina Faso in terms of politics, culture, and dialogue. Therefore, Maarif Foundation can work to integrate the local leaders in the process of negotiations by showing the interest of this foundation for the societies. This study involves the collection and analysis of qualitative data from a group of people to gather and generate information and new ideas on the subject.

5.11.2. Voices from Burkina Faso

Talking about the lack of functioning of the Maarif Foundation in Burkina Faso, a few people from Burkina Faso have given their opinions on the matter during my last visit to Burkina Faso in July 2022. In this work, brief comments on the Maarif Foundation were gathered from a discussion of 8 people who have different social statuses in the country. But the comment of three people has drawn our attention and we find it useful to share them in this essay. This approach is particularly designed to give an opportunity to the local people to give their opinion on the issue and three of them agreed to help with data collection. Likely, they have different social statuses including religious leaders, civil servants, and students.

Mady, for example, is an ordinary and confessional adult burkinabè[5] citizen who is very passionate about Türkiye and its president. He says: *"You know, it is complicated to speak about the establishment of Maarif Foundation here because this institution will work to develop and strengthen the Muslim community, and our authority does not give a privileged place to this community in the country and consider the Ankara request as to*

[5] A person from Burkina Faso

support the Muslim community, so it is a complex subject but I think it will establish, but it will take time." Mady sees Türkiye as a Muslim country that aims to support the evolution of Islamic knowledge in the country.

M. Bama is a political leader in the country, who wanted to give his opinion about the Turkish institution in Burkina Faso. He asserts that: *"Maarif Foundation is a good institution which is already working in the neighboring countries, but after the collapse of Blaise Compaoré*[6] *regime in 2014, our country is looking for political stability, the country is facing unprecedented terrorist attacks and recurring military coups, so negotiation between Türkiye and Burkina Faso on Maarif Foundation issue is not a priority right now".* This participant justified the lack of this Turkish institution in the country based on the ongoing political instability of Burkina Faso.

Rosine is a young lady and sociology student at the University of Joseph Ki Zerbo in Ouagadougou the capital city of Burkina Faso. At the time, she was interviewed on the strategies that will favor the establishment and the effectiveness of the Maarif Foundation in Burkina Faso. She thinks that: *"the foundation is actually a flag bearer of Turkish culture abroad and I am sure that its activities and schools will be open to all the classes of the society including rich as well as poor people, unlike the "hizmet school" where only rich people can access to education. The education policy of our country aims to encourage mass education where many youths will access to education, and Maarif Foundation can meet the government's expectation since most parents are poor".* According to this lady, the Maarif foundation schools will suit the people of this country where most of the population cannot benefit from good education with limited resources.

These are what some local people from Burkina Faso had to say about the Maarif Foundation in Burkina Faso. Clearly, the absence of the activities of the Maarif Foundation in Burkina Faso is of concern to the Turkish government as well as some local people. Accordingly, the foundation can help to develop education in the country like other institutions that work to reduce poverty through literacy such as TIKA and Yunus Emre Institute. Certainly, the establishment of the Maarif in Burkina Faso will be a great

[6] President of Burkina Faso from 1987 to 2014

satisfaction for the majority not for the minority. Properly negotiation plan between the two countries could help to establish this cultural institution in Burkina Faso.

Turkish low political strategies performances in the Sahel region underline Türkiye's efforts to adapt to the politics and sociocultural environment in this part of the continent. The dynamic of Turkish low political strategies is different from that of its high political strategies in the region. The following part of this thesis will address economic and military strategies as part of Turkish high political strategies elements in the region.

PART THREE: TURKISH HIGH POLITICS STRATEGIES IN THE SAHEL REGION

4.1. Introduction

High politics refer to state affairs that are necessaire for the survival of the state (Bures, 2015). This study considers economics and security to be the most two important for the state's survival. Therefore, this section examines Türkiye's high political strategies in the Sahel region and Burkina Faso while considering economic and security cooperation in the region. The high political relations developed by Türkiye in Africa and the region are characterized by win-win relations based on security cooperation developed with bilateral and multilateral agreements alongside local authorities and international forces for peace and development in the region.

4.2. Economic Strategies

Türkiye has developed two types of economic strategies with the countries of the Sahel region based on state and private sectors. Indeed, direct investment and indirect economic investment are the two economic strategies developed by Türkiye to promote its foreign policy in this geography. The indirect investment begins with the economic forums and meetings organized by Türkiye to improve economic cooperation between the African countries in general and Sahel countries. From this perspective, the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Türkiye (DEIK) spared no effort to establish "business diplomacy" based on bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the countries of the region. In the framework of multilateral economic cooperation, Türkiye organizes every two years, an economic forum with African countries in general. In 2016, the countries held the first Türkiye-Africa Economy and Business forum. Following the 2016 meeting, Türkiye held economic meetings with Africa in 2018, 2020, and recently in 2022 (DEIK, 2022). In addition, DEIK has organized an economic meeting with one important regional institution in Africa. In 2016 and 2018 Türkiye organized an economic and business meeting with the ECOWAS to foster economic dynamism and cooperation. This meeting highlights the institutionalization of Turkish economic strategy in its economic policy. However, DEIK has established bilateral business councils with the countries of the Sahel region within the scope of the African Union. The first DEIK bilateral business agreement within the Sahel region was signed with Mauritania in 2011. In 2017 Türkiye and Mauritania signed economic cooperation in different areas including mining, fishing,

agriculture, and education sectors (DEIK, 2018). However, Türkiye-Chad; Türkiye-Mali, and Türkiye-Niger Business councils were created in 2015. Burkina Faso is the latest country in the region to establish a business council with Türkiye in 2018.

The first DEIK bilateral business forum was held in Istanbul with Mali in 2015. The second Sahel country to hold a meeting with DEIK is Chad in 2017. However, in 2019 DEIK and Burkina Faso organized a bilateral economic meeting in Ankara. These meetings aim to improve the economic relations of the Turkish private sector with the countries of this part of the African continent. The outcome of these meetings was made evident by the presence of direct investments in Turkish private sectors in the region.

Direct investment is another economic strategy favoring the development of Turkish foreign in the area. This investment takes different forms including job creation, concessional loans, technical cooperation, support for National NGOs, etc.

4.3. Turkish main economic actors in the region

The driving motives of Turkish relations with Africa and the Sahel region are more economics rather than politics (Özkan, 2010). The most important and active Turkish economic actor in the region is Turkish Airlines company. This company is one of the dynamic economic actors with multiple direct flights per week from Istanbul to different capital cities in the region (Özkan, 2010). Indeed, a direct flight refers to a non-stop plane trip between two different places. However, a direct flight allows passengers to save energy and time and ensure rapid exportation of goods. Unlike an indirect flight, a non-stop plane trip prevents the loss and damage of luggage. However, in the domain of construction, the Turkish SUMMA INŞAAT company received authorization to build Diori Hammani International Airport, and Radisson Hotel in Niger in 2018 (SUMMA, 2022). In Mali, the FORM INŞAAT construction company is directing the construction of the country's military hospital (Malijet, 2022). However, since 2016 the Turkish MNG-Gold company is operating in Burkina Faso (Lefaso.net, 2018). Moreover, the Turkish TOYA Gold company is operating in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (Tanchum, 2021). In addition to economic cooperation with the countries of the region, the Turkish government had also paid official visits to many countries in the continent. These visits are incredibly significant and thereby facilitate the relations between the countries. The following table 8 enumerates some active Turkish economic actors present in the region.

Table 8: Turkish main active economic actors in the region

Countries / Actors	Burkina Faso	Mali	Chad	Niger	Mauritania
TURKISH AIRLINES	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SUMMA INŞAAT	No	No	No	Yes	No
MNG-GOLD	Yes	No	No	No	No
NUROL MAKINA	No	No	No	Yes	No
NUROL HOLDING	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
BAYRAKTAR	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
TOYA GOLD	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Official visit	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source: Africa Intelligence, (2022).

The above table informs us that Turkish economic actors are active in construction and defense business activities in the region. However, the infrastructure building sector and mining sectors are the primary areas of Turkish economic activities in the region. In addition, the Turkish airline company is the only actor operating in all these countries in the region. The AKP government's official visits to the countries of the region express the determination of the Turkish government to deepen its relations and cooperation with the countries of the region. This dynamism of these companies contributes to reducing unemployment by increasing the economic development of Türkiye and the countries in the region.

4.4. The General Trade Situation between Türkiye and the Sahel Region

Türkiye has increased its trade volume in the region and reached almost 500 million US dollars in 2019. This economic performance aims to increase in the future. However, Türkiye's main export products to the region are food, textile, furniture, and construction products (Türkiye Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2020). However, the trade balance between Türkiye and the countries of the region has not been stable. In 2016, the total trade volume between Türkiye and Chad was estimated at 42 million USD. The main exportation products are wheat flour, steel, food product, and carpets which were estimated at 19 million USD. However, the importation was 23 million USD and Fish, fish oil, marine animal meals, meat, and animal skin. The trade balance is 4 USD in favor

of Chad. (DEIK, 2016). In 2017, the total trade volume between Türkiye and Mauritania was estimated at 132 million USD. The main exportation products are Iron, Food products, cement, and construction products. The exportation, however, was evaluated at 87 million USD while the importation was 45 million USD and the country needs basic food products such as fish, fish oil, marine animal meals, meat, and animal skin (DEIK, 2017). The Trade balance is 42 million USD in favor of Türkiye (DEIK, 2016). However, the following table and graphs address the economic situation between Türkiyeand the countries of the region including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger. Reliable data were not available in Mali.


Table 11: Türkiye's Total Exports to the Region in Millions USD

	2010	2015	2019	2020	2021	Total
Burkina Faso	10	22	33	66	96	227
Chad	3	17	40	41	53	154
Mali	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritania	37	97	168	120	409	831
Niger	15	31	76	59	78	259
Total	65	167	317	286	636	1471

Source: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, (2022).

The above table represents the total export value in USD of the Republic of Türkiye to the Sahel countries in the year 2010, 2015, 2019, 2020, and 2021. In fact, Türkiye's export values have constantly increased in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger. In 2010, the total value of Türkiye's exports in the region was 65 million USD and has increased nearly by 5 in 2019 and by 10 in 2021, an increase of 21,51% and 43,23% respectively. During these periods of time, Türkiye's export value was very important in Mauritania than the rest with 831 million USD. This value is 3 times higher than the export value in Burkina Faso and Niger and 5 times more than in Chad. Indeed, this value of export in Mauritania represents 56% of Türkiye's total export value to the region.

Figure: 3



Source: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, (2022).

The above figure is associated with the information on Türkiye's export value and expresses, the evolution of Türkiye's export values in the region in different periods of time. This evolution has two phases in three different moments. The first phase is an increasing phase and is extended from 2010 to 2019 and from 2020 to 2021. This phase shows the increase in Türkiye's export value in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger. However, the period between 2019 and 2020 is a decreasing second phase and represents a diminution in Türkiye's export value in the region, particularly in Burkina Faso and Mauritania.

Table 12: Türkiye's Total Imports from the Region in Million USD


	2010	2015	2019	2020	2021	Total
Burkina Faso	45	47	21	8	14	135
Chad	0	22	35	71	110	238
Mali	-	-	-	-	-	
Mauritania	1	13	83	27	277	401

Niger	0	0	0	0	10	10
Total	46	82	139	106	411	784

Source: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, (2022).

The information indicated in the above table corresponds to the values of Türkiye's imported products from the Sahel region in five different years. These values were very important in 2021 with 411 million USD, an increase of nearly 9 times more in 2010 and 3 times more in 2019. This represents 5,86%, and 52,42 %, of the total imports value in 2010, 2019, and 2021 respectively.

Figure: 4



Source: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, (2022).

The information indicated in the above table corresponds to the evolution of values of Türkiye's imports from the Sahel region in 2010, 2015, 2019, and 2020. These values have steadily increased within 5 years from 22 million USD to 110 million USD in Chad and from 1 million USD to 401 million USD in Mauritania. Even though the imports were constant in Niger with 10 million, they decreased in Burkina Faso between 2015 and 2020.


Table 13: Türkiye's Total trade volume between the countries of the Region in Million USD

	2010	2015	2019	2020	2021	Total
Burkina Faso	55	68	53	74	110	360
Chad	3	39	76	112	163	393
Mali	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritania	39	110	252	147	686	1234
Niger	4	31	76	59	89	259
Total	101	248	457	392	1048	2246

Source: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, (2022).

Table 14 represents Türkiye's total trade volume in the Sahel region in 5 different years. Indeed, the trade volume represents the market exchange between Türkiye and the countries of the region. The total value was very important in 2021 in comparison to the previous years with 1048 million US. This represents 10 times higher than in 2010, and 2 times higher than in 2019, an increase of 46% of the total trade volume.

Figure 5: Türkiye's Total trade volume between the countries of the Region in Million USD



Source: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, (2022).

The trade volume graph shows that the market exchange has constantly increased in Chad but has generally been unstable in Burkina, Mauritania, and Niger. However, between 2019 and 2020, the total trade volume decreased in Mauritania and Niger but slightly increased in Burkina Faso.


Table 14: Türkiye's Total Trade balance in the Region in Millions of USD

	2010	2015	2019	2020	2021	Total
Burkina Faso	-35	25	12	59	82	143
Chad	3	-4	5	-29	-57	-82
Mali	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritania	36	84	85	93	133	431
Niger	15	31	75	59	68	248
Total	19	136	177	182	226	740

Source: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, (2022).

Table 14 represents the difference between Türkiye's import and export value in the region between 2010 and 2021. In 2021, the total trade balance of Türkiye with the countries of the region was 226 million USD. This represents 12 times higher than the value obtained in 2010 and nearly 2 times more than the value of years 2015, 2019, and 2020.

Figure 6: Türkiye's Total Trade balance in the Region in Millions of USD



Source: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, (2022)

The evolution of Türkiye's trade balance in the Sahel region is represented in graph 6 in different periods of time. The trade balance is positive between Mauritania, and Niger but was negative in 2010 with Burkina Faso and from 2019 to 2021 in Chad.

4.5. Interpretation

Table 11 and 12 shows that both Türkiye's total import and total export value in the Sahel region steadily increased between 2010 and 2021. In this sense, both demands and supplies are increasing and the economic results are in general positive in the Sahel region

according to Tables 13 and 14. These positive results reveal that Türkiye's trade activities with almost the countries of the region generate additional financial resources beyond its borders and the same time increase the GDP of the country. Indeed, these positive results can be seen as an achievement rather than a failure for the country. However, the economic strategies aim to stimulate the country's economic growth through exports. The objectives of this economic strategy are to bring back foreign resources by increasing the foreign trade volume.

4.6. Turkish Military Strategies in the Region

According to the security dilemma in the Sahel, the relationship between Türkiye and the Sahel countries has drastically reshaped in the last decade. Indeed Türkiye has taken steps to accompany the Sahel countries to regain peace and security through stabilization and development rather than military intervention. However, the stability and development strategies adopted by Türkiye are based on bilateral, and multilateral peace cooperation. These strategies are part of Ankara's engagement with global peace and account for the Turkish Official Development Assistance program for the continent (Özkan, 2018). Nevertheless, peace and security are troubled in this part of the continent by illegal armed groups and terrorist groups. These groups became stronger after the collapse of the Kaddafi regime in Libya which was able to control and secured the borders and arms trafficking in the region.

At the bilateral level, Türkiye established military cooperation with some countries in the region for reinforcing security and peace. In July 2020 a defense accord was signed between Türkiye and Niger to enhance peace and security in the region. This agreement will allow Türkiye to provide a military training program to Niger with the option to establish a military base in the future (Ramani, 2021). In addition, on July 6^{th,} 2021, the national press of Burkina Faso informed the public that the country maintains a security partnership with Türkiye. This information is supported by the international press. Indeed, on July 21st, 2021, "The Defense post" published that Türkiye's ASFAT *(Askeri Fabrıka Ve Tersane İşletme)* company will export Mechanical Mine Clearing Equipments to Burkina Faso (Reyes, 2021). Due to the multiple improvised explosive device war technic of terrorist groups in the northern and eastern parts of the country, these types of equipment will help to prevent and reduce the loss of lives during military operations in risk areas.

At the multilateral level, Türkiye is engaged to support regional and international institutions to bring security and peace to the Sahel zone. In the illustration, the Turkish government advocated in 2018 to support the G5 Sahel joint forces with 5 million USD for peace and security in the Sahel (Sıradag, 2018). In fact, the G5 Sahel bloc was initiated in 2014 and come into existence in 2017 through the effort of five countries including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The G5 Sahel bloc aims to form a common army to promote security and development in the Sahel.

At the international level, Türkiye joined in 2013, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) for peace and stability in the Sahel (Grigoriadis and Fusiek, 2022) In fact, the MINUSMA is a peacekeeping and state-building plan of action established by the United Nations in 2016 to ensure security and peace in Mali and the Sahel region. However, Türkiye is also active in supporting regional institutions for peace and security in the region. Today, the bloc has many regional and international partners including the ECOWAS, the AU, France, Germany, Türkiye, the European Union (EU), the UN, etc. However, this bloc is strongly supported by France whose military presence in the region is becoming a challenge for Mali and Burkina Faso. In addition to the presence of 5.000 French soldiers in the region (Cold-Ravnkilde, 2018). The Turkish foreign policy strategies are challenged by both local and international power such as dictator presidents, armed band groups, Russia, and China. Accordingly, the following part of this research will evaluate some local and international challenges hindering the development of Turkish foreign policy in the region.

PART FOUR: CHALLENGERS

5.1. Introduction

This part will examine both local and international actors hindering the development of Turkish foreign policy in the region. It attempts to show that there are different factors that negatively influence the objectives and goals of Türkiye in the Sahel region. Indeed, corrupted leaders on one hand and the partisans of violence constitute a threat to the development of relations between Türkiye and the countries in the region. In addition, this part tried to show that France is one of the most influential international power that may directly compete with Türkiye in this part of the continent. However, the presence of Turkish political, economic, and social actors gives rise to debate in terms of human rights promotion.

5.2. The Sahel Region: A New Challenge for Türkiye

In the Sahel region, there is the presence of three types of challengers with various motivations and aims.

5.3. Local Challengers: Governments, Armed band Groups, and Terrorists

Governments of Sahel countries are partially responsible for the current poor economic and security situation in the Sahel region. They change the countries' constitutions to overstay in power for their own benefit. In Burkina Faso, former president Blaise Compaoré ruled the country from 1987 to 2014 and was overthrown by his own population denouncing his bad governance via strikes and protests. In Chad, President Idris Deby ruled the country for more than 30 years. Indeed, all the countries from the region failed to promote good governance in the region. Since their independence, the respective governments fail to enforce the law, promote free and fair elections, and establish an independent judiciary system and alternation in power.

The region is one of the hottest spots in Africa and there are many armed band groups and terrorists that promote insecurity and favor a secessionist state. In the northern part of Mali, the National Liberation Movement for Azawad (MNLA) waged a secessionist war against the Malian government. Following the chaos in Libya, the Azawad movement aims to establish an Islamic state in the Sahel (Aynaou, 2015). In addition, Mali is a place of interest to combatants from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for

Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Eddine. However, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) terrorist group is operating in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. But Boko Haram is operating in Chad and Niger (Barkindo, 2020). The main activities of these groups in the Sahel are kidnapping, arms, and drug trafficking.

5.4. International Challengers

There are bilateral international forces that work to promote stability and development in the region. Indeed, France, the United States, Germany, Denmark, and Russia are some international forces intervening in the Sahel. In addition to that, the United Nations, European Union, and NATO are also some international actors that pay attention to the situation in the Sahel. In fact, European countries and international institutions have established multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the Sahel countries. Recently, the Danish government sought to deal with four main issues in the Sahel including security, migration, growth, and governance. Indeed, the government provides troops to the MINUSMA, Assistance to displaced people, and gives support to non-governmental organizations in the region (Boserup & Martinez, 2018). Following the 2011 Chaos in Libya, NATO is tackling the security issue in the Sahel region based on cooperation. Indeed, NATO is committed to dealing with the UN, the EU, the AU, Sahel G5, and ECOWAS to enhance dialogue and improve coordination for stability in the region (Berger, 2021). In addition to its engagement with regional and international actors for stability, NATO supports the EUCAP Sahel mission to train Malian in Nigerien armies against terrorist groups present in the region (Aynaou, 2015).

Like NATO, the relationship between Russia and the Sahel region is based on security cooperation. In fact, the Russian mercenary group (Wagner) is present in the Sahel at the side of the Malian army to restore security in the country. Even though this presence is opposed by French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, it is said that Wagner aims to reduce the influence of western powers in the Sahel by securing Russian interests and developing military cooperation in the area.

In the last two decades, the United Nations (UN) has intensified its presence in the region to enhance security, good governance, and development based on "hybrid peace"[7] (Tardy, 2014). To this end, the UN is represented by the MINUSMA which has proven difficulties

[7] Hybrid peace: peace builds by both internal and external actors.

to promote human rights, justice, security, and sustainable assistance to refugees in Mali and beyond.

5.5. Former colonial power; France, a Direct Challenger?

The economic, social, and defense cooperation established between France and the countries of the region is based on France's foreign policy strategy toward its former colonies. This strategy is based on three principles (Ongouya, 1980). The first principle is to spread French culture in the region and the second is to help the countries to develop by protecting French economic interests in the region. The third principle is to provide technical assistance by sending civil servants to maintain their independence. Accordingly, France is one of the main political, socio-cultural, economic, and military partners of the countries of the region due to the strong past colonial bond between them. Politically, France supported the military coup in Chad and condemn it in Mali, and Burkina Faso. Socio-culturally, the countries of the Sahel region are members of the French-speaking community (Francophonie). This community is a group of 21 countries that have adopted officially the French language in their constitution (Breton, 2004). Economically, the currency (CFA franc) of four countries in the region is made in France since 1947 and the country is granted the right to export raw materials within the region. In addition, France's multinational business companies such as Total, Bolloré Transport & Logistics, and Canal Plus, dominate the market in the region. In the area of defense, France is granted the territorial integrity of its former colonies and established a training program for the armies within (Smith, 2013). In addition, the country is the main partner of the region with Official Development Assistance estimated at 314,1 million euros in 2021 and was normally apportioned as followed: Burkina Faso:92, Chad:53,3, Mali: 39,7, Mauritania: 31,9, and Niger: 97,2 (Agence Française de Developpement, 2021).

In Burkina Faso, there is a complex historical military cooperation between France and the country tracing back to the 1950s. In the 1950s French military troops were sent to build armies within the colonies based on the French military aid policy adopted in 1957. This policy led to the creation of Burkina Faso's National Army in 1960 (Ongouya, 1980). However, France is the first economic partner of the country due to its colonial past. Indeed, the amount of bilateral trade between the two countries reached 342 million euros in 2014 (L'economiste du Faso, 2016). According to the French General Directorate of the Treasury, the import volume of Burkina Faso from France was 264,2 million Euro

against 22,8 million of exportation in 2019. The country imports industrial and agricultural equipment, pharmaceutical products, electronic devices, and modern modes of transportation. However, the country exports agricultural products (cotton and Fruits) to France. France is a long-term partner of the country and since 1958 it supports the government to meet the demand for basic services through the AFD institution. France's Official Development Assistance to Burkina was estimated at 84,8 million euros in 2021. According to this institution, France had financed different development projects in Burkina Faso including water and sanitation, food security, health, and education. (See table 5).

Table 5: AFD projects in million euros in Burkina Faso

Projects	Number	Value	Year
Dam construction (Ziga II)	CBF1186	30 MEUR	2019
Electrification (renewable energy Zagtouli)	CBF 1257	22,5 MEUR	2020
Road constructions	N/A	19 MEUR	1015
Education and training	CB1259 and CB 1299	111,22 MEUR	2022
Health system	CBF 1248	9 MEUR	2017

Sources: French Development Agency, (2021).

Table five shows that France is supporting the development of Burkina Faso through education, health, energy, and infrastructure in different periods of time with different values. Education and training projects are the priorities based on the value invested in 2022. In addition, water, energy, infrastructure, and health projects are respectively important in promoting development in Burkina Faso.

To promote development through education and science in the country, France is annually delivering, more than six hundred student visas to Burkina Faso (Le Faso.net, 2021). Indeed, the country is the favorite destination for students in terms of education and learning (table 6).

Table 6: Favourite destinations countries for Burkina Faso students

Host country	Year:2012	Year: 2017	Total % in 2017	Evolution 2012-2017
1. France	1282	1420	23,5%	+ 11 %
2. Cote D'Ivoire	186	858	14,2%	+361%
3. Senegal	NA	619	10,3%	-
4. Morocco	106	584	9,7%	+451%
5. USA	611	485	8%	-21%
6. Canada	300	471	7,8%	57%
7. Saudi Arabia	141	314	5,2%	123%
8. Niger	94	242	4,0%	+157
9. Tunisia	111	153	2,5%	+38%
10. Türkiye	15	144	2,4%	860%

Source: Campus France, (2019).

According to table 6, France is the first favorite destination country for education and training for Burkina Faso students. However, Türkiye is lagging far behind France and many countries on the list of the favorite destination countries for Burkina Faso students. Recently the Turkish government has developed some strategies to develop the quality of education in the region by providing educational opportunities to students from this region through its annual YTB scholarships program.

The presence of Turkish diplomatic, economic, and social institutions in the region which is known as the French sphere of influence due to its colonial legacy does not exclude direct competition between the two countries in the region. Türkiye is in competition with France by intervening in its sphere of influence (Grigoriadis & Fusiek, 2022). The recent verbal altercation between the French president and the Turkish president is an ongoing geopolitical rivalry opposing Ankara and Paris (Jabbour, 2021). Turkish foreign policy strategy on regional and international issues is based on careful consideration of its own conditions (Davutoğlu, 2012). Unlike France, Türkiye is more influential in humanitarian activities rather than in Sahel countries' politics. Indeed, Türkiye's foreign policy strategy in the Sahel could be qualified as a bottom-up strategy that aims to target the local population in the first lines.

5.6. Challenging the Status quo in the Region: A Revisionist State?

Compared to western powers like France, Russia, the EU, and the UN, Türkiye is a new actor in the Sahel region but attempts to change the existing international economic system in the region. This system refers to Immanuel Wallerstein's theory of economic development where the world economy is divided into core, semi-periphery, and periphery. In fact, core countries are characterized by a high level of urbanization and industrialization but are facing a shortage of raw materials and high labor costs. However, peripheric countries are considered to dispose of cheap both raw materials and labor. Among the two types of countries in the world economic system, semi-peripheric countries have the characteristics of both core and peripheric countries (Inayat et al, 2017).

Looking at the level of urbanization and industrialization in France, the United Nations, Germany, and Russia which are the main Sahel region partners are certainly core countries. According to the dependence theory, economic flows, trade, and foreign direct investment define the terms of the relations between the core and the peripheries countries (Hamme and Pion, 2012). However, economic flows, trade, and foreign direct investment systems existing between western countries and the Sahel countries date back to the colonial period. Indeed, a network between core countries and peripheric countries has been going on for more than fifty years.

Today, the presence and impact of Türkiye in the region foster a substantive discussion. According to Hamme and Pion Türkiye is considered a semi-peripheric country for many reasons. Indeed, "*semi-peripheric countries export light manufacturing goods and agricultural products but in a less massive way than the core countries"* (Hamme and Pion, 2012, p.75).

But the most striking feature of this international economic system in the region is that Türkiye as a semi-peripheric country gets its share in this system. In fact, Türkiye's open-to-Africa policy established in 2005 has permitted the country to involve more in African business, particularly in the Sahel countries. This implies that the ring of countries undertaking politics, economic, and social relations with the Sahel countries has enlarged and therefore, needs to take into consideration the presence of Türkiye while defending their interest. Indeed, many peripheric countries in the Sahel region have put their trust in

a semi-peripheric country for their security and development process. Certainly, Türkiye has therefore captured new market shares in an extremely competitive market in terms of fighting terrorism and the foreign investment system in the region. In this sense, the principles of dependence theory established by international economic theorists on the condition of the development of peripheric countries based on core countries are not the only condition for development. In that respect, the presence of Türkiye in the region to some extent changes the deal between the former colonizers and the colonized.

Looking at the situation in the general situation in the region, including insecurity, and poverty, Türkiye is appeared to be an important partner that can help to promote peace and development. However, its foreign policy strategies in the region are expedient and can meet one part of the countries' expectations. Indeed, the countries of the continent and the region have been looking for new economic partners in the aftermath of their independence for development where the western powers failed to promote security and development in this geography. In addition to the security dilemma in the region where Türkiye has already engaged in Niger and the MINUSMA to restore peace and counterterrorism, the Sahel is suffering from bad governance and a lack of effective institutions.

5.7. Mischief Foreign Policy Strategies in the region

The Turkish foreign policy agenda toward the Sahel region is to promote economic, diplomatic, and sociocultural relations between the two parties. Economically, the Sahel countries can benefit from the expertise of Turkish business companies in different areas including construction sectors, mining, and trade. However, this agenda cannot succeed in these countries unless democracy, good governance, and independent justice are established. Indeed, democracy, however, is one of the main challenges for African countries since their independence, and this was highlighted by liberal democrats. Indeed, on July 20th, 2015, former American president Barack Obama declared in Addis Ababa that *"I believe Africa's progress will also depend on democracy… We all know what the ingredients of real democracy are. They include free and fair elections, but also freedom of speech and the press, freedom of assembly"* (Obama's speech, 2015, Addis Ababa). From this declaration, the president calls for the improvement of political rights as well as civil liberties in Africa including the Sahel countries. However, in the 2022 annual global report of Freedom House where 195 countries and 15 territories were put into

evaluation, Türkiye does not have a good score in terms of political rights and civil liberties. Indeed, Türkiye scored 32/100 and is ranked behind Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mauritania (See table 14).

Table 14: Freedom scores for Sahel countries and Türkiye (Total Score over 100)

Countries	Burkina Faso	Chad	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Türkiye
Civil Liberties	30	14	24	21	28	16
Political Rights	23	1	8	14	23	16
Total Score	53	15	32	35	51	32
Status	Partly Free	Not Free	Not Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Not Free

Sources: Freedom House, (2022).

Table 14 provides some information about civil liberties and political rights in the Sahel countries and Türkiye. The evaluation is based on the scoring process established by the institution (See scoring process)[8]. However, the most relevant information is that Türkiye has scored 32 over 100 for both civil liberties and political rights. Considering this, Türkiye is not considered by the Freedom House a free country and therefore cannot be an example country in terms of these values for the Sahel countries.

Before Addis Ababa's speech, Barack Obama declared in Accra that: *"Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong institutions"* (Obama's speech, Accra, 2009). Talking to the Ghanaian parliament, the US former president encourage African countries including Sahel countries to promote good governance through good institutions for sustainable development in the region. The term "strongmen" refers to African leaders who came to power via military coup or who stay in power for long times or who change the country's constitutions to remain in power forever. However, "strong institutions" refer to democracy which is the main route for development in Africa. Today, almost all the countries of the Sahel region are ruled by strongmen with red berets mainly in Burkina

[8] https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology

Faso, Chad, and Mali. In Burkina Faso, the new military coup hindered the democratic process that the country has recently embarked with an elected government.

However, in 2017, the Turkish current president visited the late president Idriss Deby who has been in power since 1990 in Chad. In addition, the chairman of the transitional military council and the president of Chad paid an official visit to Turkish president Tayyip Erdoğan in 2021 (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, 2021) In the same year, the Turkish president discussed in a phone call with the Malian military regime and aimed to accompany the transition and strengthen bilateral cooperation between the two countries (Daily Sabah, 2021). The feeling of Türkiye toward the military leaders in the region goes against the principle of democratic ideas mentioned by former US President Barack Obama in Addis Ababa and Accra.

Referring to the speech of Barack Obama in Addis Ababa about the relationship between progress and democracy in Africa, Acemoglu, and Robinson think lately that: *"the rule of law appears to be decisive for economic development"* (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012:2). For instance, the rule of law is to certain conditions a prerequisite for development. However, the rule of law in a country necessitates the establishment of an independent judiciary system. The establishment of this system within the region entails the support of the partners of the region including Türkiye. Indeed, Türkiye rather works to strengthen independent institutions in the region for sustainable progress and development. Remarkably, Turkish foreign policy strategies do not embody political conditionality in supporting democracy and human rights that will foster development and progress in the region. In that sense, the Turkish foreign policy toward the region is doomed to failure since it does not consider the situation of civil liberties and the political rights of the population within the region.

In addition to civil liberties and political rights issues, corruption is another problem for African countries including Sahel countries. Indeed, political corruption and transnational bribery are the two main types of corruption that reduce growth, restrict trade, and increase poverty in the world (Altamirano, 2007). Therefore, Turkish foreign policy should develop strategies that will support governments in the Sahel countries to reduce "the exercise of the public power for private gain" (World Bank, 2022). The below table will reveal the corruption situation in the Sahel countries and Türkiye.

Table 15: 2021 corruption perceptions Index in Sahel countries and Türkiye

Countries	Burkina Faso	Chad	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Türkiye
Score	42	20	29	28	31	38
Rank	78	164	136	140	154	96

Source: Transparency International, (2021).

Transparency International is an international organization that studies the level of corruption in the public sector of 180 countries and territories around the world and scores the countries from 0 to 100 corresponding from highly corrupt to very clean. However, table 10 shows that Türkiye and the countries of the Sahel have scored less than 50 below the average score. This signifies that corruption is not only an issue in the Sahel but also in Türkiye. Indeed, a country like Burkina Faso in this table is performing better than Türkiye in this ranking. For this reason, the Sahel countries cannot rely on Türkiye to fight against corruption which is a serious challenge to the development of the continent.

CONCLUSION

The presence of Turkish political, economic, and sociocultural actors in the African Sahel region is the outcome of Ankara's 1998 "opening to Africa" policy. This policy was in the last decade concretized with the establishment of diplomatic missions, and socioeconomic cooperation in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. This thesis offers a modest contribution to the academic literature on Turkish foreign policy strategies in the African Sahel region. These strategies involve different principles including political, humanitarian, cultural, economic, and security. The principles of Turkish foreign policy strategies are extensively discussed in parts two and three of this paper. Certainly, the presence of Turkish foreign policy actors in this part of the continent shows that their political, economic, and sociocultural relationship is not a contested one anymore. The humanitarian performances under the barrel of TIKA are globally recognized (Haşimi, 2014). Economically, the Turkish Airlines company is very dynamic and the trade volume between Türkiye and the countries of the region is positive in its favor (Türkiye Ministry of Trade, 2022). Exceptionally, the Turkish Maarif Foundation failed to meet the objective of Ankara's vision of cultural diplomacy in Burkina Faso. Indeed, some burkinabè decided to give their opinion about the issue. Certainly, the Turkish Maarif Foundation will be an "added value" to the educational sector of this country where the education system is by far to be the best in the continent. The permanent political and social instability dominated by military coups in the country appears to be a significant obstacle to its establishment. Regardless of different academic sources on the subject, this study is impartial and proposed a theoretical study by using empirical data to analyse the development of Turkish foreign policy in the region to the benefit of international relations scholars. However, the thesis shows that the aims and objectives of Türkiye in the Sahel region are to diversify its area of economic cooperation and promote non-state capacity building throughout its NGOs. Indeed, the growing presence of Türkiye in the Sahel region offers the latter the opportunity to loosen economic dependence ties with former colonial powers and international financial institutions. Building economic relations with Türkiye, the Sahel countries aim to move from the status of passive beggars of international financial institutions to not only active players in the economic system but also arbiters in the competition between the international actors present in the region. Undoubtedly, they are growing confident and

have started to diversify their relationship with new other partners. However, the relationship between Türkiye and the countries of the region does not guarantee any sustainable development of the population of the area in such circumstances where military coups, rule of law, and lack of an independent judiciary system failed to consolidate. In addition to state-state cooperation in certain domains such as security where agreements are often secretly concluded, Türkiye's relations with the Sahel region are driven more than humanitarian actions by consolidating "people-people" relations. Turkish model is mixt and does respond to the expectation of the population in the region in both short and long-term periods. The ongoing insecurity and global warming affecting arable lands and agricultural productivity in the region jeopardize the future of the region. Humanitarian assistance will remain vital in Turkish foreign policy strategies toward the Sahel region. Despite the presence of other international actors such as France and Russia which have already gained a head-start on the security issue in the region, Türkiye must take the opportunity to develop its economic cooperation in the following areas: buildings, health, agriculture, farming, fishing, textile industry. Today, the presence, and impact of Turkish foreign policy actors in the region discussed in the previous lines are remarkable in terms of diplomatic, economic, social, and cultural cooperation. However, the people from the Sahel region and their respective governments must define their own development strategies model to take advantage of this relation to the great delight of their population that they failed to realize under their former colonial power's relations.

REFERENCES

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2012). “Why Nations fail? The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty”

Afrobarometer, (2022). https://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/mali/

Agence Anadolu, Nadia Chahed 05.01.2022; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Agence Française de Developpement, (2021). file:///C:/Users/dell/Downloads/sahel-activity-report-2021.pdf

Agence D’Information du Burkina, (2019). AK. 7 Octobre 2019. https://www.aib.media/2019/10/07/le-coton-contribue-a-plus-10-au-pib-agricole-du-burkina-ministre/

Akgün, B. and Özkan, M. (2020). Turkey’s Entrance to International Education. Insight Turkey, Vol. 22, No.1 (Winter 2020), pp. 59-71

Akgün, B. and Özkan, M. (2010). Turkey’s opening to Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies, December 2010, vol. 48, No.4 (December 2010), pp. 525-546

Altamirano, G.D. (2007). “The impact of the Inter-American Convention against corruption”. The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, spring, 2007, Vol. 38, No. 3 (spring, 2007), pp. 487-547

Aral, B. (2009). “Turkey in the UN Security Council: Its Election and Performance”. Insight Turkey, Fall 2009, Vol. 11, No. 4, New Kurdish initiative: Ready for a solution? Muslim Democracies: Changes and Challenges Turkey in the UN Security Council (Fall 2009), pp.151-168

Africa Intelligence, 2022. Nurol Holding, porte-etendard des interest turcs a N’Damena. 06.01.2022. https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-centrale/2022/01/06/nurol-holding-porte-etendard-des-interets-turcs-a-n-djamena,109714597-art

Ardigo, I. A. (2019). “Burkina Faso”: Overview of the corruption and anti-corruption. U4 Anti-corruption resource center, Transparency International (2019)

Armstrong, H. (2021), Turkey in the Sahel. International Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/turkey-sahel

Avundukluoglu, E. (2016). "We don't see Africa from a colonial perspective": Erdogan. Anadolu Agence, Türkiye, World, Africa. 27.12.2016 https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/we-dont-see-africa-from-colonial-perspective-erdogan/715297

Aynaou, R. (2015). "NATO and the Security Challenges of the Sahel-Sahara Region within the new Geopolitical Order", Research division - NATO Defense College, Rome-No.110- March 2015.

Balaam, D.N. and Dillman, B., (2014). Introduction to International Political Economy, Routledge.

Barkin, J. S. (2006). "International Organization: Theories and Institutions" First edition: March 2006

Barkindo, A. (2020). "The Sahel: A new theatre for global jihadist groups?", Counter terrorist trends and analyses, Vol. 12, No. 2 (March 2020), pp.21-26

Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018 file:///C:/Users/dell/Downloads/West+African+Sahel%20(1).pdf

Berger, C. (2021). "What role for NATO in the Sahel?" NDC Policy Brief No.22, December 2012, Research Division-NATO Defense College

Boukhars, A. (2012), "The drivers of insecurity in Mauritania", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2012)

Boserup, R., A., and Martinez, L. (2018). "Europe and the Sahel-Maghreb crisis", Danish Institute for International Studies (2018)

Bures, O. (2015). "Political corporate social responsibility: including high politics?", Journal of business ethics, July 2015, Vol. 129, No. 3 (July 2015), pp.689-703

Breton, R. (2004). "La francophonie en Afrique", Diplomatie, Avril-Mai 2004, No. 8 (Avril-Mai 2004), pp.35-38

Campus France, (2019). Fiche Statistique Burkina Faso, Mobilite International (UNESCO), 2019 https://ressources.campusfrance.org/publications/mobilite_pays/fr/burkina_faso_fr.pdf

Cannon, B.J. (2021). "Turkey in Africa": Turkey's military strategy in Africa, p.133

Climate Change Profile, West African Sahel (2018). Bangladeh Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018

CNN Turk, (2021). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tUnIxv4G_4U

CNN TÜRK, 2021. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: "Fransa, Afrika'yı bir sömürge kıtası olarak kullanmış" Angola'da konuştu. 18 oct. 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tUnIxv4G_4U&ab_channel=CNNT%C3%9CRK

Cold-Ravnkilde, M. (2018). "International support of the G5 Sahel joint force: A fragile military response". Danish Institute for International Studies

Dahir, A. (2012). "The Turkey-Africa Bromance: Key Drivers, Agency, and Prospects," Insight Turkey, December 2021, Vol. 23/ No.4/ pp.27-38

Daily Sabah, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-supports-malis-stability-prosperity-erdogan-says

Debet, (2021) Jeune Afrique, (2021). Economie, Cote D'Ivoire, Burkina, Rwanda: quand la Turquie accelere en Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1262938/economie/cote-divoire-burkina-rwanda-quand-la-turquie-accelere-en-afrique/

Diabouga, Y.P. and Bazongo, B.D, (2014). Le financement de l'education au Burkina Faso: Le défi de la scolarisation primaire universelle; Revue international d'education de Sevres. 65/ Avril 2014

Davutoğlu, A. (2012). Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring. International Policy and Leadership Institute. 2012- Third Edition, pp1-9

DEIK, (2022). Foreign Economic Relations Board. https://www.deik.org.tr/

Direction General du Tresor Français https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Pays/BF/relations-bilaterales

Dodo, M. (2016). "Understanding new Turkey-Africa relations: Rationale and Challenges", Journal of Alternative perspectives in the social sciences (2016 volume 7 No 4,612-642)

Donelli, F. (2019). Persuading through Culture, Values, and Ideas: The case of Turkey's cultural diplomacy. Insight Turkey, Vol. 21, No. 3, Turkey in changing world: responses to domestic and regional dynamics (summer 2019), pp. 133-134

FIDA, (2020). Inverstir dans les populations rurales. https://www.ifad.org/fr/web/operations/w/pays/mauritania

Freedom House annual report, https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores

Fradkin, H., and Libby, L. (2013). "Erdoğan's grand vision: Rise and Decline: Rise and Decline", World Affairs, March / April 2013, Vol. 175, No. 6 (March / April 2013), pp. 41-50

Gadiaga, K. (2016). L'Economiste Dufaso, 2016. Echange commerciaux: La france premier fournisseur du Burkina. https://www.leconomistedufaso.bf/2016/04/25/echanges-commerciaux-la-france-premier-fournisseur-du-burkina/

Gilley, B. (2015). "Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism", Perceptions, spring 2015, Volume XX, Number 1, pp. 37-58

Giovetti, O. (2022). How does education affect poverty? It can help end it. https://www.concernusa.org/story/how-does-education-affect-poverty/

Grigoriadis, I.N., and Fusiek, A.D. (2022). "Turkey's "anti-colonial" pivot to Mali: French-Turkish competition and the role of the European Union in the Sahel", Turkey program

Hagberg, S., Kibora, O. L., Barry, S., Cissao, Y., Gnessi, S., Kaboré, A., Kone, B. and Zongo, M. (2019). "Sécurité par le bas; Perceptions et perspectives citoyennes des defis de securite au Burkina Faso", UPppsala papers in African Studies

Hamme, V. G. and Pion, G. (2012). "The relevance of the world-system approach in the era of globalization of economic flows and networks", Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography, March 2012, Vol. 94, No.1 (March 2012), pp. 65-82

Harte, J. (2012/2013). “Turkey Shocks Africa”. World Policy Journal, Winter 2012/2013, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Winter 2012/2013), pp.27-38

Haşimi, C. (2014). “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 16/ No. 1/ 2014, pp. 127-145

Heraclides, A., and Dialla, A. (2015). “International law and humanitarian intervention”, Humanitarian Intervention in the long Nineteenth century.

Hudson, V.M. (2008). “The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis. Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases, 11-29

Inayat, A., Shahbaz, M.H., Afzal, U., Zafar, F. (2017). “Flow of development in the World trade by core countries to semi and periphery countries”, International Journal of Economics & Management Sciences. Volume 6. Issue 3

International Crisis Group, (2017). “What is the G5? Finding the right role for the g5 Sahel joint force”. Africa report N°258, 12 December 2017

Jabbour, J. (2021), France vs. Turkey in the EastMed: A geopolitical rivalry between a “Keeper” of the Older Order and a challenging emergent power. Centre for Applied Turkey Studies. 06, May 2021.

Joffe, E.G.H. (1982), “The International Consequences of the Civil War in Chad”, Review of African Political Economy, No.25 (Sep. – Dec. 1982), pp. 91-104

Kaboré, M. (2013), Inadaptation scolaire et problème d’emploi au Burkina Faso: Vol. 29, n°2 – Juillet- Décembre 2013, Science et technique, Lettres, Sciences sociales et humaines

Kavak and Aktas, 2021, Anadolu Ajansı https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/3-ortaklik-zirvesiyle-afrikayla-iliskilerin-yeni-bir-boyuta-tasinmasi-hedefleniyor/2448773

Keyman, E. F. (2017). “A new Turkish foreign policy: Towards proactive “Morale Realism”. Insight Turkey, Vol. 19/ No.1/ 2017, pp. 55-69

Kwasi, S. Cilliers, J. Donnenfeld, Z. Welborn, L. Maiga, I. (2019). Prospects for the G5 Sahel countries to 2040. West African Report/ November 2019

L'economiste du Faso, 2016: https://www.leconomistedufaso.bf/2016/04/25/echanges-commerciaux-la-france-premier-fournisseur-du-burkina/

La Tribune Afrique February 17th, 2021

Lebovich, A. (2018). Halting Ambition: EU Migration and the security policy in the Sahel. European Council on Foreign Relations (2018)

Lecoq, B. and Klute, G. (2013), "Tuareg separatism in Mali", International Journal, September 2013, Vol. 68, No. 3 (September 2013), pp. 424-434

Le Faso.net, 2021: https://lefaso.net/spip.php?article104803

Le faso.net, (2021). Rapport d'enquete sur le "Devenir des etudiants burkinabé diplome en France. 29. Mai. 2021. https://lefaso.net/spip.php?article104803

Maarif Foundation, (2022). https://turkiyemaarif.org/

Maarif Foundation Catalog: https://turkiyemaarif.org/uploads/TanitimKataloguEN.pdf

Malijet, (2022). Hopital Militaire du Mali : Le Ministre de la Defense S'imprégne de l'etat d'avancement des travaux. 12. Mai. 2022. https://malijet.com/la_societe_malienne_aujourdhui/actualite_de_la_nation_malienne/269385-h%C3%B4pital-militaire-du-mali-le-ministre-de-la-d%C3%A9fense-s%E2%80%99impr%C3%A8gne-d.html

Marchal, R. (2013). Military (mis)adventures in Mali, African Affairs, July 2013, Vol. 112, No. 448 (July 2013), pp. 486-497

Mbabia, O. (2011). "Ankara en Afrique": Stratégies d'expansion, "Outre-terre" (March 2011) N°29. pp. 117-119

Ministere de l'Agriculture et de la Souveraineté Alimentaire (France), (2022). https://agriculture.gouv.fr/les-politiques-agricoles-travers-le-monde

Ministere de l'Economie de Finances et de la Souverainete Industriel et Numerique. Direction Generale du Tresor. https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Pays/BF/relations-bilaterales

Ongouya, J.F. (1980). "La presence militaire de la France en Afrique". Presence Africaine, 4e trimester 1980, nouvelle serie, No.116 (4e trimestre), pp. 43-63

OCHA, (2022). Office for Coordinationa of Humanitarian Affairs. https://data.humdata.org/organization/380d709f-ab7f-484d-b5a4-b3ddbd192b3a

Özcan, M. (2017). "Turkish policy under the AK Party", Insight Turkey, Vol. 19, No. 2, AK Party 15 years in power political, economic, and social transformation (spring 2017), pp. 9-20

Özkan, M. and Akgün, B. (2010). "Turkey's opening to Africa". The Journal of Modern African Studies, December 2010, Vol.48, No.4, pp.525-546

Özkan, M. (2014). "A Post-2014 Vision for Turkey-Africa Relations". Insight Turkey, Fall 2014, vol.16, No. 4, Turkey's guests' refugees and migrants Syrians, Russians, Afghans, Iranians, retirees (fall 2014), pp. 23-31

Özkan, M. (2010). "What drives Turkey's involvement in Africa?" Review of African political economy, December 2010, Vol. 37, No. 126 (December 2010), pp. 533-540

Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/speeches-statements/558/131135/transitional-president-mahamat-idriss-d-by-itno-of-chad-to-visit-turkey

Pole de Dakar, Institut international de planification de l'education: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000264605/PDF/264605fre.pdf.multi

Raineri, L. and Ross, A. (2017). The security-Migration-Development Nexus in the Sahel: A Reality Check. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) (2017)

Ramani, S. (2021). "Eye on Niamey: Middle East regional powers vie for influence in Niger" MEI@75, Peace. Prosperity. Partnership. https://www.mei.edu/publications/eye-niamey-middle-east-regional-powers-vie-influence-niger

Remarks by President Obama to the People of Africa, Mandela Hall, African Union Headquarters Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 28, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/28/remarks-president-obama-people-Africa

Remarks by the president to the Ghanaian Parliament, Accra International Conference Center, Accra, Ghana. July 11, 2009. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-ghanaian-parliament

Republic of Turkey Foreign Affairs; Turkish Representations, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-representations.en.mfa

Reyes, H. (2021). "Turkey to export unmanned mine clearing equipment to Burkina Faso", https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/07/30/turkey-minesweepers-burkina-faso/

Sahel activity report, (2021). file:///C:/Users/dell/Downloads/sahel-activity-report-2021%20(1).pdf

Sıradağ, A. (2018). Turkey-Africa alliance: Evolving patterns in security relations, African Security Review, December 2018

Schweller, R. L., (1994). "Bandwagoning for profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In". International Security, Vol. 19, No.1 (Summer, 1994), 72-107.

Smith, W., S. (2013). "France in Africa: A new chapter?" Current History, Vol. 112, No. 754, Africa (May 2013), pp. 163-168

Somda, E. (2019). Enjeux de Securité au Sahara-Sahel Insécurité au Sahara-Sahel: Enjeux politiques, economiques ou religieux? Faculté des sciences economiques, sociales, politiques et de communication, Université catholique de Louvain, 2019. Prom. Michel légeois.

Tanchum, M. (2021). "The New Humanitarianism Turkey's Maghreb-West Africa economic Architecture: Challenges and Opportunities for the European Union". Centre for applied Turkey Studies (CATS)/ WP NR. 03, June 2021

Tardy, T. (2014). "Hybrid peace operations: Rationale Challenges", Global governance, Jan- Mar. 2014, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan. Mar. 2014), pp. 95-118

Tertrais, B. (2014). "Uranium from Niger: A key resource of diminishing importance for France", Danish Institute for International Studies (2014)

Transparency International; corruption perceptions index, 2021 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021

TIKA, (2014). "Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency. Annual report, Department of strategy development

TIKA, (2018). “Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency. Annual report, Department of strategy development

TIKA, (2019). “Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency. Annual report, Department of strategy development”

Turkey Minister of Foreign Affairs, (2022). https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-niger.en.mfa

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, (2022). https://www.trade.gov.tr/

TV5MONDE, (2021). Presidentiel au Chad https://afrique.tv5monde.com/information/presidentielle-au-tchad-pourquoi-la-france-soutient-idriss-deby.

UN info August 28th, 2020. https://uninfo.org/location/52/unct-overview

UNICEF, (2022). https://www.unicef.org/mali/

Uslu, S. (2015). “Turkey’s Energy Diversification Strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa” Insight Turkey, spring 2015, Vol. 17, No.2, Turkey’s Energy Security. Turkish Stream, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, Eastmed, Caucasia (spring 2015), pp. 101-102

Van der Berg, W. and Meester, J. (2019). Turkey in the Horn of Africa: Between the Ankara Consensus and the Gulf Crisis. Clingendael Institute (2019), p.7

Vedie, H. (2020). L’or: L’actif refuge des temps difficiles. Policy Brief, Sepembre 2020, PB-20/77

Venkatachalam, M. (2019). “Turkey in Africa: Voyeurism, Neo-Ottomanism and Islamic Humanitarianism” ASC Working paper 145/2019

Walt, S.M. (1998). International Relations: One World, Many Theories. Foreign Policy, No.110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp/ 29-46

Walther, O. and Retaillé, D. (2010). Sahara or Sahel? The fuzzy geography of terrorism in West Africa. Working paper, No 2010-35 November 2010.

Waltz, N.K. (1967). International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power. Journal of International Affairs, 1967, Vol. 21, No.2 (1967), pp. 215-231

Waltz, K. (1979). “Theory of International Politics” University of California, Berkeley

World population review 2020, The Borgen Project Tag Archive for Poverty in Chad