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THE SOMALI CIVIL WAR: ROOT CAUSES

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ABSTRACT

Somalia, like many other African countries, has experienced a state of civil war which has brought to total state collapse and a deep-rooted conflict that fragmented the country deteriorated the physical security and caused institutional deformity. The anarchic condition resulted in the halting of the basic social services. It also led to a catastrophic condition such as famine and drought. As a result, Somalia became synonymous with failed state, terrorism, warlords, famine, tribal wars and even pirates. The thesis utilizes qualitative approach and undertakes of critical evaluation of the literature on Somalia's civil war to demonstrate the underlying causes of her and thereby to offer a strong explanation for its outbreak. It aims to investigate the role of the politicized clan identity, external linkages, deterioration of basic needs, and state's repressive role in the outbreak of the Somali civil war. The study showed that these causal factors are the necessary underlying causes, proven to be sufficient conditions for the civil war.

Keywords: The Somali civil war, Primordialist, Instrumentalist, PSC Theory.

ÖZET

Somali de, diđer birçok Afrika ülkesinde olduđu gibi, devleti parçalayan ve ülkeyi parçalayan, fiziksel güvenliđi bozmuş, kurumsal deformiteye yol açan köklü bir çatışmaya yol açan bir iç savaş yaşandı. Anarşik durum, eğitim, sađlık ve kamu güvenliđi gibi temel sosyal hizmetlerin durdurulmasıyla sonuçlandı. Ayrıca kıtlık ve kuraklık gibi bir felakete yol açtı. Sonuç olarak, Somali başarısız bir devlet, terörizm, savaş ağaları, açlık, kabile savaşları ve hatta korsanlarla eş anlamlı hale geldi. Tez, Somali'nin iç savaşının nedenlerini ortaya koymak ve böylelikle salgınının güçlü bir açıklamasını sunmak için literatürün eleştirel yaklaşımını ve eleştirel değerlendirmesini kullanmaktadır. Siyasallaşmış klan kimliğinin rolünü, temel ihtiyaçların kötüleşmesini, devletin baskıcı rolünü ve Somali iç savaşının patlak vermesinde uluslararası bağlantıların rolünü araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Araştırma ayrıca sivil savaşların altında yatan nedenleri de ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Somalili iç savaş, Primordialist, Enstrümantalist, PSC Teorisi.

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PSC	Protracted Social Conflict
UNDP	United Nation Developments Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UN	United Nation

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the central government in 1991 was the beginning of Somalia's protracted civil war. According to Elmi and Barise, the circumstance was more intensified by the huge displaced refugees escaping the civil war that had engulfed Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia. (Elmi and Barise 2006).

The twenty-one-year Somali story that started in 1969 with national elation and a sense of hope ended up with a nightmare. As the civil war in the capital city, deepened, the other parts of the country fell into hands of clan-based warlords. (Abdi Samatar 1997: P. 704). After the downfall of Siad Barre's dictatorial regime by various rebel groups led by clan-based warlords, as a consequence; Somalia entered years of endless civil war. (H. Y. Muhammed 2014; Abdullahi M. 2015; Barbora Rýdlová 2007: P. 63). Consequently, a massive humanitarian calamity broke out in Somalia caused thousands of civilian deaths and displacement. The international community reacted to this tragedy by organizing humanitarian aid followed by UN humanitarian intervention in late 1992. (H. Y. Muhammed 2014: P. 10).

A report by the United Nations Developments Programme describes Somalia's civil war as "the world's worst humanitarian disaster." During the course of such "humanitarian disaster" more than 1.4 innocent people, women and children displaced from their homes. Moreover, the 2011 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees confirms that the civil war along with famine and drought has caused widespread displacement of civilians. Accordingly, the civil war has caused 1.5 million of displaced people that are living as refugees inside the country and in neighbouring countries. (UNHCR 2011).

Following the 1969 bloodless military coup that brought military regime to power, and predominantly after the Ogaden War, Somalia suffered under a cruel dictatorial regime that supports animosity among Somali clan families and used army forces to put down popular protests. By 1991, when the military regime collapsed, the Somali people faced catastrophic conditions such as famine, drought and destructive civil war. (Ahmed

Samatar and Terrence Lyons 1995: P. 8). The nature of the Somali civil war changed over time. In late 1991, the civil war was mainly clan warfare between the Somali clan families in southern Somali land. According to Menkhous, by early 1992, the reasons behind Somalia's civil war led to a new phase, an exceedingly vicious one, in which Daarood and Hawiye clan engaged in deadly civil war. (Menkhous 2003).

The cold war had a negative influence on the genesis of Somalia's civil war. The ideological rivalry between Soviet Union and the US was one of the battlegrounds on which the Somalis adversaries sought to fight each other. These adversaries had a dynamic of their own. Russia and the US, both are said to have become involved in Somalia's civil war because of each other's opposite interests. (Guimarães, F. A. 2000: P. 11). The international influences will be discussed to demonstrate their role in Somalia's protracted war.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the two major super powers were seriously involved in supporting patrons in Africa, particularly in the Horn of African countries, notable Somalia and Ethiopia. In the process of pursuing what they considered their own geopolitical and economic interests, the superpowers contributed to hastening of a regional arms race. During this period, Soviet Union and the US jockeyed to check each other, while Somalia and Ethiopia was outwit one another. The result was the Ogaden War of 1977-1978. (Joseph K. Nkaisserry 1997: P. 3). Somalia's civil war is one of the armed conflicts that have engulfed to Africa in the early 1990s. Some scholars argue that, the civil war resulted from the legacy of the Ogaden War which ended in 1978.

Many scholars though that peace in a unipolar world would triumph after the end of the cold war in 1990s. Instead, several internal wars took places in third world countries. Various clan-based rebel organizations challenged states' monopoly over domestic security. Consequently, a number of states disintegrated and experienced years of protracted civil war. Many African countries such as Somalia, Congo, South Sudan and Liberia are examples of post-colonial countries that went through deep-rooted civil wars. Many scholars often described these wars as clan-based conflicts. (Elmi 2006: P. 1).

Following the outbreak of the civil war, Somalia fell into clan-based warlords competing with each other for state power and resources. Consequently, the civil war

has brought a total state collapse and deep-rooted conflict that fragmented the country; it deteriorated the physical security, caused institutional decay, and led to increased dependency. The anarchic condition resulted in the halting of the basic social services. It also led to a catastrophic condition such as famine and drought. As a result, Somalia became synonymous with failed state, terrorism, warlords, famine, tribal wars and even pirates.

Somalia's civil war is discussed in the work of Edward Azar where I borrowed three of his preconditions of protracted social conflict theory. These preconditions are the deprivation of basic needs, the state's repressive role, and international linkages. I added to a fourth factor which was regarded as the critical factor for Somalia's civil war. Azar's work examines the nature and implications of social conflicts, and other internal political transformations, which made them, in their very essence, global events. A theoretical approach to achieve the purpose of this thesis has been suggested by Edward Azar. He pointed out that "the nature of elements of protracted social conflict theory recognizes a set of conditions that are accountable for the transformation of non-conflictual into conflictual ones." (Azar 1990: P. 7).

This thesis has adopted this theoretical approach and sets out to systematically analyze the root factors that influenced the outbreak of Somalia's civil war after the collapse of the military regime. This is done by examining firstly the existing literature on the Somali civil war.

The history of post-colonial Somalia, particularly the post-1991 era, has been plagued by deep-rooted conflict. As a result, the country endures a profoundly confused one. The civil war did not quickly start with the collapse of the military regime, but it was noticeable in the most portions of the country for some time before the abandonment of the conventional institutions that had traditionally achieved solidity in the Somali pastoral life. According to Barbora Rydlova, the formation of the Somali state was on the wrong track since its independence in 1960. The outbreak of Somalia's civil war was, therefore, not remarkable. (Rýdlová 2007).

After more than two decades, security in the south of Somalia is still being challenged. Cessation of hostilities and peace-building efforts was necessary since the anarchy in 1991 has an intense impact on the peace of the country, and it also influenced the Horn

of Africa at large. Despite the fact that policymakers around the world realize the strategic significance of Somalia, they do not organize enough methods to achieve possible solutions and to end the protracted political violence as different global and regional actors have previously played a very unhelpful role in Somalia's deep-rooted civil unrest.

Literature on Somalia's civil war has attracted many scholars from different academic disciplines, including political science, economy, anthropology, sociology. Two schools of thought have emerged to find out the root causes of the civil war: Primordialists and Instrumentalists.

Somalia's civil war has multiple causal forces. As Elmi and Barise (2006) noted that the reasons behind Somalia's civil war are competition for resources, state's repressive role and colonial legacy. In the view of primordialists (traditionalists), the Somali civil war was a product of clan rivalry, age-old hatreds and clan differences. (I.M Lewis 1961; Samuel M. Makinda 1991; Kusow 1994). Another leading school of thought, the Instrumentalist, viewed Somalia's civil war as a result of the military regime's bad economic policy, competition for resources and state power, elite manipulation, and colonial legacy. (Abdi Samatar 1992; Abdi Dirshe; 2013; Osman A. A. 2007; Elmi and Barise 2006; Menkhous 2003; Mubarak 1996)).

It will be argued that most scholars of Somalia focused only on the genesis of the civil war but they overlooked the role played by the following major factors: Politicized clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and international linkages. However, this thesis will explain the root causes of the Somali civil war. It views Somalia's civil war as a deep-rooted civil war that resulted from a combination of four factors such as politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and international linkages.

The thesis will be divided into four chapters. The first chapter presents the research question, purpose statement, problem statement, scope and limitation, significance and methodology. The second chapter examines the literature on Somalia's civil war. With regard to the theoretical framework of the research study, the literature review will focus on two main explanations of Somalia's civil war to achieve the investigation with respect to the research question: What explain the root causes of Somalia's civil war?

The chapter three analyzes the Somali civil war through Edward Azar's theory of protracted social conflict. In this chapter, four variables were examined in the context of Edward Azar's theoretical framework on root causes for the Somali conflict, with particular emphasis on the outbreak of Somalia's civil war. The chapter will examine the role of politicization of clan identity, international linkages, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role which are considered as the explanatory aspects of the outbreak of the Somali civil. The chapter is also concentrates on the findings of the thesis. With the discussion section, the explanations of the Somali civil war will commence, and placing its focus on root causes. Its findings will be reflected the arguments of the scholarly articles, reports from international institutions and media press. The final part is the general conclusion of the study..

1.1 Research Question

This thesis focuses on understanding the underlying causes of Somalia's civil war. It has been twenty-seven years from now since the explosion of Somalia's civil war in 1991, the longest recorded in Africa's post-independence history. Moreover, it exploded into one of the worst political crisis in the African continent. The civil war in Somalia is not unique in the overall African situation. The whole of Africa is in fact yet torn apart by several examples of armed conflicts, which obstructed the progress of various African regimes. South Sudan, Somalia, Congo, Liberia, Nigeria are some cases of the political violence that badly affect Africa's peace and security.

Since the post-1991 era, there has been many violent conflicts mainly based on clan warfare led by local clan-based warlords ravaged the south and central part of Somalia. Some scholars of Somalia often described the civil war as a product of competition for power/resources, colonial legacy, ancient hatreds and clan rivalry among Somali clan families. In this thesis, I will attempt to answer this question: What explain the root causes of the civil war in Somalia? The research question will mainly focus on the role played by politicized clan identity, international linkages, deprivation of basic needs, and state's repressive role in case of Somalia's civil war.

1.2 Purpose Statement

The main aim of this research study are to explain the underlying causes of Somalia's civil war and to apply the basic concepts from the Edward Azar's theory of Protracted Social Conflict to the Somali civil war.

1.3 Problem Statement

Majority of the literature explains the civil war in Somalia give clan rivalry and genealogical divisions among Somali clan families priority. Specifically, the literature focuses on ancient hatreds, clan rivalry and clan differences among Somali clans as the major causal factors. (I. M. Lewis 1961; Samuel M. Makinda 1991; Kusow 1994). Many scholars of Somalia have questioned the validity of such claims. (Abdi Samatar 1992; Ahmed Samatar; 1988; Abdi Dirshe; 2013; Ssereo 2003; Ingririis 2016; Kapteijns 2004; Osman A. A. 2007; Elmi and Barise 2006; Menkhous 2003).

Although much has been written on the genesis of Somalia's civil war, the politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages remain understudies. Moreover, since the civil war broke out in 1991, there have been many scholarly explanations offered by different scholars to explain the civil war, however, neither of these explanations has an explanatory power.

The study intends to fill the gap in literature on Somalia's civil war by examining the role of politicized clan identity, international linkages, deprivation of basic needs and state's repressive role. It urges us to adopt fresh perspectives by presenting an alternative explanation.

1.4 Scope and Limitation

The aim of the study is to explain root causes of Somalia's civil war. It will focus on the period between 1991 and 2006. The reason for limiting the study to this period is basically due to limitations in the available literature. The period allows us to understand general patterns relating to the political, social and cultural dimension of the Somali civil war. In the period indicated above, there are many studies; however this thesis will be limited to those related to Somalia's civil war.

1.5 Significance of the Study

I think this research study is significant in terms of generating a new debate for contemporary Somali studies. The theoretical contribution such as the academic support of Edward Azar's theoretical model used to analyze the civil war in Somalia will contribute theoretically to the existing literature on Somalia's civil war.

Furthermore, the study is necessary for the following reasons. It will offer an alternative explanation to the Somali civil war. Secondly, the method and the technique of collecting information used in this thesis will function as an important base for future research in this area.

1.6 Methodology

By applying the basic concepts from the Edward Azar's theory of Protracted Social Conflict to Somalia's protracted civil war using mainly secondary resources. The secondary information is preferred because it saves travel and time costs.

The type of methodology that will be used is qualitative approach. I will examine the role of politicized clan identity, international linkages, deprivation of basic needs, and state's repressive role in the case of Somalia's civil war through critical evaluation in the available literature.

1.6.1 Research Strategy

Case Study Research is deployed to obtain information from multiple sources. According to Borrow's Bromley's definition "Case Study is a systematic inquiry into an event or a set of related events which aims to describe and explain the phenomenon of interest." (Bromley 1990: P. 302). In addition, case study is about examining the phenomenon within its context. As Robert K. Yin (1984: P. 23) defined it "An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources are used."

The study explores additional sources of information on online media like websites and newspapers focusing on topics like armed conflicts in Africa, particularly in Somalia. The data used in the study is obtained from authorized databases. Thus, the thesis offers an unbiased explanation of the civil war in Somalia. Furthermore, within the range of

the research strategy, the thesis will critically evaluate the available literature. Somalia's civil war is selected as a case study for number of reasons. First its underlying causes are unclear and need to be addressed. Moreover, it remains under-researched in literature. Secondly, the civil war in Somalia did not get much attention in comparison to other civil wars in the African continent.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 Literature Review

This chapter reviews the available literature on the protracted civil war in Somalia. Somalia's civil war was an integral part of the political catastrophes that engulfed Africa in the early 1990s. After the end of the cold war in early 1990s, we have seen the outpouring of a new conflict in Africa, tied to ethnicity or tribalism. This new phenomenon occurs within the borders of states as opposed to between states. One of the unique characteristics of the new phenomenon is that it tends to have a strong underlying component of clan identity.

Many scholars have been interested in understanding and explaining this new phenomenon. Kaldor (1999: P. 1) described it as a "new war," and noted that "During the 1980s and 1990s, a new type of organized violence has developed especially in Africa...which is one aspect of the current globalized era. I describe this type of violence as a new war." Furthermore, she insisted that the new war was resulted from "intensification of global interconnectedness." Accordingly, the new wars have to be understood in the context of globalization. (Kaldor 1999: P. 3). However, it is not a "new war" but it has long existed and dominated in the domestic arena, and one might argue that it has come to replace interstate as a primary source of international conflicts in the modern era.

This phenomenon of new war does not exist in a continental vacuum; mostly it was hosted by the African countries. As Elbadaw and Sambanis (2000: P. 1) observed: "Over the last 40 years nearly 20 African countries or about 40% of Sub Sahara Africa have experienced at least one period of civil war." Since the end of the cold war in early 1990s, the continent has been characterized by a number of ongoing armed conflicts tied to ethnicity like the one in Somalia, South Sudan and many more. These civil wars were very immediate, divisive and destructive for civilians.

They are widely seen as a product of ethnic diversity and ancient hatreds (Weir 2012), security dilemma (Posen 1993), inadequate state authority (Ayoob 1996), creed or economic opportunities (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier 1999), inequality (Curr

1993), grievance (Ellibsen 2000; Azar 1990), failed political institutions and poverty (Sambani and Elbadawi 2000), fear of dominance (Glazer 1986), elite manipulation (Abdi Samatar 1997; Chandra 2004). The African continent has been a victim of political catastrophes, ethnic violence and experienced more than its fair share. If we look at the size of its population, it is over one billion out of the roughly seven billion people on the planet.


The next sub-sections discuss two most influential schools of thought that have dominated the literature of Africa's civil wars, namely the primordialism and the instrumentalism.

2.1 Primordialism

The Primordial tribal explanation of Africa's armed conflicts is based on genealogical divisions and ancient hatreds (Weir, 2012). These hatreds were old and deeply historical rooted (Esteban et al. 2012). Accordingly, ethnicity is the primary cause of African's armed conflicts. So the conflict in Central Republic of Africa is defined in terms of religion; the black and white conflict in America is racial, not religious and even not linguistic; the mass violence in South Sudan is tied to clanism neither religion nor race. Thus, all of these are examples of intensity of passion and violence derived by old-aged hatreds. However, this explanation has its critics.

Abdi Samatar (1997: P. 687) argues armed conflicts in Africa are the result rather than the responsible forces of social turmoil in the continent. Likewise, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000: P. 1) claims that "the relatively higher prevalence of war in Africa is not due to the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of its countries, but rather to higher levels of poverty, failed political institutions, and economic dependence on natural resources." Furthermore, they empirically examine whether there is a correlation between ethnicity and the occurrence of civil wars in thirty two African countries (see figure 1). Accordingly, came out with conclusion that was totally against the premises of primordialism in explaining Africa's civil wars.

Figure 1: The relationship between genealogical diversity and civil war



Source: Osman 2007: P. 118

If ancient hatreds and genealogical divisions are so deep-rooted, and the causal factors of Africa's civil wars, however, the critical question is why different tribes live in Somalia have violent conflicts but those in Tanzania and Botswana do not. Differently, if hatred among Somali clan families was so deeply rooted, why the different tribes in Botswana and Ghana have managed peace for the last three decades? It does not mean that the genealogical divisions in Tanzania, Botswana and Ghana love each other and those in Somalia hate each other. That is not the reality as there is always some antagonism, but these do not necessarily cause mass violence or civil wars.

Therefore, ethnic variables are significantly related to conflict as long as there are political or economical prizes at stake. Can we actually show using theoretical and econometric methods that ethnic differences and ancient hatreds cause violent conflicts in Africa? This is the critical question for the primordialists to think about analytically.

2.2 Instrumentalism

Instrumentalism is another leading school of thought, which focuses on the place of primordial identities in Africa's civil wars, in their associations with domestic political structures and the role of human agencies. While recognizing the existence of the so called primordial features such as clanism, ethnic culture and religion, instrumentalists

argue that these features on their own do not naturally result in mass violence. (Omeje 2015: P. 11).

Instrumentalist explanation of Africa's civil wars is heavily relying on elite manipulation and economic factors. (Collier 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). An instrumentalist follows a line of argument which suggests that the political elites mobilize the ethnic groups for their own political interests. In other words, ethnic-oriented political elites capitalize on the ethnic divisions for their private political gains.

According to this line of argument, innate variables like antagonism or ethnic identity is not the driver of Africa's civil wars but what drives armed conflicts in Africa is the political or economic use of these variables. In addition, Africa's civil wars occurred because the political elites use ethnicity as an instrumental means to achieve their political or economic interests. (Chandra 2004). Likewise, there is evidence suggesting ethnic identity becomes very dangerous only when these genealogical divisions become associated with grievance among ethnic groups living within a single political system. This can become particularly dangerous when one ethnic group that gains control of the state power is able to use the state power in order to advance their own position at the expense of marginalized other clan identity groups, this adds as one of the very strong motivates for Africa's conflict. (Glazer 1986).

One of the examples where we see these patterns of domination and discrimination leading to civil war is Somalia during the President Siad Barre's regime, where few clans ruled over all other clans. The political elites may find ethnicity or clan identity useful for political mobilization, however, the critical question is why do civilians respond to the elites? It is very difficult to find solid evidence showing the link between the political or economic factors and civil wars in Africa. The instrumentalist explanation has its own weakness.

Somalia's civil war has been explained by many scholars of Somalia through separate lenses of primordialism and instrumentalism. This chapter critically evaluates literature on Somalia's civil war, as well as presents further evidence in support of its new explanation about the underlying causes of the Somali civil war. The chapter recognizes two major schools of thought which have dominated literature on Somalia's civil war. These two theoretical approaches are summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1
Comparison of the Primordialist and Instrumentalist Explanation

Characteristics	Primordialism	Instrumentalism
Unit of Analysis	Clan Identity	Political elites
Motivation	Grievance	Greed
Historical Roots	Old	New
The Main Claims	Clan rivalry, ancient hatreds and clan differences are the causal forces of the Somali civil war.	Elite manipulation, bad economic policy adopted by the military regime in the 1980s, competition for resources, the Ethio-Somali war and colonial legacy, state building and modernization process are the root factors of the Somali civil war.

NOTE: Table 1 summarizes two main theoretical approaches to explain the Somali civil war, 1991-2006.

2.3 The Somali Civil War and Explanations in literature

Somalia, like many other African countries, has experienced civil war in the early 1990s. In recent years there is a wide range of studies existed from as far back as the 1980s and these studies offered explanations that attempted to help us to understanding the reasons behind Somalia's prolonged civil war. According to Kapteijns, these explanations can be categorized into three inter-relating factories: from political, economic and cultural. (Kapteijns 2008). Each of these explanations has its basic assumptions.

To understand the complexity of Somalia's civil war, however, one must put it in the context of historical analysis in order to get a clear snapshot of violent local actors in the civil war (see Table 2).

TABLE 2

Violent Local Actors	Description
Armed Factions	Post-1991 era, clan-based political organizations including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, the Somali National Movement, the United Somali Congress, and the Somali Patriotic Movement.
Subclan Militias	Clan-milias comprising pastoralists, warlord armed

	gangs, private security guards, armed youths, sharia court security forces.
Islamist Armed Groups	Islamist groups comprising Ras Kamboni Mujahidin, Jabhadda Islaamiga Soomaaliyeed, and the Khalid bin Walid group.

Source: Paul, C., Clarke, C., & Serena, C. 2014: P.157.

2.3.1 Primordialist Explanation of Civil War in Somalia

Primordialists argue that Somalia's civil war involved clanism and genealogical divisions among Somali clan families. Moreover, we heard from the media that there has been violent conflict in Somalia because clan X has clashed with clan Y. But the analytical question is why Somalia went into such destructive civil war? Some scholars of Somalia have argued that the answer has its root in the nature of Somali clanism. As I. M. Lewis (1961) argues, it is assumed that clan rivalries among Somali clan families will result in conflict, as Somalis are intrinsically clanistic, therefore act in a clanistic way. From this perspective, clanism has been long a social division generating resources competition and power within and between Somali clan families.

I. M. Lewis (1961) claims that clanism is a part of the organic defining feature of Somali society and the Somali people have been clanistic and organized in clan groups hostile to each other. Said Samatar and David Laitin (1987) have come out with similar argument and have supported Lewis's explanation about the correlation between the nature of the Somali* political life and the civil war in Somalia. However, the logic of this explanation is flawed and unable to offer a sufficient explanation of the Somali civil war.

Conversely, clanship can be both unifying and divisive at the same time depending on how we use it. When the colonial powers have used clanship as a wedge to divide communities, it became a catastrophe, but when Somalis used it in the old way of kinship and families that share a lot of things together, it brought the Somali clan families together. In a positive way, clan in Somalia is a wonderful form of insurance. For example, if someone from Somalia arrives in any country in Europe or Africa, he will find that his clan's brothers and sisters will look after him.

Although I. M. Lewis explained the Somali civil war through primordialist lens, but he failed to account the historic and linguistic differences among Somali clan families. As

Kusow (1994: P. 31) pointed out that most of scholars who are relying on only the primordialist explanation have failed to respect the differences among Somali people.

In contrast to I. M Lewis's claim of ancient hatred and clan rivalry among Somali clans as responsible factors for the Somali calamities, Kusow points that the historical differences among Somali clans and how they have manipulated their history are the underlying causes of the Somali civil war. As Kusow (1994: P. 42) argues that "the civil war in Somalia is a direct result of both the long-suppressed historical, cultural, and ecological differences among the Somali clan families and how they have used history."

However, these explanations offered by Kusow and Lewis are weak because the clan differences and ancient hatreds or clan rivalry themselves do not reflect the cause of serious conflicts in African in general and in specific to Somalia. In other words, the cause is not the clan identity or difference itself but it is the way that clan-oriented political elites politicize these factors for the sake of their political gains, so the conflict arises not from the clan differences or ancient antagonism but from politicization of clan identity instrumentalized for somebody's agenda by political elites. In this context, Somalia's civil war was a response to politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages.

Having many clan groups living together within a state does not necessary mean that there must be a civil war, though some researches has suggested that in some cases makes political violence more likely, particularly if there antagonistic social relations between different clans that might led hostility. This thesis argues that the involvement of clan-oriented political elites who try to use clan identity or ethnicity as an instrumental means to mobilize in order to solidify their own positions of state power.

2.3.2 The Clan Factor in Somalia

Clan factor in Somalia has performed a powerful part in socio-political interactions and it has played both as a social adherence and a cause of tribal war. (Ssereo 2003). For a long time, Somalis have subjected each other using clanism as the basis for advancing their interest in their political system. Every Somali relates to a particular tribe, clan, sub-clan and household or family. In this context, the clan factor can be a driving force and at the same time is a uniting force. (Osman 2007).

Moreover, each clan is responsible for its members and, therefore, the action of members will have an influence on the entire clan. Relating to a clan provides security, access to water, land, and political power, as well as conflict resolution through traditional customary law. Stig Hansen (2003) notes that the clan groups in Somalia function as a support system for members, for instance, members rely on the clan for basic needs such as food security during famine. In addition, Catherine Besteman points out that clan membership in Somalia gives you a status within the people. (Besteman, Catherine 1993: P. 567).

The Somali people share one language, religion and common fate, which put together one ethnic identity who resides in a large area in East Africa. According to Abdullahi, the bulk of Somalis belong to four main tribes, namely Hawiye, Daarood, Dir and Rahanweyn. They are agriculturists and pastoralists, the latter move regularly during the year in search of grazing land and water. (Abdullahi 2015: P. 2).

There are two major theoretical explanations of the concept of clan identity in the Somali context, both of which will be explored in the following lines: The first explanation emphasizes clanship as the necessary social foundation and the main and enduring laws of the socio-political connections of the society. From this perspective, the clan factor has always acts as the central determinant. Professor I. M. Lewis introduced this predominates explanation in the late 1950s, as he renewed the structural functionalist approaches to social anthropology (Lewis 1961). As his approach seemed to have chiefly endured in Somali studies, where Professor I. M. Lewis fifty years later is still holding it. (Kapteijns 2004).

The second explanation believes that the I. M. Lewis's approach exaggerates the importance of clanship and it emerged in a very detailed historical context, particularly, that of the late-colonial consensus between Colonial rulers and Somali subjects documented by Professor I. M. Lewis himself during his 1955–57 research. Accordingly, clan factor in Somalia is not a fundamental and constant behavioral postulate of the Somali political life but it is a central principle of a very influential way of thinking about Somalis socio-political life. Furthermore, it is a way of thinking with a singular history in the present. (Kapteijns 2004).

Most of literature reviewed for this thesis recognizes that these major clan families indicated above, who are believed to be family of Samali. However, this thesis argues that clans are not part of the problem, however when it gets politicized by clan-oriented political elites cultivates negative competition for economic resources, zero-sum attitude, security dilemma and clan based civil strife become evident as we see in the Somali case.

In the past, clan identity has played a unifying role in Somali society. It was a source of solidarity among tribesmen, creating a system of mutual assistance for the solution of daily problems among a clan's members. Each clan had its respected leaders and elders, who enjoyed their clan member's trust and were vested with the authority to resolve disputes. The elders were also the representative of the clan in any dialogue with other clan leaders, and in case of inter-clan conflicts. The clan in Somalia's context was recognition of a person's identity and his genealogical lineage.

After the end of the war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1978, President Siad Barre has used tribalistic policy against other clans to maintain his power. This policy split his enemies and logically intensified general awareness of clan membership. According to Barbora Rydlova, the president motivated clan warfare in a number of ways: He organized and encourage Somali armed forces to wage war against any opposing clan organizations. (Barbora Rýdlová 2007: P. 46).

2.3.3 Instrumentalist Explanation of Civil War in Somalia

Somalia's the civil war has not resulted from genealogical divisions and ancient hatreds and clan rivalry among Somali clans, but these variables have been manipulated by clan-oriented politicians to attain state power. Abdi Samatar and Ahmed Samatar are some of the leading scholars of Somalia, and both refused Lewis's explanation of the Somali civil war. That, instead, looked at the civil war through instrumentalist lens.

Ahmed Samatar published several studies about the Somali civil war. Ahmed argued that, I. M. Lewis confused clanship relations with clannishness. (Ahmed Samatar 1988). Following Somalia's civil war, there have been many published books and articles which attempted to explain the reasons behind the civil war. The book by Ahmed Samatar and Terrence Lyons (1995: P. 100-104) argued that the underlying factors

which are responsible for the Somali civil war are “the disintegration of political institutions and the resulting chaos and insecurity.”

According to Abdi Samatar, the argument primordialist explanation leads to the conclusion that Somalia’s civil war is the nature of its culture, threaded in the clan system. Moreover, in the view of Abdi Samatar (1992: P. 629), the primordialist approach has four major failings: 1. it confuses kinship with clanism. 2. It accepts the ideology of clanism as reality. 3. It gives excessive weight to the causal power of clanism. 4. It treads clan as a static phenomenon. Menkhous (2003: P. 406) came out with similar summery, noted that:

The conventional wisdom on Somalia’s crisis offers several explanations. They include charges 1. Somali leaders have been irresponsible and myopic in their quest for power and their stubborn refusal to compromise; 2 collective fear of the re-emergence of a predatory state undermines public support for peace-building; 3 the powerful centrifugal forces of Somali clannismen works against centralised authority, making quests to rebuild a Western-style sate a fool’s errand; neighbouring states such as Ethiopia conspire to perpetuate [the civil war] in Somalia for their own reasons; 4 external diplomacy has been consistently misinformed and incompetent in its mediation efforts.

The civil war in Somalia was widely seen as a result of elite manipulation. As Abdi Samatar (1997: P. 688) argues, “the central actors responsible for the destruction of the Somali world order are the dominant elites.” Accordingly, these dominant elites have been using clannishness as a tool of exploitation to advance their political interests.

Abdi Samatar blames the state elites for the destruction of the Somali world order for two reasons: First, the ruled elites have never tried to rationalize the public sector management through what he called “the reinvention of the civil service commission.” Secondly, President Siad Barre, who was the leader of the ruled elites, was the only decision maker of all vital decisions in the public management. Furthermore, Abdi Samatar (1997: P. 705) argued that “...The civil war in Somalia is not resulted from the genealogical divisions among Somali clan families.” Similarly, Menkhaus (2003: P. 414) blamed on the Somali politicians and warlords for the civil war.

Accordingly, these key players are warlords, businessmen, politicians or what he called “white colors.” In addition, these elites or key players had power to obstacle any local efforts to impose rule of law and revival of the central state collapse. They were able to do through what Menkhuas has termed a “clever manipulation of clannism.” However,

this explanation failed to give much attention the role played by the following factors: Politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages.

By contrast, some scholars of Somalia have explained the Somali civil war in terms of inequality and economic factors. According to these scholars, the Somali civil war was a product of three interrelated problems: availability of weapons, struggle for resources/power and bad economic policy. (Elmi and Barise 2006; Mubarak 1996). It was also been viewed that, these explanatory aspects are the product of the colonial legacy. However, the analytic question is how did the weapons become available to the public? According to Osman (2007), weapons became available because when the Ogaden war has ended, the country's economy begun to deteriorate; as a result of this, the weapons became more accessible to the general public. However, this explanation fails explain why the civil war broke out.

Elmi and Barise (2006) argue that the destruction for Somali world order is resulted from resource competition or state power, the long-term brutality of the Siad Barre's military regime and the colonial legacy. Accordingly, the most important motivational factor which explains the Somali conflict is the competition for resources. This argument is often referred to the Somali's pastoral life; the nomadic clans always fight each other over the struggle of grazing, water and livestock long time before the country got independence. Conflict among Somali clan families have been relatively peaceful until particularly notable in the pastoral life, where competition for graze and water has resulted in violence and antagonism. However, Elmi and Barise have failed to address why masses or ordinary people armed up against the regime.

Elmi and Barise, have also argued that state's repression is considered as the second causal force of the civil war. However, they failed to give a detailed description of how state's repression led to a civil war. According to the theory of state repression, state's existence depends on nations giving their legitimacy. Therefore, repression is one of the instrumental means that the regime used to protect itself from political challenges.

It should be noted that if one wants to understand the destruction of the Somali world order, one should explain it from the economic perspective rather than cultural and sociological. Mubarak (1996) argues the regime's financial strategy, its reactions to the

economic crisis in the late 1980s, has been harmful for the national development. As a result, the country's economy and the political condition have deteriorated which in turn led into civil war.

Similarly, in his study "*Empty Bowl: Agrarian Political Economy in Transition and the Crises of Accumulation*," Abdi Samatar is the merely scholar that wrote in detail, with the economic forces of the failure of the state under Siad Barre rule. His conclusion includes the under accumulation of capital as well as the predatory state that was kept in power as a result of international military and economic development aid. ((Kapteijns 2008: P. 28).

However, in the Somali context, one should not consider clan itself has any causal force and its effects on the Somalis political life because it is conditional rather than essential. As Abdi Samatar Abdi Samatar (1992: P. 631) argues the search for the responsible factors in the outbreak of Somalia's civil war have to embarked on by searching the nature of the changes that had happened in the Social order rather than genealogical orders of the population.

Despite all these economic factors indicated above, Osman and Mubarak failed to explain why the civil war in Somalia occurred in 1991, but not during the economic decline in the 1980s. The civil war in Somalia has multiple causal forces and it has been drawn from political science, economics, anthropology, theology and more. As Samuel M. Makinda (1991: P. 118) argued that:

"The civil war has stemmed from a combination of various factors, including clan rivalries and differences, nepotism, corruption in high places, the uneven distribution of national resources and, above all, President Barre's dictatorial rule."

Somalia has been a stadium of clan warfare and experienced a catastrophic condition which ultimately led into disastrous and anarchy. Abdi Dirshe (2013) claims the conflict in Somalia has primarily resulted from the "colonial institutional legacy" and the presence of "neoliberal economic agenda." However, this explanation fails to account the role played by other factors such as politicized clan identity, deterioration of basic needs, state's repressive role, and external linkages.

The state under Siad Barre rule was authoritarian, and during his reign it was characterized by politicized clanistic policy, and clan manipulation, causing deterioration of basic needs, and repression. Consequently, several clan rebel organizations armed up against this dictatorial regime. Thus, some scholars think that Somalia's civil war primarily resulted from Barre's dictatorial leadership. (Paul, C., Clarke, C., & Serena, C. 2014; Samuel M. Makinda 1991).

The Somali people were living under their own indigenous political system called Somali traditional system before the colonial powers came into Somali lands, and introduced modern political system. When the colonial powers came into Somali lands, they destroyed the traditional system and substituted it into the modern administration which was totally incompatible with the local cultural realities. This transformation has created a confusion and frustration among the Somali clan families. As a result, the country entered into a protracted civil war.

In addition, the civil war resulted from the intensification of a process which had started with the very beginning of Somalia's independence in 1960. As Ssereo (2003) argues that the Westphalia model of the state which Somali has adapted after independence, Somalia's civil war resulted from the beginning of the state building and Somalia's modernization process. Accordingly, if we want to understand Somalia's political crisis, we need to look back at the process of decolonization and the formation of the first and second republic of Somalia.

To sum up, this thesis argues the Somali civil war needs to be understood as mainly political. Therefore, the thesis does not stand on the position of the classical clan readings and instrumentalism, but stands on the middle. In other words, it will use some elements from the Primordialism and Instrumentalism to come up with a combined explanation of the Somali civil war.

Instead of siding with either of these two dominant schools of thought, the thesis argues that Somalia's civil war leading to combination of four factors: Politicization of clan identity, external linkages, deprivation of basic needs, and state's repressive role. The causal forces indicated above are summarized in the table 3. I argue that they not only caused Somalis against the Siad Barre regime but also Somalis against Somalis, which latter ended in protracted civil war.

TABLE 3

The Causal Forces of Somalia's Civil War

PRECONDITIONS	Problems Associated with Preconditions
Clan	Politicization
Human needs	Deprivation of basic need
State's role	Scales of political repressions
International linkages	Military aid

Many scholars of Somalia have been putting much effort on the explanation of the genesis of the civil war in Somalia; however, they overlooked these explanatory variables of the civil war. The following chapter will analyze the overlooked explanatory aspects of Somalia's civil war and aimed to fill the analytical gap by filling the missing literature on the Somali civil war.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 Theoretical Analysis

This chapter applies the basic concepts from the theory of protracted social conflict developed by Edward Azar to Somalia's civil war. The civil war can be explained by the help of what Edward Azar observed as "preconditions of protracted social conflict." According to Edward Azar's PSC theory, these preconditions are deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and international linkages. Thus, the main theoretical concepts used in this chapter will derive from the preconditions of protracted social conflict theory.

In his book, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, Edward Azar defines protracted social conflict as "prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation." (Azar 1990). It generally understands that, the hostile interaction between different clans which resulted from a deep seated ancient hatred that persisted over time with killing each other over water, land and grass.

The Protracted Social Conflict theory is selected because of its unique form of social conflict. It recognizes the fundamental responsible forces of the protracted civil war in Somalia. Moreover, Somalia's civil war is a good example to understand the nature of deep-rooted civil war in PSC theory. Put it another way, some variables in the Somali civil war are vital to understand the conceptual preconditions of protracted social conflict.

While there have been many efforts to develop theoretical explanations of the Somali civil war, no work has been done to explain it through PSC theory. Thus, the chapter strives to find out the self-explanatory forces of the Somali civil war, a better understanding of underlying causes of the civil war.

It must be noted that this chapter does not involve the reasons behind the longevity of the Somali conflict; rather it analyzes the outbreak of the Somali civil war. In doing so,

the thesis strives to answer one of the critical questions on the nature of Somalia's protracted civil war. The question is what explains the root causes of the Somali civil war? In answer to this question, the thesis adopts PSC theory which understands the genesis of the civil war in Somalia.

3.1 Deprivation of Basic Needs

PSC theory views deprivation of basic needs as a subjective characteristic that occurs when a [clan] does not receive what they think they have the right to receive. This leads to frustration that motivates political violence. This happened in the case of clan-based political organizations during the reign of the President Siad Barre; as a result, grieved clan rebel organizations with frustration over basic needs armed up against his dictatorial regime.

In early 1991, the military regime ended and Somalia entered into a protracted civil war. Some scholars argue that it has resulted from a combination of domestic and external factors. At the domestic level, many years of perpetual failure over basic needs directed to social unrest. Between 1980 and 1990, the underlying problems in Somalia were food shortage together with state's repression, lack of security and fair access to political and economic institutions. In short, it is the deprivation of people's needs.

According to Thomas and Mazrui (1992), people tend to arm up themselves when their needs such as security, food, shelter, recognition are not fulfilled by the regime. Such unfulfilled basic needs are experienced by Somalia in the late 1980s. In his memoir, *The Road to Zero*, Mohamed Osman Omar, who served under the regime in various ambassadorial posts, provided his reflections on the deprivation of basic needs in Somalia:

“While the masses were suffering greatly, the ruling elite and the members of the upper stratum of the population were leading an extravagant, luxurious life. They had everything in abundance. Water and diesel were scarce commodities for the common man but the tanks of the rich were always full. The women in high society competed with each other to acquire the newest model of car to add to the collection in their garages. Possession of a Landcruiser was a special status symbol for those families who were members of the ruling clan. It is well-known that ...Siad Barre played one clan against the other in order to rule over all.”

Regime's repression against its people disrupted food production and distribution. Between 1980s and 1989, food shortages appeared and local food prices doubled.

Moreover, late 1989, hundreds of Somalis were at risk for malnutrition and Starvation. By 1990s, the situation had become hopeless and Somalis were suffering.

It can be argued that the regime under President Siad Barre developed a state-centric security rather than a human centric-security policy and led the country into deprivation of human needs. Frustration over basic needs often breeds social unrest, this lead to a civil war. As Edward Azar (1990: P. 9) stated that grievances resulting from deprivation of basic needs are normally manifested collectively; neglecting to remedy these complaints by the regime breeds a cranny for armed conflict.

According to PSC theory, accesses to political and social institutions are the key determinant factor for satisfying a clan group's needs. Furthermore, it claims such dismissal raises greater adherence within victimized clan identity groups, and may work to support collective mass violence...if no other method of compensation is possible. (Azar 1990: P. 9-10). If these basic needs are denied by the state or by the ruling clan than collective grievances pave the way for another social conflict in the future. Consider the case of Somalia in early 1980s, the majority clans were dismissed entrance to political organizations on the basis of their clan identities.

Somalia was created out of the colonial nightmare. However in most cases the country is not positioned to supply for the basic needs. This is primarily what we have seen in Somalia before the civil war in 1991. Moreover, one of the reasons for the escalations of the armed clan-backed opposition groups against the military regime in post-ogaden war was frustration over basic needs coupled with insecurity and injustice. As Ssereo (2003: P. 28) noted that:

“Children could not go to school because education was not free; the sick could not be cared for sufficiently because there were no facilities; populations from famine affected areas could not be fed because there was not enough food in spite of the provisions made by International humanitarian [organizations]; ...social and political aspirations could not be achieved because the political framework was not democratic.”

President Siad Bare was an illegal dictator and his military forces committed atrocities in Somalia, they slaughtered hundreds of innocent people and as a consequence, the country's economy deteriorated and Somalis, particularly the young people suffered. As Samuel M. Makinda (1991: P. 118) noted that “[the civil war] has crippled the young and healthy persons and whereby refused the society some implied labor.”

3.2. State's Repressive Role

According to PSC theory, political authority is usually controlled by a hegemonic clan groups or a dominant clan. These hegemonic clan groups or dominant clan limited access to social institutions to other [clans]... created crisis of legitimacy. (Azar 1990: P. 10). Nevertheless, this variable is related to the role played by the state in the game of bad governance and repression. Edward Azar argues that "Most states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile and authoritarian government that fails to satisfy basic human needs." (Azar 1990: P. 11).

Between 1969 and 1990s, Somalia was ruled by an authoritarian government characterized by incompetent leadership, clanistic in nature and fragile. As the following statement by Ingiriis (2016: P. 2) indicated that:

"Siad Barre's seizure of power followed by an 'absolutist authoritarian rule'—led the unified Somali State—as we knew it—to a state of statelessness. ...The [regime] was preoccupied from the beginning with promulgating draconian legislations to impose new authoritarian rules and regulations."

The regime depended on intimidation rather than on reasonable debate between the different clans unearthed within society. In addition to repression, the Presidential armed guards of the regime continued to harass the people, indulging in criminal acts of robbery and killing of civilians. Mass violence gradually engulfed the entire country. (Ingiriis 2016).

President Siad Barre has established a governance system which was based on clan-patronage and connections. This system led to the spread of corruption and bribery in the public offices. As Ingiriis (2016) observed that through a combination of corrupt practices and exhortation, the only people who had big money in those days' turned out to be President Siad Barre's clan-oriented politicians.

Similarly, I M Lewis observed the repressive role of Siad Barre's regime, and its growing reliance on hard power rather than soft. In addition, all means of communications in the country were under President Siad Barre's clansmen. In this context, repressive and discrimination was institutionalized by the military regime. (Ingiriis, 2016). According to Elmi and Barise (2006), the state under President Siad

Barre rule used discriminate slaying, burning of settlements and cruelty an instrument of restriction. When the military regime took power in 1969, made the situation worse.

The discriminatory policy under Siad Barre rule against its citizens had been a constant prevalence since post-independence. In addition it expanded to clanistic state against the opposing clan from north. Additionally, distribution of development aid and state investment, the oppressed clans, particularly the Hawiye and Isaaq seemed forgotten. According to Barbora Rydlova, regime's spending on domestic development was lower than the one in the colonial times. In 1986s, when the regime's policies became clannish, the assaults were directed against both Hawiye and Isaaq clans. As the regime gave security essentially to the ruling clans, it was largely the opposing clans who were sufferers of Siad Barre exclusivist policy. (Barbora Rýdlová 2007: P. 47).

According to Elmi and Barise, the suppression by the regime was regarded as one of the major factors which explain Somali conflict. Accordingly, the regime used the national armed forces to suppress the members of opposing clans mainly reside in the east, when some military officers attempted to oust the government. According to Elmi and Barise, the regime was involved in the slaying of noncombatants and committed atrocities against its own people. (Elmi and Barise 2006: P. 35).

3.3. International Linkages

Edward Azar (1990: P. 11) stated that “The role of the state in preventing protracted social conflict by... satisfying basic needs is not determined solely by endogenous factors.” He added that the role play by the government is considerably determined by the linkage of the global actors. Economic and military relations of Somalia with international powers, namely Russia and United States of America, explained as one of the self-explanatory factors for the Somali civil war.

Russia sponsored economic and military aid to Somalia which in turn made the regime more dependent on external powers for survival. There is a Somali proverb which draws the Siad Barre regime’s linkage with external actors, “Either be a mountain or have a mountain to lean on.” Obviously, “Russia was the mountain for the regime to lean on for its survival.” (Ingiriis 2016: P. 169). When Siad Barre came to power in 1969 through military coup, he cut off political relations with USA, and took steps to

strengthen relations with Russia. Since the coup, there has been a patron-client relationship between Somalia and Russia. This relation deepened in late 1974, when the regime signed a treaty with Russia. As a result, Russia provided massive military aid to its new comrade Somalia. As Ingiriis (2016: P. 85) pointed out that:

The Soviet Union sent massive arsenal and hardware as military assistance to the military regime, providing 150 T-35 and 100 T-54 tanks, fitted with 105mm guns, 50 MiG 16 (later added MiG 16 and 21) fighter jets, 200 coastal batteries, Il-28 bombers, 300 armed carriers and SA-2 ground-to-air missiles. The military aid increased each subsequent year and cemented a strong client-patron relationship to such an extent that Somalia was supposed to be ever dependent on the Soviet Union for generations to come.

In the late 1980s, Somalia secured United State support. Hence, US gave substantial economic assistance but gave little military aid. Similarly, Italy, ex-colonial master was the merely European country that has typically secured strong relations with the regime. However, an important point of the international linkages in Somalia is when the relationship between Somalia and Russia became weak. As a result, the country was both economically and militarily ruined. Put it another way, there was a chance for clan rebellion movements to arms up against the regime. I. M. Lewis (1988: P. 260) observed that “Following the Ogaden war, as we have seen Somalia’s primarily arms dependence on [Russia] had been replaced by more generalised aid dependence on the United States, the EEC and OPEC countries.”

To sum up, the military regime weakened in the late 1980s, as the external linkage with Russia ended due to the diplomatic controversy. As a result, the regime was prone to a civil war. (Ingiriis 2016). The military aid mainly from the sources named has played a key role as self-explanatory aspects on the demise of the Siad Barre’s legitimacy rule. In addition, global political dynamics such as the cold war between USA and Russia had their influence on Somalia. (Barbora Rýdlová 2007: P. 78).

3.4 Politicized Clans in Communal Content

In his book, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, Edward Azar identified basic variables as preconditions for the protracted social conflict. This thesis considers the politicized clan identity in multi-communal society as the most critical factor in Africa’s civil wars. This supported Edward Azar’s assertion “If a

society characterized by multi-communal composition... conflicts is most likely to arise.” (Edward Azar 1990: 7).

According to PSC theory, the regime is normally controlled by a single clan which is unsympathetic to the needs of the other clans cultivates [clan-based civil war]. Accordingly, people in the multi-communal countries give primarily loyalty to their clan identities rather than to the whole nation living in the country.

Politicized clan group in the communal content is means “A generic reference” to politicized clan identity group whose members share common ancestor, religion, linguistic and other cultural features. However, the core problem comes when the relationship between the state and clan groups become distrustful, in other words, what Azar termed “the articulation between state and society as in one piece.” As Edward Azar (Azar 1990: 7) stated:

“Multi-communal societies are characterized by disarticulation between the state and society as a whole, with the state usually dominated by a single communal group or a coalition of a few communal groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other clan groups.”

Somalia has experienced twenty one-years history of dictatorial leadership, clan favoritism and clan dominance rule during the reign of President Siad Barre (1969-1990). It resulted from when Marehan (President Siad Barre’s clan) became the only clan that was able to steer the wheel of the state resources and power for their favour at the expense of other clan groups. (Ingiriis 2016). In addition, politicization of clan identity was fed into Said Barre’s regime politics and became even more dangerous. As a result, clan-based political affiliations along with politicized clan lines armed up against Siad Barre’s dictatorial regime.

The ruling clans, known by the code-name MOD (Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante) controlled the key executive positions and the security forces, which in turn cultivated anger and grievances among oppressed clans and have fuelled a clan warfare that was persisted until 2006.

Somalia is a country characterized by a multi-clan composition. The identity profile of the country is complex. According to data in the World FactBook, the main ethnic divisions are: “Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15% (including

30,000 Arabs).” (WorldFactbook 2018). The country also has genealogical divisions with a deep historical root that goes back pre-colonial era.

Pre-colonial Somali society was split into several self-governing clan communities that shared a common tradition. Nevertheless, this thesis recognizes that clan identity groups in the communal content are crucial factor shaping the Somali society, however, it argues that clan identity is not necessarily the cause of the Somali problem in general and particular in the outbreak of the Somali civil war.

3.5 A Discussion on the Causes of Somalia’s Civil War

The thesis argues that the deprivation of basic needs, state’s repressive role and international linkages, together with politicized clan identity have strong explanatory power and have performed well in the outbreak of Somalia’s civil war. This section will address the research question: What explain the root causes of Somalia’s civil war? The discussion will be reviewed in the light of literature review which was conducted in the period from 1991 to 2006. Moreover, the findings for this section reflect the arguments of the scholarly articles, reports from international institutions and media press.

Until 2006, there has been violent conflict mainly based on clan warfare ravaged the south and central part of Somalia. Several writers and some of the media reports often described it as a conflict over struggle and competition for resources. (Elmi and Barise 2006). Opposing the reports and scholar’s arguments, the thesis argues Somalia’s civil war which in turn became a protracted conflict, is caused when clanship or clan identity is politicized by clan-oriented political elites. Put it another way, when they put it in the context of the struggle over state power and resources it cultivates political violence.

Three main causal factors have been explained by most of scholars of Somalia as the underlying causes of the Somali civil war. These causal factors revolve around colonial legacy, ancient hatreds and clan rivalry, and economic factors. (H. Y. Muhammed 2014).

According to Elmi and Barise, the colonial legacy is one of the main responsible factors of Somalia's civil war. Colonial's scrambling of Somali inhabiting territories enduringly damaged the people. Hadwari, one of the most popular Somali poets, insists

convincingly in his poems that most of the colonial powers demolished Somalia's political system. (Elmi and Barise 2006: P. 36).

Accordingly, the most critical causal factor that has responsibly the civil war is struggling for resources. As the literature on Somalia's civil war points, clan groups in Somalia usually conflicted over grazing and water before the country got its independence. (Elmi and Barise 2006: P. 33).

Colonial legacy was a crucial factor in the civil war in Somalia. According to Abdi Dirshe, Somali conflict is resulted from the colonial legacy and neoliberal economic agenda. (Dirshe 2013). Somalia's civil war is linked to the colonialism. The colonial powers cut Somali lands into five portions. Italy obtained Italian Somaliland while British colonized two parts (The British Somaliland and Northeast Somali territory of Kenya), France colonized Djibouti and the Ogaden region was occupied by Ethiopia. (H. Y. Muhammed 2014).

Colonial legacy played a role of bolstering and formulating clan divisions in the society. Notably, Somali customary ways of governance were discontinued as a result of imposed illogical boundaries that were drawn along the interest of colonial powers with absolute disregard of conventional clan affinities. As a result, inherited political systems were perilously influenced by these difficulties. (Rýdlová 2007: P. 31).

According to Issa-Salwe , the colonial powers responsible for the disintegration of Somali political institutions and culture, through the selection of paid chiefs, the institutionalization of collective punishment, and the politicization of lineages in the new context of the colonial state. Moreover, the burden of nonviable and unreasonable boundaries was a time bomb for future civil wars. (Kapteijns 2008: P. 13). He blames the Siad Barre government for sowing the clan antagonism whose fruits are now being harvested by singling out one group after another for near-genocidal devastation, and presenting violent action by the state and servants of the regime as the work of particular clans against other clans. (Kapteijns 2008: P. 13).

After the cold war, clan politics grew as a symbol of socio-political cleavage in many countries in Africa. During the colonial era, clan conflicts among Somalis over scarce resource were at the level of sub clans, but in the post-1991 era, conflict among clans was at a national level mainly competition for state power. For example, Daarood clan

dominated the political institutions during the military rule through president Siad Barre until the civil war started in 1991. (Abdullahi M. 2015: P. 6).

In the view of Hashim, the primary causes of the civil war are the legacy of colonial rule; the inability to constitute a strong middle class to carry the state; group particularism and clanism; war; the transformation of the pastoral economy; Somalia's peripheralization in the world economy; dependence on foreign aid; and dictatorship. Moreover, it resulted from this long cumulative shattering process. (Kapteijns 2008: P. 15).

Somalia's civil war resulted from the legacy of a brutal in the 1980s, in which Somali armed forces executed several cruelties against certain clans, notable Isaaq, Majeerteen, and Hawiye. (Paul, C., Clarke, C., & Serena, C. 2014). The military regime helped clan resentment; as a result, the country saw an unparalleled break out of clan-warfare between Somali clans. Majority of the clan communities in the country were involved in the civil war. Consequently, we have seen a violent contestation for state power, the rise of clan rebel organizations which finally led to a protracted civil war.

On the other hand, the Somali civil war resulted from the economic crisis in the 1980s. As Mubarak (1996) came out with similar conclusion. He argues that the primary reasons behind the civil war in Somalia are inadequate economic policy and absence of sustainable growth. Somalia over the years had received military and economic aids from external linkages, most notable Russia and USA, which help the regime to survive more than two decades. For example, the military regime received over millions of dollars from the USA alone (Osman 2007).

Much studies show that the civil wars in many African countries are but primordial in nature. In conventional academic circles, Somalia's civil war is thought to be product of clan animosities. For example, when the civil war broke out in 1991, initial explanations rarely go beyond characterizations of clan rivalry and tribalism. (I. M. Lewis 1961). Over time, more historically based explanations emerged.

3.6 Politicization of Clan Identity

The misuse of clan identity by clan actors, be them political or religious leaders, reinforces the idea of clan differences to the point that it becomes conflict. Fenton speaks of “state-sponsored ethnicity” saying, “Once the state takes a hand in using ethnic categories to allocate resources, it both creates or confirms ethnic categories and makes ethnicity a politically instrumental principle.” He points out that “when it is mobilized, [clan] identity may be an apparently powerful source of action. This is because it can be, for the individual and the community, a totalizing identity: if people are concerned about their jobs, their neighbourhood, their education and that of their children, their legal status, their personal security, under the right circumstances ethnic identity may be incorporated in all of these.” (Paglia, P. 2006: P. 17).

In Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement, David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild claim, “Ethnic conflict is not caused directly by inter-group differences, ‘ancient hatreds’ and centuries-old feuds, or the stresses of modern life within a global economy. ... Rather, ethnic conflict is caused by collective fears of the future. ... [clan actors] and political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, reinforce these fears of physical insecurity and polarize the society.” John Mueller came out with similar conclusion, saying “this analysis of the experiences in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda suggests that ethnicity is important in ‘ethnic wars’ more as an ordering device than as an impelling force ... that the wars did not necessarily derive from the ethnic peculiarities of those regions ... Ethnicity proved essentially to be simply the characteristic around which the perpetrators and the politicians who recruited and encouraged them happened to array themselves. It was important as an ordering device or principle, not as a crucial motivating force.” (Paglia, P. 2006: P. 17).

This thesis argues that there are four major factors which are critical to the genesis of the Somali conflict in general, and particularly in the outbreak of Somalia’s protracted civil war. They are the politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state’s repressive role and International Linkages. This section examines how politicized clan identity was connected to Somalia's civil war. It discusses the theoretical concept of politicized clan identity. It will be stated that clan identity as a concept which indicates a various meaning from the knowledge of clan in a social world. On the other hand, the

term politicized which represents a critical role in the analysis of clan identity readings will review in association with the concept of clan identity in a multi-communal political environment.

When referring to the term clan identity, it can be on the personal level, group or nation. However, it is essential to understand this concept because it acts a highly significant part in this thesis. Spencer and Taylor (2004: P. 11) defined the concept of clan identity as “[clan] identity is a work in progress, a negotiated space between ourselves and others; constantly being re-appraised and very much linked to the circulation of cultural meanings in a society.” Likewise, Erikson T. (2002: P. 166) described it as:

“[Clan] identity becomes crucial important the moment it is perceived as being under threat. Since clan is an aspect of relationship, the importance of boundaries may thus be said to be conditional on the pressure exerted on them...expressions of clan identity also be regarded as symbolic tools in political struggle.”

In Somalia’s context, politicized clan identity plays a vital role. President Siad Barre himself contributed to the outbreak of Somalia’s civil war by politicizing clan identities to achieve his own political interests. The concept of politicized clan identity points the purpose of the maintaining of the state power as the clan-oriented politicians struggle to influence political decisions.

The politicization of clan identity together with deprivation of basic needs, state’s repressive role and external linkages reading takes us to the under-researched literature which was overlooked by scholars of Somalia. This subsection discuss how clan identity politicized in Somalia? At this point, it may be helpful not to confuse the term politicized clan identity with clan identity. Politicization of clan identity in this thesis means when clan-oriented political elites put clan identity in the context of struggle over resources and state power produces negative consequence, clan based civil strife.

Simon and Klandermans (2001: P. 327) defines politicization of clan identity as “the increasing awareness of shared complaints and a definite idea of who or what is accountable for those complaints show a distinct cognitive illustration of one’s worldview giving group members with a meaningful view on the social world and their position in it.” However, it would be difficult to discuss the concept of politicized clan identity without mentioning politics and state power. It may be because politicization of

clan identity rotates around the competition over state power/resources to advance one's own economic and political gains.

Joseph Rothschild (1981) defines politicization of clan identity as a method through which genealogical divisions are underlined and then misused by clan-oriented politicians in order to advance their interests. Thus, it is safe to argue that clan identity and politicization are so intertwined that whenever political violence occurs in a multi-communal society, both are often connected with power. According to Thomson (2010), clan identity as a mobilizing factor that can be used to mobilize identity groups in multi-communal contents. In other words, clan identity could be an instrumental tool enabling clan groups to aggregate their political demands.

Heur-Vogel (2000) presented an opposing view, stated that the genealogical differences among clan groups in multi-communal society itself are a critical factor because it cultivates clan based civil strife. Politicization of clan identity became harmful when people began using clan connections for political gains, in other words, for state power or public office. For example, after independence in 1960, Somali politicians used their clan identity in election campaigns and created artificial divisions among the population, threatened the national identity of *Somaliness*.

Politicization of clan identity became a source of corruption and also weakened the military regime's legitimacy and governance system in Somalia during the reign of Siad Barre's era. According to Ingiriis (2016: P. 167) "Siad Barre's reassertion of authority through clan politics contributed to the destruction of national unity and rule of law and paved the way for social injustice."

If one wants to understand why clan identity itself is not the reasons behind the Somali conflict in general, particularly Somalia's civil war, it is essential to clarify what clan identity is, to set the role of it with regard to the civil war. Clan identity is an identity shared by a group of people which claim to have a common ancestor or fate in terms of history. More precisely, it is a concept which revolves around who we are. According to Simon and Loewy (1998) describes it as a status in society. It is a status which is an expression of any places on community-related dimensions such as ethnicity. Moreover, sociologists tend to examine politicization of clan identity at the collective lever while psychologists considered it at a personal level.

Clan identity groups are critical to Somalia's politics. When these identity groups get politicized, this affects the governance, public administration and so on. It is as a social formation has been politically used by the Siad Barre regime (1969-1991). The consequence, Somalia went into civil war. Before the colonial powers, notable British and Italy came to Somali lands in late 1880s, clan identities in Somalia were changeable, shifting through intermarriages. Every clan in the country belonged to distinct tribal groups, thus while Somali clan identities breathed, these were subordinate to constant change over time. However, with the arrival of the colonial powers, notable British's "divide and rule" policy the Somali clan identities shifted frozen.

The colonial era from 1840 to 1960 set the justifications for the high level of politicization of clan identity and clan divisions in Somalia. For example, Italy and British used segregating administrative structures, which stressed local clan realities. Since then, clan identity became a highly politicized. According to Anke Weber, through this divide and rule policy, the Somali clan families became divided into separate clan groups, however, this encouraged high levels of clan identity consciousness. (Anke Weber et al 2016: P. 54).

The clan groups in Somalia then became the basis of the political parties for the parliamentary election in 1964, which indicated that from the very beginning of Somalia's political parties had a strongly clan awareness. As Ssereo (2003) notes that "the political system adopted by the Somali governments between 1960 and [1990s] was a clan-based parliamentary ...democratic system. This model of democracy was used to prevent civil war and to ensure political stability." In this way, the colonial administrations, namely Italy and British set the cornerstone for today's clan politics in Somalia.

Throughout the country's postcolonial history, the allocation of parliamentary seats was changed to go with the clan-oriented political leader's support base, since then remained a critical factor explaining the predominance of clan identity interests in Somalia's politics. After the successful military coup in 1969, President Siad Barre drastically reduced the number of other clans, notable Hawiye and Isaaq in his ministry and substituted them with members of his own clan. He intends to maintain his power by implementing a one-party state rather than multiparty system and by arresting anyone

who against his clan-patronage politics. By banning political oppositions, President Siad Barre secured his monopolistic power of the state. In the years that followed, he used his power on state resources to the great benefit of his own clan group. While the level of politicization of clan identity certainly varied throughout Somalia's post-independence history, with peaks was observed in particular before elections in 1964, since then the average level of politicization in Somalia remained high. At this point, the regime under Siad Barre rule had increased the level of politicization of clan identity and patronage politics.

The thesis argues that clan-oriented political elites under Siad Barre's rule played a decisive role in defining a threat in the politicized environment and frustrating conflict by blocking any possible solutions. These political elites used their clan identity as an instrumental means to stay in power. For example, President Siad Barre (1969-1990) particularly strengthened his own clan by giving the key political positions in the government, military and public services. The president sought his clan (Marehan) to protect his presidency against any clan opposition group. The consequence has that the country went into a destructive civil war, which later became a deep-rooted conflict.

According to Samuel M. Makinda (1991) there is evidence that members of the Siad Barre's military regime have been influenced by clan allegiances. The President himself has relied on his Marehan clan to maintain power. His most trusted ministers have been drawn from his clan.

It should be noted that other clans such as Hawiye had no real power to influence from 1967-1990. The marginalization of these clans led to similar grievances expressed by the Isaaq clan in 1980s. As Ingiriis (2016: P. 236) noted in his book, in the words of Hawiye elder:

“The D[a]arods were the privileged in Somalia since independence, but suddenly, after the downfall of Siad Barre regime in 1991 they lost almost everything they acquired, and they experienced in a short period of time hardship worse than what Hawiye experienced in thirty years.”

Somalia's post-colonial history has shown us that the protracted civil war has both confirmed the negative consequence of politicization of clan to achieve power.

However, the thesis argues that clan itself was not the prime reason for Somalia's civil war but it could be politicized for various reasons, mainly for state power in the case of Siad Barre's Marehan identity and its dominance rule in Somalia. As I. M. Lewis (1988: P. 256) observed "[The] expansion of Marehan power was particularly striking in the army, where by the middle of 1987 it was estimated that as much as half the national armed officers came from the president's clan." What president Siad Barre did was to take existing artificially clan differences and politicize them through injustice means and power politics approach. The consequence of this attitude was a catastrophic clan based civil strife. Ssereo (2003: P. 34) came out with similar observation, as he noted that:

"From 1979 president [Siad] Barre increased his allegiance to the Marehan clan as a political strategy to prevent a coup d'état. To ensure this policy he appointed individuals from [his] clan to important government posts. Several years later, in January 1991, the other clans mobilized against his government."

An important historical process that shaped the civil war is that of the clanization of political institutions under Siad Barre's regime. Closely related to this is the authoritative strand of clan punishment that was a fundamental feature of the regime's violent repression of political oppositions, as well as the increasing extent of the repression the state unleashed against its own people. ((Kapteijns 2004).

Although the state under Siad Barre rule tried to weaken the Somali clan identities solidarity among Somalis by establishing formal institutions during the first phase of his rule (Between 1969 and 1975), some clan identity-related aspects which are rooted in the legacy of the Somali traditional life were politicized by members of his regime. As a result, a grieved clan based rebel groups were armed up against his clan dominance rule. As Kusow (1994: 41) argued:

"The Darood clan has been dominated political power in the country since independence. That is also why Hawiye and Ree-win [clans] have deeply resented the Darood clan. It was mainly this deep resentment between the Hawiye and the Darood that has culminated into this savage civil war."

Abdulahi Osman (2007) came out with similar findings; he argued that "The [Somali] conflict was started by oppressed clans who used the existence of an inequality that favored certain clans to others." Some of these scholarly arguments justify drawly a

correlation between the politicization of clanship or clan identity factor and the Somali civil war.

The regime's exclusivist policy against certain clans (Isaaq, Majeerteen and Hawiye) cultivated grievance which in turn became the legitimate excuse of the clan based opposition organizations in the country. Amnesty International (1992) in its report stated "The worst atrocities were in Mudug region between 1978 and 1982 against the Majarten clan, and in Hargeisa and the northwest in 1988, when tens of thousands of Isaaq clan-members were massacred by government soldiers."

A study undertaken by African Watch also found that "between 50, 000 and 60,000 civilians mainly from northern clans were killed by the regime's army forces in 1988 and 1989." The regime's army forces had carried out "systematic extremely violent attack on the [certain clans.]" Most of them were tortured and detained because of their clan identity, and the report added as a consequence this treatment, grieved clan groups armed up against Siad Barre's dictatorial regime. This report provides convincing evidence of the causal relations between the politicization of the clan identity along with repression by the military regime and the eruption of Somalia's civil war.

According to Laitin and Said Samatar (1987), during the military regime era, inter-clan competition for state power and politicization of clanship is reported to be dangerous and likely more drastic than in any period of Somalia's post-colonial history. In his book, *Somalia: A Country Study*, Helen Chapin Metz noted that:

"The regime might have lingered indefinitely but for the wholesale disaffection engendered by the genocidal policies carried out against important lineages of Somali clanship groupings. These actions were waged first against the Majeerteen clan (of the Daarood clan-family), then against the Isaaq clans of the north, and finally against the Hawiye, who occupied the strategic central area of the country, which included the capital."

A report from Somalia by Jane Perlez of NY times also noted that:

"In his 80's and in feeble health, the President is said by American officials to have a weak grasp on power as he struggles to arrange a succession that will insure the perpetuation of his family and clan in power."

Based on the above findings, the Somali civil war was widely seen as a product of a social reaction to politicization of clan identity or clanship by the Siad Barre regime in response to a legitimate crisis. As Siad Barre's legitimacy lost, he began to rely on more support from his clanship associations. As the pursuit of this politicized and exclusivist

policy, the other oppressed clans began mobilizing war against his regime which latter ended in a negative consequence, in other words, a destructive civil war.

CONCLUSION

The thesis aimed to explain the reasons behind the eruption of Somalia's civil war. It analyzed the civil war with the help of protracted social conflict theory which understands the responsible factors for the destruction of Somali world order. The genesis of the civil war in Somalia was explored theoretically, based on a qualitative analysis and the literature review. The thesis argued that clan itself or genealogical divisions of the Somali clan families was not responsible for Somalia's civil war, it was the politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages.

Primordialists claimed that the Somali civil war was involved clan rivalry and genealogical divisions among Somali clan families. Instrumentalists, on the other hand, argued that the civil war in Somalia was not resulted from genealogical divisions and ancient hatred or clan rivalry among Somali clans, but these variables have been used by political elites to draw lines, to draw allegiance in order to create political power. However, this thesis argued that both explanations have failed to capture the role played by the politicized clan identity.

Having examined the role played by the politicized clan identity, showed that when clan identity get politicized or put it in the context of struggle over state power produces clan-based civil war or political violence. Moreover, based on the examining the politicization of clan identity in the Somali civil war, it was noticed that clan identity was used as an instrumental means to achieve political gains, particularly it used for political mobilization. Additionally, it was revealed that the state under Siad Barre rule is usually dominated by a single clan which is unresponsive to the needs of the other clan groups in the country, which later cultivated clan-based civil strife.

Based on these theoretical reviews, the thesis used the preconditions of the PSC theory as a theoretical means to identify root causes of Somalia's civil war. By the PSC theory: Deprivation of basic needs, external linkages, state's repressive role together with politicised clan identity suggested that they are the necessary underlying causes, proven to be sufficient conditions for the civil war.

Ultimately, the author of this thesis admits that this research study does not cover every issue and aspects of Somalia's civil war; however it suggests further field research on this topic from a broader perspective which investigates the role of politicized clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages on the Somali conflict in general. More importantly, further research would help to understand how politicization of clan identity along with deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages can explain both in Somalia's protracted conflict and other social conflicts in Africa.

APPENDIX 1: Cover Page

T.C.

ISTANBUL COMMERCE UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF AFRICAN STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE PROGRAMME

THE SOMALI CIVIL WAR: ROOT CAUSES

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ISTANBUL, July 2018

APPENDIX 3: Table of Contents

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TABLE 1

Comparison of the Primordialist and Instrumentalist Explanation

Characteristics	Primordialism	Instrumentalism
Unit of Analysis	Clan Identity	Political elites
Motivation	Grievance	Greed
Historical Roots	Old	New
The Main Claims	Clan rivalry, ancient hatreds and clan differences are the causal forces of the Somali civil war.	Elite manipulation, bad economic policy adopted by the military regime in the 1980s, competition for resources, the Ethio-Somali war and colonial legacy, state building and modernization process are the root factors of the Somali civil war.

APPENDIX 5: List of Tables

TABLE 2

Violent Local Actors	Description
Armed Factions	Post-1991 era, clan-based political organizations including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, the Somali National Movement, the United Somali Congress, and the Somali Patriotic Movement.
Subclan Militias	Clan-milias comprising pastoralists, warlord armed gangs, private security guards, armed youths, sharia court security forces.
Islamist Armed Groups	Islamist groups comprising Ras Kamboni Mujahidin, Jabhadda Islaamiga Soomaaliyeed, and the Khalid bin Walid group.

Source: Paul, C., Clarke, C., & Serena, C. 2014: P.157.

APPENDIX 6: List of Tables


TABLE 3

The Causal Forces of Somalia's Civil War

PRECONDITIONS	Problems Associated with Preconditions
Clan	Politicization
Human needs	Deprivation of basic need
State's role	Scales of political repressions
International linkages	Military aid

APPENDIX 7: List of Figures

Figure 1 the relationship between genealogical diversity and civil war



Source: Osman 2007: P. 118

APPENDIX 8: List of Abbreviations

LIST OF ABBRIVATIONS

PSC	Protracted Social Conflict
UNDP	United Nation Developments Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UN	United Nation

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